This paper investigates the theme of sense and nonsense as it pertains to the phenomenological problem of “flesh.” It raises two sets of questions: 1) What is the relation of flesh to body and body to flesh? It is possible to admit the materiality of the corporeal condition while maintaining the phenomenological privilege of flesh and life? Or must one deny the privilege of flesh in favor of a more moderate “balance” of flesh and body? 2) How does the phenomenality (...) of flesh and body go together with the theological reality of the Incarnation of the Word? How is the passage into theology effected in phenomenology when it is a question of body and flesh? The article objects to Emmanuel Falque’s interpretation of Michel Henry, enters into recent scholarship relating phenomenology and cognitive science, and questions whether incarnation can be adequately described by a phenomenology in which perception is ultimate. (shrink)

A review of Jeffrey Hanson and Michael R. Kelly, eds., Michel Henry: The Affects of Thought (London: Continuum, 2012), 177 pp.