A letter to The Times of London, May 9, 1992 protesting the Cambridge University proposal to award an honorary degree to M. Jacques Derrida.

The proliferation of large language models (LLMs) can influence how historical narratives are disseminated and perceived. This study explores the implications of LLMs’ responses on the representation of mass atrocity memory, examining whether generative AI systems contribute to prosthetic memory, i.e., mediated experiences of historical events, or to what we term “prosthetic denial,” the AI-mediated erasure or distortion of atrocity memories. We argue that LLMs function as interfaces that can elicit prosthetic memories and, therefore, act as experiential sites for memory (...) transmission, but also introduce risks of denialism, particularly when their outputs align with contested or revisionist narratives. To empirically assess these risks, we conducted a comparative audit of five LLMs—Claude, GPT, Llama, Mixtral, and Gemini—across four historical case studies: the Holodomor, the Holocaust, the Cambodian Genocide, and the genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. Each model was prompted with questions addressing common denialist claims in English and an alternative language relevant to each case (Ukrainian, German, Khmer, and French). Our findings reveal that while LLMs generally produce accurate responses for widely documented events like the Holocaust, significant inconsistencies and susceptibility to denialist framings are observed for more underrepresented cases like the Cambodian Genocide. The disparities highlight the influence of training data availability and the probabilistic nature of LLM responses on memory integrity. We conclude that while LLMs extend the concept of prosthetic memory, their unmoderated use risks reinforcing historical denialism, raising ethical concerns for (digital) memory preservation, and potentially challenging the advantageous role of technology associated with the original values of prosthetic memory. (shrink)

A mental state is luminous if, whenever an agent is in that state, they are in a position to know that they are. Following Timothy Williamson’s Knowledge and Its Limits, a wave of recent work has explored whether there are any non-trivial luminous mental states. A version of Williamson’s anti-luminosity appeals to a safety- theoretic principle connecting knowledge and confidence: if an agent knows p, then p is true in any nearby scenario where she has a similar level of confidence (...) in p. However, the relevant notion of confidence is relatively underexplored. This paper develops a precise theory of confidence: an agent’s degree of confidence in p is the objective chance they will rely on p in practical reasoning. This theory of confidence is then used to critically evaluate the anti-luminosity argument, leading to the surprising conclusion that although there are strong reasons for thinking that luminosity does not obtain, they are quite different from those the existing literature has considered. In particular, we show that once the notion of confidence is properly understood, the failure of luminosity follows from the assumption that knowledge requires high confidence, and does not require any kind of safety principle as a premise. (shrink)

People often fail to detect large changes to scenes, provided that the changes occur during a visual disruption. This phenomenon, known as ''change blindness,'' occurs both in the laboratory and in real-world situations in which changes occur unexpectedly. The pervasiveness of the inability to detect changes is consistent with the theoretical notion that we internally represent relatively little information from our visual world from one glance at a scene to the next. However, evidence for change blindness does not necessarily imply (...) the absence of such a representation-people could also miss changes if they fail to compare an existing representation of the pre-change scene to the post-change scene. In three experiments, we show that people often do have a representation of some aspects of the pre-change scene even when they fail to report the change. And, in fact, they appear to ''discover'' this memory and can explicitly report details of a changed object in response to probing questions. The results of these real-world change detection studies are discussed in the context of broader claims about change blindness. (shrink)

This paper investigates the nature of, and distinctions between, ‘ordinary’ and ‘sceptical’ doubts regarding our knowledge of the external world, and their relationship to such doubts regarding our knowledge of other minds. It introduces a framework for distinguishing these doubts within the context of external world scepticism and evaluates its applicability, often just assumed, to the problem of other minds. This evaluation is achieved by contrasting the views of Marie McGinn and Stanley Cavell, and their interpretations of Wittgenstein's notion of (...) an attitude, which are shown to hinge on this question. It concludes, via a distinction in the staging of each scepticism, that we can't straightforwardly import the framework of doubts from external world scepticism to the problem of other minds. This undermines McGinn's response to the problem and explains some commonly misunderstood insights of Cavell's work. (shrink)

Paul Ricœur describes two ‘ruinous alternatives’ often reached interpreting translation philosophically: either translation is taken as a mechanical process, and there is a theoretical search for a logically universal language in which all words can be at home, or the diversity of languages and natural limits of translation motivate scepticism regarding the possibility of translation. This paper shows how these alternatives, as represented by Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and Quine’s ‘radical translation’, tend to collapse into and “translate each other” (Derrida 57) due (...) to a shared intellectual standpoint which theorises our human limits (the finitude of translation) as limitations (fatal or sceptical flaws). -/- I demonstrate how Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations and its vision of language respond to these philosophical theorisations of translation by accepting the human limits to translation and reclaiming and returning us to our ordinary practice of translation. (shrink)

This essay responds to the helpful criticisms of Valuing Health: Well-Being, Freedom, and Suffering, which have been offered by Elselijn Kingma, Adam Oliver, Anna Alexandrova, Alex Voorhoeve, Erik Nord and James Wilson. I am extremely grateful to Jonathan Wolf and especially James Wilson for arranging a one-day conference on my book, Valuing Health: Well-Being, Freedom, and Suffering [Hausman, D.. Valuing Health: Well-Being, Freedom, and Suffering. Oxford: Oxford University Press.], and for publishing this symposium. I am also grateful to the wonderful (...) six scholars who took the time to study my work and to offer perceptive and helpful criticisms. Without unduly trying the patience of readers, I cannot respond to all their remarks, but I hope that in what follows I have replied to the most important of their comments on the arguments and conclusions of Valuing Health. Before I begin these replies, a brief synopsis of Valuing Health may be helpful to the reader. (shrink)

Change blindness is the striking failure to see large changes that normally would be noticed easily. Over the past decade this phenomenon has greatly contributed to our understanding of attention, perception, and even consciousness. The surprising extent of change blindness explains its broad appeal, but its counterintuitive nature has also engendered confusions about the kinds of inferences that legitimately follow from it. Here we discuss the legitimate and the erroneous inferences that have been drawn, and offer a set of requirements (...) to help separate them. In doing so, we clarify the genuine contributions of change blindness research to our understanding of visual perception and awareness, and provide a glimpse of some ways in which change blindness might shape future research. (shrink)

Our recent opinion article [1] examined what change blindness can and cannot tell us about visual representations. Among other things, we argued that change blindness can tell us a lot about how visual representations can be used, but little about their extent. We and others found the ‘sparse representations’ view appealing (and still do), and initially made the overly strong claim that change blindness supports the conclusion of sparse representations [2,3]. We wrote our article because change blindness continues to be (...) taken as evidence for sparse – or even absent – representations, and we used O’Regan and Noë’s influential paper [4] as an example. However, as has been noted for some time [5–8], this conclusion is logically flawed: lack of ability need not be caused by lack of representation. (shrink)

In this paper, I order the thinking of Friedrich Waismann, Gordon Baker, and Rupert Read into what I call the Freedom View (FV). I justify this labelling by demonstrating their inter-influence and evolving articulation of a shared framework that conceives the problems, aims, and method of (Wittgenstein’s) philosophy to be defined by freedom. The Freedom View is one of the most consequential, yet frequently misunderstood, explications of the therapeutic aspects of Wittgenstein’s later work. This interpretative labour enables an informed assessment (...) of the merit of such a view. While the FV offers a coherent and provocative reading of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, I argue, drawing on Heidegger’s criticisms of Kant’s conception of orientation, that it ultimately fails to capture the sense of ordinary orientation invoked by Wittgenstein in §123: “A philosophical problem has the form: ‘I don’t know my way about’”. As such, the FV is partial and incomplete, unable to recognise a significant dimension to Wittgenstein’s thought. (shrink)

Grenville and Lauderdale were both important figures of British political life at the turn of the nineteenth century. Both of them were particularly interested in the emerging science of political economy, and were amongst the few politicians of this rank to write extensively on this topic. While they were raised in the same Whig political tradition, they chose opposite sides when William Pitt seceded from the party to become prime minister in 1783. This article examines how Lauderdale and Grenville wove (...) economic arguments into their political discourse to defend their positions on varied issues: the war with France, the funding system and the sinking fund, the fiscal policy and the introduction of an income tax, the Corn Laws, the gold standard and the resumption of cash payments. Grenville and Lauderdale’s views gradually converged as they collaborated in Grenville’s Ministry of all the talents. Both took their distance from the Whig party in the 1820s, which was increasingly influenced by the radicals, to adopt a more conservative stance. This raises the question of their relationship towards ‘Christian political economy’, displaying the specific position occupied by these Whig Statesmen of the eighteenth century in the new industrial world. (shrink)

Research over the past half century has produced extensive evidence that observers cannot report or retain all of the details of their visual world from one moment to the next. During the past decade, a new set of studies has illustrated just how pervasive these limits are. For example, early evidence for the failure to detect changes to simple dot patterns (Phillips, 1974) and arrays of letters (Pashler, 1988) generalizes to more naturalistic displays such as photographs and motion pictures (e.g., (...) Levin & Simons, 1997; Rensink, O’Regan, & Clark, 1997; see Rensink, 2002 for a recent review). This failure to report changes (change blindness) can be induced in both simple and naturalistic displays, whenever the change co-occurs with a visual disruption such as an eye movement (Currie, McConkie, Carlson-Radvansky, & Irwin, 1995; Hollingworth, Schrock, & Henderson, 2001), image shift (Blackmore, Brelstaff, Nelson, & Troscianko, 1995), flashed blank screen (Rensink et al., 1997), blink (O’Regan, Deubel, Clark, & Rensink, 2000), transient (O’Regan, Rensink, & Clark, 1999; Rensink, O’Regan, & Clark, 2000), movie cut or pan (Levin & Simons, 1997; Simons, 1996), or an occlusion event (Levin, Simons, Angelone, & Chabris, 2002; Simons & Levin, 1998). Change blindness can also occur in the absence of a disruption, provided the change occurs gradually enough that it does not attract attention (Simons, Franconeri, & Reimer, 2000). -/- Failures of visual awareness have been induced in a number of ways. For example, observers often fail to report a visible but unexpected stimulus when attention is focused on some other object or event in the display (inattentional blindness). As for change blindness, inattentional blindness occurs for both simple (Mack & Rock, 1998; Most et al., 2001) and naturalistic stimuli (Simons & Chabris, 1999). Similarly, repeated instances of an item often go undetected when embedded in a rapid sequence (repetition blindness), a phenomenon that occurs for both words and pictures (Kanwisher, 1987; Kanwisher & Potter, 1990). Observers can also fail to detect a stimulus in a rapid stream of stimuli provided they had to perform an attention-demanding task shortly before the stimulus appeared (Shapiro, Arnell, & Raymond, 1997). The surprisingly large variety of conditions that induce failures of conscious perception reinforces the broad conclusion that we are often unaware of what would otherwise be fully-visible stimuli. -/- Along with an increased appreciation of the limitations of visual awareness has come a renewed interest in using these limitations to explore the nature of the representations and processes underlying our visual experience. Are these limitations due to failures of perception? Of attention? Of memory? What is preserved with and without awareness? -/- The papers in this special issue of the Journal of Vision provide examples of exciting new work on induced failures of visual awareness and the mechanisms that underlie them. For example, several papers examine whether observers are drawn to parts of a display by the stimulus features or whether top-down control or semantic comprehension influence search through a display. Others investigate the nature of and limits on the information that is preserved from one view to the next and how much information needs to be retained for effective perception and action. As guest editors, we hope that this special issue will illustrate how studying the relationship between visual awareness and visual representations can lead to important new insights into the nature of seeing. (shrink)

Social norms – rules governing which behaviours are deemed appropriate or inappropriate within a given community – are typically taken to be uniquely human. Recently, this position has been challenged by a number of philosophers, cognitive scientists, and ethologists, who have suggested that social norms may also be found in certain non-human animal communities. Such claims have elicited considerable scepticism from norm cognition researchers, who doubt that any non-human animals possess the psychological capacities necessary for normative cognition. However, there is (...) little agreement among these researchers about what these psychological prerequisites are. This makes empirical study of animal social norms difficult, since it is not clear what we are looking for and thus what should count as behavioural evidence for the presence (or absence) of social norms in animals. To break this impasse, we offer an approach that moves beyond contested psychological criteria for social norms. This approach is inspired by the animal culture research program, which has made a similar shift away from heavily psychological definitions of ‘culture’ and to become organized around a cluster of more empirically tractable concepts of culture. Here, we propose an analogous set of constructs built around the core notion of a normative regularity, which we define as a socially maintained pattern of behavioural conformity within a community. We suggest methods for studying potential normative regularities in wild and captive primates. We also discuss the broader scientific and philosophical implications of this research program with respect to questions of human uniqueness, animal welfare and conservation. (shrink)

Despite strong evidence that autonomy enhances motivation and achievement, few interventions for promoting student autonomy in higher education have been developed and empirically tested. Here, we demonstrate how two autonomy-supportive policies effectively increase classroom attendance and subject mastery. First, in a randomized controlled field study, we explored the effect of allowing students to choose whether to make their attendance mandatory (i.e., a component of their course grades). We found that nearly all students used the opportunity as a pre-commitment device and (...) were subsequently more likely to attend class than were students whose attendance had been mandated. Second, in a multi-year cohort study, we explored the effect of allowing students to opt out of a challenging, high-effort assessment stream, finding that students given greater autonomy invested more effort into their assignments and attained greater proficiency with the material. We discuss other opportunities for applying choice architecture to improve learning, motivation, and well-being in higher education. (shrink)

This article grows out of the conviction that (some) films can philosophise. It looks to juxtapose the film Dogtooth and Wittgenstein's builders' example, such that they are seen as philosophising in similar ways over similar issues. Both strike me as probing the possibility—or denial—of a future with language. Using Stanley Cavell and Rush Rhees' responses to Wittgenstein's builders, I register the significance and meaning of themes from the film and Wittgenstein's work in a mutually enlightening way: language, games and breaking (...) free. This results in two different pictures of our hope of a future in and with language. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis essay compares and contrasts Zalabardo’s reading of the purpose of the Tractatus, and its use of nonsense, with the ‘resolute’ and ‘ineffabalist’ readings. First determining that it sh...

This paper addresses the ways in which asylum seekers in the UK manage making complaints about their host country. The authors demonstrate that asylum seekers have fled dangerous situations in their countries of origin and then can face difficulties and hostility in the UK. A discursive psychological approach is used to assess the ways in which asylum seekers made complaints regarding their treatment. Interviews were conducted in a refugee centre in the Midlands with nine asylum seekers and were transcribed for (...) a discourse analysis to be conducted. Analysis of the data showed that participants criticised the asylum system for being unfair. They also made claims about not being happy in the UK, but did so in ways that downgraded the problem so as to manage the possible dilemma of appearing ungrateful and undermining their reasons for claiming asylum. The problems associated with these strategies are discussed. (shrink)

Ontologies and thesauri structure concepts and, from the perspective of a practitioner, do not appear to be very different. Nevertheless, experts acknowledge that ontologies are different from thesauri in several respects. In this paper we aim to clarify some of the similarities and differences by systematically comparing the structure of each: the relations and their relata in ontologies and the relationships and their relata in thesauri. In particular, we analyze thesaurus relationships and their relata as they are defined in the (...) latest version of the international (ISO) thesaurus standard against formally well-defined ontological relationships and relata from ontology literature – more specifically ontology literature based in realism. We have found that the relata as well as the relationships in thesauri need to be classified further before any reasonable matching to formal ontological relationships is possible. Isolated hierarchical relationships in thesauri then may correspond to the is-a relationship, specific mereological relationships, or fundamental relationships such as the instantiation between universals and individuals in ontologies. Determining how such correspondences apply in domain-specific cases depends on whether the thesaurus relationships contribute to the specifications of necessary and sufficient conditions for their respective relata in the ontology – a function that relationships do not have in thesauri. Our findings make it clear that thesauri require structural and definitional reengineering in order to be reused or treated as ontologies, but that adherence to the international standard for thesauri provides a good base for such reengineering. (shrink)

If a gorilla walked out into the middle of a basketball pitch, you’d notice it.

One of the main limitations of natural language‐based approaches to meaning is that they do not incorporate multimodal representations the way humans do. In this study, we evaluate how well different kinds of models account for people's representations of both concrete and abstract concepts. The models we compare include unimodal distributional linguistic models as well as multimodal models which combine linguistic with perceptual or affective information. There are two types of linguistic models: those based on text corpora and those derived (...) from word association data. We present two new studies and a reanalysis of a series of previous studies. The studies demonstrate that both visual and affective multimodal models better capture behavior that reflects human representations than unimodal linguistic models. The size of the multimodal advantage depends on the nature of semantic representations involved, and it is especially pronounced for basic‐level concepts that belong to the same superordinate category. Additional visual and affective features improve the accuracy of linguistic models based on text corpora more than those based on word associations; this suggests systematic qualitative differences between what information is encoded in natural language versus what information is reflected in word associations. Altogether, our work presents new evidence that multimodal information is important for capturing both abstract and concrete words and that fully representing word meaning requires more than purely linguistic information. Implications for both embodied and distributional views of semantic representation are discussed. (shrink)

Insight has been investigated under the assumption that participants solve insight problems with insight processes and/or experiences. A recent trend has involved presenting participants with the solution and analysing the resultant experience as if insight has taken place. We examined self-reports of the aha experience, a defining aspect of insight, before and after feedback, along with additional affective components of insight (e.g., pleasure, surprise, impasse). Classic insight problems, compound remote associates, and non-insight problems were randomly interleaved and presented to participants. (...) Solution feedback increased ratings of aha experience in both insight and non-insight problems, with this result being driven by responses to solutions that were initially incorrectly generated. Ratings of aha for correctly generated solutions decreased after the correct solution was presented. These findings have implications for insight research paradigms as well as informing teaching methods. (shrink)

Conspiracy beliefs have been linked to perceptions of collective victimhood. We adopt an individual perspective on victimhood by investigating the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and the individual disposition to perceive and react to injustice as a victim, i.e., victim justice sensitivity (VJS). Data from two German samples (Ns = 370, 373) indicated a positive association between VJS and conspiracy mentality beyond conceptually related covariates (e.g., mistrust). In a multinational sample from 15 countries (N = 14,978), VJS was positively associated with (...) both general and specific conspiracy beliefs (about vaccines and climate change) within countries, though these associations varied across countries. However, economic, sociopolitical and cultural country-level factors that might explain the cross-country variability (e.g., GDP, Human Freedom Index, individualism–collectivism), including indices of collective exposure to direct violence, did not moderate the studied associations. Future research should investigate the relationship between victimhood and conspiracy beliefs, considering both intraindividual and intergroup perspectives. (shrink)

In this paper, we investigate a large-scale financial statement fraud to better understand the process by which individuals are recruited to participate in financial statement fraud schemes. The case reveals that perpetrators often use power to recruit others to participate in fraudulent acts. To illustrate how power is used, we propose a model, based upon the classical French and Raven taxonomy of power, that explains how one individual influences another individual to participate in financial statement fraud. We also provide propositions (...) for future research. (shrink)

Attempts to understand visual attention have produced models based on location, in which attention selects particular regions of space, and models based on other visual attributes . Previous studies of inattentional blindness have contributed to our understanding of attention by suggesting that the detection of an unexpected object depends on the distance of that object from the spatial focus of attention. When the distance of a briefly flashed object from both fixation and the focus of attention is systematically varied, detection (...) appears to have a location-based component. However, the likelihood that people will detect an unexpected event in sustained and dynamic displays may depend on more than just spatial location. We investigated the influence of spatial location on inattentional blindness under precisely controlled, sustained and dynamic conditions. We found that although location-based models cannot fully account for the detection of unexpected objects, spatial location does play a role even when displays are visible for an extended period. (shrink)