El artículo estudia la teoría de la guerra justa, en san Agustín, considerándolo como el fundador de esta teoría, ya que fue el primero en articular los criterios perennes dentro del marco de "ethos" cristiano del amor e igualdad como seres humanos creados a imagen y semejanza del Creador. Trata también del influjo de Agustín en el desarrollo de esta teoría de la guerra justa.

An anthology of writings from Plato and Aristotle, including an introductory essay on the history of ancient Greek philosophy and Greek Glossary.

Antonello da Messina’s Annunciation with the Blessèd Virgin sola breaks with iconic convention, so inviting new interpretations of the theme. The Rome exhibition of 2006 allowed one to compare Antonello with van Eyck: Antonello seemed pre-modern. This review discusses three important essays on the Annunciation (see the last three keywords). All three perceptive essays raise theological and phenomenological issues directly related to the almost unique iconic representation which Antonello gives us.

Concerns about censorship have once again reached a fever pitch across the liberal West. In other historical periods, such concerns may have marked reactions to book bans and burnings. Often, they followed prosecutions and subsequent jailtime for things spoken or written. During the Red Scare, they were the hushed response to chilling state-sponsored watch-lists and employer-supported blacklists designed to ensure victory against communism. Against this history, complaints about the new censorship appear differently. With respect to the new censorship, there are (...) no books burnings, no prosecutions, no laws or committees. Indeed, there is no coercive state involvement at all. With a few notable exceptions, complaints about censorship in the 21st-century West are complaints about the behavior of private parties: social groups, employers, media conglomerates, social media platforms, and search engines. -/- To better understand the concerns surrounding nonstate interference with speech, Private Censorship offers an account of censorship, as well as an assessment of the ethical and political issues it raises across contexts. J.P. Messina asks and variously answers questions like: what should we think when employees get fired for things they say and how might patterns of such firings create a climate of fear inimical to free inquiry? When is it appropriate for social media firms to deplatform users, and what does it mean for our democracy that those in charge of such decisions are often wealthy Silicon Valley executives? Do search engines act as massive gatekeepers to information in troubling ways, and how might they be constrained, if they do? Along the way, Messina casts a critical eye on many popular proposals for responding to these complaints. Unlike these popular approaches, Private Censorship foregrounds the importance of rights to property, association, and free expression for thinking well about 21st-century censorship concerns. (shrink)

I elaborate and defend a "necessitarian" interpretation of Kant's account of laws.

In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant famously characterizes space as a unity, understood as an essentially singular whole. He further develops his account of the unity of space in the B-Deduction, where he relates the unity of space to the original synthetic unity of apperception, and draws an infamous distinction between form of intuition and formal intuition. Kant ’s cryptic remarks in this part of the Critique have given rise to two widespread and diametrically opposed readings, which I call the Synthesis (...) and Brute Given Readings. I argue for an entirely new reading, which I call the Part-Whole Reading, in part by considering the development of Kant ’s views on the unity of space from his earliest works up through crucial reflections written during the silent decade. (shrink)

I begin by arguing that, for Kant, the pure category of substance has both a general content that is in play whenever we think of any entity as a substance as well as a more specific content that arises in conjunction with the thought of what Kant calls a positive noumenon. Drawing on this new “Dual Content” account of the pure category of substance, I offer new answers to two contested questions: What is the relation of the pure category to (...) phenomenal substance? What, if any, epistemic gains can we achieve when we apply the pure category to noumena? Regarding the first question, I argue that while phenomenal substance does not qualify as a substance according to the Inner-Simple Conception, it does qualify as one according to the Subsistence-Power Conception. Regarding the second question, I argue that, in the case of the substantiality of positive noumena, Kant’s account allows for justified conditional beliefs involving the Inner-Simple Conception. In the case of negative noumena, it allows for justified existential beliefs involving the Subsistence-Power Conception. (shrink)

abstract: According to a common narrative, Kant held a kind of relationalist view of space from the time of his earliest publication, Living Forces, until 1768, when he published Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Directions in Space. The narrative holds further that considerations about incongruent counterparts prompted an abrupt volte-face—concerns about right and left hands were supposedly the decisive factor in causing a sudden shift to the metaphysical view expressed in Directions. I argue that the common narrative (...) is wrong, offering a new account of the timeline of, and reasons behind, Kant's rejection of relationalism. (shrink)

In response to Luciano Floridi’s conjecture on a fundamental trade‑off between certainty and scope in symbolic and generative AI (Floridi, 2025), we firstly propose a shift in perspective by relocating the problem of quantifying the conjecture from the viewpoint proposed in the original paper, which considers AI machinery as static usage-independent artefacts, to a pragmatism-driven one which recovers the central role of the users in the evaluation of a system and transforms the quantities involved in the conjecture into achievable field (...) measurements, taking into account the intrinsic probabilistic nature of modern generative AI. Secondly, based on this shift of perspective, we identify formal issues in the original definitions—specifically, the conflation of probabilistic and order‑theoretic notions in model correctness (C) and the opaque use of cumulative Kolmogorov complexity for mapping scope (S) and propose alternatives that fit the new conceptualization and resolve the identified issues. In summary, although retaining most of the original philosophical foundations and motivations, we (i) reframe the general problem introducing aspects related to usage in the conceptualization of the problem; (ii) introduce an Epistemic Certainty Level that replaces a mixed supremum–probability measure with a coherent expectation over indicator functions on output space’s user-driven equivalence classes; (iii) substitute cumulative Kolmogorov complexity with Shannon joint entropy. In our judgement, these revisions better quantify input/output mapping scope and make the conjecture more tractable in practice, by turning it from an aprioristic system evaluation into a field measurement. (shrink)

Although many recent free speech skeptics claim Millian credentials, they neglect the more pessimistic elements of Mill's account of human nature. Once we recover the darker elements of Mill's thought, American-style laissez-faire in the domain of expression looks significantly more attractive. Indeed, this paper argues that if Mill is correct about human nature, we have good reason to oppose recent proposed restrictions on expression and to embrace a legal regime that tolerates much speech that is false, obscene, demeaning, and even (...) hateful. While philosophers are right to worry about the substantial moral costs of such regimes, we ought to attempt to address these costs in ways that do not amount to rejecting the regimes themselves. (shrink)

Leibniz's well-known thesis that the actual world is just one among many possible worlds relies on the claim that some possibles are incompossible , meaning that they cannot belong to the same world. Notwithstanding its central role in Leibniz's philosophy, commentators have disagreed about how to understand the compossibility relation. We examine several influential interpretations and demonstrate their shortcomings. We then sketch a new reading, the cosmological interpretation, and argue that it accommodates two key conditions that any successful interpretation must (...) satisfy. (shrink)

I argue that Kant’s mature political philosophy entails the provisionality thesis. The provisionality thesis asserts that in a world like ours, populated with beings sufficiently like us, acquired rights (rights to external objects of choice, including property, sovereignty and territory) are necessarily provisional. I motivate the standard view, which restricts the notion of provisional right to the state of nature and the transition from the state of nature to the civil condition. I then provide two textual arguments against it. I (...) conclude by reflecting on the normative implications of the provisionality thesis, arguing that they are more modest than has been formerly appreciated. (shrink)

Whereas several commentators have held that Kant’s argument for the postulate of private right fails insofar as it begs the question, I argue here that this criticism misses the mark. Critics have...

Prolegomena §38 is intended to elucidate the claim that the understanding legislates a priori laws to nature. Kant cites various laws of geometry as examples and discusses a derivation of the inverse-square law from such laws. I address 4 key interpretive questions about this cryptic text that have not yet received satisfying answers: How exactly are Kant's examples of laws supposed to elucidate the Legislation Thesis? What is Kant's view of the epistemic status of the inverse-square law and, relatedly, of (...) the legitimacy of the geometric derivation of that law? Whose account of laws, the understanding, and space is Kant critiquing in the passage? What positive account of the relationship between laws, the understanding, and space is Kant offering in the passage? My answer to depends crucially on my answers to –. As I interpret Kant, he holds that a wide range of a priori laws—including geometric laws, the inverse-square law, and the universal laws discussed in the Analytic of Principles—are ‘grounded’ in categorial syntheses rather than the intrinsic nature of the space given to us in pure intuition. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie Jahrgang: 97 Heft: 4 Seiten: 416-457.

Après les guerres du siècle dernier qui ont remis en cause l'idée de progrès, devant les formes multiples des guerres actuelles, peut-on encore penser la paix aujourd'hui? A l'encontre des idées conservatrices de la paix où cette dernière, conçue comme ordre et stabilité, a souvent été le corrélat des Etats policiers, la pensée de la paix, telle que l'élabore Levinas, relève d'une critique de l'autoritarisme politique et permet d'élaborer un nouveau concept de liberté affranchi de la tutelle des Etats. La (...) paix n'est pas ici une idée abstraite mais porte le sujet hors de toutes les formes de confort moral ou de conformisme politique. C'est à un Levinas neuf que nous avons ici à faire : tout en dialoguant avec la tradition moderne et contemporaine de la philosophie politique, il nous montre que la paix est une forme d'insubordination qui aspire à "désembourgeoiser la révolution". Une lecture intranquille de Levinas. (shrink)

The importance of Gottlob Ernst Schulze's Aenesidemus 1 for the history of German Idealism has been widely recognized. Much as Hume had awoken Kant, Aenesidemus jolted the young Fichte out of his slumbering adherence to Reinhold's formulation of Kant's philosophy, leading him to re-evaluate the claims, methods, and foundations of the Critical philosophy. In his "Review of the Aenesidemus" 2 Fichte set out the results of this re-evaluation, which included his doctrine of intellectual intuition with remarkable and uncharacteristic clarity. 3 (...) According to a widely accepted story about the genesis of Fichte's Jena Wissenschaftslehre, the early Fichte was largely sympathetic to .. (shrink)

This paper explores Kant's attempt in the Physical Monadology (1756) to arrange a marriage between metaphysics and geometry (as represented, respectively, by the Leibnizian-Wolffians and the Newtonians), and it also considers why the marriage failed. It is argued that the theory of space that Kant advocates is not only not necessary for his account of physical monads, but that it is in various respects in tension with his Newtonian approach to geometry, resulting in a bad dynamic in the marriage. The (...) paper concludes with some reflections on the evolution, in the years after the Physical Monadology, of Kant's views on space and monads. (shrink)

In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant argues that rejection of the ideality of space and time leads, via some additional assumptions, to Spinozism. Understanding this ambitious argument requires understanding, inter alia, what Kant means by ‘Spinozism,’ what assumptions figure in the argument, and how these assumptions are supposed to be connected to the ideality of space and time. While my interpretation differs from others on numerous points, one crucial difference lies in my account of the key assumptions. As I (...) argue, Kant takes them to arise naturally from human reason itself. The most crucial and substantive among them concern reason’s naturally formed Ideas of, respectively, absolute space, absolute time, and God. More precisely, Kant takes these claims to be products of a natural transcendental illusion, and he holds that human reason under the spell of transcendental realism is unable to expose them as illusory and unwarranted. (shrink)

kant famously claims that space is merely a feature of the mind—something subjective—rather than a mind-independent feature of reality in itself.1 In accepting the subjectivity thesis, Kant rejects the transcendental realist assumption that he thinks has traditionally, albeit tacitly, been made in debates about the nature of space. According to this assumption, space has to do with things in themselves. For the Newtonians, as Kant understands their position, space is a substance-like thing in itself; for the Leibnizians, space consists in (...) relations among things in themselves.2 Kant breaks sharply with these traditional accounts.However, it would be a mistake to think that Kant's commitment to the... (shrink)

Kant claims that we cannot cognize the mutual interaction of substances without their being in space; he also claims that we cannot cognize a ‘spatial community’ among substances without their being in mutual interaction. I situate these theses in their historical context and consider Kant’s reasons for accepting them. I argue that they rest on commitments regarding the metaphysical grounding of, first, the possibility of mutual interaction among substances-as-appearances and, second, the actuality of specific distance-relations among such substances. By illuminating (...) these commitments, I shed light on Kant’s metaphysics of space and its relation to Newton and Leibniz’s views. (shrink)

I am interested in the use Kant makes of the pure intuition of space, and of properties and principles of space and spaces (i.e. figures, like spheres and lines), in the special metaphysical project of MAN. This is a large topic, so I will focus here on an aspect of it: the role of these things in his treatment of some of the laws of matter treated in the Dynamics and Mechanics Chapters. In MAN and other texts, Kant speaks of (...) space as the “ground,” “condition,” and “basis” of various laws, including the inverse-square and inverse-cube laws of attractive and repulsive force, and the Third Law of Mechanics. Moreover, in his proofs of all the laws just mentioned, the language of “construction” figures prominently, which suggests that Kant’s proofs (somehow) rest on or involve mathematical construction in his technical sense. Such claims give rise to a number of questions. How do properties and principles of space and spaces serve to ground this particular set of laws? Which spatial properties and principles is Kant appealing to? What, if anything, does the spatial grounding of the inverse-square and inverse-cube laws of diffusion (treated in the Dynamics Chapter) have in common with that of the Third treated in the Mechanics Chapter)? What role—if any—does mathematical construction play in Kant’s proofs of these laws? Finally, how if at all, are Kant’s grounding claims consistent with his other commitments—for example, how are they consistent with his notorious denial in Prolegomena §38 that there are any laws that “lie in space” (Prol 4:321)? I offer answers to these questions. (shrink)

This book features new perspectives on the ethics and politics of free speech. Contributors draw on insights from philosophy, psychology, political theory, journalism, literature, and history to respond to pressing problems involving free speech in liberal societies. Recent years have seen an explosion of academic interest in free speech. However, most recent work has focused on constitutional protections for free speech and on issues related to academic freedom and campus politics. The chapters in this volume set their sights more broadly (...) on the non-state problems that we collectively face in attempting to realize a healthy environment for free discourse. The volume's contributors share the assumption that threats to free speech do not come exclusively from state sources or bad actors, but from ordinary strategic situations in which all may be acting in good faith. Contributors take seriously the idea that our current cultural moment provides plenty of reason to be concerned about our intellectual climate and offer new insights for how to make things better. New Directions in the Ethics and Politics of Speech will be of interest to researchers and students working in ethics, political philosophy, social theory, and law. (shrink)

Contractarians aim to derive moral principles from the dictates of instrumental rationality alone. But it is well-known that contractarian moral theories struggle to identify normative principles that are both uniquely rational and morally compelling. Michael Moehler's recent book, *Minimal Morality* seeks to avoid these difficulties by developing a novel "two-level" social contract theory, which restricts the scope of contractarian morality to cases of deep and persistent moral disagreement. Yet Moehler remains ambitious, arguing that a restricted version of Kant's categorical imperative (...) is a uniquely rational principle of conflict resolution. We develop a formal model of Moehler's informal game-theoretic argument, which reconstructs a valid argument for Moehler's conclusion. This model, in turn, enables us to expose how a successful argument for Moehler's contractarian principle rests on assumptions that can only be justified by subtle yet significant departures from the standard conception of rationality. We thus extend our understanding of familiar contractarian difficulties by showing how they arise even if we restrict the scope of contractarian morality to a domain where its application seems both promising and necessary. We show that the problem lies not in contractarians' immodest ambitions but in the modest resources rationality can offer to satisfy them. (shrink)

Kant was engaged in a lifelong struggle to achieve what he calls in the 1756 Physical Monadology (PM) a “marriage” of metaphysics and geometry (1:475). On one hand, this involved showing that metaphysics and geometry are complementary, despite the seemingly irreconcilable conflicts between these disciplines and between their respective advocates, the Leibnizian-Wolffians and the Newtonians. On the other hand, this involved defining the terms of their union, which meant among other things, articulating their respective roles in grounding Newtonian natural science. (...) In this paper, consider how Kant’s project of marrying metaphysics and geometry evolves from the pre-Critical to the Critical period and how key discussions in the Prolegomena are related to the lifelong marriage project. (shrink)

This paper defends traditional political philosophy against the challenges Gaus leverages against it in The Open Society and Its Complexities. Granting Gaus that consensus on the principles of political philosophy is not forthcoming and that complexity undermines many of our most ambitious reform efforts, the paper argues that much work remains for political philosophy as it has been practiced for centuries. This is for three reasons. First, Gaus's own defense of the open society requires resources from the very traditions that (...) he tends to dismiss. Secondly, the kinds of reform Gaus encourages us to focus on in light of complexity presuppose answers to philosophical questions, answers that philosophers have long attempted to provide. Thirdly, not all politically salient philosophical questions are aimed at action guidance. Despite the value in Gaus's analysis, I conclude that political philosophy's future will look, at least in part, like its storied past. (shrink)

Strategies for knowledge-sharing have been among the key challenges faced by research in ubiquitous music (ubimus). Post-2020 musical activities feature a disruption of both the standard venues and the specialized profile of the stakeholders engaged in musical endeavors. This new context opens opportunities for an overhaul of the design and deployment of support infrastructure. Given the heterogeneous characteristics of ubiquitous music ecologies, a complex emergent issue is the management and circulation of knowledge. On the one hand, ubimus ecologies encompass state-of-the-art (...) technologies featuring adaptive and distributed forms of knowledge production and sharing. On the other hand, they provide support for legacy forms of music-making that rely on established specialized knowledge. Hence, the frameworks that recycle acoustic-instrumental notions such as the score, the orchestra or the hierarchical social structures embedded in centralized musical infrastructure are challenged by the emergent heterogeneous, distributed and esthetically pliable approaches to thinking, designing and deploying musical resources that characterize ubimus research. In this paper we discuss two examples of design deployments based on second-wave ubimus frameworks as an effort to increase our understanding of the role of actionable tacit knowledge in creative activities. (shrink)

Of late, Kant scholars have been looking to contemporary discussions of laws of nature and dispositions to better understand Kant’s account of laws and causal powers. Indeed, according to a recent interpretive trend, set in motion by pioneering work of Eric Watkins and Jim Kreines, Kant’s account of laws is a version of dispositionalism. However, there is room for controversy about which version of dispositionalism Kant embraces and, relatedly, which contemporary figures provide the best models for understanding Kant’s account. Some (...) recent proponents of the dispositionalist reading have ascribed to Kant a version of natural kind essentialism along the lines of Brian Ellis, while more recently Kristina Engelhard has argued that Kant’s account of laws is instead a “pure dispositionalist view”—that is, a view more like Alexander Bird’s. I defend the view that Kant, in both the pre-Critical and Critical period, embraces a version of natural kind essentialism along the lines of Ellis’s. I highlight a number of parallels. I also show how an understanding of the debate between Ellis and Bird can assist us in appreciating the philosophical strengths, weaknesses, and implications of Kant’s natural kind essentialism. (shrink)

The concept of interpersonal emotion regulation refers to a variety of processes in which emotion regulation occurs as part of live social interactions and includes, among others, also those interpersonal interactions in which individuals turn to others to be helped or to help the others in managing emotions. Although IER may be a concept of interest in group therapy, specific theoretical insights in this field appear to be missed. In this article, we firstly provide a review of IER definitions, of (...) classifications of IER strategies, and of IER clinical conceptualizations. Afterwards, we discuss the relevance of considering IER for group therapy, both in terms of non-specific group therapeutic factors and of group therapy techniques promoting adaptive emotion regulation, underlining the potentially relevant role of IER behaviors as intrinsically involved in group experience. (shrink)

This article juxtaposes Anna Pawełczyńska’s writings with the works of Meir Dworzecki and Dov Levin. It will adopt a threefold analytical lens: first, using Pawełczyńska’s writings to reassess the conception of the early resistance that Dworzecki elaborated, second utilising Dworzecki’s viewpoint as a means to articulate Pawełczyńska’s perspective of Amidah, and then looking at Levin’s perspective on Pawełczyńska’s use of partisan testimony as a historical source. The main aims are to contribute to today’s debates on the Jewish resistance and the (...) relevance of partisanship in Holocaust historiography. The article also highlights some debates on the relationship between history and memory, as well as the necessity of rethinking Catholic-Jewish relations in Poland before and after the war. It presses for a new discussion of Dan Michman’s discourse of Jewish resistance, or Yehuda Bauer’s conceptualisation of it, and underscores the originality of Levin’s thought on memory as an essential tool for history. By way of a conclusion, the reader is invited to rethink the Polish World War II historiography and to read Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik’s contribution about the blessings of the Amidah. (shrink)

Resumen El artículo se propone mostrar cómo, en El can de Kant, la filosofía llega a ser cuestionada por la literatura, y qué tipo de operación crítica o deconstructiva esta última posibilita. Muestra en particular que los problemas de la imaginación y del tiempo en Kant están enfocados a partir de la experiencia de la memoria y de la traducción en Borges. Finalmente, se sugiere que, mientras la imaginación posibilita la conformación de objetos, y por ende la posibilidad de tener (...) a un perro, la literatura abre a otras formas de territorialidad, de relaciones y de asunción del cuerpo.This article aims to show how in Kant’s Dog philosophy can be questioned by literature, and what kind of critical or deconstructive operation the later enables. In particular, it shows that the problem of imagination and time in Kant are focused on the experience of memory and translation in Borges. Finally, the article suggests that while imagination enables the conformation of objects, and therefore the possibility of having a dog, the literature opens to other forms of territorialities, of relationships, and of assumption of the body. (shrink)

Summary The article is dedicated to the figures of Alberto Argenton, Paolo Bozzi, Gaetano Kanizsa and Manfredo Massironi, psychology professors and artists, whose work constitutes a significant example of continuity between the cultures cultivated in their lives, with primary interest in perception. Outlining their scientific and artistic research, the article seeks to highlight a key value that permeates it and which appears vital to promote: learning to perceive reality.

Summary This article is related to previous works by its authors addressed to the figures of the same four scholars: Alberto Argenton, Paolo Bozzi, Gaetano Kanizsa, and Manfredo Massironi. The interest in these scholars, who devoted their lives to both teaching and scientific research in psychology and artistic research, also lies in the potential offered by the heritages they handed down to combine science and art. An exemplification of the potentialities we are referring to here is provided by a recent (...) art exhibition dedicated to the four scholars, the precise aim of which was to link the representational strategies they employed in their artistic works with phenomena studied in the fields of Psychology of perception and Psychology of art, of a Gestaltist matrix. The description of the exhibition allows us to make some considerations and proposals aimed at deepening the relations between the two domains, seen also in a cultural, formative and educational perspective. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Being and Freedom: On Late Modern Ethics in Europe by John SkorupskiJ. P. MessinaJohn Skorupski. Being and Freedom: On Late Modern Ethics in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. 560. Hardcover, $130.00.John Skorupski's Being and Freedom traces the development of modern ethics in France, Germany, and England, as set in motion by two great revolutions: the French Revolution and Kant's methodological revolution in the Critique of Pure (...) Reason. I begin this review by offering [End Page 714] a brief summary of the book (which consists of eight lengthy chapters, an introduction, and a brief conclusion). I then raise some interpretive worries and offer an overall assessment.In chapter 1, Skorupski reminds us that the French Revolution, a physical struggle between opposing factions, was also a battleground of ideas. In opposing the ancien régime, revolutionaries took aim at the "Catholic-feudal order" (27). Underlying this order was an ethical view, "holism," according to which a person lives well through excellent performance of community roles assigned by family, state, and church. When individual interests conflict with these social roles, the latter take precedence. Revolutionaries (partially inspired by Rousseau) railed against this. On their view, persons were born for freedom, not the chains of traditional life. To realize such freedom demanded a radical democratic state. Here, too, fidelity to the ethical whole (the Republic) sometimes required sacrifices on the part of individuals. But in a properly constituted republic, these sacrifices would be self-imposed requirements of the general will.As revolution turned to terror and blood became the regular currency of sacrifice, critics like Guizot saw the ancien régime's parochialism as a symptom of a larger problem with its underlying ethics, one it shared with the radicals aligned against it: its commitment to holism. Holism says that some social entities have a good not reducible to the good of their members. Additionally, these social wholes have their own rights that sometimes override individual rights (28, 59). These features make it easy for holist orders to justify sacrificing individuals for collective goods. If this is the disease, individualism of the sort associated with Kantian ethics can seem to be the cure.Chapter 2 argues that the new critical philosophy resulting from Kant's "Copernican" Revolution is a mixed bag. On the one hand, Kant offers no good reason for positing a noumenal world and locating freedom there (77–79). On the other hand, there is lasting promise in the idea that morality follows from each person's individual autonomy. And yet, in the end, Kant's arguments fail here, too. For deriving morality from autonomy requires an explicit commitment to impartiality, which does not follow from autonomy (83–102). And, even when suitably modified, Kant's ethical principles risk emptiness if they fail to take content from our relationships and social roles (112, 148). Unfortunately, Kant suggests that doing so would perpetrate heteronomy, making such emptiness inevitable (102).By chapter 3, the tension between holist and individualist conceptions of ethics has become Skorupski's central leitmotif. On the one hand, individualists are well positioned to resist oppression and terror. On the other hand, individualism risks atomism and alienation from our attachments and feelings. Such alienation leads Schiller to reject Kant's views on freedom and virtue (161). For our author, this is as it should be.Skorupski next turns to Fichte. Although Fichte takes a step away from transcendental idealism by making intellectual intuition the hallmark of our subjectivity (173), he agrees with Kant that morality follows from autonomy. Indeed, for Fichte, autonomy commits us to striving for full self-sufficiency, which appears to court a similar atomism. Yet this impression is corrected when Fichte turns to politics. There, Fichte grounds rights (as permissible demands) in mutual recognition (182–83). This positions him to see the state and the family as ethical wholes (187–88), pointing away from Kantian individualism back toward holism.Hegel takes these steps away from Kant to their logical conclusion. As Skorupski explains in chapter 4, Hegel argues that the individualist systems grounded in autonomy and abstract right (Moralität) mark but stages on the way to moral... (shrink)

Journal of Applied Philosophy, EarlyView.

ABSTRACT This article aims to analyze the problem of violence, as tackled by Derrida in his dialogue with Levinas. It is asked in particular how it is possible to think critically about violence if we assume that violence constitutes us. In order to do this, it dwells on the diference that Derrida establishes between criticism and deconstruction and on his analysis of the relationship between violence and silence. One of the main theses of this article is that what allows a (...) critique of violence refers to what Derrida calls “trace”, that is, a silence that inhabits language and that does not refer to a previous meaning. In addition, this article focuses on the critic Derrida addresses to Levinas in “Violence and metaphysic”. It shows that far from fitting this critique, Levinas’s analysis of the relation between language and silence implies a radicalization of Derrida’s thesis on what he calls the “worst violence”. (shrink)

It is widely appreciated that Kant’s mature practical philosophy holds all genuine moral duties to be grounded in necessitation by means of self-legislated categorical imperatives, never by incentives like coercion and fear. Yet in the 1780s, Kant appears to combine this view with the claim that external moral duties result from outer necessitation involving incentives of just this kind. This raises what I call the paradox of outer necessitation. On the one hand, outer necessitation ought not to be capable of (...) grounding duties; on the other hand, a subclass of moral duties is grounded in precisely this. I argue that Kant’s early understanding of external moral duties renders the air of paradox superficial. Genuine external duties presuppose self-legislated categorical imperatives, which an external legislator merely enforces. But this solves one problem only to invite another. For Kant already holds that legislators in the civil condition bind citizens to genuinely new duties, and do so by means of outer necessitation. I argue that Kant’s Rechtslehre is sensibly read as a sustained response to this inconsistency in his early view, a response that emphasizes the nature and limits of positive lawgivers’ political authority. (shrink)

Rape is a form of violence that causes destructive consequences to both the physical and spiritual health of women. Due to its taboo nature as well as the societal response to the victim, rape is especially harmful and results in han, a Korean concept that signifies a compressed suffering. The continual torment caused by han damages the rape victim’s spiritual health and ultimately leads to spiritual death. This article offers a definition of spiritual death and explores how the experience of (...) the violent act of rape within a rape culture constructs han. Specifically, the victims’ inability to express pain as well as assumed qualities of shame, self blame, and invisibility are examined with a focus on the societal response’s ability to provoke these qualities, further contributing to the emotional and spiritual trauma which results in a spiritual death. The possibility for multiple spiritual resurrections through various practices including the application of the traditional practice of Han-Pu-Ri, a Korean shamanistic ritual that releases han is discussed. (shrink)

The thoughts of apocalypse can either be intense and demanding, or lead to the risk of abandoning the present to a state of inertia and impotence. The apocalypse can be, in fact, the moment of the Last Judgment. In this case, justice is related to the revelation of truth. But the apocalypse can also be the revelation of the end of any truth, i.e. the revelation that the history doesn’t have any meaning, that the end is as endless as it (...) is hopeless. This article takes up “the apocalypse of Blanchot.” It shows that by thinking that the apocalypse has always already occurred, history is not what leads to an end, but is rather the responsibility to an endless end. In that sense, for Blanchot, history is not the redemption of contingency as eternity; rather, what must be historicized is the eternity of the end. (shrink)