I do want to reply because I think my claims are reasonable.

The only actual cryptographic function for the schema is the secrets.randbelow(). Scrutinize this function if you don’t think it can achieve what I am claiming it can.

The randomize function takes each ID and assigns it a new integer. This is taking entropy at the OS level. There are no seed values used here. It’s never going to repeat in a billion years. Because there are 2million+ entries, the amount of possibilities are essentially limitless. You could stack 1 petabyte drives across our entire universe and still would not be able to capture every possible state.

This function is highly documented and (as far as I know) is the one of the best available CSPRNG you can actually utilize on a device.

Here is an example of the raw shuffle map that is generated.

Before the shuffle map is loaded, if you query your word, your going to get the raw unshuffled associated message ID.

Once a shuffle map is generated and loaded into the program the query is simply looking for the new CSPRNG assigned integer.

The shuffle map can now be considered the key. Because this is a pure lookup table, there is no algorithm to attack aside from guessing how my exact device generated the shuffle map in it’s exact moment of existence…that’s where the strength of this schema lies.

Thanks for the discourse I’ve enjoyed the pushback despite we can’t agree.

Edit*

Take a look at the new pack62 compression though!