This article critically examines the proposed use of the psychiatric distinction between delusions and extreme overvalued beliefs as a tool for distinguishing criminal insanity from (mere) violent extremism. The analysis contrasts this distinction with a wholly normative one that we designed to better fulfill the same purpose. This normative distinction, based on concepts from John Rawls’ political philosophy, highlights and depends upon a host of political considerations relevant to the ideals of the criminal justice system and the rights and freedoms (...) fundamental to the political systems in which it is situated. These considerations challenge the psychiatric distinction between delusions and extreme overvalued beliefs, suggesting that criminal responsibility cannot be adequately explained or justified by psychiatric factors alone. The article further explores the case of criminal accountability for psychopaths and concludes that neither the psychiatric diagnosis of psychopathy nor the empirical findings that one may lack the capacity for empathy is determinative in such cases. Evaluations of criminal responsibility involve a host of other moral and political considerations, and the weight one gives to those considerations ultimately provides the basis for a legitimate determination of responsibility within the criminal law. (shrink)

In this article I argue that the objections against hate crimes defined as separate offenses and in terms of group animus are misguided and are based upon a mistaken view of human action that does not see motives as constituent parts of complex actions. If we are going to have hate crimes legislation, there are no good formal reasons keeping us from having distinct offenses for hate crimes or from having ones defined in terms of group animus. My goal is (...) to clear up a number of action-theoretical confusions that have led some theorists and jurists to raise objections that draw attention away from the real crux of the debate over hate crime legislation. Initially, I defend several considerations that weigh against an understanding of hate crimes legislation as being concerned exclusively or even primarily with character, belief, or motive. These considerations in turn help undercut the related concern that hate crime legislation violates free speech protections. (shrink)

This essay offers a particular view of the distinction between criminal attempts and actions that could constitute “mere preparation” for the later commission of a crime, that prioritizes a proper balancing of public safety and the protection of individual liberty. Modeled after Hart's distinction between the general justifying aims and the principles of distribution of a system of punishment, this view allows a coherent way of distinguishing between attempts and mere preparation that avoids many difficulties associated with subjectivist and objectivist (...) approaches.**. (shrink)