Dialogical egalitarianism is the thesis that any proposition asserted in dialogue, if questioned, must be supported or else retracted. Dialogical foundationalism is the thesis that some propositions are privileged over this burden of proof, standing in no need of support unless and until support for their negation is provided. I first discuss existing arguments for either thesis, dismissing each one of them. Absent a successful principled argument, I then examine which thesis it is pragmatically more advantageous to adopt in analytic (...) philosophical dialogue. This requires identifying the goal of such dialogue, to the attainment of which the thesis would be so advantageous. To identify this goal, I draw on Douglas Walton’s typology of dialogues for an analysis of the types of dialogue of 110 representatively selected journal articles in current analytic philosophy. 95% of articles are found to instantiate persuasion dialogue. In light of the thus prevalent goal of persuading one’s opponent, I argue that the adoption of dialogical egalitarianism in analytic philosophical dialogue is pragmatically inescapable. (shrink)

Who carries the burden of proof in analytic philosophical debates, and how can this burden be satisfied? As it turns out, the answer to this joint question yields a fundamental challenge to the very conduct of metaphysics in analytic philosophy. Empirical research presented in this book indicates that the vastly predominant goal pursued in analytic philosophical dialogues lies not in discovering truths or generating knowledge, but merely in prevailing over one’s opponents. Given this goal, the book examines how most effectively (...) to allocate and discharge the burden of proof. It focuses on premises that must prudently be avoided because a burden of proof on them could never be satisfied, and in particular discusses unsupportable bridge premises across inference barriers, like Hume’s barrier between ‘is’ and ‘ought’, or the barrier between the content of our talk or thought, and the world beyond such content. Employing this content/world barrier for a critical assessment of mainstream analytic philosophical methods, this book argues that we must prudently avoid invoking intuitions or other content of thought or talk in support of claims about the world beyond content, that is, metaphysically significant claims. Yet as content-located evidence is practically indispensable to metaphysical debates throughout analytic philosophy, from ethics to the philosophy of mathematics, this book reaches the startling conclusion that all such metaphysical debates must, prudently, be terminated. (shrink)

This chapter addresses the following question: If you assert a proposition and your interlocutor questions the same, then are you invariably required to accept the burden of proof, and to provide support for this proposition—or may you sometimes demand support for the proposition’s negation instead, thus placing the burden of proof upon your interlocutor? Existing arguments for either answer are examined, such as the contention that exemptions from the burden of proof would be dogmatic, or the claim that placing the (...) burden of proof invariably upon the proponent would yield a regress towards scepticism. On the basis of the attitude/dialogue separation and the goal of persuasion, all such arguments are rejected. It is then argued that, for persuasive success, the burden of proof must prudently be accepted invariably by a proposition’s proponent. (shrink)

This chapter employs the inference barrier between the content of talk or thought, and the world beyond such content, for an assessment of common philosophical methods. Content-located evidence (e.g. intuitions) and objects of hypotheses (e.g. anthropogenic kinds) are distinguished from world-located evidence (e.g. empirical observations) and objects of hypotheses (e.g. natural kinds). The crossing of inference barriers, including of the content/world barrier, must be avoided in analytic philosophy, and therefore elements of content (e.g. intuitions) must prudently not be invoked in (...) support of aspects of the world beyond content (e.g. natural kinds). (shrink)

This chapter applies the content/world barrier to more substantive debates in analytic philosophy, including to normative, modal, epistemic, and ontological debates. It is argued that assertions about norms and necessities are unsupportable in analytic philosophy (also due to the is/ought barrier and the contingent/necessary barrier) and must prudently be avoided. It is further argued that assertions about knowledge and abstract entities are equally unsupportable and must be avoided if knowledge or abstract entities are aspects of the world beyond content. In (...) conclusion, any engagement in analytic philosophical debates about aspects of the world beyond content, that is, metaphysical debates in analytic philosophy, must prudently be avoided. (shrink)

This chapter examines how the burden of proof can be discharged. It is argued that evidence in support of a questioned hypothesis is persuasively useless if it differs in kind from that hypothesis (e.g. descriptive evidence in support of a normative hypothesis), because the inferential premise stating that such evidence supports the given hypothesis would itself be entirely unsupportable. The crossing of such inference barriers between divergent kinds must therefore prudently be avoided in analytic philosophical dialogue.

This chapter establishes two key premises. First, commitments in dialogue do not necessitate corresponding commitments in beliefs or other attitudinal states, nor vice versa. Second, the goal pursued in analytic philosophical dialogues is to persuade one’s opponents—rather than, say, to generate knowledge or discover truths. In order to establish the latter, a typology of dialogues developed in Informal Logic is employed for an empirical analysis of a sample of 110 journal articles in analytic philosophy, 95% of which are found to (...) instantiate a type of dialogue aimed at persuasion. (shrink)

This chapter assesses ways to avoid the preceding anti-metaphysical conclusion. Said conclusion can be accommodated by opting for a coherentist framework, located solely within content, or by opting for a type of dialogue other than persuasion-directed dialogue—though neither option is entirely satisfactory. Alternatively, the conclusion can be undermined by prioritising a personal goal over the goal of persuasion, such as the goal of avoiding challenges to one’s convictions, or of avoiding unemployment, or of influencing wider societal practices—but none of these (...) goals would seem satisfactory to analytic philosophers seeking to engage in metaphysical debates. (shrink)