Résumé Cette étude a pour objectif de déterminer la forme d’existence en tant que régime sémiotique. La forme d’existence est un agencement de propriétés, appartenant à divers modules d’analyse, dont l’entité renvoie à un code, se constituant ainsi en isotopie par rapport à elle. En particulier, l’étude examine le flagrant délit comme un modèle de forme d’existence dont les spécificités sont circonscrites par le code juridique. D’intenses interférences entre les formes d’existence et le code se produisent (...) de manière à ce que l’espace sémiotique de celui-ci soit contraint à se modifier, s’intensifiant/relâchant ou s’élargissant/rétrécissant, afin que de nouvelles formes d’existence y soient prises en compte ou réfutées. En dernier ressort, nous constatons que de nouveaux modes de sémiotisation apparaissent, par séparation ou par bifurcation, et augmentent l’intensité de l’espace sémiotique du code ou repoussent ses limites. La forme d’existence en tant que régime sémiotique nous permet d’appréhender les différences entre divers environnements sémiotiques ainsi que d’évaluer les évolutions ou les régressions apparues dans le même environnement sémiotique au cours du temps. Elle se manifeste alors telle une expression des tensions, des accumulations et des interdits, des refoulements et des compromis qui tissent l’environnement sémiotique. (shrink)

This book is both an introduction to and a research work on Meinongianism. “Meinongianism” is taken here, in accordance with the common philosophical jargon, as a general label for a set of theories of existence – probably the most basic notion of ontology. As an introduction, the book provides the first comprehensive survey and guide to Meinongianism and non-standard theories of existence in all their main forms. As a research work, the book exposes and develops the most up-to-date (...) Meinongian theory (called modal Meinongianism), applies it to specific fields, and discusses its open problems. Part I of the book provides a historical introduction to, and critical discussion of, the dominant philosophical view of existence: the “Kantian-Fregean-Quinean” perspective. Part II is the full-fledged introduction to the Meinongian theories of existence as a real property of individuals: after starting with the so-called naïve Meinongian conception and its problems, it provides a self-contained presentation of the main neo-Meinongian proposals, and a detailed discussion of their strengths and weaknesses. Part III develops a specific neo-Meinongian theory of existence employing a model-theoretic semantic framework. It discusses its application to the ontology and semantics of fictional objects, and its open problems. The methodology of the book follows the most recent trends in analytic ontology. In particular, the meta-ontological point of view is largely privileged. (shrink)

Kierkegaard's notion of the aesthetic covers at least two interrelated aspects. On the one hand, it defines a way of existence characterized by either the immediate embodiment or the reflective contemplation of life's possibilities. On the other hand, it indicates the investigation of those possibilities of life within the medium of certain works of art and narratives. Both aspects entail a critical approach to existence on the basis of ethical and religious presuppositions.

Hylemorphism is the view that objects are compounds of matter and form. Principle-based hylemorphism is the view that forms are principles of unity. In this paper, I want to rise a challenge to contemporary versions of principle-based hylemorphism. It is commonly acknowledged by principle-based hylemorphists that (i) each object has, associated with its sort, certain persistence conditions, and (ii) for an object to be of a particular sort is for it to have a particular (kind of) form. If (...) this is right, there must also be a close connection between an object’s form and its persistence conditions. The challenge to principle-based hylemorphism is to provide a reasonable explanation of this connection? I first argue that contemporary versions of principle-based hylemorphism fail to meet this challenge. Then, I suggest a modified version of principle-based hylemorphism – two-layered principle-based hylemorphism – that has the resources for providing the required explanation. (shrink)

As Emmanuel Levinas states in the preface to Existence and Existents, "this study is a preparatory one. It examines . . . the problem of the Good, time, and the relationship with the other [person] as a movement toward the Good." First published in 1947, and written mostly during Levinas's imprisonment during World War II, this work provides the first sketch of his mature thought later developed fully in Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence. This (...) new edition marks the first time this important work has been made available in an inexpensive paperback edition. Levinas's project in Existence and Existents is to move from anonymous existence to the emergence of subjectivity; to subjectivity's practice, theory and morality; to its encounter with the alterity of the other person. He is concerned here primarily with the time of the solitary subject; time is the inner structure of subjectivity, of the movement of existing. "Levinas's work," says Alphonso Lingis, "contains not only wholly new analyses of the forms of time of the present, the past, the future but also a new conception of the work of time." Beginning with Existence and Existents, then, it is possible to begin tracing the progressive "alterization" of time as it unfolds across the development of Levinas's entire philosophy. As a "preparatory" study, Existence and Existents introduces the major themes and concerns that occupied Levinas throughout his career. This is essential reading for understanding both Levinas's own philosophy and the developments in philosophical thought in the twentieth century. (shrink)

Kant said that existence is not a predicate and Russell agreed, arguing that a sentence such as ‘The king of France exists’, which seems to attribute existence to the king of France, really has a logical form that is not reflected in the surface structure of the sentence at all. While the surface form of the sentence consists of a subject and a predicate, the underlying logical form, according to Russell, is the formula given in. (...) This formula obviously has no subjectpredicate form and in fact has no single constituent that corresponds to the verb phrase ‘exists’ in the surface sentence. ∃x∀y The importance of Russell’s analysis becomes clear when we consider ‘The king of France does not exist’. If this sentence would attribute non-existence to the king it should entail that there is someone who does not exist, just as ‘Mary doesn’t like bananas’ entails that there is someone who doesn’t like bananas. Thus the idea that all sentences have subject-predicate form has led some philosophers to the view that there are objects that lack existence. This embarrassing position can be avoided once Russell’s analysis is accepted: if ‘The king of France does not exist’ is formalised as the negation of formula, no unwanted consequences follow. (shrink)

The article explores the concept of co-being as a form of existence rooted in ancient philosophy, particularly in the thought of Heraclitus. The authors argue that the problem of co-being – namely, the mutual existence of the human being, nature, society, and the cosmos – belongs to the sphere of fundamental ontological questions, as it reflects the mode of human existence in the world and its relation to the whole. The study traces how the ancient notion (...) of φύσις in the philosophy of the Milesian school, Anaximander, and Heraclitus shaped an understanding of being as a dynamic, self-unfolding process that maintains the unity of all forms of existence. Heraclitus’s principle of the unity of opposites, according to which conflict and tension constitute the condition of harmony, is interpreted as the first philosophical formulation of the idea of co-being. Drawing on interpretations by modern scholars of ancient philosophy (E. Theodossiou, V. Manimanis, R. Neels, K. Begley, N.-L. Cordero) the authors demonstrate that early Greek thought on phýsis presupposes a relational ontology, in which being is conceived not as a set of isolated entities but as a network of interrelations and mutual dependencies. This ontology of wholeness and interpenetration provides the philosophical foundations for contemporary ecological thinking. Within this context, co-being signifies not merely an ethical demand for coexistence but the very mode of human existence in which the individual is inseparable from the natural and cosmic whole. The ancient conception of world unity expressed through phýsis and logos is interpreted as a philosophical prototype of the modern ecosystemic model of being. The authors emphasize that a return to this worldview principle may offer a way to overcome technocratic and anthropocentric modes of thought that have contributed to the current ecological and spiritual crises. The restoration of co-being thus appears as an ontological precondition for the formation of a new ecological culture and an ethics of responsibility for the integrity of life. Therefore, the philosophy of co-being is understood not only as a rethinking of ancient heritage but also as a conceptual response to the challenges of modern civilization, which urgently requires the harmonization of the relations between humanity, nature, and the cosmos. (shrink)

To account for privations, Aquinas links being as truth to the question an est (does it exist?). When we ask, “Does blindness exist?”, the answer is positive because it is true that some people are blind. Kenny refers to this way of existing proper to privations as anitas and identifies it with the first-order existential quantifier. Moreover, Ventimiglia, following Kenny and Geach, while clarifying that in Aquinas privations and accidental forms are ontologically distinct, suggests that both privations and accidental forms (...) are said to exist in terms of anitas. This holds in the case of Frege, according to whom there is no need to distinguish between privations and accidents since they are both first-level concepts. But for Aquinas it is necessary to provide a clear distinction between them on the basis of a difference in their modes of existence. The author’s thesis is thus that it is not possible to account for both privations and accidental forms in terms of the existential quantifier unless, following Aquinas, we distinguish different senses of the existential quantifier expressing their different modes of existence, while avoiding the blurring of ontological distinctions. (shrink)

In this article I offer a novel explanation of Wittgenstein’s claim, in his Tractatus, that to represent the logical form of a proposition would require our being positioned outside of logic. The account here presented aims to exploit a connection, widely noticed, between the logical forms of objects and those of the propositions in which the names of those objects figure. I show that the logical forms of propositions may, on Wittgenstein’s view, be identified with places in logical space, (...) and that places in logical space are reducible to the forms of both objects and their names. I argue, though, that according to Wittgenstein the representation of a proposition’s logical form would require the existence of a place in logical space not so reducible. I conclude that on Wittgenstein’s position, the attempt to represent logical forms cannot, therefore, succeed. (shrink)

An original and constructive African though system with universal reach. Existence and consolation transcends the ethno-philosophies the dominated in the post-colonial period. While the African experience might lead one to say human life is pointless, the author argues that meaning comes in the form of consolation and is rooted in mood.

The paper aims to investigate the peculiar relationship between art and life in the context of Nietzsche’s thought. We mean to show how Nietzschean aesthetics is not conceived as a theoretical and rational reflection that abstractly investigates the conditions of possibility of beauty and art: on the contrary, aesthetics is understood by Nietzsche as a practice aimed at shaping life in a beautiful form. The topic of the Lebens-form is considered as a common thread of an original exegesis (...) of human types as aesthetic symbols of life within Nietzsche’s philosophy. Nietzsche’s notion of “becoming who we are” will therefore be understood as an ability to affirm and realize one’s life in all its potential. The Dionysian conception of art, which is considered in The Birth of Tragedy as an ecstatic inebriation that stimulates life and saves man from the tragedy of pain, will then be compared with the idea of ars vivendi, referring to the notion of wisdom and to the Hellenistic-Roman practice of ἄσκησις. (shrink)

Philosophers sometimes discuss the “ontological status” of this or that kind of entity. They _should_ be addressing one of the following questions, or the word _ontological_ is being misused: 1. Does X exist? 2. Under what conditions can X exist? 3. Do we have good reasons to think that X exists? All three questions can be asked about elements, and have been asked. Aristotle criticized the atomist account of chemical combination, according to which elements survive in their compounds. Eighteenth-century chemists (...) rejected the Aristotelian view, although tacitly; they simply assumed that an element lives on in its compounds. Nineteenth-century chemists gradually adopted (an adapted form of) atomism, according to which an element can exist wherever its characteristic atoms do. The periodic table also allowed them to ask, of its empty spaces, whether they correspond to real but unknown elements. Priority disputes forced them to consider when there is sufficient evidence for the discovery of new elements. In the 1920s, IUPAC proposed a very thin definition of an element, according to which an element exists wherever its characteristic nuclear charge does. But according to some scientists, it is now challenged by the fleeting existence of some superheavy elements; if a nucleus cannot survive long enough to acquire a stable electronic structure, then it cannot be said to have any chemical properties. How then can it be called a chemical element? In this paper I explore this latest ontological question, in the light of a sufficiently nuanced understanding of earlier ones. I then relate this discussion to a more general question about existence: the Special Composition Question. (shrink)

Argues that later developments in Leibniz's thinking about the relation between perfection and existence provide a more promising basis for a version of his ontological argument for theism – a version that is substantively metaphysical rather than purely logical in nature. These developments involve viewing existence not as one of the qualities into which an essence may be analyzed, but as entailing a higher‐order property or status that an essence may have. The revised argument rests on a strong (...) form of the principle of sufficient reason and on the thesis that a bias in favor of existence is built into the foundations of ontology. (shrink)

This article examines the evolution of the concept of existence in modern visual representation and reasoning, highlighting important milestones. In the late eighteenth century, during the so-called golden age of visual reasoning, nominalism reigned supreme and there was limited scope for existential import or individuals in logic diagrams. By the late nineteenth century, a form of realism had taken hold, whose existential commitments continue to dominate many areas in logic and visual reasoning to this day. Physical, metaphysical, epistemological, (...) and linguistic positions underlie both nominalist and realist views. Since the paradigmatic works on visual reasoning in the 1990s, formal diagram systems have been developed that revive either the nominalist or realist perspectives. Unlike in the nineteenth century, these are not motivated by philosophical views. Nevertheless, they may still have an impact on many areas of philosophy and science outside logic. (shrink)

Four accounts, three of them Kantian, of true sentences of the form “ exists” are contrasted. Russell’s theory that such sentences are meaningless is contrasted with two other Kantian theories that are analogous to one another: Frege’s semantic-ascent theory and the Frege-inspired ungerade (indirect, “oblique”) theory. Frege’s objection to the semantic-ascent account of identity is applied, ironically with equal force, against his account of existence. A second argument favoring the ungerade theory is offered. The argument is then refuted (...) through an application of a general strategy suggested by Kripke. A fourth theory, the deeply anti-Kantian existence-as-predicate theory, fully accommodates these results. (shrink)

Three different concepts of matter are identified: matter as what a thing is immediately made of, matter as stuff of a certain kind, and matter in the (dubious) sense of material ‘substratum’. The doctrine of hylomorphism, which regards every individual concrete thing as being ‘combination’ of matter and form, is challenged. Instead it is urged that we do well to identify an individual concrete thing with its own particular ‘substantial form’. The notions of form and matter, far (...) from being correlative, are relatively independent. There is nothing absurd in the notion of form without matter. Matter provides neither a principle of individuation nor a criterion of identity for individual concrete things: their form alone provides both. Finally, a substance ontology which admits also the existence of particular qualities, or tropes, is to be preferred both to a substance ontology which denies the existence of tropes and to a pure trope ontology. (shrink)

I shall here raise and attempt to answer -- given the constraints of space, rather dogmatically -- some fundamental questions as regards the fertile and far-reaching doctrine Ted Honderich has in the past called Consciousness as Existence.

This paper focuses on two arguments William MacAskill discusses with approval in What We Owe the Future. Both arguments support the existentially unrestricted form of longtermism that MacAskill favors, and both rely on moral principles that reflect a particular way of resolving the decades-old, Narveson-inspired, value of existence controversy. But it is questionable whether that way of resolving the controversy — i.e., against Narveson — has ever in fact been entirely grounded. Instead, many in the population ethics mainstream (...) have simply assumed that the controversy was happily put to bed soon after it first gained attention. Once we identify that assumption as mere assumption, we can see that the principles in question work, not as the solid underpinnings of an insightful resolution of the value of existence controvery, a resolution we ourselves are compelled to accept, but rather as dogma – thus the two dogmas of population ethics. That insight opens the door to an existentially restricted form of longtermism, a form that is arguably more attractive than MacAskill’s own. (shrink)

In Metaphysics M.2, 1077a9-14, Aristotle appears to argue against the existence of Platonic Forms on the basis of there being certain universal mathematical proofs which are about things that are ‘beyond’ the ordinary objects of mathematics and that cannot be identified with any of these. It is a very effective argument against Platonism, because it provides a counter-example to the core Platonic idea that there are Forms in order to serve as the object of scientific knowledge: the universal of (...) which theorems of universal mathematics are proven in Greek mathematics is neither Quantity in general nor any of the specific quantities, but Quantity-of-type-x. This universal cannot be a Platonic Form, for it is dependent on the types of quantity over which the variable ranges. Since for both Plato and Aristotle the object of scientific knowledge is that F which explains why G holds, as shown in a ‘direct’ proof about an arbitrary F (they merely disagree about the ontological status of this arbitrary F, whether a Form or a particular used in so far as it is F), Plato cannot maintain that Forms must be there as objects of scientific knowledge - unless the mathematics is changed. (shrink)

Jan Narveson has articulated a deeply held, widely shared intuition regarding what moral law has to say about bringing additional people into existence: while we are “in favour of making people happy,” we are “neutral about making happy people.” Various formulations of the Narvesonian intuition (closely related to the person-affecting intuition or restriction) have been widely criticized. This present paper outlines an off-the-beaten-path alternate construction of the intuition—the existence condition—and argues that that particular construction has the resources to (...) avoid some of those criticisms. But still other considerably more widely recognized alternate constructions have been offered as well. Thus John Broome outlines what he calls the neutrality intuition. While Broome finds the underlying intuition “strongly attractive,” he nonetheless argues that the neutrality intuition itself leads us quickly into inconsistency. Wlodek Rabinowicz disagrees. On his view, Broome’s inconsistency argument shows, not that the neutrality intuition is false, but rather that it doesn’t follow, from the fact that the outcome, or possible future or world, that includes the additional person is neither better nor worse than the (otherwise similar) world that excludes that person, that the one world is exactly as good as the other. The better view, according to Rabinowicz, is that, on occasion, and specifically when the coming into existence of additional people is at stake, the one world is incommensurate with the other. What is called the principle of trichotomy is, in other words, false. Difficulties arise, however, when we try to reject that seemingly compelling conceptual principle. This present paper concludes with the argument that the availability of the existence condition—which, together with certain other uncontroversial moral principles and a handful of conceptual principles, forms the existential approach—shows that we can maintain the most intuitive parts of neutrality intuition while avoiding both Broome’s inconsistency worry and Rabinowicz’s commitment to incommensurability. Incommensurability may be correct on other grounds—but not, this present paper argues, on the grounds provided by Broome’s inconsistency argument. (shrink)

This paper develops the metaphysical hypothesis that there are irreducibly collective pluralities, pluralities of objects that do not have a singular object among them. A way to formulate this hypothesis using plural quantification will be proposed and the coherence of irreducibly collective existence will be defended. Furthermore, irreducibly collective existence will be shown to allow for bottomless scenarios that do not involve things standing in relations of parthood. This will create logical space for an anti-atomistic form of (...) mereological nihilism. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on the study of contemporary physics, and follows the philosophical path in order to conceive the universal principle of the ontological difference between form and Content. The distinction between "form" and "content" is fairly recent. It started with medieval philosophy, which separated substance from accidents and essence from existence, while also conceiving substance no longer as an ontological substratum in an Aristotelian sense, but as an underlying thing. Equating on an ontological level Being and (...) Content as opposed to form leads us back to lines of inquiry investigated in ancient times. Beatitude, truth and power represent a trinity shedding light on a path that allows us to move toward considerations about Christian ontology, which is also associated with Being and Content. The chapter also aims to establish a relationship between the oblivion of Content and the oblivion of Time. (shrink)

Sider (Four-dimensionalism 2001; Philos Stud 114:135–146, 2003; Nous 43:557–567, 2009) has developed an influential argument against indeterminacy in existence. In what follows, I argue that the defender of metaphysical forms of indeterminate existence has a unique way of responding to Sider’s argument. The response I’ll offer is interesting not only for its applicability to Sider’s argument, but also for its broader implications; responding to Sider helps to show both how we should think about precisification in the context of (...) metaphysical indeterminacy and how we should understand commitment to metaphysically indeterminate existence. And if I’m right that metaphysical indeterminacy can allow for indeterminate existence in a way that semantic indeterminacy can’t, indeterminate existence might actually give us a reason to accept metaphysical indeterminacy (rather than a reason to reject it, as is commonly assumed). (shrink)

This dissertation advances the thesis that modern political freedom has an aporetical relation to the possibility of its own foundation. In the first volume, I examine how Machiavelli establishes the internal relation between political freedom and historical contingency that gives rise to the non-foundational concept of political freedom in early modernity. Far from reducing politics to the activity of providing secure foundations for the state, Machiavelli elaborates a conception of politics torn by the antinomical tasks of giving political freedom its (...) reality in the "form" of the state, and of restoring the anti-realist character of this ungroundable freedom in the "event" of the republic. These two irreducible poles of modern political life correspond to the basic political difference between the process of securing rule and the affirmation of a space of no-rule, where a common political existence is led in the absence of domination. ;The second volume illustrates how the historicist and anti-foundational character of modern political freedom can illuminate the situation of late modernity, viewed politically. The first trait of this situation is revealed by the problematic, yet inescapable, synthesis of political philosophy and philosophy of history. By exploring the reasons for, and the limits of, this synthesis I provide a new interpretation of the complementary ideas that freedom has a history and that history is the history of freedom in view of elaborating a postmetaphysical concept of political freedom. The second trait of the situation of modernity consists in the permanent possibility of situating politically the validity of norms, thereby putting into question the link between morality and metaphysically consolidated principles. Focusing on the contemporary debate over the tension between the validity of a norm and its application to a given situation, I argue that the erosion of metaphysical grounds for the determination of what is right corresponds to the priority assigned to political freedom over justice. This priority is manifest by the fact that, in the situation of modernity, the very difference between fact and norm is drawn on the site of politics conceived as an uncircumventable conflict of interpretations. (shrink)

Aquinas’ theory of being has received a growing amount of attention from contemporary scholars, both from a historic and a philosophical point of view. An important source of this attention is Geach’s seminal Form and Existence. In it, Geach argues that Aquinas subscribes to a tensed notion of existence and a theory of time according to which past and future entities do not exist in act. Subsequent commentators, such as Kenny in his Aquinas on Being, have agreed (...) with Geach on both points. In this paper, I argue that in several passages of his corpus, most notably those in which he is concerned with God’s knowledge of future contingents, Aquinas implicitly subscribes to a theory of being and time according to which: past and future entities are attributed existence in act, there is theoretical need for introducing a tenseless notion of existence. (shrink)

The idea that we may continue to exist in a bodiless condition after our death has long played an important role in beliefs about immortality, ultimate rewards and punishments, the transmigration of souls, and the like. There has also been long and heated disagreement about whether the idea of disembodied existence even makes sense, let alone whether anybody can or does survive dissolution of his material form. It may seem doubtful that anything new could be added to the (...) debate at this late date, but I hope to show that this is not so. I will explore the problem of disembodiment from a somewhat different direction than has been tried before, one that leads to what seem to me more interesting and more definite conclusions about its unintelligibility. Furthermore, the approach I will be taking puts both the traditional mind-body problem and the competing claims of dualism and physicalism in a fresh light that can help us to understand better the nature of our embodied existence. (shrink)

Giorgio Agamben and Ludwig Wittgenstein seem to have very little in common: the former is concerned with traditional ontological issues while the latter was interested in logics and ordinary language, avoiding metaphysical issues as something we cannot speak about. However, both share a crucial notion for their philosophical projects: form of life. In this paper, I try to show that, despite their different approaches and goals, form of life is for both a crucial notion for thinking ethics and (...) life in-common. Addressing human existence in its constitutive relation to language, this notion deconstructs traditional dichotomies like bios and zoé, the cultural and the biological, enabling both authors to think of a life which cannot be separated from its forms, recognizing the commonality of logos as the specific trait of human existence. Through an analogical reading between both theoretical frameworks, I suggest that the notion of form-of-life, elaborated by Wittgenstein to address human production of meaning, becomes the key notion in Agamben's affirmative thinking since it enables us to consider the common ontologically in its relation to Human potentialities and to foresee a new, common use of the world and ourselves. Giorgio Agamben e Ludwig Wittgenstein parecem ter muito pouco em comum: o primeiro se ocupa de questões ontológicas tradicionais, enquanto o segundo estava interessado na Lógica e na linguagem corrente, evitando os problemas metafísicos como algo de que não podemos falar. No entanto, ambos partilham um conceito crucial para seus projetos filosóficos respectivos: forma de vida. Este artigo tento mostrar que, apesar de seus diferentes enfoques e objetivos, a noção de forma de vida é fundamental no momento de pensar a ética e a vida em-comum. Abordando a existência humana em sua relação constitutiva com a língua, essa noção desconstrói dicotomias tradicionais como bios e zoe, o cultural e o biológico, permitindo-lhes pensar uma vida que não pode ser separada de suas formas, e reconhecendo o caráter comum do logos como o traço específico da existência humana. Através de uma leitura analógica entre ambos quadros teóricos, sugiro que a noção de forma-de-vida, elaborada por Wittgenstein para abordar a produção humana de significados, tornase o conceito-chave do pensamento afirmativo de Agamben, já que nos permite considerar o comum ontologicamente em sua relação com as potencialidades humanas e vislumbrar um uso novo e comum do mundo e de nós mesmos. (shrink)

"Analytic philosophy has leveled many challenges to Kant's ascription of necessary properties and relations to objects in his Critique of Pure Reason. Some of these challenges can be answered, it is argued here, largely in terms of techniques belonging to analytic philosophy itself, in particular, to its philosophy of language. This Kantian response is the primary objective of this book. It takes the form of a compromise between the real existence of the objects that we can intuit and (...) that get our knowledge started - dubbed initiators - and the ideality of the necessary properties and relations that Kant ascribes to our sensible representations of initiators, which he entitles appearances. Whereas the real existence of initiators is independent of us and our senses, the necessity of these properties and relations of appearances is due to their origins in the mind."--BOOK JACKET. (shrink)

This paper investigates the ontological characterization of Large Language Models (LLMs) like ChatGPT. Between inflationary and deflationary accounts, we pay special attention to their status as agents. This requires explaining in detail the architecture, processing, and training procedures that enable LLMs to display their capacities, and the extensions used to turn LLMs into agent-like systems. After a systematic analysis we conclude that a LLM fails to meet necessary and sufficient conditions for autonomous agency in the light of embodied theories of (...) mind: the individuality condition (it is not the product of its own activity, it is not even directly affected by it), the normativity condition (it does not generate its own norms or goals), and, partially the interactional asymmetry condition (it is not the origin and sustained source of its interaction with the environment). If not agents, then… What are LLMs? We argue that ChatGPT should be characterized as an interlocutor or linguistic automaton, a library-that-talks, devoid of (autonomous) agency, but capable to engage performatively on non-purposeful yet purpose-structured and purpose-bounded tasks. When interacting with humans, a “ghostly” component of the human-machine interaction makes it possible to enact genuine conversational experiences with LLMs. Despite their lack of sensorimotor and biological embodiment, LLMs textual embodiment (the training corpus), digital extended interface embodiments, and resource-hungry computational embodiment, significantly transform existing forms of machine automatism and human agency. Beyond assisted and extended agency, the LLM-human coupling can produce midtended forms of agency, closer to the production of intentional agency than to the extended instrumentality of any previous technologies. (shrink)

There have been three different approaches to Gorgias’ texts. According to the first approach, Gorgias’ treatise On What is Not is just a rhetorical parody of philosophical doctrines (philological or rhetorical approach). According to the second approach, Gorgias is just a nihilist (or a negative dogmatic or a forerunner of scepticism) attacking the doctrines of the Eleatics and the Presocratics (ontological approach). On the third approach (which attributes to Gorgias an interesting philosophical position): a) Gorgias is seriously interested in the (...) problems of predication and meaning (linguistic interpretation), and b) he wants to show that “nothing exists” in the sense that nonbeings like chimeras are manmade imaginary entities, i.e. mental images, icons (eikones), as he characterizes them (phenomenological/perceptual interpretation). Based on these philosophical interpretations, it will be shown that, in the 5th century BCE treatise On What is Not, Gorgias argues that nonbeing does exist in the form of mental images. An interpretation that is corroborated by Plato as well. (shrink)

Terence Nichols recently pointed to three examples from modern science that seem to refute Aquinas’ doctrine of the unicity of substantial form: water in man, organ transplants, and the genetic material received from one’s parents. These examples are intended to demonstrate the quasi-independent existence of parts from the substantial form of the whole. Nichols proposes modifying Aquinas’s hylomorphism by adding a third category of form, which can be called subsidiary forms, subsidiary wholes, or holons. In simpler (...) terms, a holon is a semi-autonomous whole within a larger whole. Nichols’ overall argument suggests that we revise Thomistic metaphysics to account for these scientific findings. I argue that Nichols’ suggestion is unwarranted for two reasons. First, Aquinas argues that holons are a logical impossibility within his metaphysical framework. Second, while Nichols rejects the virtual presence of forms, this does not demonstrate a failure of the Thomistic account of substances within larger wholes. (shrink)

On the standard view for something to exist is for one thing to exist: in slogan form, to be is to be countable. E.J. Lowe argues something can exist without being countable as one, however. His primary example is homogenous “stuff,” i.e., qualitatively uniform and infinitely divisible matter. Lacking nonarbitrary boundaries and being everywhere the same, homogenous stuff lacks a principle of individuation that would yield countably distinct constituents. So, for Lowe, homogenous stuff is strongly uncountable. Olson rejects Lowe’s (...) view and defends the orthodox connection between existence and number. He argues that if there is any stuff, there is a number of portions of stuff. Sider also rejects a stuff ontology, claiming it is incompatible with his preferred view that the familiar quantifiers of predicate logic carve at nature’s joints. Against these arguments, I defend the uncountability of stuff and the possibility of existence without countability. If to be is to be countable, more is needed than the arguments that Olson and Sider provide. (shrink)

Patočka and Merleau-Ponty are both interested in appearing as such. Both attempt to understand this in terms of the body. Despite this agreement, there is a fundamental difference. For Merleau-Ponty, the body’s determination of appearing is ultimately a function of its intertwining with the world. Indeed, its very status as an animated body or “flesh” involves the fact that, located in the world, it also is able to internalize the world that encloses it. This intertwining or “chiasm” is its (...) class='Hi'>form as flesh. For Patočka, by contrast, what is crucial is the body’s motility, a motility whose sense embraces all of its actions. He claims that “movement … first makes this or that being apparent, causes it to manifest itself in its own original manner.” I bring these approaches into dialogue by seeing Merleau-Ponty’s chiasm, not just as the form of flesh, but also as the form of its movement. (shrink)

Along the strike of this article we’ll try to perform two tasks. The first one is to review the world existence but not in form of concept but in form of modern scientific-philosophic system of views on the Universe structure and on the processes of formation and development of non-organic world, worlds of life and intelligence. The second one is to answer the question “what is the essence of human life?” through the scientific-philosophic understanding of the world (...) existence. (shrink)

Drawing on John Dewey's discussion of habit in Human Nature and Conduct and Simone de Beauvoir's discussion of the “adventurer” in The Ethics of Ambiguity, I argue that while some of our relations with things and people may very well be instrumental, many take a different form in which it is our very setting, and not merely our attainment, of ends that is at stake. Moreover, the fullest realization of our freedom requires us to recognize not only that this (...) different form of relation, which is cooperative rather than controlling, exists but also that it is constitutive of, rather than in opposition to, our freedom. I conclude by briefly examining how our honest acknowledgment of a kind of powerlessness inherent to our powers, to our freedom, might change the way we interact with other things and other people. (shrink)

En partant du constat que les significations du terme « utopie » varient en fonction des différents niveaux de langue (politique, professionnel, commun, etc.) l’auteur s’interroge sur les modalités des « expérimentations utopiques » dans la société. Dans la lignée des analyses de Paul Ricœur et de Robert Nozick, ainsi qu’en s’appuyant sur les conclusions de ses propres recherches consacrées aux représentations utopiques au XVIIIe siècle, l’auteur montre que l’utopie permet à l’individu d’exprimer son idéal de la société basé sur (...) des choix axiologiques personnels, ainsi qu’à fonder l’identité d’un groupe dont les membres disputent à l’idéologie sa prétention à la domination. Enfin, l’utopie sous la forme de fiction constitue un élément important d’un discours théorique portant sur les modèles institutionnels alternatifs et questionnant l’idéologie. L’étude des modes de l’existence sociale de l’utopie permet d’interpréter la façon dont elle se manifeste et perdure dans la société. (shrink)

This book examines an important area of Aristotle's philosophy: the generation of substances. While other changes presuppose the existence of a substance (Socrates grows taller), substantial generation results in something genuinely new that did not exist before (Socrates himself). The central argument of this book is that Aristotle defends a 'hylomorphic' model of substantial generation. In its most complete formulation, this model says that substantial generation involves three principles: (1) matter, which is the subject from which the change proceeds; (...) (2) form, which is the end towards which the process advances; and (3) an efficient cause, which directs the process towards that form. By examining the development of this model across Aristotle's works, Devin Henry seeks to deepen our grasp on how the doctrine of hylomorphism - understood as a blueprint for thinking about the world - informs our understanding of the process by which new substances come into being. (shrink)

Argues that later developments in Leibniz's thinking about the relation between perfection and existence provide a more promising basis for a version of his ontological argument for theism – a version that is substantively metaphysical rather than purely logical in nature. These developments involve viewing existence not as one of the qualities into which an essence may be analyzed, but as entailing a higher‐order property or status that an essence may have. The revised argument rests on a strong (...) form of the principle of sufficient reason and on the thesis that a bias in favor of existence is built into the foundations of ontology. (shrink)

This essay introduces central features of classical Hindu reflection on the existence and nature of God by examining arguments presented in the Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhatta (9th century CE), and the Nyāyasiddhāñjana of Vedānta Deśika (14th century CE). Jayanta represents the Nyāya school of Hindu logic and philosophical theology, which argued that God’s existence could be known by a form of the cosmological argument. Vedānta Deśika represents the Vedånta theological tradition, which denied that God’s existencecould be known (...) by reason, gave primacy to the revelatory texts known as the Upanisads, and firmly subordinated theological reasoning to the acceptance of revelation. Jayanta and Deśika are respected representatives of their traditions whose clear, systematic positions illumine traditional Hindu understandings of “God” and the traditional Hindu debates about God’s existence and nature. Attention to their positions highlights striking common features shared by Hindu and Christian theologies, and offers a substantial basis for comparative reflection on the Christian understanding of God’s existence and nature, and the roles of reason and revelation in knowledge of God. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Existence and the Good: Metaphysical Necessity in Morals and Politics by Franklin I. GamwellWilliam MeyerExistence and the Good: Metaphysical Necessity in Morals and Politics FRANKLIN I. GAMWELL Albany: State University of New York Press, 2011. 219 pp. $24.95In the current era, a few prominent philosophers have called into question the antiteleological tendencies of modern thought. For instance, Thomas Nagel argues that we should reject the antiteleology of (...) science and its “comprehensive, speculative world picture” of “reductive materialism” (Mind and Cosmos, Oxford 2012, 4). As a nontheist, Nagel proposes a “natural teleology” as a secular alternative to theism and to the nonteleology of science as a way to offer a more intelligible and holistic understanding of existence; yet he admits at one point: “Without God, it is unclear what we should aspire to harmony with” (Secular Philosophy & the Religious Temperament, Oxford 2010, 6). With less notoriety but with greater insight, Franklin Gamwell challenges not only modernity’s nonteleology but also its postmetaphysical outlook. By developing a neoclassical or process form of metaphysical theism informed by the works of Charles Hartshorne and Alfred North Whitehead, Gamwell spells out with thoughtful clarity what we should aspire to harmonize with in our individual and collective lives.Focusing on moral and political theory, Gamwell demonstrates that a coherent understanding of ethics (The Divine Good: Modern Moral Theory and the Necessity of God, HarperSanFrancisco, 1990) and politics (Democracy on Purpose: Justice and the Reality of God, Georgetown University Press, 2000) presupposes a neoclassical metaphysical teleology. Here, in Existence and the Good, he offers [End Page 228] a more concise, refined, and integrated formulation of these previous arguments as well as new engagements with important thinkers such as Martin Heidegger and Jeffrey Stout.Gamwell pursues metaphysics in both a “strict” and a “broad” sense: the former refers to critical reflection on the most general characteristics of existence as such, while the latter refers to reflection on the necessary conditions of existence with understanding (17–19). Beginning with the former, he argues that metaphysics properly conceived––in terms of becoming rather than being––is a valid and essential enterprise because “something exists” is necessarily true while “nothing exists” cannot possibly be true (25). He then seeks to show that metaphysics in a broad sense includes metaphysics in the strict sense because existence with understanding necessarily presupposes a metaphysical telos. Toward this end, he engages Heidegger on the metaphysics of subjectivity (chap. 2). Whereas the later Heidegger maintains that all understandings of totality are wholly dependent upon some lifeworld, Gamwell counters that “totality is prior to meaning” because “exemplifications of subjectivity are constituted by prior or nonconscious relations to an order of actualities and possibilities” (49).In chapter 3 Gamwell explicates his neoclassical theism by arguing that the metaphysical telos must be an all-inclusive divine individual. Distinct from Hartshorne, he posits that God does not relate to the world merely in terms of an integration of all past actualities but rather “cooccupies the locus of all contemporaries.” Thus, all “worldly enactment localizes the divine” (90). Gamwell offers here a metaphysical version of incarnation: “Localization of the divine means relation to a becoming that cooccupies one’s place in the world and, therefore, means a communion unlike any other, so that God, we may say, is ‘closer than hands or feet.’ As the metaphysical individual, God is literally the one ‘in whom we live and move and have our being’” (92).Gamwell concludes by engaging Stout on the underlying necessity of metaphysics for democracy. Whereas Stout offers an “ethics without metaphysics” in the form of a “specific pragmatism,” which holds that citizens can coordinate actions on the basis of “moral norms [that] are entirely creatures of historically located social practices” (134), Gamwell maintains that democracy requires “a metaphysical pragmatism,” because “the practice of democratic discourse itself, as all human practices, implies the necessary principle or principles of morality” (146). The key distinction here is between implicit and explicit: Gamwell submits that democracy implicitly presupposes the divine metaphysical telos because that telos is rooted in the very character of reality as such. However, this does not mean that citizens must explicitly recognize or hold... (shrink)

Une analyse rigoureuse des expressions théologiques majeures en Afrique - les engagements et les textes des évêques, les déclarations écrites des conférences épiscopales, les coalitions des Églises chrétiennes, les oeuvres de certains théologiens africains - révèle qu’il existe bel et bien une théologie politique en Afrique. Celle-ci s’articule d’une part, en forme de critique sociopolitique des systèmes injustes et d’autre part, en forme de proposition d’une vision alternative de l’humanité et de la société qui découle de la foi en Dieu (...) Trinité. Cela dit, dans le contexte actuel de reconstruction, cette réflexion théologique pourrait être prolongée en intégrant une nouvelle perspective, celle de combat sociopolitique à mener par l’Église qui considère la communauté politique non comme un ennemi mais comme un partenaire pour la construction ou la reconstruction sociale. (shrink)

There are two main formulations of a key causal principle in the Cartesian a priori philosophical system: one, present in Meditation III, says that the cause of the representational content of an idea must be situated at the same or higher level in ontology than the level at which the object represented is situated, the other, present in the axioms section of the Second Replies, says that the cause must contain the same property as is represented by the idea. This (...) central chapter defends four main contentions. The same‐property formulation is basic in Descartes's system. The notion of causality in the basic causal principle does not represent a spatio temporally extended natural process but a form of intentional explanation. When point is combined with the interpretation of the rule of truth offered in Ch. 2, the rule of truth and the basic causal principle prove to be equivalent. Finally, in light of, there is one main pattern of inference in Cartesian epistemology taking the rule of truth/causal principle as its major premise and underlying all of Descartes arguments from my ideas to the existence of things outside my ideas, including the proof of my own existence, the proof of the existence of God in Meditations III and V and the proof of the existence of the external world in Meditation VI and the Principles of Philosophy II,1. (shrink)