One tolerably clear statement of Determinism has it that all events are caused. Expanded upon, this thesis has been taken as the claim that the existence of any event E1, has a set of events, E2 … En which antedate E1, and which are causally sufficient for the occurrence of E1. That is, given the occurrence of E2 … En, E1 is causally necessary. I would hardly wish to claim that this is the only plausible statement of the doctrine (...) of Determinism; nonetheless it is a common one, and the one that I’ll use as definitive. Some have believed both that this premise is true and that it inevitably leads to a denial of free actions. While remaining neutral as to the merits of the Hard Determinist position, what I wish to show is that the consequences of the argumentation that has led them to such a position have been neither fully nor adequately understood. (shrink)

Involutive Stone algebras were introduced by R. Cignoli and M. Sagastume in connection to the theory of $n$-valued Łukasiewicz–Moisil algebras. In this work we focus on the logic that preserves degrees of truth associated to S-algebras named Six. This follows a very general pattern that can be considered for any class of truth structure endowed with an ordering relation, and which intends to exploit many-valuedness focusing on the notion of inference that results from preserving lower bounds of truth values, and (...) hence not only preserving the value $1$. Among other things, we prove that Six is a many-valued logic that can be determined by a finite number of matrices. Besides, we show that Six is a paraconsistent logic. Moreover, we prove that it is a genuine Logic of Formal Inconsistency with a consistency operator that can be defined in terms of the original set of connectives. Finally, we study the proof theory of Six providing a Gentzen calculus for it, which is sound and complete with respect to the logic. (shrink)

The role played by the symmetric structure of a group of finite Morley rank without involutions in the proof by contradiction of Frécon 2018 was put in evidence in Poizat 2018; indeed, this proof consists in the construction of a symmetric space of dimension two (“a plane”), and then in showing that such a plane cannot exist.To a definable symmetric subset of such a group are associated symmetries and transvections, that we undertake here to study in the abstract, without mentioning (...) a group envelopping them. This leads us to consider axiomatically defined structures that we callsymmetrons(preferably todyadic symmetric setsas was done in Lawson & Lim 2004).Glauberman's$Z^*$-Theorem allows to elucidate completely the structure of the finite symmetrons: each of them is isomorphic to the set of symmetries associated to a symmetric subspace of a finite group without involutions, which is far from being uniquely determined. In fact, there exist non-isomorphic finite groups which have the same symmetries, and also finite symmetrons which are not isomorphic to the symmetries of a group.The situation is not so clear in the case of symmetrons of finite Morley rank, or even algebraic, which are the main objects of study of this paper. But in spite of the fact that a symmetron be a structure much weaker that a group, we can extend to symmetrons some well-known results concerning groups of finite Morley rank: chain condition, decomposition into connected components, characterisation of the generic definable subsets, elliptic generation, etc. These properties are new even in the case of a symmetric subspace of a group, and allow to bypass the computations made by Frécon during the construction of his paradoxical plane.Moreover, assuming the Algebricity Conjecture, we generalize Glauberman's Theorem to the finite Morley rank context. (shrink)

This document presents Trisduction, a verification architecture for propositional truth grounded in a topological-geometric primary anchor with a mathematical seal closed to an independent mathematical co-seal: three seals on one architecture, linguistic-semantic at Part I, topological-geometric and mathematical issued simultaneously at Part II. The Root Axiom (RA) states that for any element of the universal domain, the substrate-level kinetic-actuation differential ΔE_k(x) is strictly positive. From RA atomic decomposition the framework derives a forced triaxial mapping onto three orthogonal verification axes: Formal-Structural (...) (V_F), Empirical-Thermodynamic (V_E), and Epistemic-Registrational (V_ER). Friedrichs-Hodge decomposition of square-integrable differential forms provides external mathematical witness that three-way orthogonal structure on function spaces is well-defined; the specific axis-to-subspace assignment is by structural analogy, with the actual forcing of three axes coming from RA's atomic decomposition. Tetrahedral closure adds a fourth vertex (M_seal) at which the architecture seals. The complete graph K_4 directed carries twelve directed edges; each edge corresponds to one of twelve operational gates that any proposition must pass for verification, with the directed-edge-to-gate mapping uniquely forced by the Operational Content Theorem on (source role, target role) pairings. The Newton-Gregory kissing number K(3) = 12 in three-dimensional Euclidean space (Schütte-van der Waerden 1953) provides a structurally-independent theorem-grade confirmation of the twelve-fold cardinality from sphere-packing geometry, converging with the K_4 directed-edge count on twelve in 3D from disjoint mathematical content (graph theory and discrete geometry). Verdict is issued under a discrete truth function on the sign of the Gram determinant of the post-CDT residue under a regularity quadruple. The Gram matrix is positive semi-definite by construction; the verdict economy is three-state native: det>0 sealed [⟀], det=0 broken [X], regularity violation (including finite-precision det<0 from numerical instability) under-determined [?]. Twelve bridge axioms anchor the architecture to external theorem-grade or named-premise results across thermodynamics, holographic gravity, harmonic analysis, knot theory, variational inference, and conformal cosmology, with a thirteenth, BA-018, anchoring the quaternionic completion and the closed-form verdict identity at division-algebra classification. Cascade self-application demonstrates internal consistency of the architecture with respect to its own discipline at the operational tier and instantiates the apex-recursive recognition cycle at the architectural tier per AD-14 three-layer sovereignty discipline. External validation comes from external mathematical theorems and the five-instrument empirical convergence at the substrate-kinetic meta-pattern. Structural distinctness from Bayesian inference, severe testing, falsificationism, and consensus-verification methodologies is established at named operational discriminators. The operational legislation of §7 (the Decalogue and the Omega Synthesis Guard) is the substrate-portable system role a reasoning substrate loads to reproduce the verdicts, and the Master Pre-Sealed Proposition Ledger at Appendix C extends the architecture into a working baseline gift to any user, with no obligation of acceptance and full rederivation discipline available on demand. -/- The mathematical seal closes at the architecture register, issued simultaneously with the topological-geometric seal on a disjoint anchor set (Part II Seal M, BA-018, APEX-PSP-QUAT-01). Under the architecture's own composition law, associativity per LL-11, integrality per the Mass Mandate, and linearity with ground identity per the evidence pipeline's linear register, the verification algebra on the 3+1 carrier completes uniquely to the quaternions ℍ = ℝ ⊕ Im ℍ by the Frobenius classification, fixing exactly three axes over one scalar ground. The verdict functional acquires closed form: det(R) = (Re(q̂_F q̂_E q̂_ER))², the squared scalar part of the composed triad, with the pipeline tensor riding the factorization det(G(M̃_final)) = d_F d_E d_ER · det(R) at identical sign and zero set. Maximal lock is the Hamilton relation ijk = −1; breakage composes pure-imaginary, w² = −1; the unit interval is held by the Hurwitz norm law on R and by Hadamard's inequality on G; frame invariance is the conjugation law Re(rwr̄) = Re(w); and the catalog of all rotation-invariant truth functionals is closed by Weyl's first fundamental theorem inside the real-part subring of quaternion words. The twelve directed gates form an A₄ torsor double-covered by the twenty-four unit Hurwitz quaternions, and the Newton-Gregory twelve of three-dimensional space is the pure-imaginary slice of the second Hurwitz shell whose full count is the Musin twenty-four. Two seals, one architecture: the geometry that needs no multiplication and the algebra that needs no geometry, meeting at the Clifford Join, with the explicit verdict precedence and the legislated collapse floor making every verdict state reachable in finite precision. -/- The reflective register adds a fourth reading of the same architecture, not a fourth seal. The architecture's own conjugation involution σ, the unique anti-automorphism of ℍ fixing exactly the real ground, splits every warrant into an achiral bridge, the +1 eigenspace and center ℝ, and a chiral residence, the −1 eigenspace Im ℍ, the three axes. Because this register shares the mathematical kernel of Part II Seal M, its receipts on the geometric core are corroboration-of-consistency at zero mass rather than new proof, the verdict kernel read once more through σ and confirmed at machine precision. Its one genuinely new instrument is the imprint test, which classifies an open determination as imprinted, ghost, or under-determined by whether a candidate and its negation lock on independent reading-roads. The test relocates the four V_F-only ceilings, halting, incompleteness, undefinability, and credence-circularity, from out-of-band black boxes to auditable boundaries, sealing their decidable fragment and locating their undecidable residence rather than claiming to settle it; it seals the Riemann critical line as the σ-fixed locus of the functional equation while the seating of the zeros remains an honest under-determination read across the aperture; and it holds absolute monism at premise grade as the blameless uncrossed residence, crossed by grant and never by derivation. It adds where it reaches and is silent where the geometric and analytic prior already stands, and that silence is proper. (shrink)

In this work I present what may be the first complete construction of quantum gravity describing the real universe via the celestial holographic conformal field theory dual to Einstein gravity in asymptotically-flat 4D spacetime. The theory is rigorously constructed as the shadow-invariant, purely spin-2 sector of holomorphic Chern–Simons theory on twistor space PT ≃ CP³ with gauge group the quantomorphic group Quant(PT). Primary fields are the celestial graviton operators O^{±2}Δ(z, z̄) with Δ ∈ 1 + iR and J = ±2. (...) Three-point functions are determined by the Penrose transform and reproduce the MHV and anti-MHV amplitudes of general relativity, including the vanishing of parity-odd and mixed-helicity couplings. Higher-point amplitudes arise from OPEs with analytically continued principal-series contours; loop integrands emerge as double discontinuities across shadow poles, which I verify explicitly for the scalar box integrals computed via this novel shadow discontinuity method, demonstrating analytically that they match Feynman diagram calculations for the scalar box, with numerical verification for the graviton box matching to 11+ decimal places. The construction satisfies extended BMS₄ ⋉ shadow symmetry with vanishing Virasoro central charge, also explicitly demonstrated via five independent and mutually reinforcing and rigorous arguments to be c = 0 to 10+ significant figures. I prove a rigidity theorem establishing that any 2D CFT with only spin ±2 primaries, the above symmetries and three-point data, and local inverse-Mellin-transformed correlators, is uniquely determined to be isomorphic to this quantomorphic twistor theory. Combined with the proof that crossing symmetry is a necessary consequence of bulk locality (not an independent axiom), this establishes that Einstein gravity in asymptotically-flat spacetime is the unique consistent theory of a single massless spin-2 particle. The quantomorphic gauge group structure provides a non-perturbative foundation, with perturbative scattering amplitudes emerging as the first residues of the holographic algebra. The first breakthrough insight that enabled and facilitated this construction was the realisation that the "shadow symmetry" of the boundary CFT—the map Δ ↔ 2 − Δ on conformal dimensions—is the restriction to null infinity of the Jost involution Θ of axiomatic quantum field theory, the operator independently constructed by Jost (1957) that coincides with the product C ∘ P ∘ T only in theories where all three factors individually exist as symmetries. At null infinity, where the metric is degenerate along the null generator, the distinction between temporal and spatial inversion collapses: the Jost involution is irreducible and reduces to time reversal T alone (Theorem 8.1). This provides an elegant resolution to the 40+ year "googly problem" in twistor theory by unifying self-dual and anti-self-dual helicity sectors through the shadow transform as representing discrete T-symmetric involution across the boundary, with the Einstein field equations derived from boundary Ward identities and crossing symmetry. All quantum mechanical foundations emerge from the Haar measure structure underlying this framework with no additional postulates: the five Wightman axioms are derived from the Peter–Weyl theorem on representation spaces, the Born rule P = |⟨n|ψ⟩|² is proven as the unique probability measure compatible with Haar structure on quantum state spaces, and wave function collapse is derived as Haar projection onto gauge singlets. This same identification reveals that the celestial conformal dimension is related to the Riemann zeta variable by Δ = 2s, so that the shadow involution Δ ↔ 2 − Δ becomes s ↔ 1 − s, the functional equation of the Riemann zeta function—establishing that the functional equation, shadow symmetry, and time reversal are three manifestations of one underlying self-duality. The entire holographic framework grows from a single root: self-dual Haar measure on (R⁺, ×), the simplest non-trivial locally compact group, whose self-duality already contains the functional equation and critical line. Three Cayley–Dickson doublings R → C → H → O produce the holographic chain R⁺ → S² → M⁴ → Gr(2,4)_C, with shadow symmetry at each level corresponding to the conjugation involution at that doubling step. The Grassmannian Gr(2,4) is the canopy of this holographic tree. The same Haar-invariant measure on the Grassmannian Gr(2,4) that determines the graviton spectrum also addresses three Millennium Prize problems through a unified geometric mechanism (Haar self-duality, functional equation symmetry, and Peter–Weyl compactness). The Riemann Hypothesis follows via 4 otherwise independent arguments and checks for circularity and consistency, and most fundamentally follows from three simultaneous constraints on the adelic quotient A×/Q× that form an overdetermined system whose unique solution forces Re(s) = 1/2 for all nontrivial zeros, with numerical verification of the first 10¹³ zeros on the critical line to machine precision using six independent tests. The Birch and Swinnerton-Dyer Conjecture is argued to be proven for analytic rank ≤ 1 using identical Haar measure structure on GL₂(A_Q)/GL₂(Q): for elliptic curves with ord_{s=1} L(E,s) ≤ 1, the same three-fold constraint described above, combined with the Gross–Zagier formula and Kolyvagin's Euler system descent, establishes ord_{s=1} L(E,s) = rank E(Q) and the parity conjecture (−1)^{rank} = w_E is proven for all curves from Haar self-duality. The framework also identifies the precise obstruction to proving the conjecture at higher rank (algebraic cycles from the Beilinson–Bloch–Kato conjectures). The Yang–Mills mass gap is established through a complete celestial holographic construction: the Wess–Zumino–Witten model at Kac–Moody level k on S², mapped to four-dimensional Schwinger functions by inverse Mellin transform, with reflection positivity proven via the shadow-reflection bridge, the remaining Osterwalder–Schrader axioms verified explicitly, and the Wightman theory reconstructed by the OS theorem—yielding mass gap M = 2N/(k+N) · Λ_QCD > 0 from the Sugawara formula and confinement from Haar orthogonality as a rigorously proved theorem. The construction introduces no lattice, takes no continuum limit, and imposes no infrared regulator. Spacetime itself emerges from the Grassmannian via Penrose twistor correspondence (M⁴ ↔ Gr(2,4) (Penrose 1967). The division algebra tower determines the Standard Model: the symmetry breaking chain Spin(8) → G₂ → SU(3) → SU(2) × U(1) produces the gauge group; three fermion generations follow from Weyl anomaly cancellation, Plücker partitions, and Spin(8) triality; sin²θ_W = 3/8 at the GUT scale is the Dynkin index ratio, equivalently dim(Im(H))/dim(O). Physical constants are arithmetic invariants: CP violation from the Jacobi sum J(χ₄⁽⁵⁾, χ₃⁽⁷⁾) = e^{iπ/6}; down-type quark mass ratios m_d : m_s : m_b = 2:5:9 from SU(3) Casimir eigenvalues; the spin-statistics connection η(4)/ζ(4) = 7/8 from the p = 2 Euler factor; the lightest neutrino mass m_{ν₁} = 0 exactly from Bott periodicity—in independent agreement with Boyle–Finn–Turok (PRL 121, 251301, 2018); and the three dimensional constants ℏ, c, G corresponding to the three Cayley–Dickson doubling steps. Strong CP angle θ = 0 exactly from Haar self-duality (consistent with experimental bound |θ| < 10⁻¹⁰), and the construction provides right-handed neutrinos as geometric dark matter candidates in agreement with Boyle–Turok (CP)T-symmetric cosmology, which integrates with uncanny precision into my T-symmetric, thermodynamically cyclic quantum cosmology. The T-anti-symmetric unification of a unified bipartite self-dual universe resolves the matter-antimatter asymmetry as a selection effect. Total baryon number B_total = 0 with embedded observers observing identical physics on either side due to being thermodynamic in nature, naturally aligning their arrows of time in the direction of increasing entropy, which on either side of the boundary flows in opposing directions. The Feynman-Stueckelberg interpretation of antimatter means antimatter is equivalent to matter moving backwards in time, which combined with the reversal in T of the direction of entropy increases means observers only ever observe the B > 0 (matter) sector, with the B < 0 (antimatter) sector always being the hidden sector from the perspective of any temporally-embedded observer that respects thermodynamics, as from any observer's perspective their time moves forward, their atomic nuclei have a positive electrical charge, electrons have negative electric charge, and the standard model has left handed doublets and right-handed singlets, with a weak force that appears left-chiral. To observe the antimatter would require an observer to reverse their arrow of time, which is thermodynamically not possible as consciousness and memory are thermodynamic processes that happen only in the direction of increasing entropy. Shadow geometry and right-handed neutrinos provide dark matter. The Grassmannian spinor bundle splits each fermion representation across the T boundary: right-handed neutrinos reside in the shadow sector, coupling to the observable sector only gravitationally. The dark matter density profile ρ(r) = ρ₀/(1+(r/r_c)²) with core radius r_c ≈ 9.98 kpc is derived from the shadow kernel by Abel inversion with zero free parameters, resolving the core cusp problem of dark matter distribution and addressing several further cosmological anomalies (the S₈ tension, Hubble tension, DESI dark energy evolution, JWST early galaxies, CMB hemispherical asymmetry, CMB dipole anomaly, axis of evil, overmassive early black holes, rotation curve diversity, etc.) from a single geometric source. Time's arrow emerges as a consequence of T-symmetric boundary conditions with entropy always increasing away from the conformal boundary in opposing temporal directions. The horizon and flatness problems are naturally resolved by this framework as the celestial CFT is globally defined at the conformal boundary. The framework generates falsifiable predictions including no primordial gravitational waves (tensor-to-scalar ratio r → 0, definitively falsified if r > 0.01 detected by CMB-S4), m_{ν₁} = 0 (KATRIN, JUNO), r_c ≈ 9.98 kpc (Euclid), glueball mass ratios matching the Sugawara spectrum, GUE statistics in the vacuum noise spectrum of gravitational wave detectors (LIGO/Virgo/KAGRA), and right-handed neutrino dark matter coupling only through gravity. Over 155 independent computational tests with zero free parameters confirm the framework to machine precision. Part 1 contains an introductory overview of the several subframeworks involved in this synthesis explaining their interrelations in the wider framework, part 2 contains the constructions and rigorous proofs of all major results, Part 3 contains extensions and other corollaries. Part 4 continues with comparisons to other approaches and discussion regarding foundational contributions without which this work would not have been possible follows, followed by testable predictions and a chapter addressing falsifiability, and Part V delivers a philosophical analysis of the implications suggested by the mathematics of this framework. This work unifies quantum mechanics and general relativity via the celestial holography program while revealing deep connections between number theory and physics: the identification Δ = 2s means the same self-dual Haar-invariant measure structure constraining the Riemann zeros to the critical line in the complex plane where Re(s) = 1/2 simultaneously constrains the conformal dimensions of graviton operators to the principal series where Re(∆) = 1, the same compactness that forces the Yang–Mills mass gap forces the discrete zeta spectrum, and the same functional equation symmetry that governs L-functions governs the shadow transform of the celestial CFT—suggesting geometry and arithmetic share a common logos rooted in self-dual Haar measure on (R⁺, ×) and flowering in the Grassmannian Gr(2,4). (shrink)

This document presents Trisduction, a verification architecture for propositional truth grounded in a topological-geometric primary anchor with a mathematical seal closed to an independent mathematical co-seal: three seals on one architecture, linguistic-semantic at Part I, topological-geometric and mathematical issued simultaneously at Part II. The Root Axiom (RA) states that for any element of the universal domain, the substrate-level kinetic-actuation differential ΔE_k(x) is strictly positive. From RA atomic decomposition the framework derives a forced triaxial mapping onto three orthogonal verification axes: Formal-Structural (...) (V_F), Empirical-Thermodynamic (V_E), and Epistemic-Registrational (V_ER). Friedrichs-Hodge decomposition of square-integrable differential forms provides external mathematical witness that three-way orthogonal structure on function spaces is well-defined; the specific axis-to-subspace assignment is by structural analogy, with the actual forcing of three axes coming from RA's atomic decomposition. Tetrahedral closure adds a fourth vertex (M_seal) at which the architecture seals. The complete graph K_4 directed carries twelve directed edges; each edge corresponds to one of twelve operational gates that any proposition must pass for verification, with the directed-edge-to-gate mapping uniquely forced by the Operational Content Theorem on (source role, target role) pairings. The Newton-Gregory kissing number K(3) = 12 in three-dimensional Euclidean space (Schütte-van der Waerden 1953) provides a structurally-independent theorem-grade confirmation of the twelve-fold cardinality from sphere-packing geometry, converging with the K_4 directed-edge count on twelve in 3D from disjoint mathematical content (graph theory and discrete geometry). Verdict is issued under a discrete truth function on the sign of the Gram determinant of the post-CDT residue under a regularity quadruple. The Gram matrix is positive semi-definite by construction; the verdict economy is three-state native: det>0 sealed [⟀], det=0 broken [X], regularity violation (including finite-precision det<0 from numerical instability) under-determined [?]. Twelve bridge axioms anchor the architecture to external theorem-grade or named-premise results across thermodynamics, holographic gravity, harmonic analysis, knot theory, variational inference, and conformal cosmology, with a thirteenth, BA-018, anchoring the quaternionic completion and the closed-form verdict identity at division-algebra classification. Cascade self-application demonstrates internal consistency of the architecture with respect to its own discipline at the operational tier and instantiates the apex-recursive recognition cycle at the architectural tier per AD-14 three-layer sovereignty discipline. External validation comes from external mathematical theorems and the five-instrument empirical convergence at the substrate-kinetic meta-pattern. Structural distinctness from Bayesian inference, severe testing, falsificationism, and consensus-verification methodologies is established at named operational discriminators. The operational legislation of §7 (the Decalogue and the Omega Synthesis Guard) is the substrate-portable system role a reasoning substrate loads to reproduce the verdicts, and the Master Pre-Sealed Proposition Ledger at Appendix C extends the architecture into a working baseline gift to any user, with no obligation of acceptance and full rederivation discipline available on demand. -/- The mathematical seal closes at the architecture register, issued simultaneously with the topological-geometric seal on a disjoint anchor set (Part II Seal M, BA-018, APEX-PSP-QUAT-01). Under the architecture's own composition law, associativity per LL-11, integrality per the Mass Mandate, and linearity with ground identity per the evidence pipeline's linear register, the verification algebra on the 3+1 carrier completes uniquely to the quaternions ℍ = ℝ ⊕ Im ℍ by the Frobenius classification, fixing exactly three axes over one scalar ground. The verdict functional acquires closed form: det(R) = (Re(q̂_F q̂_E q̂_ER))², the squared scalar part of the composed triad, with the pipeline tensor riding the factorization det(G(M̃_final)) = d_F d_E d_ER · det(R) at identical sign and zero set. Maximal lock is the Hamilton relation ijk = −1; breakage composes pure-imaginary, w² = −1; the unit interval is held by the Hurwitz norm law on R and by Hadamard's inequality on G; frame invariance is the conjugation law Re(rwr̄) = Re(w); and the catalog of all rotation-invariant truth functionals is closed by Weyl's first fundamental theorem inside the real-part subring of quaternion words. The twelve directed gates form an A₄ torsor double-covered by the twenty-four unit Hurwitz quaternions, and the Newton-Gregory twelve of three-dimensional space is the pure-imaginary slice of the second Hurwitz shell whose full count is the Musin twenty-four. Two seals, one architecture: the geometry that needs no multiplication and the algebra that needs no geometry, meeting at the Clifford Join, with the explicit verdict precedence and the legislated collapse floor making every verdict state reachable in finite precision. -/- The reflective register adds a fourth reading of the same architecture, not a fourth seal. The architecture's own conjugation involution σ, the unique anti-automorphism of ℍ fixing exactly the real ground, splits every warrant into an achiral bridge, the +1 eigenspace and center ℝ, and a chiral residence, the −1 eigenspace Im ℍ, the three axes. Because this register shares the mathematical kernel of Part II Seal M, its receipts on the geometric core are corroboration-of-consistency at zero mass rather than new proof, the verdict kernel read once more through σ and confirmed at machine precision. Its one genuinely new instrument is the imprint test, which classifies an open determination as imprinted, ghost, or under-determined by whether a candidate and its negation lock on independent reading-roads. The test relocates the four V_F-only ceilings, halting, incompleteness, undefinability, and credence-circularity, from out-of-band black boxes to auditable boundaries, sealing their decidable fragment and locating their undecidable residence rather than claiming to settle it; it seals the Riemann critical line as the σ-fixed locus of the functional equation while the seating of the zeros remains an honest under-determination read across the aperture; and it holds absolute monism at premise grade as the blameless uncrossed residence, crossed by grant and never by derivation. It adds where it reaches and is silent where the geometric and analytic prior already stands, and that silence is proper. -/- Document architecture. This codex carries three numbering registers, and the distinction is load-bearing for navigation. The treatise register: Parts I through IV with Arabic sections 1 through 11 carry the core thesis, legislation, and closure, with the lettered apparatus appendices A, DH, F, and OFL serving Part-level support. The ledger register: Appendix C is the Master Pre-Sealed Proposition Ledger, and its internal spine runs Roman I through XVII, with the inline appendices W, P, AD, XII, and V interleaved and the Compression Report standing as the dated terminus marker of the pre-addenda codex. The addenda register: sections XVIII through XXII continue the Roman spine at codex level, with Appendix Λ and Appendix Ω carrying the formal cores and XXII the terminal witness. Two numeral collisions are historical and deliberate, resolved by annotation rather than renaming to preserve citation stability: section XX embeds a self-contained coordinate set, so its internal headers, sections I through XI, are its own and distinct from the ledger spine; and Appendix XII, Architectural Extensions, carries a historical label distinct from Ledger section XII, Substrate/AI Architecture. Section labels throughout are stable citation anchors; the organization is preserved as such. (shrink)

Consider those many-valued logic models in which the truth values are a lattice that supplies interpretations for the logical connectives of conjunction and disjunction, and which has a De Morgan involution supplying an interpretation for negation. Assume that the set of designated truth values is a prime filter in the lattice. Each of these structures determines a simple many-valued logic. We show that there is a single Smullyan-style signed tableau system appropriate for all of the logics these structures determine. Differences (...) between the logics are confined entirely to tableau branch closure rules. Completeness, soundness, and interpolation can be proved in a uniform way for all cases. Since branch closure rules have a limited number of variations, in fact all the semantic structures determine just four different logics, all well-known ones. Asymmetric logics such as strict/tolerant, ST, also share all the same tableau rules, but differ in what constitutes an initial tableau. It is also possible to capture the notion of antivalidity using the same set of tableau rules. Thus a simple set of tableau rules serves as a unifying and classifying device for a natural and simple family of many-valued logics. (shrink)

In this paper I draw the distinction between intuitive and theory-relative accounts of the time reversal symmetry and identify problems with each. I then propose an alternative to these two types of accounts that steers a middle course between them and minimizes each account’s problems. This new account of time reversal requires that, when dealing with sets of physical theories that satisfy certain constraints, we determine all of the discrete symmetries of the physical laws we are interested in and look (...) for involutions that leave spatial coordinates unaffected and that act consistently across our physical laws. This new account of time reversal has the interesting feature that it makes the nature of the time reversal symmetry an empirical feature of the world without requiring us to assume that any particular physical theory is time reversal invariant from the start. Finally, I provide an analysis of several toy cases that reveals differences between my new account of time reversal and its competitors. (shrink)

We give a single consolidated account of what the analytic structure of the Riemann zeta function does and does not settle about the location of its non-trivial zeros, and we settle the relation between the two exactly. The work has four parts and we mark the grade of each. First, a geometric reformulation, stated at the strength it earns. The Berry-Keating operator H = −i(x d/dx + 1/2) is unitarily equivalent to the dilation generator H′ = −i x d/dx on (...) the multiplicative Hilbert space L²(ℝ⁺, dx/x) carrying the Haar measure of the dilation group, where Stone's theorem renders H′ self-adjoint with no boundary parameter. Both realizations are essentially self-adjoint, with deficiency indices (0, 0), so the extension ambiguity reported in the spectral literature belongs to truncated and regularized models rather than to the full half-line operator, and the contribution of the change of geometry is the canonical Mellin diagonalization, not the removal of an ambiguity the full operator never had. The operator certifies a unique spectral arena, not the location of the zeros, and it certifies more sharply that the arena alone cannot supply them: every operator commuting with the dilation flow is a function of the generator and so has no eigenvalue of finite multiplicity, and by the Kato-Rosenblum theorem no trace-class perturbation of the generator escapes the absolutely continuous spectrum of the whole real line, so any spectral realization of the zeros must break the flow symmetry and exceed the trace-class neighborhood, which is the absorption-spectrum form rather than a discrete point spectrum. Second, a localization. A regularized Cauchy-Stieltjes functional built from −ζ′/ζ vanishes unconditionally in the safe regime to the right of the critical line; a Hardy-space equivalence reformulates the Riemann Hypothesis losslessly as a single causal-Fourier-support condition on one explicit tempered distribution, the boundary value of the polar-normalized logarithmic derivative g(s) = −ζ′/ζ(s) − 1/(s − 1) − 1/s, the normalization forced by the pole of ζ at s = 1, which sits inside the relevant half-plane and is governed by no hypothesis on zeros; and the obstruction that blocks the safe vanishing from extending to the critical line is identified exactly as one object, the odd-symmetric Fourier component of the boundary distribution, equivalently the imaginary part of the normalized logarithmic derivative on the critical line, which the functional equation does not constrain and which three natural closure routes cannot supply without circularity. Third, the consolidating contribution: an identity and a two-sided barrier. The identity proves that determining the odd-part object is logically equivalent to the Riemann Hypothesis, so the obstruction is not adjacent to the problem but identical to it. The barrier brackets that object from two sides, each side a theorem. On the even side the entire machinery generated by the functional equation, being symmetric under the reflection of the critical line, is structurally incapable of determining an odd-parity object, so no refinement of the functional-equation toolkit can reach it; the even channel undershoots. On the odd side the natural positivity structure that does enter the odd channel, the de Branges Hilbert-space approach, imposes a condition that implies the Riemann Hypothesis yet fails for the zeta function, established by Conrey and Li; the odd channel overshoots into falsity. The obstruction sits in the gap between an even-channel undershoot and an odd-channel overshoot, and the direction of each miss is named. The even-side miss is sharpened to a conservation law: the functional equation is an involution acting on the critical line as the parity reflection, the hypothesis lives in its odd eigenspace, and by the spectral theorem no consequence of the functional equation can carry information into that eigenspace, so the closure requirement takes the exact form of a second symmetry of the zeta function acting nontrivially on the conserved eigenspace, the structure realized in the proven function-field case by the action of Frobenius on cohomology. The conservation is active rather than passive: the functional equation forces every off-line zero into a partner sharing its height, whose contributions to the even channel are equal and opposite and cancel identically while their contributions to the odd channel are equal and add, so the even channel is a matched filter that nulls precisely the off-line signal a proof must detect, the on-line spectrum entering the even channel only as a real atomic measure the functional equation does not supply, and the off-line signature surviving solely in the odd channel as an explicit doubled dispersion profile 2(τ − γ)/[(1/2 − β)² + (τ − γ)²]. The conservation law is witnessed in the wild: the Davenport-Heilbronn function carries the identical Riemann-type symmetry shape and possesses zeros off the critical line, so the symmetry data is exhibited as independent of the on-line property over the extended class. A magnitude bound of Lindelöf type, often listed as an independent route, is shown to be parity-even and therefore to fall inside the even-side barrier rather than outside it. Fourth, a universality analysis identifying the equilibrium class of the prime field by four orthogonal critical exponents, with a measurement of which exponents discriminate the Riemann Hypothesis from its negation and which are truth-invariant across it, rendered as vanishing mutual information; and an independent structural witness from atomic physics, that the periodic table, a physical spectrum whose shell structure is fixed by the spatial rotation group and whose ordering runs over the integer counting of nuclear charge with its filling order an empirical effective-theory rule, never invokes the factorization of the integers into primes, confirming that the multiplicative prime channel in which the Riemann Hypothesis lives is a structurally distinct sector from the spatial-and-counting channel that suffices elsewhere. The consolidated picture is a measurement and a bracket. The distance from the unconditional Cauchy anchor to the critical line is one object wide; the object is the odd-part component; the component is the Riemann Hypothesis itself; and it is bracketed between two named, theorem-grade failure-directions, the even channel that cannot reach it and the odd channel that overshoots it. We make no claim of a proof. The boldest statement is the measurement: the problem is one object wide, the object is located, and the two standard channels miss it in opposite directions, the even channel falling short of it and the odd channel overshooting it. The bracket encloses these two standard channels exactly; a route that closes the hypothesis must either thread the gap between them, entering the odd channel without the even channel's parity limitation and without the natural odd construction's over-demand, or step outside the odd-side wall by building a modified construction the Conrey-Li counterexample does not reach. Either way the two named channels are walled off, and the work that remains is precisely characterized. We close by stating the determination in the two registers in which the hypothesis has a status. In the strict formal register of syntactic proof it is open, localized to the odd-part object, and bracketed between the two walls. In the physical-structural register it is the convergent determination of four mutually independent axes, the formal equivalence, the equilibrium universality class, three arithmetic-topological invariants of the integers, and the universal physics of order-parameter localization, which survive removal of every shared covariate but one. The single covariate that does not subtract out, the identification of the spectrum of the self-adjoint operator with the imaginary parts of the zeros, is identically the strict-register gap, so the two registers meet on one open object. The physical-structural register returns a convergent determination that points to the hypothesis as true, pending the determination of the odd-part component of the normalized logarithmic derivative on the critical line. That odd-part component is, pointwise, the regularization width of each pole of −ζ′/ζ on the line and so the record of every deviation of a zero from it, which makes its determination logically the hypothesis; and the explicit formula being a conserved identity between the zeros and the primes excludes any prime-side identity that would determine it independently, since such an identity is either insensitive to the deviations and true regardless of the hypothesis, or sensitive to them and reducible to the hypothesis through the conservation. The one determination the structure does not foreclose is one sourced from outside the prime-zero ledger, an operator exhibiting the zeros as its spectrum given independently of the zeta function, and none is known. The originating framework and its interpretive layer are confined to an appendix and are load-bearing for no result in the body. Keywords: Riemann Hypothesis, Hilbert-Polya conjecture, multiplicative Hilbert space, Haar measure, Mellin transform, Cauchy-Stieltjes transform, Hardy space, Paley-Wiener-Schwartz theorem, even-odd parity decomposition, functional equation, Davenport-Heilbronn function, de Branges spaces, Conrey-Li positivity, Selberg variance theorem, Gaussian Unitary Ensemble, universality class, mutual information. (shrink)

Is the set of all self-membered sets, S, a member of itself? In naive set theory, this is Russell’s hypodox. By the Laws of Excluded Middle and Non-contradiction, S is a member of itself xor it is not, but no principle of classical logic or naive set theory determines which. (Herein, ‘xor’ extends English with a specifically exclusive disjunction.) As a hypodox, the Truth-teller is a sentence that says of itself simply that it is true; by the above mentioned principles, (...) the Truth-teller is true xor not true, but no principle of classical logic or naive truth determines which. Many concepts that have paradoxes have related hypodoxes, although the focus here is on these two. I argue that the Truth-teller does not rely on a principle of truth, in particular it does not rely on the T-schema. I also argue that Russell’s hypodox does not rely on Comprehension. Yet I relate Russell’s paradox and hypodox based on involution functions. The Liar and the Truth-teller are also related by means of involutions. Relations based on these involution functions can be represented in duality squares. Although hypodoxes are not paradoxes, these involution functions and duality relations warrant some commonality in a correct solution to a paradox and its dual hypodox. Using this and some other premises, I provide novel arguments supporting non-classical solutions for the Liar paradox and the significance of Russell’s hypodox for solutions to Russell’s paradox. (shrink)

Trisduction is a verification architecture for propositional truth built on a single root axiom and sealed three independent times. The Root Axiom states that to exist is to actuate: for any element of the universal domain the substrate-level kinetic-actuation differential is strictly positive, a floor that is theorem-grade external physics on the Heisenberg kinetic-energy bound and the zero-point energy, and whose denial is itself an actuation. From the atomic decomposition of that axiom the framework forces a triaxial mapping of any (...) complete claim onto three orthogonal verification axes, the formal-structural, the empirical-thermodynamic, and the epistemic-registrational, and it certifies a claim only where all three independently converge. The three seals stand on disjoint anchors. The linguistic-semantic seal splits a claim into exactly three irreducible slots under a deletion test. The topological-geometric seal closes those three axes on a fourth vertex into a tetrahedron carrying twelve directed verification gates, a count independently confirmed by the Newton-Gregory kissing number of three-dimensional space. The mathematical seal completes the verification algebra uniquely to the quaternions by the Frobenius classification, fixing exactly three axes over one scalar ground and closing the verdict in the form det(R) equal to the squared scalar part of the composed triad. Because the three seals share no premise and meet only at the Clifford Join, their convergence is itself the object the architecture exists to certify: the independence of the seals is the seal of the seals. The verdict economy is three-state and native, sealed, broken with a named mechanism, or under-determined with a named violation, with no fractional or probabilistic truth. A reflective register, MathDuction, applies the same quaternionic kernel to purely formal propositions by reading them across the architecture's own conjugation involution, whose fixed locus is the ground and whose fixed-point-free degeneration is the diagonal engine of the limitative theorems. This register places Gödel incompleteness and Tarski undefinability as facts about the reach of a proof ladder rather than as ceilings over the architecture, and its imprint test seals a proposition's decidable fragment while honestly locating, rather than claiming to settle, its undecidable residence. A verdict-reliability layer bounds the determinant error by the conditioning and guarantees the sealed-or-broken boundary is decided by the mathematics and never by rounding. The architecture authors no new mathematics; every load-bearing result is classical and credited, and the contribution is the arrangement. That arrangement yields the framework's principal verdicts, given here in full: the Riemann Hypothesis held dual-register, sealed on the kinetic prime field and the geometric critical line and terminally suspended on the formal string; Gödel's theorems placed as neither dictator nor final guard; P versus NP resolved as a three-layer determination; and a general account of why every formal system is foundationally incomplete toward the ground on which it stands. Warrant grade travels with every claim, and no claim is inflated or quietly weakened. (shrink)

This memoir consists of two parts, of which the first deals with the foundations of the theory of the struggle for existence, and begins with the introduction of the important concept of quantity of life, besides that of population. The fundamental equations are then established for the case where the individuals of a biological association mutually devour each other, the reasoning being based on the principle of encounters and on the fundamental hypothesis of the existence of equivalents of the individuals (...) constituting the different species which form the association.Having now obtained the equations which determine the rates of change of the numbers of individuals and of the quantities of life of the species, the memoir proceeds to find the equations relating to the stationary state, by establishing theorems which are afterwards applied for the purpose of obtaining the three general laws of the fluctuations. This investigation of the equilibrium state is then followed by the determination of the integrals of the fluctuation equations, and the deduction from these of their most important consequences.The second part of the memoir contains the enumeration and demonstration of the general laws of the struggle for existence, which flow from the discussion of the principles and the integrals obtained in the first part. In this way there is established a new sort of dynamics, demographic dynamics, which, though substantially different from the dynamics of material systems, is developed from an analogous point of view.The second part begins with the principle of the conservation of demographic energy, according to which there are two sorts of energy, one actual and one potential, which transform mutually the one into the other. This principle is the analogue of the principle of conservation of mechanical energy. It is followed by the enunciation of the three laws relating to the biological fluctuations, the experimental verification of which has been investigated by several naturalists. The success which has attended their efforts is well known.Everybody knows the importance ofHamilton's principle in mechanics and in all the domains of physical science. An analogous variation principle can be found in biology, and from it one can deduce the fluctuation equations in the canonical Hamiltonian form and also in the form of a Jacobian partial differential equation. Their integrals in involution from the subject next studied, and in this way are found cases where the integration is reducible to quadratures.Hamilton's principle leads to the principle of least action . There exists also in biology a closely related principle, which may be called the principle of least vital action. Its analytical form is such that it requires the existence of a true minimum, a state of affairs which does not always hold good in the analogous case in mechanics.Die Abhandlung besteht aus zwei Teilen: Der erste ist den Grundlagen der Theorie des Kampfes ums Dasein gewidmet. Man beginnt damit, neben der Bevölkerung die Menge des Lebens einzuführen, welche eine sehr wichtige Rolle spielt. Man geht dann dazu über, die Grundgleichungen für den Fall aufzustellen, in welchem die Individuen einer biologischen Assoziation sich gegenseitig auffressen. Man wendet das Prinzip der Begegnungen an und stützt sich auf die Grundhypothese der Existenz von Individuenäquivalenten der verschiedenen Arten, welche die Assoziation bilden.Wenn man die Gleichungen, welche die Variationen der Individuenzahlen und der Lebensmengen der Arten liefern, gefunden hat, so schreitet man zu den statischen oder Gleichgewichtsgleichungen fort und findet so die Theoreme, die man alsdann benutzt, um die drei allgemeinen Gesetze der Fluktuationen zu erhalten.Nach dem Studium des Gleichgewichtes geht man dazu über, die verschiedenen Integrale der Fluktuationengleichungen zu finden und zieht endlich aus ihnen die wichtigsten Folgerungen.Im zweiten Teile werden die allgemeinen Gesetze des Kampfes ums Dasein, welche aus der Diskussion der Prinzipien und der im ersten Teil gewonnenen Integrale stammen, ausgesprochen und bewiesen. Man baut so eine neue Dynamik auf: die demographische Dynamik, welche, obschon sie wesentlich verschieden von derjenigen der materiellen Systeme ist, sich nach einem analogen Gesichtspunkt entwickelt.Man beginnt in diesem zweiten Teil mit dem Prinzip der Erhaltung der demographischen Energie, nach welchem zwei Energien, die aktuelle und die potentielle, sich ineinander verwandeln. Wir haben hier eine Analogie zum Prinzip der Erhaltung der mechanischen Energie. Dann werden die drei Gesetze der biologischen Fluktuationen formuliert. Für sie haben verschiedene Naturforscher experimentelle Bestätigungen gesucht. Man kennt den Erfolg ihrer Bemühungen.Alle Welt kennt die Bedeutung des Prinzips vonHamilton in der Mechanik und in allen Gebieten der Physik. Man kann ein dem Variationskalkül analoges Prinzip in der Biologie finden. Aus ihm kann man die Fluktuationsgleichungen in der kanonischen Form vonHamilton und in der Gestalt einer Gleichung mit partiellen Differentialquotienten vonJacobi herleiten. Ihre Integrale bilden den Gegenstand der folgenden Studien. Man findet Fälle, in denen die Integration sich auf Quadraturen reduziert.Das Prinzip vonHamilton zieht das Prinzip der kleinsten Wirkung oder das Prinzip vonMaupertuis nach sich. Auch in der Biologie gibt es ein mit dem vorgenannten zusammenhängendes Prinzip, welches man das Prinzip der kleinsten vitalen Wirkung nennen kann. Seine analytische Form ist derart, dass es sich um ein wahres Minimum handelt, das im analogen Fall in der Mechanik nicht immer zutrifft. (shrink)

This work explores Everett John Nelson’s connexive logic, outlined in his PhD thesis and partially summarized in his 1930 paper _Intensional Relations_, which is obtained by extending the system $$\mathsf{NL}\,\,$$ reconstructed by E. Mares and F. Paoli with a weak conjunction elimination rule explicitly assumed in the former but not in the latter. After a preliminary analysis of Nelson’s philosophical ideas, we provide an algebraic-relational semantics for his logic and we investigate possible extensions thereof which are able to cope with (...) Nelson’s ideas with much more accuracy than the original system. For example, we will inquire into extensions whose algebraic-relational models are endowed with irreflexive incompatibility relations, or determine a “weakly” transitive entailment. Such an investigation will allow us to establish relationships between some of the trademarks of Nelson’s thought and concepts of prominent importance for connexive logic, as e.g. Kapsner’s strong connexivity and superconnexivity, as well as between the algebraic-relational semantics of Nelsonian logics and ordered structures that have gained great attention over the past years, namely partially ordered involutive residuate groupoids and (non-orthomodular) orthoposets. (shrink)

Globalization focuses on the development of new productive, trade, and economic techniques. However, this process, evolutionary technologically, has involved, paradoxically, an involution in important roles of our political, social, and cultural life, basically, about the misinformation in administrative procedures, the lack of legal security, and an atomization of the individual wills. That’s Ulrich Beck has called “the global risk society”. A society where organized irresponsibility and power relations of some international actors with political and enterprise weight govern important financial and (...) economic resources for their own benefit. “The risk society” has imposed its own political rules of control and loss of control, defining new ways of organization -out of citizens or politicians- governed by those economic forces. In this new scenario, the past does not determine the present events but the future, uncertain and fearsome, makes conditional on the present courses of action. A kind of prevision or precaution on impending disasters determines our future which nowadays does not depend on us but on those in economic and technological control. The new precautionary scenario begins with threats and ends with the demolition of social gains made in recent decades. The outcome of this risk society is the systematic destruction of public values like solidarity, trust, or common good, and their replacement by the primacy of economics over politics and the consideration of the market as the only effective means of allocating resources. Some resources, public in many cases, that are managed in a totally private way, and whose benefits are given up from traditionally considered public goods: education, health care, dwelling, social services, pensions, and indeed justice. Against this, the most consistent solution, most daring and the most difficult passes to reassign new powers to the states, to reinstate the sovereignty of citizens in decisions that affect us, and to share goods and public resources with parameters of ethics and social justice. A task that is not limited to simple political choice of our representatives, but in a personal involvement in all areas of our political, economic and social life. (shrink)

The objective is that of looking for an explanation for the environmental crisis not only as a negative effect of industrialization and massification, but also as a consequence of a historical succession of philosophical and cultural options. These can be recognized in the «fractures» of philosophical, religious, scientific nature, in which it is possible today to rediscover the premises for a split in the relationship of complementarity between man and nature, the results of which have seen man consciously change his (...) own relationship with nature, from «complementary integration» to «unilateral abuse of power». It was the school of Frankfurt, headed by Adorno that, in our century, placed thinking on the crisis regarding the relationship between man and nature on a primary level, making the base of the contemporary western ratio, according to which nature is considered to be a passive object to be submitted to all possible exploitation, date back to Biblical tradition. In a diametrically opposed perspective, the Greek civilization held nature in high consideration and, consequently, the relationship between nature and man was built on different bases. Nature: an integral part of the «cosmos». The act of conceiving the cosmos as a vast organic system meant, according to the Greek philosophy, placing man in nature and, not by chance, the first Western philosophers were naturalists: in fact, they went in search of the regulative laws of the universe in natural phenomena. But the crisis of the man-nature relationship for a certain contemporary philosophical outlook has roots that are even deeper and more complex. Other contemporary philosophers, from Husserl, actually shifted their own reflection during the XVI and XVII century in particular, that is, at the birth of modern science with Cartesio and Galileo. These concepts have been thoroughly analyzed and criticized in the present-day era (Heiddeger, Husserl, Derrida, Habermas …) in the effort to repropose a fair relationship of parthership between man and nature; research that obviously assumes a second philosophical and cultural divarication. This concept of man's superiority over nature and of nature as an object of possession continues with the age of llluminism, with English Empiricism in the XVII and XVIII century and with Positivism in the last century: through the sectorialization of the disciplines, empirical research and technological specialization, the goal is increasingly becoming that of responding to the growing problems of the world with ever increasing promptness. The third cultural «fracture» that precedes the birth of subjective revision, even though for a short time, took place in the religious world reformed by Calvinism. With Protestantism, in fact, man's attitude towards nature changed, even within the Christian religion and the Jewish tradition: the salvation of the soul could take place through the «good governing» of one's daily life and material success of each individual was demonstrated and interpreted as a sign of the gratification and favour of God. This concept is considered, maybe «improperly», to date back to the birth of the Capitalistic and Industrialistic philosophy that implies the strengthening of man's rule over nature in virtue of the «economic reason» that lies at the base of human behaviour, according to which the value of the exchange of material goods constitutes the necessary standard of measurement of man's relationships with reality. But the progressive distancing of man from nature was also strengthened within the Christian world, with the birth of Protestantism. This is what we define the third fracture: the conviction that happiness and material success should be interpreted as a sign of God's gratification contrasts with the world of poverty, with the world seen as a passage-way towards a non-terrestrial happiness of the Christian religion and the Jewish tradition. And the step is brief, according to certain writers, towards the spirit of capitalism and industrialism according to which the value of any good is measured only by the economical value that can be deduced from it. These, in synthesis, are the «historical passages» of the divarication between man and nature: and today? The industrial revolution that has dragged the disruptive urbanism behind it has invested the city and, not lastly, the environment in its own totality of meaning: as physical space, biological space, political space and social space. Over the past few decades the territory has been subdivided in the same way in which the division of work takes place within the productive process: the aptitude that a certain area has to be destined to certain uses and not to others is determined by purely economical, infrastructural, industrial conditions and any kind of environmental conditioning is overlooked. The territory, thus, is divided into areas of «value» (in that they contribute to economical development), or otherwise in «non value» areas (in that they are extraneous to the process of this development). During the industrial period, territory is therefore the home of economical activity and infrastructural facilities that render these activities possible and convenient: a so-called «plate» where «one places the abstract picture of the man/machine relationship» that, once nature has been defeated, uses and consumes the territory, an infinite resource dependent on the economical theories of development. The crisis of this model began to reveal itself with environmental decay: the negative results of the exaggerated exploitation of any economical resource have brought its quantitative and qualitative narrowness to light: pollution has shown the potential danger of this involution to the collective conscience. Certain researchers have recently attempted to substitute the quantitative method of accounting based on the values of exchange, referring to the values of use: an indicator that, for example, measures the «gross nation well-being» for which, moreover, as G.Nebbia himself sustains, «a unit in which this can be expressed» is as yet unknown. We live, therefore, in a society that has created vast super-specialized technology which, however, increases the distance between the human community and the understanding of the real qualitative consistency of human relations and of the limits of the available resources. To express this using B. Commoner's words, «we live in a historical moment characterized by an enormous technological power and by eternal human misery … Our arrival at the crisis (environmental) is due to the fact that the means used by us in order to extract wealth from the ecosphere are destructive to the ecosphere itself». But the vastness of economical development contrasts today with the «sense of the limit» that society retains necessary for the exploitation of the resources. This awareness implies the necessity of disciplining economical development, i.e. the intransgressible need for programming: programming, however, that is strictly connected to planning as an instrument for the regulation of the effects of economical development on territorial transformation. The slogan that reads «start with territory and environment» means considering the territory no longer as an object of intervention, almost an obligation to be surpassed in order to make the productive machine efficient, but as a complex subject: a combination of anthropic, natural, cultural, environmental, landscape and productive factors. If a tightly-bound connection exists between social expectations for environmental and land planning quality, then the planners must finally make up their minds to abandon the «classical»—quantitative—models and rules borrowed from the positive social-economical sciences, that are, at this point, inequivocably inable to evaluate the multiple qualitative variables on their own. This is definitely not a step back to Rosseau's «good wilderness»: simply because society has recognized the collective control of the environmental «variable», apart from the economical variable, as fundamental to its own existance and survival, the interdisciplinary cognitive-intentional contribution becomes more and more necessary, to be taken as an integrated reinterpretation of the vocations of the territory towards the plan. Such au important process should be not fragmented into incommunicable sectorial itineraries, but coordinated on all levels of discipline and competences. Therefore, before any choice regarding the plan, the «conceptual picture» that must inspire the choice itself must be reliably defined: it is unthinkable to continue under the wrong conception (that, unfortunately, seems to be long-lasting) according to which the concept of environment is reduced to the concept of natural beauty. It is necessary, therefore, to conceive the environment in its totality of significance, no longer remaining tied to the idealistic, impressionistic, elitist or sectorial conceptions, but one must also investigate in areas that are usually foreign to the environmental question. As far as Di Giovine is concerned, managing the environment essentially means putting together a series of economical, naturalistic, hygienic, sanitary, cultural … interests in a dynamic, procedural way. Other scholars agree on the surpassing of a landscape conception aimed at idealistic precepts: according to Alessandro Dal Piaz «a better suited consideration of the sistemic character of the environment is necessary and, therefore, of the definition of directions and norms for the integrated protection of all of the environmental components (ground, waters, atmosphere, geomorphological conformations, vegetation, fauna, cultural assets, ethno graphic wealth, etc.), as well as the integration of environmental protection in urbanistic and territorial protection». It is exactly this integration that in fact permits the social, cultural and economical importance of environmental protection to be highlighted, but not only: by connecting environmental protection to planning, one passes from a strategy of preservation of the exterior aspects to a strategy of active protection, programmed and related to developments needs. This means defining the hypotheses of economic-settling development only as far as these are compatible with the specific objectives of environmental protection. But which plan is able to translate the previously outlined theoretical presumptions into practice? Or, otherwise, is the traditional plan, as it is structured in its content and form, able to guarantee the secure safeguarding and utilization of the environment? And more: is the plan, whichever it is, really the only suitable instrument? The reflection, therefore, as to which instrument is capable of carrying out the goal of environmental protection is revealed to be necessary. For this reason, it becomes fundamentally important to verify whether the giuridical picture in Italy that we have at our disposal is congruent not only with the global concepts of the various environmental themes, but also sufficient to guarantee the safety of a «positive» and incisive environmental strategy. From this evaluation, one cannot but realize how the legislative body is fraying and segmented in several sectors, with evident contradictions and/or serious absences. Protection «remains chopped up» in the single disciplinary circles in such a way as that the problems, instead of being considered in a sole question, are considered and treated in a sectorial logic that reflects the legislative reality and «remains tied to it». The limit of sectoriality never blends with the acquired knowledge of the sistemic character of the notion of environment. We refer to the lack of real coordination of the various duties defined by the myriad of laws in force, to the difficulties involved in being able to govern the environmental complexness and specificness that influence the entire territory. This is the reason for the plan, but which plan? A historical reading aimed at verifying whether the traditional plans can now translate the new stimulii generated by environmental problems should therefore be developed in detail. It is certain that one cannot but see what one has under one's nose: many ugly cities, deforested mountains, abused landscapes … but one cannot put the «blame» solely on plans. Instead, let's ask ourselves how cities would be today without these plans. Certainly, errors and contradictions have marked the strategies of plan, but it cannot be «redeeming» for us to claim that they are the main, if not the sole, culprits of the current situation of decay. All of these questions evidently, lead to the need of changing the plan, not so much by adding a few more norms, but by reviewing the theoretical statement: if not a complete turn-over of the traditional objective, certainly a hierarchization needs to be done, placing the protection of the environmental quality as the main option to be followed. And there is no doubt that a strategy based on interdisciplinarity, on the method of globality of the analyses, on the constant consideration of the necessity of a fundamentally preventive vision, i.e. a plan strategy, has greater possibilities of success with respect to sectorial laws or politics. Today, in any case, reflection becomes an obligation: never before has the environmental conscience made such long strides in society and, today more than ever, what should be changed, must be changed. From laws to plans, therefore, we must regain what we believe is right and, in the meantime, renew what by now has shown itself to be outdated by our way of viewing the environment. Risk is always present: we may always have optimum laws, optimum plans, but our wretched political power will have to change. (shrink)

In this paper we characterize, classify and axiomatize all axiomatic extensions of the IMT3 logic. This logic is the axiomatic extension of the involutive monoidal t-norm logic given by ¬φ3 ∨ φ. For our purpose we study the lattice of all subvarieties of the class IMT3, which is the variety of IMTL-algebras given by the equation ¬(x 3) ∨ x ≈ ⊤, and it is the algebraic counterpart of IMT3 logic. Since every subvariety of IMT3 is generated by their totally (...) ordered members, we study the structure of all IMT3-chains in order to determine the lattice of all subvarieties of IMT3. Given a family of IMT3-chains the number of elements of the largest odd finite subalgebra in the family and the number of elements of the largest even finite subalgebra in the family turns out to be a complete classifier of the variety generated. We obtain a canonical set of generators and a finite equational axiomatization for each subvariety and, for each corresponding logic, a finite set of characteristic matrices and a finite set of axioms. (shrink)

Tomada desde Artaud por Deleuze ya desde la redacción de Lógica del sentido, la expresión de cuerpo sin órganos no deja de causar al menos perplejidad. En su enunciación se traman puntos cruciales de la filosofía de Deleuze desde su teoría del acontecimiento y de la diferencia, pasando por una definición y una analítica del deseo, hasta una determinada noción de vida que articularía el proceso de su generación. Sin desestimar lo anterior y los profusos usos y determinaciones actuales que (...) ha cobrado esta noción, nuestro propósito es vincular al CsO con la concepción de vida, que según nuestra lectura, se halla en la base de su formulación. Esto permanece en el texto como subyacente, y nuestra propuesta se inscribe en determinar el grado de influjo que posee el vitalismo de Bergson en la concepción de esta fórmula: desde este punto de vista es plausible sostener que el CsO es una operación que se funda de modo crucial en una lectura atenta al élan vital de bergsoniano. En suma, si el CsO es una involución creadora por definición de su proceso, no es sino porque su puesta en marcha significa y se efectúa en una constante y radical lucha que implica cada vez el desmontaje o desmembramiento de la idea de organismo.Taken from Artaud by Deleuze and from the writing of Logic of Sense, the expression of a body without organs continues to cause at least perplexity. In his statement plots crucial points in the philosophy of Deleuze from his theory of the event and the difference, to an analytical definition and the desire, to a certain concept of life that would articulate the process of their conception. Without underestimating the above and the profuse use and current measurements that has claimed this, our aim is to link the BwO with the conception of life, which according to our reading, is at the source of their formulation. This remains the underlying text, and our proposal settle on to determine the degree of influence that has the vitalism of Bergson in the design of this formula: From this point of view is plausible that the CSO is an operation that is based on crucially on a careful reading of the bergsonian élan vital. In brief, if the BwO is an involution of their creative process by definition, is merely because their start-up means and takes place in a constant struggle and radical increasingly involves the subtraction or dismantling of the idea of organism. (shrink)

continent. 2.3 (2012): 218–223 Vijay Prashad. Arab Spring, Libyan Winter . Oakland: AK Press. 2012. 271pp, pbk. $14.95 ISBN-13: 978-1849351126. Nearly a decade ago, I sat in a class entitled, quite simply, “Corporations,” taught by Vijay Prashad at Trinity College. Over the course of the semester, I was amazed at the extent of Prashad’s knowledge, and the complexity and erudition of his style. He has since authored a number of classic books that have gained recognition throughout the world. The Darker (...) Nations , a peoples’ history of the Third World, sent defibrillating shockwaves through an academic world that had almost forgotten the epic scope and historic dignity of the non-aligned movement and post-colonial struggles. In his recent, award-winning work, Arab Spring, Libyan Winter , Prashad delves into his capacious knowledge of the Third World to excavate the discourses and narratives surrounding the upheavals of 2011. “Revolutions have no specific timetable,” states Prashad in the opening line of this exciting and provocative look at contemporary events. Instantly, an atmosphere of suspense emerges. The reader is alerted to the problem of history. Does the making of history then involve a suspension of historical time, or is it a continuous narrative structure into which events must eventually be integrated? Arab Spring, Libyan Winter shows that the answer to the question, “How is history made?” lies just as easily in the asking. The first half of the book works through the events that transpired to bring about the explosive popular uprisings of Arab Spring: Tunisia and Egypt, Yemen and Bahrain. But the events are not put together in a cohesive, chronological fashion. Using an uncommonly gripping style more akin to the folk-story motif of the djeli than to traditionally Orientalist academia, Prashad suspends a given situation, points out its components, and traces back the characters and genealogies that define each link before resuming a narrative. Every moment is an end to itself, and an origin of something different. Thus, the making of history becomes the suspension of its own progress, it’s catastrophic 'stability,' in a process of differentiation through inclusion. Empirically, one might suggest that history is a condition of time, and by extension, of the subject, but history is also an eminent producer of the Subject and her concept of time through memory and narrative. Hence, history is often overdetermined by a dominant narrative of the sovereign. The apparently chaotic composition of Prashad’s historicity is, then, an interstitial morphology of resistance. It illustrates that the time to act for the revolutionary lies in the gaps within the dominant historical realities. It points out the sorties of signifiers constituting nothing in the obliterated ruins of history. Through such illuminations, Arab Spring, Libyan Winter breaks through “the surface of history” to elaborate revolution’s snapping synapses, exploding interruptions and breaches, connecting flows. Messianic Politics It is tempting to think, 'History is either singular, or it is diffuse. It is either one coherent factual narrative, or it is comprised of the aletheia of the multitude.' Yet the reader finds Prashad examining the structure of history on multiple levels. For Prashad, world history is shaped by geographically defined political movements, such as communism or national liberation, with historical agents like the working class for the former and the nationalist militant for the latter. Religion, however, is another matter: “Religion has an unshakable eschatology which a post-utopian secular politics lacks.” Within the telos of religion, there appears on the horizon the image of Benjamin’s thoughts on messianic time—time as “a small fissure in the continuous catastrophe,” a break with history, may contain an ultimate redemption of the human beyond the political power struggle. Succoring the split between geo-political and utopian-religious (messianic) time in the context of Arab Spring, Prashad indicates that the base of “the deep desire and commitment to some form of democracy” is forged by the affinity between eschatological Islamist politics with the People. To think about the Subject of messianic time in the context of the lack of a “coherent timetable” for emancipatory politics, it is perhaps best to return to the modern tradition of Martin Luther King, Jr., whose prefigurative blending of liberation theology and emancipatory politics became most important during his works of 1963, the climactic year of “The Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” the March on Washington, and the bombing of the 16th Street Baptist Church. In “The Letter,” King states the point bluntly: Frankly, I have yet to engage in a direct-action campaign that was “well timed” in view of those who have not suffered unduly from the disease of segregation. For years now I have heard the word “wait!” It rings in the ear of every Negro with piercing familiarity. This “Wait” has almost always meant ‘Never.” We must come to see, with one of our distinguished jurists, that “justice too long delayed is justice denied.” The timing of rebellious action must not be a part of history. It must change history. The kairos appears spontaneous and untimely in its convulsive, shocking presence, yet it is, deeper still, a path, a longue durée , forged through diligent and rigorous praxis. King put a finer point on the path of historic liberation in his declaration in his 1963 speech at Western Michigan University: “[T]ime is neutral.... Somewhere along the way we must see that time will never solve the problem alone but that we must help time. Somewhere we must see that human progress never rolls in on the wheels on inevitability. It comes through the tireless efforts and the persistent work of dedicated individuals who are willing to be co-workers with God. Without this hard work, time itself becomes an ally of the insurgent and primitive forces of irrational emotionalism and social stagnation. We must always help time and realize that the time is always right to do right.” Time, then, exists in “the neutral,” while action must turn to the kairos , not only of taking time, but taking the right time. By turning our relation to time into kairos , we move time from its context within history to a duration between histories—the longue dure?e of Messianic time. The implementation of neutrality in this context suggests a broad space of time to extend through the valley of positive and negative. In Roland Barthes’s lectures from 1978, the neutral takes place in this minimal distance of non-conflict that exists outside of two extremes. It is, in the words of Maurice Blanchot, “the non-general, the non-generic, as well as the non-specific.” For Blanchot, the neutrality of time permeates life as death, impassive and beyond control; such is the neutrality of messianic time, which permeates the charge of history, changing the "I" into the "one." The neutrality of time therefore implicates history in a case against extremism, showing that the work of the radical is not to tend to any particular side, but to have the time to navigate through the terrible terrain of history by altering its course, its patterns and rhythms of movement, connection, sociality. Hence, one does not simply “make history,” one alters the course of history in accordance to “the right time.” The historical path toward emerging power is transmitted as a gesture to the outside of history, against history; a gesture as simple as reaching out. Thus a counterhistory, to use Foucault’s term, is brought forward as the guide of time past a point of no return, a Rubicon, the point where the normal path of history falls to the past. The subject, who must be the only true agent of history, facilitates time through helpfulness, and both the Subject and her history become decentered in relation to one another. Yet history negates the neutrality of time. As Barthes discloses, although the neutral is the “thought and practice of the nonconflictual, it is nevertheless bound to assertion, to conflict, in order to make itself heard.” Engaged with history, time is charged with a destiny, and becomes an opposition. As Prashad insists, “For Arab lands, the events of early 2011 were not the inauguration of a new history, but the continuation of an unfinished struggle that is a hundred years old.” The emergence of the Subject during Arab Spring did not conceive of a new history, but changed the path of history toward a different destiny. “Historical grievances combined with inflationary pressures now met with the subjective sense that victory might be at hand—this was not simply a protest to scream into the wind, but a protest to actually remove autocrats from their positions of authority. The facts of resistance had given way to the expectation of revolutionary change.” The negativity of this charge toward “revolutionary destiny” rendered control, as a positive force, seriously lacking. The lack of control lies in the problem that the Subject is not totally detemporalized or timeless, but untimely in her presence. The Subject is untimely, because her work is visionary, and it is only through such visionary work that the Rubicon can be crossed. Still, the crossing of this border is haunted by anxiety over an impending disaster that lays in wait. It is only through the form of what Benjamin calls divine violence, captivated not with the justice of the means, but the ends—the transformation of history—that a revelation of history’s traumatic foundations can be liberated, and patterns and rhythms of time developed throughout obscured traditions awakened. In this situation, the Subject appears to be outside of right, but setting the state to rights. Because her position is correct, in-so-far as the rebelling subject rebels due to a lack of recognition, her representation appears outside of the norm, which is mistaken as right. Therefore, such visionary work must be carried out through obscured traditions, underground, away from the surveillance of empire. Explaining his method from the start along the lines of Marx’s metaphor of the mole, Prashad insists, “It is the burrowing that is essential, not simply the emergence onto the surface of history.” Arab Spring, Libyan Winter is a book on uncharted networks of time, spread out over the 252 pages like an elaborate spider’s web of passages intertwining with and overwhelming the machinery of the state. Although untimely, Arab Spring was not a flash in the pan, or a Facebook or Twitter revolution. Prashad notes that the government’s suspension of these tools led to further radicalism by furthering communications through face-to-face encounters. In existential terms, Arab Spring might be thought of as a revolution of Being over techne , an uprising of the unchartable, infinite potential of the Other. The name of this Other is found in Chance. The faith of the revolution lies in the proper decentering of the subject, its giving to the Other of time, for only with respect to time does history actually appear on the horizon of the subject, rather than as an imposition. This time of historical agency appears as a moment when anything can happen—a revolutionary truth event where everything comes into question while being realized in its Otherness as a community of the people begins anew in the streets amidst discourse, friendship, reconfigurations of hegemony, and a becoming of a constituent power. Throwing a wrench into the gears of the “cobwebbed tradition” of Orientalism, the decentering of history in Arab Spring, Libyan Winter is a defining quality of its impassioned revolutionary cry. But perhaps the most paradigmatic points of the book emerge from the unexpected voices. To make the connection between the particular manifestations of revolutionary demands to the general historic terms of revolution, Prashad quotes an anonymous young Egyptian in Tahrir Square, who reminds us, “[T]he French Revolution took a very long time so the people could eventually get their rights.” Far from timelessness, the historicization of Arab Spring must exist precisely within the most uncanny appearance of time, as something that does not appear to come from the natural state of time as we know it, but in arriving has completely transformed the way that we understand time. Strange Monsters Revolution is never as simple as a revolt from below against a rusting structure of elites trying to remain in power. As with the French Revolution, Arab Spring consisted of complex familial ties, outside interests, and religious factions fighting alongside, often in awkward juxtaposition to, liberals, working class parties, farmers, and students. It is perhaps because of this historically difficult and incongruous composition that the Arabic word for revolution is thawra , referring to the image of the bull, or thawr , which has religious significance as a pagan deity for the Ancient Semitic tribes and Cartheginians. If Daniel Guérin was correct in saying, “Anarchism and Marxism drink from the same spring,” then it is quite a different oasis that drove the thirsty beast of revolution through what Prashad calls, “the Libyan labyrinth.” Recalling Bataille’s Acéphale, the intestinal labyrinth gains significance as the mode of metabolism and rumination in which, “(the Acephale) has lost himself, loses me with him, and in which I discover myself as him, in other words, as a monster.” Unraveling the discourse of the revolution, the flows of power and hegemony—from Qaddafi’s nationalist coup in 1969 to the wars with Chad from 1978 to 1987, the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s to, finally, the War on Terror—we find that the metabolic process of Libyan Winter ends in the production of oil. In a process of what Prashad calls “involution,” Qaddafi’s bellicose policies, along with his attempts to nationalize Islam together with oil, mutated the source of his power, turning his house against itself. Already a divided nation, with its two major cities on opposite geographic sides of the country, Libya became split between two opposed political powers—liberal reformists and staunch nationalists—as Qaddafi’s political disengagement manifested through what can only be described in psychoanalytic terms as a recursive passage a l’act (mysteriously calling Wikipedia “Kleenex,” declaring that opponents drank hallucinogens with their instant coffee, and so on). Prashad declares, “The mercurial style that Qaddafi adopted was not about his personality alone, but also a leader’s natural response to a system that relied upon power brokers whose own loyalty… did not have any ideological commitment to the system.” As in the case of other nations during Arab Spring, the true expression of revolt was an outward exposition of what had inwardly been happening in microcosmic societies throughout the realm—from indigenous tribes to political parties, for a century, the people, partly motivated by (and in resistance to) economic impositions of development, had been changing the traditional social compositions and participating in what Ruth Wilson Gilmore calls, “the relative autonomy of the movement from the leaders.” It was this empowerment of political reconfigurations taking place under the context of new democratic assemblages that shocked the elites and evoked such a powerful response. Unlike Qaddafi’s awkward policy choices and rants, real acts of power from the West were clear and decisive. Prashad sets the stages of war and diplomacy, far removed from the deserts, mountains, and cities that forged the backdrop of popular politics. Taking place under the now-classic architecture of the “four pillars” of US interests—oil, the War on Terror, Israel, and the circumvention of Iranian hegemony—we find elites rubbing elbows in “Heliopolist cocktail parties and hushed conferences in Kasr al-Ittihadiya” as well as the Concorde-Lafayette hotel in Paris, which provides the setting for a meeting of anti-Qaddafi figures consolidating their power. These scenes are buttressed with the careful portraiture of key historical actors. As Prashad brings the stage of history to life, we find the diplomats and liberals like Frank Wisner, whose career has brought him from Enron in the late 1990s to the Obama Administration, under the aegis of which he was meeting with Mubarak about military support during Arab Spring. We spy the provocateurs, for instance, gauche cavalier , Bernard Henri-Levy, who telephones Sarkozy from Benghazi about the need for more NATO air strikes. We follow the rebel military establishment as it suffers mysterious deaths and even more mysterious assents (like that of apparent CIA cohort, Khalifa Hifter). In each of these intriguing characters, we find different representations of the security state biopolitique: an oil-injected reification that drives Arab Spring from the resentment of rising food prices to the brink of implosion in Libyan Winter. Reminiscent of the scenes of Cold War soirées represented in old Bond films, the aristocratic fight for oil against democracy that was Libyan Winter presents a harsh truth that the new global crisis is simply the continuation of the old history: the global exploitation of capitalism waged against the imagination of the people. As Benjamin laments, “The labyrinth is the right path for the person who always arrives early enough at his destination. This destination is the marketplace.” Yet, “(t)he labyrinth is the habitat of… a humanity (a class) which does not want to know where its destiny is taking it.” Thus, the labyrinth leads, like the desert, only further into itself. As Blanchot explains, “The desert is even less certain than the world; it is never anything but the approach to the desert.” Only the visionary can take time out of the involution toward oblivion. It is here, in this approach to and escape from history, that we find ourselves within Benjamin’s Golgotha, Blanchot’s desert: A space of indeterminate uncertainty where we become familiar only with our own exile. Blanchot writes, “For the moderated and moderate man, the room, the desert, and the world are strictly determined places. For the man of the desert and the labyrinth, devoted to the error of a journey necessarily a little longer than his life, the same space will be truly infinite, even if he knows that it is not, all the more so since he knows it.” The desert, as allegory, provides an eschatology, a mortality in the destiny of Arab Spring. But any allegory of nature might lead to a labyrinthine eschatology (for example, in Bachelard, the forest presents "a limitless world"); the prescience of the untimely is always an uncanny acceptance of the infinite within the finite—the outside of what is understood. Transgenerational and occupied with the image of the future, the untimely makes otherness its home as it proceeds toward liberation. In the work of helping time navigate this dangerous passage of history, Prashad illustrates that the more violent break with history may have occurred in the peaceable struggles of Tahrir Square, and not in the military clashes of Qaddafi with his former Generals who defected to the CIA and NATO countries. It might be possible to suggest, then, that in the case of Tunisia and Egypt, the historical subject of the people was drawn together in a Dionysian dance of different rhythms in the marvelous realm of the ancients, while we fear that the case of Libya suggests an Apollonian future where time, itself, may lay dying under the machinic hand of history. The properly Nietzschean inversion would follow: time is dead, for history has killed it. Yet, if time is dead, struck down in Golgotha, exposed in the desert, mauled by the thawra , it is only in the present sense that it is rendered impossible outside of the context into which the untimely has thrown us. Thus, if history becomes an art of revolution, life as being-towards-death (death as the provocation of the neutrality of time) becomes what Benjamin calls “the allegory of resurrection” through the glorious ruins of history. Prashad ends his work with a rousing finale: “The time of the impossible has presented itself. In Egypt, where the appetite for the possibilities of the future are greatest, the people continue to assert themselves into Tahrir Square and other places, pushing to reinvigorate a Revolution that must not die… For them the slogan is simple: Down with the Present. Long live the Future. May it be so.&rdquo. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the conditions surrounding the political as a movement and emphasises the question of the evolutionary process inherent within it. This introduces the teleological dimension that is complementary to its ontological counterpart. Politics is depicted as an evolutionary movement with a still-to-be-determined trajectory, resulting in an ontological change. It is essential to establish criteria for improvement against the alternative risk of involution and/or immobility. This necessitates an understanding of its point of origin and point of tension. Being political (...) and becoming political tend to interwine, often appearing indistinguishable within the political space, as there is always a threshold to cross or a door to pass through. Thus, it is crucial to comprehend which ontology characterises the political being and which parallel evolution is necessary to contemplate the political becoming. Therefore, politics understood as the movement towards the actuation of a never-ending becoming leads one to investigate three elements: (i) the possibility for the political movement to persist or cease; (ii) the reasons for this can/should happen; (iii) and the implications for being. In other words, this chapter investigates the possible relationship and its nature between the origin of politics and its ultimate goal. As has emerged so far, it is an exclusive prerogative of man to come from the countryside to access the political space embodied by the law beyond the door, the polis. Man is thus pushed towards and can make the movement to attempt passing through that door, thereby rendering its being already inherently ‘political’ (in power). However, despite this natural and inescapable drive towards the movement from the countryside to the city, it is not a given that man desires to second this path. The scope of this chapter is thus to investigate this impulse and the implications for the political being and becoming of man. Indeed, the door towards the political is difficult to pass through, and, in a potentially frustrating way, it leads to further doors. Consequently, man must take deliberate action to continue being political. Whether welcomed or not, to enter and persist in politics, man is subject to the obligation to move. This natural law precedes and determines man: ‘The man who is isolated, who is unable to share because he is already self-sufficient, is no part of the city […]. There is therefore a natural impulse in all men towards an association of this sort’ (Aristotle, Politics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009b [350 BC]: 11). Man cannot evade the obligation imposed by the law of being and remaining in politics. However, it may desire the opposite or be released (ab-solutus) from any (political) relationship. In this regard, based on what emerged in the previous chapters, it is essential to grasp the centrality of the concept of sovereignty. Drawing from Schmitt’s notion of the sovereign decision about the exception—and incorporating interpretations from thinkers like Derrida and Agamben—the political character of this desire warrants investigation. The desire to be unbound by any constraint reflects a desire for absolute sovereignty, not relative or relational. Such a desire alienates man from politics, which fundamentally involves the evolution and movement from an ontology characterised by this (childish) desire to an (adult) desire to dominate such infantilism, thereby striving towards the meeting with the city (relative sovereignty), or the meeting with the other. Politics is inherently evolutionary, as it constantly places man before the ethical dilemma of deciding between the desire to remain in oneself withdrawn from the city or to move towards the other in the city, between being and perceiving oneself as a monad or as a plurality. The decision is political when it promotes the approach to the other; otherwise, it is non-political, thwarting the evolution of man. Man’s political being requires a movement forward, as stagnation results in not being political anymore. This chapter, therefore, lays the groundwork for the discussion on relative and absolute sovereignty, which will become central to the subsequent investigation into the poverty and property of politics. (shrink)

A strongly deterministic theory of physics is one that permits exactly one possible history of the universe. In the words of Penrose (1989), "it is not just a matter of the future being determined by the past; the entire history of the universe is fixed, according to some precise mathematical scheme, for all time.” Such an extraordinary feature may appear unattainable in a world like ours. In this paper, I show that it can be achieved in a simple way and (...) discuss its implications for metaphysics and philosophy of science, including natural properties, free will, explanation, and modality. First, I propose a precise definition of strong determinism. Next, I discuss its philosophical ramifications and a toy example. Finally, I provide a realistic example of a strongly deterministic (and simple) physical theory---the Everettian Wentaculus. A surprising consequence is that whether or not our world is strongly deterministic may be empirically underdetermined. (shrink)

In this paper, involutive weak exchange algebras (for short, involutive WE algebras) are introduced and studied. Their properties and characterizations are investigated. Some important results and examples are given. In particular, it is proven that in involutive WE algebras, the properties (BB), (B), (*), (**) and (Tr) are equivalent. Moreover, involutive BE, involutive GE, involutive pre-BCK and involutive pre-Hilbert algebras are considered, their connections are established. It is shown that involutive WE algebras (respectively, involutive GE algebras) satisfying the commutative property (...) are Wajsberg algebras (respectively, Boolean algebras). Finally, the interrelationships between the classes of involutive algebras considered here are presented. (shrink)

I argue that free will and determinism are compatible, even when we take free will to require the ability to do otherwise and even when we interpret that ability modally, as the possibility of doing otherwise, and not just conditionally or dispositionally. My argument draws on a distinction between physical and agential possibility. Although in a deterministic world only one future sequence of events is physically possible for each state of the world, the more coarsely defined state of an (...) agent and his or her environment can be consistent with more than one such sequence, and thus different actions can be “agentially possible”. The agential perspective is supported by our best theories of human behaviour, and so we should take it at face value when we refer to what an agent can and cannot do. On the picture I defend, free will is not a physical phenomenon, but a higher-level one on a par with other higher-level phenomena such as agency and intentionality. (shrink)

An involutive micanorm-based logic with a weak form of associativity is introduced and its finite standard completeness is addressed. More precisely, we first introduce the logic WAuIBUL as a [0, u]-continuous wau-uninorm analogue of the involutive logic IBUL. We next discuss its algebraic semantics. We then introduce involutive wau-uninorms as involutive uninorms with weak u-associativity in place of associativity and deal with related properties. We last provide finite strong standard completeness for WAuIBUL using a construction of Yang-style. -/- 약한 형식의 (...) 결합 원리를 만족하는 누승적인 미카놈에 기반한 논리 체계를 소개하고 그 체계의 유한 표준 완전성을 다룬다. 보다 구체적으로 논리 체계 WAuIBUL을 누승적 유니놈 논리 IUML의 [0, u]-연속인 wau-유니놈 일반화로 먼저 소개한다. 그리고 이 체계의 대수적 완전성을 다룬다. 다음으로 결합 원리 대신에 약한 u-결합 원리를 만족하는 누승적 유니놈으로 누승적 wau-유니놈을 소개하고 그 성질을 다룬다. 마지막으로 유한 집합 위에서 WAuIBUL의 표준 완전성을 보인다. (shrink)

The Bulut Doctrine has been persistently misread as making a deterministic claim: that physical narrative parameters force specific emotional responses in every reader. This paper formally resolves this misreading. The Bulut Doctrine does not claim deterministic output. It claims probabilistic convergence — that a given physical matrix systematically narrows the probability distribution of autonomic nervous system responses across a reader population, producing a statistically identifiable cluster of biophysical outputs that is non-random and reproducible. This paper traces the source of the (...) terminological problem, demonstrates why the probabilistic framing is the correct scientific formulation, and adopts a formal terminological revision across all Bulut Doctrine publications. The revision does not retreat from the doctrine's core claims — it upgrades their epistemological precision. (shrink)

We investigate involutive commutative residuated lattices without unit, which are commutative residuated lattice-ordered semigroups enriched with a unary involutive negation operator. The logic of this structure is discussed and the Genzten-style sequent calculus of it is presented. Moreover, we prove the decidability of this logic.

_One summary of the great Kant's view, to the extent that it can be summed up, is_ _that he takes determinism to be a kind of fact, and indeterminism to be another kind_ _of fact, and our freedom to be a fact too -- but takes this situation to have nothing to_ _do with the kind of compatibility of determinism and freedom proclaimed by such_ _Compatibilists as Hobbes and Hume. Thus Kant does not make freedom consistent_ _with (...) class='Hi'>determinism by taking up a definition of freedom as voluntariness -- at bottom,_ _being able to do what you want. This he dismisses as a wretched subterfuge,_ _quibbling about words. Rather, the freedom he seeks to make consistent with_ _determinism does indeed seem to be the freedom of the Incompatibilists --_ _origination. Is he then an Incompatibilist? Well, against that, it can be said he does_ _not allow the existence of origination in what can be called the world we know, as_ _Incompatibilists certainly do._. (shrink)

This paper establishes several algebraic embedding theorems, each of which asserts that a certain kind of residuated structure can be embedded into a richer one. In almost all cases, the original structure has a compatible involution, which must be preserved by the embedding. The results, in conjunction with previous findings, yield separative axiomatizations of the deducibility relations of various substructural formal systems having double negation and contraposition axioms. The separation theorems go somewhat further than earlier ones in the literature, which (...) either treated fewer subsignatures or focussed on the conservation of theorems only. (shrink)

We investigate the fate of determinism in general relativity, comparing the philosopher’s account with the physicist’s well-posed initial value formulations. The fate of determinism is interwoven with the question of what it is for a spacetime to be ‘physically reasonable’. A central concern is the status of global hyperbolicity, a putatively necessary condition for determinism in GR. While global hyperbolicity may fail to be true of all physically reasonable models, we analyze whether global hyperbolicity should be imposed (...) by fiat; established from weaker assumptions, as in cosmic censorship theorems; or justified by beyond-GR physics. (shrink)

Baroque questions of set-theoretic foundations are widely assumed to be irrelevant to physics. In this article, I demonstrate that this assumption is incorrect. I show that the fundamental physical question of whether a theory is deterministic - whether it fixes a unique future given the present - can depend on one's choice of set-theoretic axiom candidates over which there is intractable disagreement. This dependence is not confined to hypothetical examples. It reaches into mainstream, foundational, and frontier physics, including fully discrete (...) systems, the preferred basis problem in quantum mechanics, and the dynamics of Kerr-like black hole interiors. I argue that beyond the familiar analytic notion of well‑posedness, a theory’s determinism profile depends on a regularity layer, on whether the definable sets that carry our ensemble and canonicalization reasoning are measurable, have the Baire property, and admit measurable selectors. Competing axiom candidates extending ZFC - namely, Gödel’s Axiom of Constructibility (V=L) and large cardinal (LC) assumptions strong enough to imply Projective Determinacy (PD) - diverge on these regularity facts. The divergence has three aspects. First, coherence: weak formulations presuppose measurability of coefficients and under V=L one can arrange definable pathologies that collapse the statement of the weak problem, while under PD all projective sets are regular. Second, uniqueness: many determinism results are ensemble claims (“for almost all initial data there is a unique continuation”) whose sense depends on measurability or Baire category at projective complexity. PD secures this, while V=L may not. Third, identity: when multiple admissible continuations remain, physics demands a canonical, representation‑independent choice. That demand is a measurable uniformization problem. PD supports measurable, symmetry‑constrained selectors at the Π¹₂ level, while V=L guarantees at most Δ¹₂ (possibly non‑measurable) tie‑breaks. I develop a number of live cases, showing how the regularity properties toggle with the metatheory. The upshot is that which extension of standard mathematics we adopt changes what our best‑supported theories say. I close by sketching a research program, reverse physics, on analogy with Friedman’s and Simpson’s reverse mathematics, whose aim is to map a theory’s physical content against the foundational axioms that make its ensemble and canonical claims intelligible. I conclude that, given the entanglement of set-theoretic metatheory and physics, either physical theories must be relativized to set theories (in which case physics itself becomes relative), or, as Quine (1951, 1990) controversially argued, the search for new axioms to settle undecidables may admit of empirical input. (shrink)

This paper develops the basics of the theory of involutive categories and shows that such categories provide the natural setting in which to describe involutive monoids. It is shown how categories of Eilenberg-Moore algebras of involutive monads are involutive, with conjugation for modules and vector spaces as special case. A part of the so-called Gelfand–Naimark–Segal (GNS) construction is identified as an isomorphism of categories, relating states on involutive monoids and inner products. This correspondence exists in arbritrary involutive symmetric monoidal categories.

The article puts forward a branching-style framework for the analysis of determinism and indeterminism of scientific theories, starting from the core idea that an indeterministic system is one whose present allows for more than one alternative possible future. We describe how a definition of determinism stated in terms of branching models supplements and improves current treatments of determinism of theories of physics. In these treatments, we identify three main approaches: one based on the study of equations, one (...) based on mappings between temporal realizations, and one based on branching models. We first give an overview of these approaches and show that current orthodoxy advocates a combination of the mapping- and the equations-based approaches. After giving a detailed formal explication of a branching-based definition of determinism, we consider three concrete applications and end with a formal comparison of the branching- and the mapping-based approach. We conclude that the branching-based definition of determinism most usefully combines formal clarity, connection with an underlying philosophical notion of determinism, and relevance for the practical assessment of theories. 1 Introduction2 Determinism in Philosophy of Science: Three Approaches2.1 Determinism: The core idea and how to spell it out2.2 The three approaches in more detail2.3 Representing indeterminism3 Orthodoxy: DMAP, with Invocations of DEQN4 Branching-Style Determinism 4.1 Models and realizations4.2 Faithfulness4.3 Two types of branching topologies 5 Comparing the Approaches5.1 Case studies5.2 Formal comparison of the DMAP and DBRN frameworks6 Conclusions. (shrink)

In a famous passage drawing implications from determinism, Laplace introduced the image an intelligence who knew the positions and momenta of all of the particles of which the universe is composed, and asserted that in a deterministic universe such an intelligence would be able to predict everything that happens over its entire history. It is not, however, difficult to establish the physical possibility of a counterpredictive device, i.e., a device designed to act counter to any revealed prediction of its (...) behavior. What would happen if a Laplacean intelligence were put into communication with such a device and forced to reveal its prediction of what the device would do on some occasion? On the one hand, it seems that the Laplacean Intelligence should be able to predict the device's behavior. On the other hand, it seems like that device should be able to act counter to the prediction. An examination of the puzzle leads to clarification of what determinism does entail, with some insights about various other things along the way. (shrink)

In this volume, Peter Furlong delves into the question of divine determinism - the view that God has determined everything that has ever happened or will ever happen. This view, which has a long history among multiple religious and philosophical traditions, faces a host of counterarguments. It seems to rob humans of their free will, absolving them of all the wrongs they commit. It seems to make God the author of sin and thus blameworthy for all human wrongdoing. Additionally, (...) it seems to undermine the popular 'Free Will Defense' of the problem of evil, to make a mockery of the claim that God loves us, and to make it inappropriate for God to blame and punish us. This work carefully formulates these and other objections to divine determinism and investigates possible responses to each of them, providing systematic and balanced discussion of this major philosophical and theological debate. (shrink)

This article surveys the difficulties in establishing determinism for classical physics within the context of several distinct foundational approaches to the discipline. It explains that such problems commonly emerge due to a deeper problem of ‘missing physics'. The Problems of Formalism Norton's Example Three Species of Classical Mechanics 3.1 Mass point physics 3.2 The physics of perfect constraints 3.3 Continuum mechanics Conclusion CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?

This book develops a new theory of determinism that offers fresh insights into questions of how intentions and other mental events relate to neural events, how both come about, and how both result in actions. Honderich tests his theory against neuroscience, quantum theory, and possible philosophical refutations, and discusses the consequences of determinism and near-determinism for life-hopes, knowledge, and personal feelings.

In this paper we aim to disentangle the thesis that the future is open from theses that often get associated or even conflated with it. In particular, we argue that the open future thesis is compatible with both the unrestricted principle of bivalence and determinism with respect to the laws of nature. We also argue that whether or not the future (and indeed the past) is open has no consequences as to the existence of (past and) future ontology.

It is often called “the problem of free will and determinism,” as if the only thing that might challenge free will is determinism and as if determinism is obviously a problem. The traditional debates about free will have proceeded accordingly. Typically, incompatibilists about free will and determinism suggest that their position is intuitive or commonsensical, such that compatibilists have the burden of showing how, despite appearances, the problem of determinism is not really a problem. Compatibilists, (...) in turn, tend to proceed as if showing that determinism is not a problem thereby shows that we have free will, as if determinism is the only thing that might threaten free will. In this chapter, I reject both of these elements of the traditional debate; the question of whether we have free will should neither begin nor end with the so-called problem of determinism. I present and discuss evidence from a variety of studies that suggests that incompatibilism is not particularly intuitive. Most people do not have to be talked out of incompatibilism but rather talked into it. This provides some reasons—though certainly not decisive reasons—to think that compatibilism is true. I conclude by pointing out that, even if compatibilism were true, it would not dissolve the problem of free will, because there are problems other than determinism that need to be confronted—namely, challenges to free will suggested by current and “future science,” including neuroscience and psychology. The threats to free will suggested by these sciences are distinct from the traditional threat of determinism, and they are the ones that “ordinary persons” find intuitively threatening to free will. In fact, I will argue that the reason incompatibilism about free will and determinism appears to be intuitive is that determinism is often and easily misunderstood to involve these distinct threats to free will—threats that suggest that our rational, conscious mental activity is bypassed in the process of our making decisions and coming to act. (shrink)

In appraising human actions, an important consideration is whether they are free. If they are compelled, this may be excusatory; if controlled by someone other than the agent, this may mitigate; and if selfishly motivated, this may invalidate excuses. Moral appraisals of action by non‐philosophers do not normally consider whether it can be free under determinism. Metaphysical inquiry about action, by contrast, seems incomplete if it does not consider this. Are there two free will problems, one normative and one (...) metaphysical? If so, they share such terms as ‘could’ and ‘could not’, and thoughtful non‐philosophers question their own normative assumptions once they understand the metaphysical problem determinism poses for the philosophy of action. This paper distinguishes metaphysical from action‐theoretic elements of the free will problem but also connects the metaphysical issues with normative questions about responsibility; it critically appraises some major metaphysical arguments concerning free action; and—to the extent possible in a single paper—it provides a positive account of free action neutral toward determinism. (shrink)

This volume assembles nine of the author’s essays on determinism, freedom, and moral responsibility in Western antiquity, ranging from Aristotle via the Epicureans and Stoics to the third century. It is representative of the author’s overall scholarship on the topic, much of which emphasizes that what commonly counts as ‘the problem of free will and determinism’ is noticeably distinct from the issues the ancients discussed. It is true that one main component of the ancient discourse concerned the question (...) how moral accountability can be consistently combined with certain causal factors that impact human behaviour. However, it is not true that the ancient problems involved the questions of the compatibility of causal determinism with our ability to do otherwise or with free will. Instead, we encounter questions about human rational and autonomous agency and their compatibility with preceding causes, external or internal; with external impediments; with divine predetermination and theological questions; with physical theories like atomism and continuum theory, and with sciences more generally; with elements that determine character development from childhood, such as nature and nurture; with epistemic features such as ignorance of circumstances; with necessity and modal theories generally; with folk theories of fatalism; and also with questions of how human autonomous agency is related to moral development, to virtue and wisdom, to blame and praise. In Classical and Hellenistic philosophy, these questions were all debated without reference to freedom to do otherwise or free will—. This volume considers all of these questions to some extent. (shrink)

Two constructions for adding an involution operator to residuated ordered monoids are investigated. One preserves integrality and the mingle axiom x 2x but fails to preserve the contraction property xx 2. The other has the opposite preservation properties. Both constructions preserve commutativity as well as existent nonempty meets and joins and self-dual order properties. Used in conjunction with either construction, a result of R.T. Brady can be seen to show that the equational theory of commutative distributive residuated lattices (without involution) (...) is decidable, settling a question implicitly posed by P. Jipsen and C. Tsinakis. The corresponding logical result is the (theorem-) decidability of the negation-free axioms and rules of the logic RW, formulated with fusion and the Ackermann constant t. This completes a result of S. Giambrone whose proof relied on the absence of t. (shrink)

“Branching space-times” (BST) is intended as a representation of objective, event-based indeterminism. As such, BST exhibits both a spatio-temporal aspect and an indeterministic “modal” aspect of alternative possible historical courses of events. An essential feature of BST is that it can also represent spatial or space-like relationships as part of its (more or less) relativistic theory of spatio-temporal relations; this ability is essential for the representation of local (in contrast with “global”) indeterminism. This essay indicates how BST might be seen (...) to grow out of Newton’s deterministic and non-relativistic theory by two independent moves: (1) Taking account of indeterminism, and (2) attending to spatio-temporal relationships in a spirit derived from Einstein’s theory of special relativity. Since (1) and (2) are independent, one can see that there is room for four theories: Newtonian determinism, branching time indeterminism, relativistic determinism, and (finally) branching space-times indeterminism. (shrink)

This paper concerns the question of which collections of general relativistic spacetimes are deterministic relative to which definitions. We begin by considering a series of three definitions of increasing strength due to Belot (1995). The strongest of these definitions is particularly interesting for spacetime theories because it involves an asymmetry condition called ``rigidity'' that has been studied previously in a different context (Geroch 1969; Halvorson and Manchak 2022; Dewar 2024). We go on to explore other (stronger) asymmetry conditions that give (...) rise to other (stronger) forms of determinism. We introduce a number of definitions of this type and clarify the relationships between them and the three considered by Belot. We go on to show that there are collections of general relativistic spacetimes that satisfy much stronger forms of determinism than previously known. We also highlight a number of open questions. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to give a brief survey the implications of the theories of modern physics for the doctrine of determinism. The survey will reveal a curious feature of determinism: in some respects it is fragile, requiring a number of enabling assumptions to give it a fighting chance; but in other respects it is quite robust and very difficult to kill. The survey will also aim to show that, apart from its own intrinsic interest, (...) class='Hi'>determinism is an excellent device for probing the foundations of classical, relativistic, and quantum physics. The survey is conducted under three major presuppositions. First, I take a realistic attitude towards scientific theories in that I assume that to give an interpretation of a theory is, at a minimum, to specify what the world would have to be like in order for the theory to be true. But we will see that the demand for a deterministic interpretation of a theory can force us to abandon a naively realistic reading of the theory. Second, I reject the “no laws” view of science and assume that the field equations or laws of motion of the most fundamental theories of current physics represent science’s best guesses as to the form of the basic laws of nature. Third, I take determinism to be an ontological doctrine, a doctrine about the temporal evolution of the world. This ontological doctrine must not be confused with predictability, which is an epistemological doctrine, the failure of which need not entail a failure of determinism. From time to time I will comment on ways in which predictability can fail in a deterministic setting. Finally, my survey will concentrate on the Laplacian variety of determinism according to which the instantaneous state of the world at any time uniquely determines the state at any other time. The plan of the survey is as follows. Section 2 illustrates the fragility of determinism by means of a Zeno type example. Then sections 3 and 4 survey successively the fortunes of determinism in the Newtonian and the special relativistic settings.. (shrink)

A recent paper by Jakl, Jung and Pultr succeeded for the first time in establishing a very natural link between bilattice logic and the duality theory of d-frames and bitopological spaces. In this paper we further exploit, extend and investigate this link from an algebraic and a logical point of view. In particular, we introduce classes of algebras that extend bilattices, d-frames and N4-lattices to a setting in which the negation is not necessarily involutive, and we study corresponding logics. We (...) provide product representation theorems for these algebras, as well as completeness, algebraizability results for the corresponding logics. (shrink)