This work of intellectual and cultural history seeks to understand the recurring connection of teaching with contradiction in some major texts of the European Middle Ages. It moves comfortably between patristic and monastic exegesis, the Paris schools of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and late medieval Spain; between Latin and vernacular, between religious and secular. It assimilates the methodologies of religious and erotic texts, thereby displaying the investment of each in the sensuality and analytical power of language. The book begins (...) by exploring Christian exegesis, in which biblical contradiction is the textual incarnation of a Truth that is at once and paradoxically singular and multiple. Exegesis teaches us of the possibility of maintaining the truth in one biblical proposition and, equally and simultaneously, in its apparent opposite. Under the aegis of dialectic and the Aristotelian rule of non-contradiction, however, we are next taught to read either/or, and to resolve contradiction not through suspension and multiplicity, as in exegesis, but rather through a judgment that favors either one proposition or the other. The writers studied here are John of Salisbury, whose Metalogicon is an ostensibly moderating critique of the intellectual extremism of the School of Paris logicians, and Peter Abelard, in whose life and writing the forces of contradiction work with maiming and illuminating violence. The book then considers the teaching-textuality of two great secular works of the Middle Ages, formed under the double instruction of the master disciplines of monastic exegesis and dialectic and under the tutelage of Ovid. Calling simultaneously on the both-and of exegesis and the either/or of dialectic, the teaching of these two texts is both biblical and worldly—impossibly, both at once, always in motion. The De Amore of Andreas Capellanus teaches two opposite propositions and commands that either one or the other must be chosen, yet in practice shows each proposition to be deeply embedded in the other. The concluding chapter turns from the Latin to the vernacular tradition to study one of the lesser-known examples of contradictory teaching, the fourteenth-century Libro de Buen Amor of Juan Ruiz, whose titular "good love" conflates the contrary things of spiritual and carnal love, while reminding readers that the difference between the two is urgently consequential. (shrink)

The introductory revised essay, "Horses of Wrath: Recent Critical Lessons," followed by nine reprinted essays, pits the Christian Rationalist, Wimsatt, an aroused Horse of Instruction, against the Tigers of Wrath, Blakean Myth critics led by Northrop Frye. Their battleground is the relation of poetry to life: what for the Blakeans is the fearful symmetry of poetry as the apocalypse of life is for Wimsatt the hateful siege of contraries, both an anarchy of life and a confusion of (...) poetic limits. Wimsatt supports the classical and Christian notion that harmony comes "in spite of" the conflict of good and evil, not "because of" that conflict, as the Blakeans would claim. For Wimsatt, poetry's unique kind of cognition is the analogous perspective it establishes toward contraries, namely the perspective of drama and metaphor in which is created a mock substance of the human condition. But after Wimsatt's analysis, we are left with a dualism which can be itself a hateful contrary: the more poetry performs its perspective function, the more it destroys its subject matter. It is also to the credit of Wimsatt's theoretic hesitancy that he will not let us forget these contraries.—E. S. T. (shrink)

Daya Krishna (1924-2007) was easily the most creative and original Indian philosopher of the second half of the 20th century. His thought and philosophical energy dominated academic Indian philosophy and determined the nature of the engagement of Indian philosophy with Western philosophy during that period. He passed away recently, leaving behind an enormous corpus of published work on a wide range of philosophical topics, as well as a great deal of incomplete, nearly-complete and complete-but-as-yet-unpublished work. Daya Krishna's thought and publications (...) address a broad range of philosophical issues, including issues of global philosophical importance that transcend considerations of particular traditions; issues particular to Indian philosophy; and issues at the intersection of Indian and Western philosophy, especially questions about the philosophy of language and ontology that emerge in the context of his Samvada project that brought together Western philosophers and Nyaya pandits to discuss questions in the philosophy of language and metaphysics. The volume editors have organized the volume as a set of ten couplets and triplets. Each draws together papers from different periods in Daya Krishna's life: some take different approaches to the same problem or text; in some cases, the second paper references and takes issue with arguments developed in the first; in still others, Daya Krishna addresses very different topics, but using the same distinctive philosophical methodology. Each set is introduced by one of the editors. These couplets are framed by two of Daya Krishna's finest metaphilosophical essays, one that introduces his approach, and one that draws some of his grand morals about the discipline. Daya Krishna's daughter, Professor Shail Mayaram of the Center for the Study of Developing Societies contributes a preface, and Professor Arindam Chakrabarti, a longtime colleague of Daya Krisha and a collaborator on some of his most important philosophical ventures has written the introduction. (shrink)

Dealing with conflicts seems to be a great challenge in society today. But not only in society. Higher education displays an air of resoluteness with certainty and security that disguises the conflicts and the fear of conflicts in a substantial number of subjects. If not in a state of denial, higher education avoids taking up conflicts over issues, for learning. The detailed investigation of Tagore’s pedagogical writings, with a focus on the importance of conflicts in education, reveals a genuine embrace (...) of conflicts for education. Conflicts are natural and necessary for the development and change of both the individual and society and the start of a ‘creative imagination’ to solve the problems we face in life. Contradictions in conflicts are not incompatible incongruities that are irreconcilable and mutually exclusive, but to the contrary, in need of each other. Contradictions do not represent different worlds but are substantial parts of one world: together they form a unity. Conflicting forces are necessary to create harmony. Creativity, imagination, love, art, and critical encounters are key elements in Tagore’s practical education aimed at finding similarities among people instead of emphasizing differences. Relations between people over the Identity of people. In other words, we need conflicts to become creative and imaginative human beings. The paper continues discussing conceptual and practical issues that seem necessary to get the teaching of conflicts in education off the ground. On the conceptual level, in particular our dealing with uncertainty and fear, the valuation of conflict and the need for uncertainty-researching education. On a practical level, I propose a certain teaching model, a supportive curriculum, a way of choosing genuine conflicts for education and finally, I argue for specific support and education of teachers, acknowledging the vital role teachers play in delivering the education that we need. (shrink)

The essays in this 1987 volume are concerned with ideas of contrarity and other kinds of polar opposition in French literature of the eighteenth century. Originally these ideas were merely part of an impulse to undermine the establishment, but as the century progressed the desire to invert social values and question accepted norms merged with the main groundswell of the age to form part of the movement of Revolution. Professor Rex considers some of the major writers of the period: Diderot, (...) Rousseau, Voltaire, and Beaumarchais. He also explores minor genres such as opéras comiques, theatrical parodies, and erotic or pornographic pieces; these have been largely forgotten, but in their time they imbued the creative life of the era with vitality. In treating the literature in relation to the other arts, especially painting and music, these essays will be of interest to scholars of all aspects of eighteenth-century French culture. (shrink)

Critics often argue that Aristotle’s analysis of human agency remains “substantial,” or “purely causal.” For him, human life is the unfolding of given natural potencies toward given natural ends, rather than a process in which we really are the “subject” of our choices and ends by deciding whether they are, in fact, ours. Drawing upon the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics, and the account of divine being in Metaphysics Lambda, I argue that the reasons for the difference between Aristotelian human (...) nature and modern subjectivity lie in the way he relates life and unity to the good. For Aristotle, human life is a striving for unity that emerges from nature and transcends it toward a principle which is no longer strictly natural, but without passing through a moment of alienation from nature. This focus on the goodness of unity, and the absence of emphasis on alienation from our “merely given” nature, gives Aristotelian subjectivity its distinctive character—one which can still do justice to the way man must choose a life rather than merely live one. (shrink)

“No one has advanced a just and logical reason why reward for service to the public should be extended to the inventor of a mechanical toy and denied to the genius whose patience, foresight, and effort have given a valuable new [discovery] to mankind” . The law around the world permits the granting of patents for drugs, medical devices, and cosmetic treatment of the human body. At the same time, patentability for a method of treatment of the same body is (...) denied in some countries on various public policy grounds. Is there any logical justification for this distinction? Are methods of medical treatment not as vital to the health or even to the life of a patient as drugs or medical devices? Why is a cosmetic result patentable and a curative result not? (shrink)

Cognitive science, with its exuberant neuromythologies, is a regular target for wise humanists who insist that our rich, sharp, sad, and chancy mental life will easily resist the misplaced physics-envy of over-zealous reductionists. Yet there is little true cause for their concern: in the current confusion of multidisciplinary inquiry into computation and the brain, there are few even half-developed visions of a future completed psychology which challenge straightforward metaphysical and moral faith in personal identity and rational agency. It can (...) seem as if those who fear the encroach of science on mind, warning that it will swamp cultural-historical awareness and care, are bewitched only by the memory of a ghoulish behaviourism. (shrink)

This paper investigates the concept of behavioral autonomy in Artificial Life by drawing a parallel to the use of teleological notions in the study of biological life. Contrary to one of the leading assumptions in Artificial Life research, I argue that there is a significant difference in how autonomous behavior is understood in artificial and biological life forms: the former is underlain by human goals in a way that the latter is not. While behavioral traits (...) can be explained in relation to evolutionary history in biological organisms, in synthetic life forms behavior depends on a design driven by a research agenda, further shaped by broader human goals. This point will be illustrated with a case study on a synthetic life form. Consequently, the putative epistemic benefit of reaching a better understanding of behavioral autonomy in biological organisms by synthesizing artificial life forms is subject to doubt: the autonomy observed in such artificial organisms may be a mere projection of human agency. Further questions arise in relation to the need to spell out the relevant human aims when addressing potential social or ethical implications of synthesizing artificial life forms. (shrink)

Why life’s shortness—more than anything else—is what makes it meaningful Death might seem to render pointless all our attempts to create a meaningful life. Doesn’t meaning require transcending death through an afterlife or in some other way? On the contrary, Dean Rickles argues, life without death would be like playing tennis without a net. Only constraints—and death is the ultimate constraint—make our actions meaningful. In Life Is Short, Rickles explains why the finiteness and shortness of (...) life is the essence of its meaning—and how this insight is the key to making the most of the time we do have. Life Is Short explores how death limits our options and forces us to make choices that forge a life and give the world meaning. But people often live in a state of indecision, in a misguided attempt to keep their options open. This provisional way of living—always looking elsewhere, to the future, to other people, to other ways of being, and never committing to what one has or, alternatively, putting in the time and energy to achieve what one wants—is a big mistake, and Life Is Short tells readers how to avoid this trap. By reminding us how extraordinary it is that we have any time to live at all, Life Is Short challenges us to rethink what gives life meaning and how to make the most of it. (shrink)

Comparative to the commonplace focus onto developments in mathematics and physics, the life sciences appear to have received relatively sparse attention within the early history of analytic philosophy. This paper addresses two related aspects of this phenomenon. On the one hand, it asks: to the extent that the significance of the life sciences was indeed downplayed by early analytic philosophers, why was this the case? An answer to this question may be found in Bertrand Russell’s 1914 discussions of (...) the relation between biology and philosophy. Contrary to received views of the history of analytic philosophy, Russell presented his own ‘logical atomism’ in opposition not only to British Idealism, but also to ‘evolutionism’. On the other hand, I will question whether this purported neglect of the life sciences does indeed accurately characterise the history of analytic philosophy. In answering this, I turn first to Susan Stebbing’s criticisms of Russell’s overlooking of biology, her influence on J.H. Woodger, and her critical discussion of T.H. Huxley’s and C.H. Waddington’s application of evolutionary views to philosophical questions. I then discuss the case of Moritz Schlick, whose evolutionist philosophy has been overlooked within recent debates concerning Logical Empiricism’s relation to the philosophy of biology. (shrink)

What is truth? This fascinating spectrum of studies into the various rationalities of our human dealings with life - psychological, aesthetic, economic, spiritual - reveals their joints and calls for a new approach to truth. Putting both classical and contemporary conceptions aside, we find the primogenital ground of truth in the networks of correspondences, adequations, relevancies, and rationales at work in life's becoming. Does this plurivocal differentiation mean that the status of truth is relative? On the contrary, (...) submits Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, given the universal significance of the crucial instrument of the logos of life, "truth is the vortex of life's ontopoietic unfolding". (shrink)

The boldest and most unsettling of the major early modern philosophers, Spinoza, had a much greater, if often concealed, impact on the international intellectual scene and on the early Enlightenment than philosophers, historians, and political theorists have conventionally tended to recognize. Europe-wide efforts to prevent the reading public and university students learning about Spinoza, the man and his work, in the years immediately after his death in 1677, dominated much of his early reception owing to the revolutionary implications of his (...) thought for philosophy, religion, practical ethics and lifestyle, Bible criticism, and political theory. Nevertheless, contrary to what has sometimes been maintained, his general impact was immediate, very widespread, and profound. One of the main objectives of the book is to show how early and how deeply Leibniz, Bayle, Arnauld, Henry More, Anne Conway, Richard Baxter, Robert Boyle, Henry Oldenburg, Pierre-Daniel Huet, Richard Simon, and Nicholas Steno, among many others, were affected by and led to wrestle with his principal ideas. (shrink)

This paper proposes a basic revision of the understanding of teleology in biological sciences. Since Kant, it has become customary to view purposiveness in organisms as a bias added by the observer; the recent notion of teleonomy expresses well this as-if character of natural purposes. In recent developments in science, however, notions such as self-organization (or complex systems) and the autopoiesis viewpoint, have displaced emergence and circular self-production as central features of life. Contrary to an often superficial reading, (...) Kant gives a multi-faceted account of the living, and anticipates this modern reading of the organism, even introducing the term self-organization for the first time. Our re-reading of Kant in this light is strengthened by a group of philosophers of biology, with Hans Jonas as the central figure, who put back on center stage an organism-centered view of the living, an autonomous center of concern capable of providing an interior perspective. Thus, what is present in nuce in Kant, finds a convergent development from this current of philosophy of biology and the scientific ideas around autopoeisis, two independent but parallel developments culminating in the 1970s. Instead of viewing meaning or value as artifacts or illusions, both agree on a new understanding of a form of immanent teleology as truly biological features, inevitably intertwined with the self-establishment of an identity which is the living process. (shrink)

Background Making the right decisions, while simultaneously showing respect for patient autonomy, represents a great challenge to nursing home staff in the issues of life-prolonging treatment, hydration, nutrition and hospitalisation to dying patents in end-of-life. Objectives To study how physicians and nurses protect nursing home patients' autonomy in end-of-life decisions, and how they justify their practice. Design A qualitative descriptive design with analysis of the content of transcribed in-depth interviews with physicians and nurses. Participants Nine physicians and (...) ten nurses in 10 nursing homes in Norway. Results and interpretations Assessment of the patient's competence to consent to treatment is almost absent. The physicians build their practice on the principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence. Nurses tend to trust the patients' rejection of life support, even when the patients have difficulty speaking or suffer from dementia. Relatives were, according to the health personnel, included in decision-making processes to a very limited extent. However, futile life support is sometimes provided contrary to the physicians' judgement of what constitutes the patient's best interest on occasions when they are pressurised by next of kin. Conclusions The study reveals a need to improve decision-making routines according to ethical ideals and legislation. Conflicts between relatives and healthcare professionals in the decision-making process deflect the focus from searching for the best possible treatment for the terminal patient. Further discussion is required as to whether the concept of autonomy is applicable in situations in which the patient is impaired and dying. (shrink)

Husserl is the first philosopher who has managed to account for the specificity of perception, characterized as givenness by sketches (Abschattungen); but neither Husserl nor Merleau-Ponty have given a satisfying definition of the subject of perception. This article tries to show that the subject of perception must be conceived as living being and that, therefore, the phenomenology of perception must lead to a phenomenology of life. Here, life is approached from an existential point of view, that is to (...) say, as a specific relationship to the world. However, life cannot be characterized from human existence in a privative way, as in Heidegger's philosophy: on the contrary, human existence, and particularly perception itself, must be understood from vital existence, and accordingly, an "additive" anthropology must replace the privative zoology. The hypothesis of this article is that it is by characterizing life as desire, we are able to account for perception as givenness by sketches. (shrink)

This book is an account of the philosophical movement named Lebensphilosophie, which flourished at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. There many philosophers who participated in the movement, but this book concentrates on the three most important: Friedrich Nietzsche, Wilhelm Dilthey and Georg Simmel. The movement was called Lebensphilosophie—literally, philosophy of life—because its main interest was not life as a biological phenomenon but life as it is lived by human beings. They (...) regarded human life and experience as the fundamental reality, the basis of all knowledge and value, and disputed the relevance of any supernatural realm transcending human experience. The purpose of life was therefore life itself. Lebensphilosophie was the first modern philosophical movement in the Western tradition. It was “modern” in the sense that it was entirely humanist and secular, deriving all values from a non-religious perspective. Nietzsche, Dilthey and Simmel were either atheists or agnostics; they denied the relevance of any transcendent reality or being for human life. They abjured the traditional Christian concern with salvation and immortality. They also disputed the existence of natural law, teleology or a providential order; human beings created their own values and they did not conform to any made by nature. In anticipation of later existentialism, the Lebensphilosophen maintained that human beings are the makers of their own fate. Contrary to pessimism, they affirmed the great value of life while still acknowledging its frequent tragedy. The Lebensphilosophen were champions of an individualist ethics, which maintained that the highest good for a human being was self-realization, the development of a persons’s unique individuality. Their ethics was neither utilitarian nor de-ontological: it was not utilitarian because it did not regard the highest good as pleasure; self-realization could be a very unpleasant experience; and it was not de-ontological because it grounded moral norms upon the facts of human development and experience. The Lebensphilosophen were major advocates of historicism. They believed that human experience is formed by history, and that its horizons and limits are historical. Just as it was impossible to transcend human experience, so it was impossible to transcend history. All values and norms were therefore historical. In attempting to describe historical experience, the Lebensphilosophen developed the discipline of hermeneutics. They refused to accept mechanical explanation as a paradigm of explanation. This book attempts to describe and analyze the fundamental aspects of Lebensphilosophie by looking in detail at the views of its three leading figures. It examines their ethics, their religious background, their responses to pessimism and relativism, and their contributions to hermeneutics and historicism. (shrink)

By the juxtaposition or the intertwinement of the two arguably seminal texts on still life, Charles Sterling’s comprehensive art historical study and Gérard Wajcman’s theoretical, philosophical commentary thereon, the interpretative net is firmly established; the impression is given that all that is left is the reiteration of the well-trodden paths. However, neither the historical presentation of still life’s linear emancipation from historia nor the following ontological definition of the emancipated still life is so simple. Still life (...) as a specific iconographic genre is shown to be, contrary to its name, in a perpetual state of becoming, of movement. And more, as soon as the goal of emancipation from the historical painting is achieved, the movement becomes inverted: a renewed relationship between still life and historia follows on another level. On the other hand, it is shown that still life is only rarely completely devoid of some narrative content. (shrink)

Contrary to the widespread concern about over-treatment at the end of life, today, patient preferences for palliative care at the end of life are frequently respected. However, ethically challenging situations in the current healthcare climate are, instead, situations in which a competent patient requests active treatment with the goal of life-prolongation while the physician suggests best supportive care only. The argument of futility has often been used to justify unilateral decisions made by physicians to withhold or (...) withdraw life-sustaining treatment. However, we argue that neither the concept of futility nor that of patient autonomy alone is apt for resolving situations in which physicians are confronted with patients' requests for active treatment. Instead, we integrate the relevant arguments that have been put forward in the academic discussion about ‘futile’ treatment into an ethical algorithm with five guiding questions: (1) Is there a chance that medical intervention will be effective in achieving the patient's treatment goal? (2) How does the physician evaluate the expected benefit and the potential harm of the treatment? (3) Does the patient understand his or her medical situation? (4) Does the patient prefer receiving treatment after evaluating the benefit-harm ratio and the costs? (5) Does the treatment require many resources? This algorithm shall facilitate approaching patients' requests for treatments deemed futile by the physician in a systematic way, and responding to these requests in an ethically appropriate manner. It thereby adds substantive considerations to the current procedural approaches of conflict resolution in order to improve decision making among physicians, patients and families. (shrink)

Its critics to the contrary, the “gift of life” metaphor is not to be blamed for the indebtedness and guilt that organ recipients often experience. It is certainly misused, however, both by post‐transplant caregivers, who exploit it to manipulate recipients' behavior, and by the organ procurement system, which has failed to understand that the decision to give the gift of life must be approached communally.

Plato's ethics, contrary to the impression recent literature on the topic creates, is basically a system of religious ethics, and I sketch here its main outlines. Since the goal of Plato's philosophy is the achievement of the divine life, his ethics in its most comprehensive sense is the knowledge that this life is our good, along with the knowledge of how our good can be achieved. With the help of passages in Plato's dialogues and other ancient sources (...) I explain briefly Plato's view of the divine life and of two of the three principal paths followed to achieve that life, namely, the path of moral training, which relies on practical wisdom, and the path of contemplation, which relies both on theoretical wisdom, which is developed on the path of dialectic, and on the love of God. (shrink)

The paper aims to investigate the peculiar relationship between art and life in the context of Nietzsche’s thought. We mean to show how Nietzschean aesthetics is not conceived as a theoretical and rational reflection that abstractly investigates the conditions of possibility of beauty and art: on the contrary, aesthetics is understood by Nietzsche as a practice aimed at shaping life in a beautiful form. The topic of the Lebens-form is considered as a common thread of an original (...) exegesis of human types as aesthetic symbols of life within Nietzsche’s philosophy. Nietzsche’s notion of “becoming who we are” will therefore be understood as an ability to affirm and realize one’s life in all its potential. The Dionysian conception of art, which is considered in The Birth of Tragedy as an ecstatic inebriation that stimulates life and saves man from the tragedy of pain, will then be compared with the idea of ars vivendi, referring to the notion of wisdom and to the Hellenistic-Roman practice of ἄσκησις. (shrink)

The Texas Advance Directives Act stipulates the process by which physicians may withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment contrary to the wishes of the patient or medical proxy. Hundreds, perhaps thousands of families and clinicians have faced this personal and distressing dispute. Catholic teaching offers a rich tradition for assessing the ethics of life-sustaining treatment and analyzing disputes over its administration, yielding the conclusion that a Catholic defense of the Texas Advance Directives Act is untenable. Two objections rooted (...) in patient harm and physician conscience fail. A solution that fairly respects the patient’s moral right to choose life-sustaining treatment is offered. (shrink)

This book offers to the international reader a collection of original articles of some of the most skillful historians and philosophers of biology currently working in Latin American universities. During the last decades, increasing attention has been paid in Latin America to the history and philosophy of biology, but since many local authors prefer to write in Spanish or in Portuguese, their ideas have barely crossed the boundaries of the continent. This volume aims to remedy this state of things, providing (...) a good sample of this production to the English speaking readers, bringing together contributions from researchers working in Brazilian, Argentinean, Chilean, Colombian and Mexican universities. The stress on the regional provenance of the authors is not intended to suggest the existence of something like a Latin American history and philosophy of biology, supposedly endowed with distinctive features. On the contrary, the editors firmly believe that advances in this field can be achieved only by stimulating the integration in the international debate. Based on this assumption, the book focuses on two topics, life and evolution, and presents a selection of contributions addressing issues such as the history of the concept of life, the philosophical reflection on life manipulation and life extension, the structure and development of evolutionary theory as well as human evolution. Life and Evolution – Latin American Essays on the History and Philosophy of Biology will provide the international reader with a rather complete picture of the ongoing research in the history and philosophy of biology in Latin America, offering a snapshot of this dynamic community. It will also contribute to contextualize and develop the debate concerning life and evolution, and the relation between the two phenomena. (shrink)

My purpose in this dissertation is to delineate and evaluate William James's new psychology in The Principles of Psychology. James's avowed aim in his text is to divorce psychology from metaphysics and to treat psychology like a natural science. Psychology is to become more scientific, and is thus to become more conscious of its own goals and its limits. James's aim, in short, is to help psychology become the science of the human mind--of "finite individual minds." ;What James does is (...) to single out a new starting point for psychology by connecting consciousness with life and not with certain metaphysical hypotheses. Indeed, it is through the ordinary manifestations of consciousness that we may renew a contact with consciousness that a more cerebral psychology has lost. Such, in any case, is the revolt that James initiated against the spiritualist and associationist theories, the biological conceptions, and the experimental methods in psychology of his day; and with that revolt he launched a mode of thought that has also escaped the neat formulae of contemporary philosophy. To be sure, he came to be claimed by prominent philosophers as one of the pioneering spirits in the existential, phenomenological, and British analytic modes of thought in philosophy. ;Despite these honorific readings of James, I do not think them sound, for they do not take appropriate notice of the avowed aim and the central message of the pioneer. On the contrary, as I shall show, existentialism, phenomenology, and British analytic philosophy of Wittgenstein and Russell, have moved in an altogether opposite direction from James; in doing so, they have thereby served to foster the disintegration of the finite individual mind. (shrink)

It has been well established that life satisfaction is related to perceived social justice. However, current theories provide contrary assumptions on the direction of the influence. In this research, we use data from two longitudinal surveys collected in China to test the reciprocal relations between life satisfaction and perceived social justice over time. With a random intercept cross-lagged panel model, we disaggregate the between-person effect and the within-person effect of the relationship. To specify the conditions of the (...) effect, we consider income levels as the moderator. Study 1 showed that on the between-person level, life satisfaction, and perceived social justice are positively correlated. On the within-person level, cross-lagged effect results showed that an individuals’ deviations from their expected score in life satisfaction predict deviations from their expected perceived social justice at the next time point, while deviations from expected perceived social justice does not predict subsequent deviations from expected life satisfaction. In study 2, we divided participants into three groups based on their household income and conducted a multiple group analysis to test its moderation effect. We found that the between-person correlation of life satisfaction and perceived social justice is not moderated by income level, and it is significant in all the three groups. However, the within-person cross-lagged effect is moderated by income level, and the effect of life satisfaction on perceived social justice only exists in the low income group. This research confirms the unidirectional relationship between life satisfaction and perceived social justice across time, and clarifies the effect in different levels and income groups, providing new insights on the formation of justice perception. It is recommended that future studies apply experimental designs to reach causal effects and explore more possible moderators and mediators. (shrink)

The strong version of the life-mind continuity thesis claims that mind can be understood as an enriched version of the same functional and organizational properties of life. Contrary to this view, in this paper I argue that mental phenomena offer distinctive properties, such as intentionality or representational content, that have no counterpart in the phenomenon of life, and that must be explained by appealing to a different level of functional and organizational principles. As a strategy, and (...) following Maturana’s autopoietic theory of cognition, I introduce a conceptual distinction between mind and cognition. I argue that cognition corresponds to the natural behaviour that every living being exhibits in the realization of its existence, and that, viewed in that way, cognition is a dynamic process of structural coupling that, unlike mental phenomena, involves no representational contents. On the basis of this distinction, I try to show that while life suffices for cognition, it does not suffice for mind. That is, that the strong continuity is not between life and mind but between life and cognition. (shrink)

Several philosophers have argued that if we examine our lives in context of the cosmos at large, sub specie aeternitatis, we cannot escape life's meaninglessness. To see our lives as meaningful, we have to shun the point of view of the cosmos and consider our lives only in the narrower context of the here and now. I argue that this view is incorrect: life can be seen as meaningful also sub specie aeternitatis. While criticizing arguments by, among others, (...) Simon Blackburn, Nicholas Rescher, and Thomas Nagel, I show that what determines assessments of the meaning of a life are the standards of meaningfulness one endorses rather than the size of the context in which that life is assessed. Employing non-demanding standards of meaningfulness to assess a life is compatible with examining it in the context of the cosmos at large. That is also the case if we accept Nagel's claim that to examine a life sub specie aeternitatis is to examine it externally, impersonally and objectively: life can be evaluated as meaningful also when under these perspectives if the standards of meaningfulness we adopt are not overly challenging. Nor does the contingency of our existence, realized sub specie aeternitatis, render our life meaningless. Contrary to a commonly accepted view, then, examining our lives sub specie aeternitatis does not necessitate that we see them as meaningless. (shrink)

This essay focuses on Eric Santner’s psychoanalytic reinterpretation of the crucial symbol of Judaism – yetziat mitzrayim, the getting out of Egypt – as “the Exodus out of our own Egyptomania.” Formulated in his book on Rosenzweig and Freud, On the Psychotheology of Everyday Life, it appears in all Santner’s later works concerned with political theology, where “Egyptomania” stands for everything that overburdens human life with an excessive “signifying stress” or “ex-citation,” weighing it down with the impossible demands (...) of the ultimate metaphysical self-justification and the interpellating call to sublimity. Contrary to Hegel’s definition of Judaism as “the religion of the sublime,” Santner consequently champions the opposite view, according to which the Abrahamic revelation forms the first religion of radical desublimation that blocks the vertical transport into the extraordinary “beyond” and focuses instead on the immanent transcendence as the radical otherness of the neighbour/stranger in the world. The Exodus, therefore, is to be understood not as an exit out of the world, following the call of the otherworldly God, but precisely the other way round: as an exit of the Egyptomaniac metaphysical paralysis, where “Egypt” represents an impasse of the self-negating life which cannot tolerate its finite condition and invents a sublime alibi in a false promise of immortality. (shrink)

Boenink and Molen help us reflect on how biomarkers come to change our conceptions of disease and patient care in the future. However, whether biomarkers make disease more physiological and anticipatory and medicine more person centred may need more research. Clearly, biomarkers can decouple medicine and healthcare from what matters to people (such as pain, dysfunction, and suffering), reducing the moral relevance of medicine. Hence, putting biomarkers at the center of medicine may not mean that we set persons at the (...) center of medicine, as they claim. On the contrary, a biomarkerization of medicine may make us all diseased, as there are no healthy persons left, only persons that have not been sufficiently biomarkerized. Biomarkers may do more than detecting or anticipating disease. They may come to define “the good life” and how we feel and fare. (shrink)

Should ethically serious people seek for unity in their lives, for harmony, for coherence? Is this a requirement on living a good life, a requirement on flourishing or eudaimonia? Should we aim for some kind of self-authorship or narrative self-constitution, as Marya Schechtman and Dan McAdams have suggested? Many think we should. This chapter argues for the opposite view, assembling and reflecting on a dossier of contrary quotations from many sources, including Proust, Montaigne, Alice Munro, Georges Perec, and (...) Keats. (shrink)

In Essays Critical and Clinical, Deleuze argues that Beckettian characters usually strive towards becoming imperceptible. This statement immediately poses another question: what is becoming imperceptible and where does it lead? How can we rid ourselves of ourselves? Paradoxically enough, Deleuze states that becoming imperceptible is life. The literal and self-evident meaning of life seems somehow incompatible with the image of dissolving and decaying characters in Beckett's works. Contrary to this self-evidence, the notion of life in Deleuze (...) and Beckett should be interpreted as pure potentiality which opens both the potential to be (or do) and the potential not to be (or do). Beckettian characters together with other figures, such as Bartleby, let us think of a life in its potential not to be. The life of the individual gives way to impersonal and singular life: a life of pure immanence. Such a life can be immanent to a man who no longer has a name, though he can be mistaken for no other: the Beckettian Unnamable. (shrink)

In Life's Dominion Dworkin argues that the debate about abortion is habitually misconstrued. Substantial areas of agreement are overlooked, while areas of disagreement are, mistakenly, seen as central. If we uncover a truer picture, then hope of a certain accord may no longer seem vain. I dispute many of these claims. Dworkin argues that both sides in the debate are united in believing that life is sacred, or intrinsically valuable. I disagree. I maintain that only in a very (...) attenuated sense of intrinsic value will this be agreed upon. I consider how an account of such value might be further fleshed out, but suggest, if this is done on any plausible lines, agreement will fall away. Dworkin argues, also, that the issue of personhood, does not, contrary to widespread belief, keep the parties apart. Again I disagree. We need to distinguish the question of whether there is in fact dispute over this issue from that of whether there is, in truth, good reason for dispute. And I argue that, rightly or wrongly, the issue of personhood remains central. Dworkin suggests that the purported proximity between the two sides offers some hope of an eventual reconciliation. At least, they will agree to differ, accepting that in this area freedom of choice is paramount. I am sceptical. Even this measure of reconciliation depends upon conservatives giving up positions which, I argue, they will continue to maintain. There is a further point. Dworkin appears to be, in many ways, cautiously optimistic. I appear, in contrast, to be pessimistic. I argue, however, that only so long as we do disagree over matters of substance is there much hope that our differences might be resolved. (shrink)

As a new trend in aesthetics appearing concurrently in the West and the East in the last ten years, the aesthetics of everyday life points to a growing diversification among existing methodologies for pursuing aesthetics, alongside the shift from art-based aesthetics. The cultural diversity manifest in global aesthetics offers common ground for the collaborative efforts of aesthetics in both the West and the East. Given the rapidly growing interest and its potential for attracting new audiences extending beyond the more (...) narrowly focused traditions of twentieth-century analytic and environmental aesthetics, it stands to command its own share of attention in the future of aesthetic studies. The aesthetics of everyday life has become a stream of thought with a global ambition. This interest has led to numerous systematic and in-depth works on this topic, some of which were conducted by the authors represented in this volume. A salient feature of this book is that it not only represents the recent developments of the aesthetics of everyday life in the West, but also highlights the interaction between scholars in the West and the East on this topic. Thus, the project is a contribution toward mutual progress in the collaboration between Western and Eastern aesthetics. What distinguishes this book from other anthologies and monographs on this topic is that it reconstructs the aesthetics of everyday life through cultural dialogue between the West and the East, with a view to building a new form of aesthetics of everyday life, as seen from a global perspective. At present, the aesthetics of everyday life as a newly emergent approach to aesthetics may encounter skepticism among aestheticians accustomed to the rigors of analytic philosophers who prefer to discuss aesthetics at the level of abstract concepts and argument, and who tolerate the particulars of experience mainly as illustrations. But, there is no reason to abandon the pursuit of the aesthetics of everyday life in the face of such objections. On the contrary, there are many benefits to gain in bringing aesthetics to bear on a wider sphere of human life, made possible through efforts to show the relevance of aesthetics to a broader range of human actions. (shrink)

Since antiquity, philosophers and engineers have tried to take life’s measure by reproducing it. Aiming to reenact Creation, at least in part, these experimenters have hoped to understand the links between body and spirit, matter and mind, mechanism and consciousness. Genesis Redux examines moments from this centuries-long experimental tradition: efforts to simulate life in machinery, to synthesize life out of material parts, and to understand living beings by comparison with inanimate mechanisms. Jessica Riskin collects seventeen essays from (...) distinguished scholars in several fields. These studies offer an unexpected and far-reaching result: attempts to create artificial life have rarely been driven by an impulse to reduce life and mind to machinery. On the contrary, designers of synthetic creatures have generally assumed a role for something nonmechanical. The history of artificial life is thus also a history of theories of soul and intellect. Taking a historical approach to a modern quandary, Genesis Redux is essential reading for historians and philosophers of science and technology, scientists and engineers working in artificial life and intelligence, and anyone engaged in evaluating these world-changing projects. (shrink)

The human race has been socially organizing itself for probably about 1.8 million years. The first form of human organization was the hunter-gatherer, which was the form of organization in which man lived for about 99 % of his history. This mode of life caused humans to organize themselves into small groups and lead a nomadic life. The nomadic life ensured that these groups had no possessions and no wealth could be accumulated. In this manner, this form (...) of human organization ensured egalitarianism, a form of primitive communism. This changed dramatically with the development of agriculture in the so-called Neolithic Revolution in 10,000 BC. With the development of agriculture and the consequent development of technology, man became sedentary, the first towns were formed, and the class system made its appearance, that is, the separation between an administrative class and a productive class. The egalitarian and communist primitive society gave way to an increasingly centralized and hierarchical society. From network theory, they have been insisting for years on the benefits of the so-called scale-free networks, networks governed by certain privileged nodes called hubs. These networks are said to be slightly vulnerable and highly robust to errors. In this work, we perform a deep network analysis of a group of centralized-hierarchical networks and a group of decentralized-distributed networks. This work provides clear and compelling evidence that, contrary to what is maintained, decentralized-distributed networks are the least vulnerable and most robust networks, and are the networks that ensure an equitable and equal distribution of power and influence among their members. These results are analyzed in the context of network theory, and are discussed in relation to the theories of Jeremy Rifkin, Ernst Schumacher, Alexander Bogdanov and Aldous Huxley. (shrink)

In his posthumous work, The Citadel, Saint-Exupéry developed, through literary images, an interesting criticism of rationalism that claims to be the basis of human coexistence, aspect that seems -at first sight - contrary to many contemporary philosophical proposals. Freedom and human creativity cannot be judged by parameters of a given reality, but by that which is to emerge as something new. The emir of the Citadel faces this problem.

Discussions on the status of definitions of life have long been dominated by a position known as definitional pessimism. Per the definitional pessimist, there is no point in trying to define life. This claim is defended in different ways, but one of the shared assumptions of all definitional pessimists is that our attempts to define life are attempts to provide a list of all necessary and sufficient conditions for something to count as alive. In other words, a (...) definition of life is a strict, descriptive definition. Against this, several pragmatic alternatives have been put forward. On these pragmatic accounts, definitions of life are not strictly, but rather loosely descriptive. Their purpose is not to be true, but to be useful to scientists by guiding scientific practice. More recently, this position has come under attack for not being able to explain how our attempts to define life are connected to scientific progress within the biological sciences. Here, I argue to the contrary by showing how pragmatic definitions of life can be, and in fact are, conducive to scientific progress. Additionally, I show how the pragmatic account of definitions of life can be brought to bear upon our normative discussions involving definitions of life. (shrink)

One of the most commonly referenced ethical principles when it comes to the management of dying patients is the doctrine of double effect (DDE). The DDE affirms that it is acceptable to cause side effects (e.g. respiratory depression) as a consequence of symptom‐focused treatment. Much discussion of the ethics of end of life care focuses on the question of whether actions (or omissions) would hasten (or cause) death, and whether that is permissible. However, there is a separate question about (...) the permissibility of hastening or causing unconsciousness in dying patients. Some authors have argued that the DDE would not permit end of life care that directly aims to render the patient unconscious. The claim is that consciousness is an objective human good and therefore doctors should not intentionally (and permanently) suppress it. Three types of end of life care (EOLC) practices will be explored in this article. The first is symptom‐based management (e.g. analgesia); the second is proportional terminal sedation as a means of relieving suffering (also referred to as palliative sedation or continuous deep sedation); and finally, deliberate and rapid sedation to unconsciousness until death (a practice we call terminal anaesthesia in this paper). After examining the common arguments for the various types of symptom‐based management and sedation, we apply the DDE to the latter two types of EOLC practices. We argue that aiming at unconsciousness, contrary to some claims, can be morally good or at least morally neutral in some dying patients. (shrink)

This paper evaluates Pierre Hadot’s concept of ‘philosophy as a way of life’ (PWL) as a tool to critique academic philosophy. Firstly, I will provide a concise overview of Hadot’s critique through a discussion of two lesser-known texts. I will go on to submit that PWL, contrary to what its name might imply, does not primarily distinguish between philosophical theory and practice. Instead, through an exploration of relevant secondary sources, I will emphasize PWL’s focus on the spiritual dimension (...) of philosophy, or rather the lack thereof in the modern research university. A return to philosophy as a way of life, then, does not imply emancipation from the university as such, but rather from contemporary academia’s research practices and standards. Only then can philosophy rekindle its true essence, namely transforming the lives and worlds of many. (shrink)

As a model for explaining the inwardness of mental life, a computer in the cortex is no improvement on an immaterial mind trapped wherever Descartes or Newton originally located it. For both models distract our attention from certain crucial differences between inwardness and interiority - that is, from certain crucial respects in which these two inherited ways of thinking about the inner mind diverge from one another. Clearly, interiority is an inescapable feature of our brains and of all the (...) physiological processes that go on in the central nervous system. There is no doubt at all that those processes are permanently located inside our bodies. So, if our mental lives were, properly speaking, trapped within our brains, they must be trapped there from birth. In this view, our minds must indeed operate permanently à huis clos: like prisoners who are born, live, and die in permanent deadlock. Yet the inwardness of mental life, as we know it and speak of it in everyday experience, is not like that at all. The things that mark so many of our thoughts, wishes, and feelings as inner or inward are not permanent, inescapable, lifelong characteristics. On the contrary, inwardness is in many respects an acquired feature of our experience, a product, in part, of cultural history but in part also of individual development. So understood, our mental lives are not essentially inner lives. Rather, they become inner because we make them so. And we do develop inner lives, in this direct, experiential sense, because we have reasons for doing so. Stephen Toulmin presented an earlier version of this essay as the Nora and Edward Ryerson Lecture at the University of Chicago on 30 April 1979. He is the author of, among other works, Foresight and Understanding, Human Understanding, Knowing and Acting, and Wittgenstein's Vienna. (shrink)

It has often been thought, and has recently been argued, that one of the most profound impacts of Darwin's theory of evolution is the threat that it poses to the very possibility of living a meaningful, and therefore worthwhile, life. Three attempts to ground the possibility of a meaningful life are considered. The first two are compatible with an exclusively Darwinian worldview. One is based on the belief that Darwinian evolution is, in some sense, progressive; the other is (...) based on the belief that the natural world is a thing of value and hence, that our lives are lived in the presence of value. The third is based on a belief in providence, and holds that we must transcend the exclusively Darwinian worldview if we are to find meaning. All three are, for different reasons, rejected. The conclusion reached is that, contrary to what has often been thought and recently argued, the impact of Darwin's theory is precisely to liberate us to lead the most meaningful of lives. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Wittgenstein’s frequent and pervasive of the adjective “complicated.” I begin by comparing and contrasting the adjective’s use in the Tractatus and the much later manuscripts on the philosophy of psychology. While there are a number of important and illuminating affinities between these uses, I argue that these need to be balanced against the wide disparities between them: in contrast to the Tractatus, the later philosophy preserves a sense of “surface” complexity while jettisoning the idea of (...) a deep—but hidden—simplicity that logical analysis promises to reveal. The notion of a surface must thus be reconceived as complicated in terms of its “spread” rather than in relation to what lies “beneath” it. Wittgenstein’s later appeals to what is complicated need to be read in tandem with his critique of the idea of there being an “absolute sense” of “simple.” Doing so prevents our seeing in his later appeals to complexity a new, more substantive notion of complexity that a more adequate philosophical theory must capture or reflect. On the contrary, the appeal to something as complicated plays a recollective and corrective role that challenges the viability of a theoretical-explanatory perspective. (shrink)

Questions concerning the moral status of embryos, the validity of new technologies for human reproduction, ownership of one's own genes, gene patenting, privacy and discrimination have all been raised and debated. Although debate is healthy, it is only useful if all participants understand the fundamental biological principles underlying human life, human genes and human parenthood. Many people believe that science can play no role in determining when human life begins. I argue that this false assumption is based on (...) a failure to separate different contradictory meanings of the term ‘human life’. In actuality, science has provided great insight into when and how human life and human beings come into existence. I argue as well that, contrary to our intuitive feelings, there is no physical connection between any father and his son; shared genes represent shared information and nothing more. Nevertheless, the feeling of a physical connection between parent and child is very real and instinctive, no matter how false it may be. These new understandings have profound ramifications for the way we treat issues surrounding human reproduction, including both abortion and assisted reproductive technologies. (shrink)

This article is based on interviews with former Australian immigration detainees conducted by the author. The interviews explored the experience and understanding of resistance while in detention. The article calls into question Agamben’s twin conclusions that nothing short of a complete re-founding of ontology is required to liberate humanity from biopower and that this refoundation will spring from bare life. Contrary to Agamben’s depiction, the camp proves to be a place of determined and often successful defence of a (...) relation of politics and life based not on the camp and biopower, but on solidarity and freedom. Detainees in Australian immigration detention, like prisoners in the Nazi concentration camps, refused to abandon their politics. Rather than seeking to transform bare life, they rejected it and made their own decision on life and politics. (shrink)

Introduction. Cities play a key role in the development of countries and regions. The authors of the article emphasize the importance of the largest cities’ development, which is based on an industrial model that has not exhausted its potential. The authors show possibilities of urban development on the basis of the industrial sector effective functioning in order to improve the citizens’ welfare, meet their needs and improve the life quality. In this regard, the authors formulate a hypothesis that the (...) largest Russian cities developing according to the industrial model have and are able to realize their potential in order to improve the life quality, preserve and increase the population on their territory. The authors set a goal: to identify the possibilities for developing industrial-type megalopolises to improve the population’s life quality of the (PLQ). Methods. The authors use the following information base: strategic documents of different levels, statistical data, scientific literature, analytical documents, and expert assessments of the megalopolises’ development. The authors also use an industrial model for developing the largest cities; they determine conditions under which the potential of megacities can be realized to improve the citizens’ life quality and carry out an analysis of the demographic and social situation in the largest Russian industrial cities. The authors evaluate some approaches and theses of the study as exemplified by the following cities with a million-plus population: Yekaterinburg, Krasnoyarsk, Chelyabinsk, and Omsk and they group the cities according to the signs of growth and decline, which is illustrated by favorable or unfavorable demographic trends. To confirm the identified trends and problems of the largest cities, the authors provide the results of expert assessments on the population’s life quality and the state of the urban environment and emphasize the need for a systemic integrated development of the largest cities of industrial type to improve the life quality of the population of megalopolises. The scientific novelty of the study consists in substantiating the prospects for the socio-economic development of the largest industrial cities of Russia on the basis of an industrial model that provides for the technological transformation of the economy, the use of agglomeration effects, the formation of a friendly urban environment for residents and the achievement of socialization of urban space. Results and conclusions. As a result of the analysis and typology of the largest cities by functional specialization, two groups of cities were identified: one group with signs of demographic growth, the second with signs of decline. The cities of the first group have a greater economic potential, opportunities for agglomeration, provide more comfortable living and consolidation of the population on their territory. On the contrary, cities with signs of decreasing have fewer opportunities (resources), are less diversified, the urban environment in them is less comfortable, which is reflected in the citizens’ life quality and is accompanied by the population’s outflow. At the same time, it was revealed that all analyzed cities actively use digital technologies, realizing, in particular, the concept of a «smart city». At the same time, cities with signs of decreasing show high IQ indicators of cities. Taking into account the identified problems, the authors propose promising directions for the development of industrial megalopolises with signs of decline. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Mind and Life, Religion and Science: His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Buddhism-Christianity-Science TrialogueAmos YongIn this essay, I explore what happens to the Buddhist-Christian dialogue when another party is introduced into the conversation, in this case, the sciences. My question concerns how the interface between religion and science is related to the Buddhist-Christian encounter and vice versa. I take up this question in four steps, correlating with (...) the four parts of this essay. First, I sketch a brief overview of the Buddhism-science encounter, and then turn my attention more specifically to the recent exchanges in the Mind and Life dialogues involving Western scientists and philosophers and Tibetan Buddhist practitioners, including His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Then, in our lengthiest discussion, I focus on three of the most recent books related to the Mind and Life series in order to flesh out some of the details of how Tibetan Buddhists in general and His Holiness more specifically are interacting with the sciences. Finally, I return to the larger implications that the Buddhism-science conversation has not only for the Buddhist-Christian dialogue but also potentially for the religion-science encounter.The goal of this essay is to identify the promise and the challenges involved for Buddhists and Christians when the sciences are added into the equation. I am led by a threefold hypothesis. First, the religion side of the “religion and science” dialogue needs to be further specified. Whereas it used to be the case that “religion and science” meant “Christianity and science,” no longer can or should this be assumed. Rather, there is an emerging recognition that distinctive shifts occur in the religion and science discussion when Buddhism is factored into the conversation. Second, the interreligious dialogue in general can itself benefit from engaging a third party, in this case, the natural sciences. More specifically, I am convinced that the Buddhist-Christian dialogue has much to gain when the various scientific disciplines are allowed to inform the discussion. To be sure, there will be distinctive challenges that will present themselves, not the least of which are the methodological complexities regarding the interface between religion and science added to the already complicated methodological issues that perennially beset the interreligious encounter. However it is precisely the emergent comparisons and contrasts in dialogical approaches that [End Page 43] may contribute to pushing the discussion forward. Finally, if it is the case that religion does indeed have something to contribute to its dialogue with the sciences, so much more is it the case that science may benefit not only from the separate insights of two religious traditions, but also from the cross-fertilization that occurs in the interreligious dialogue.Two caveats before proceeding with the essay. First, I speak first and foremost as a Christian theologian with academic training in the study of religion, rather than in Buddhist traditions in particular. While my Christian perspectives will inevitably color my understanding of Buddhism, I believe it is possible in this case, given the hypotheses outlined above, that such “biases” can be profitably harnessed to explore what happens when the Buddhist-Christian dialogue is enlarged to become a trialogue between Buddhism, Christianity, and the sciences. In fact, I am convinced that Christian theology for the twenty-first century needs to dialogue both with other faiths and with the sciences, and this essay is an attempt to bring these essential dialogues together.1Second, I approach the following review essay with a certain degree of fear and trembling given that in a very real sense my primary dialogue partners are Tibetan Buddhist adepts as well as His Holiness the Dalai Lama. I do not in any way intend to be presumptuous about claiming to be able to critically interact with his knowledge of Buddhism or the sciences. On the contrary, I am a mere novice and amateur in these fields of inquiry compared to his lifelong study and practice of the Buddhist tradition, and his decades-long engagement with the sciences. Yet I find encouragement from his own openness to interacting with the Christian tradition and from his willing to learn from Christians and the Christian faith.2 Further... (shrink)

The main points made by Clarke and Mearman about Winch's article ‘The Economic Aims of Education’ are taken up and discussed. My argument is that work is not necessarily a disutility, although paid employment can be when it is undertaken in conditions that are not fulfilling. Life aims are not the same as educational aims, although educational aims (as opposed to specific curricular aims) are life aims, and can include vocational preparation, a position endorsed in the later writings (...) of R. S. Peters. Such aims can also, contrary to the views of Clarke and Mearman, include preparation for sexual companionship, a view endorsed by, for example, Rousseau. (shrink)