The English Franciscan philosopher and theologian, Adam of Wodeham (d. 1358), was a disciple and friend of William of Ockham; he was also a student of Walther Chatton. Nevertheless, he was an independent thinker who did not hesitate to criticize his former teachers - Ockham sporadically and benevolently, Chatton, frequently and aggressively. Since W odeham developed his own doctrinal position by a thorough critical examination of current opinions, the first part of this introduc tion briefly outlines the positions (...) of the chief figures in the English controversy over indivisibles. The second part of the introduction pre sents a summary of Wodeham's views in the Tractatus de indivisibilibus, lists the contents of the treatise, and considers the question of its date and its chronological position in the context of Wodeham's other works. In the third part, the editorial procedures used here are set forth. 1. THE INDIVISIBILIST CONTROVERSY In the literature of the 13th and 14th centuries, the term 'indivisible' refers to a simple, un extended entity. Consequently, these indivisibles are not physical atoms but either mathematical points, temporal instants or indivisibles of motion, usually called mutata esse. I THOMAS BRADWARDINE (d. 1349), roughly contemporary with Wodeham, classified the positions it was possible to take regarding indivisibles. He described his own view as the common view, that of "Aristotle, A verroes, and most of the moderns," according to which a "continuum was not composed of atoms (athomis) but of parts divisible without end. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION Adam Wodeham, OFM (d.) has received only passing mention in the textbooks on the history of medieval philosophy. Although recognized as a major...

In his commentary on the Sentences, Adam Wodeham tries to account for sensory illusions. In his view, they result from erroneous judgments. However, he has to address the question of how nonhuman animals can also fall prey to such an illusion. Because if illusions are erroneous judgments and if animals fall prey to illusions, it follows that they are capable of judging. This means that they can affirm or negate that something is the case by ‘complex propositions’ (as (...) judgments were defined by William Ockham). This view leads to various consequences which Wodeham is not ready to accept. Instead, he develops an interesting and intricate argument for a more parsimonious and less anthropomorphic explanation of animal behaviour. (shrink)

The idea that emotions are cognitive mental states is at the heart of many modern accounts of the emotions. This paper examines how medieval philosophers of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries thought of the relationship between emotions, usually referred to as passions of the soul, and cognitions. Although medieval authors see a close relationship between emotions and those cognitions triggering them, they usually deny that emotions are simply kinds of cognition; strictly speaking, emotions are thought to be movements (...) of the human appetites. However, one philosopher from the first half of the fourteenth century, Adam Wodeham, explicitly defends the view that emotions are cognitions. After examining Wodeham's arguments and the philosophical motivation behind his view, the paper turns to critical reactions to Wodeham's unique account. (shrink)

This paper looks at the critical reception of two central claims of Peter Auriol’s theory of cognition: the claim that the objects of cognition have an apparent or objective being that resists reduction to the real being of objects, and the claim that there may be natural intuitive cognitions of nonexistent objects. These claims earned Auriol the criticism of his fellow Franciscans, Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham. According to them, the theory of apparent being was what had led (...) Auriol to allow for intuitive cognitions of nonexistents, but the intuitive cognition of nonexistents, at its turn, led to scepticism. Modern commentators have offered similar readings of Auriol, but this paper argues, first, that the apparent being provides no special reason to think there could be intuitions of nonexistent objects, and second, that despite his idiosyncratic account of intuition, Auriol was no more vulnerable to scepticism than his critics. (shrink)

The present paper examines the trinitarian theology of Adam Wodeham and Walter Chatton through an examination of the filioque, i.e., the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and Son. The paper argues that the strong emphasis on divine simplicity that emerged in the early fourteenth century had a subtle influence on how Wodeham and Chatton understood the intra-trinitarian distinctions between the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

In his Lectura Secunda (d. 1, q. 6, §1), Adam Wodeham depicts a scenario in which God's absolute power is uncommonly used to prove the inseparability of enjoyment (fruitio) and pleasure (delectatio) in the beatific vision. After putting Wodeham's argument into its historical context, I argue that it can be considered an example of a thought experiment. If confirmed, this acknowledgment can lead to a major clarification in the current debate about Medieval thought experiments.

This chapter contains sections titled: The Norwich Lectures The Oxford Lectures Lost works by Wodeham Conclusion Note.

Complexe significabilia are the significate of whole sentences, irreducible to what is signified by categorematic sub-sentential components. It has been propounded firstly by Adam Wodeham. Wodeham construes his argument for the postulation of complexe significabilia as a middle way between William of Ockham and Walter Chatton. According to Wodeham, Ockham’s view implies a reflexive theory of mental acts, which goes against the phenomenology of the act of assent. Moreover, it leads to an anti-realist epistemology. We need (...) therefore things outside the mind to be object of the act of assent, which is also the conclusion reached by Chatton. However, against Chatton, Wodeham argues that things signified by the categorematic component of sentences cannot be the object of assent. In effect, sentences with different syncategorematic structures, but with the same categorematic components, would correspond to the same propositional attitude in Chatton’s framework, which is an unwelcome consequence. The result is that we need to postulate that the objects of assent are outside the mind, contra Ockham, that are not signified by sentential categorematic components, contra Chatton, but are irreducibly signified by the whole sentences. (shrink)

Adam of Wodeham and William of Ockham ascribe different properties to intuitive apprehensions. The properties that Wodeham ascribes to intuitive cognitions concur with his reading of one of the four scenarios that Ockham proposes in order to test the idea that an intuitive apprehension serves as an epistemic warrant. In this article, I explain that Wodeham avoids skepticism through his account of intuitive cognitions; even though, like Ockham, he accepts that God can cause us to undergo (...) various sorts of mental acts in virtue of which we could believe that something exists when really it does not exist. (shrink)

This paper presents an original interpretation of the fourteenth-century debate over whether every volitio is a cognitio. This debate, I argue, was at its heart a debate about what constitutes the mark of occurrent mental states. Three participants in this debate – Adam Wodeham, Richard FitzRalph, and John of Ripa – articulated three distinct accounts of the mark of the mental. In doing so, they also developed several philosophical accounts of the intentionality of occurrent affective states.

The relation-theory of mental acts proposes that a mental act is a kind of relative entity founded upon the mind and directed at the object of perception or thought. While most medieval philosophers recognized that there is something importantly relational about thought, they nevertheless rejected the view that mental acts are wholly relations. Rather, the dominant view was that a mental act is either in whole or part an Aristotelian quality added to the mind upon which such a relation to (...) the object can be founded. This paper examines Durand of St.-Pourçain’s defense of the relation-theory of mental acts against two objections raised against it: the first from John Duns Scotus, among others, and the second from an anonymous Thomist and Adam Wodeham. (shrink)

This paper looks at the critical reception of two central claims of Peter Auriol’s theory of cognition: the claim that the objects of cognition have an apparent or objective being that resists reduction to the real being of objects, and the claim that there may be natural intuitive cognitions of nonexistent objects. These claims earned Auriol the criticism of his fellow Franciscans, Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham. According to them, the theory of apparent being was what had led (...) Auriol to allow for intuitive cognitions of nonexistents, but the intuitive cognition of nonexistents, at its turn, led to skepticism. Modern commentators have offered similar readings of Auriol, but this paper argues, first, that the apparent being provides no special reason to think there could be intuitions of nonexistent objects, and second, that despite his idiosyncratic account of intuition, Auriol was no more vulnerable to skepticism than his critics. (shrink)

Abstract of the book This volume has three aims. First, historians of philosophy have typically focused on the discussions of the moral relevance of emotions, and with the exception of scholars of ancient philosophy, neglected the place of emotions in cognitive life. This collection of articles refocuses the discussion of emotion in the medieval and early modern periods to their role in cognition. Second, though many have aimed to clarify relationship between the later thinkers and their predecessors with regard to (...) issues in metaphysics and epistemology, there has been very little effort at tracing similar lines of thought about emotion. As a whole, the contributions to this volume serve to begin a discussion about the continuities between medieval and early modern thinking about the emotions. In this regard, there is also a discussion of the emotions of cognitive life of the Renaissance. Though we get only a snapshot of a period of philosophical work often passed over, even this snapshot invites questions about how to weave an intellectual history about accounts of our emotions in our cognitive lives. Finally, attention to the concerns that engage philosophers of the medieval, renaissance and early modern periods can inform the contemporary debate regarding the relationship between emotions, cognition, and reason. The thirteen contributions explore this from the point of view of four key themes: the situation of emotions within the human mind; the intentionality of emotions and their role in cognition; emotions and action; the role of emotion in self-understanding and the social situation of individuals. (shrink)

Die Intentionalitätsproblematik steht nicht nur im Mittelpunkt der heutigen philosophischen und kognitionstheoretischen Debatten. Sie wurde bereits im Mittelalter scharfsinnig diskutiert, ja die scholastischen Autoren prägten als Erste die Fachausdrücke "Intentionalität" und "intentionale Existenz" und entwarfen verschiedene Modelle, um das Rätsel der kognitiven Bezugnahme zu lösen. Dieses Buch stellt fünf einflußreiche Intentionalitätsmodelle vor, die im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert entstanden sind. Dabei werden so unterschiedliche Autoren wie Thomas von Aquin, Petrus Johannes Olivi, Dietrich von Freiberg, Johannes Duns Scotus, Petrus Aureoli, Hervaeus (...) Natalis, Wilhelm von Ockham und Adam Wodeham berücksichtigt. -/- "Die anschauliche und präzise Art, in der Perler mit den Denkern des Mittelalters und der Gegenwart argumentierend spricht, lockert seine gestrenge Gedankenarbeit auf, ohne darüber hinwegzutäuschen, daß dieses Buch eine Reihe von Entdeckungen und Klärungen enthält, wie sie auf diesem schwierigen Feld selten vorkommen. Er bietet eine Meisterleistung an Konzentration und Darstellungskunst. Wenige Bücher zur Philosophie des Mittelalters vereinen so glücklich wie dieses geschichtlichen Takt und Problemsinn." Kurt Flasch -/- The problem of intentionality is not only at the centre of today's philosophical and cognitive theory debates. It was already discussed astutely in the Middle Ages; indeed the scholastic authors were the first to coin the technical terms "intentionality" and "intentional existence" and designed various models to solve the riddle of cognitive reference. This book presents five influential models of intentionality that emerged in the 13th and 14th centuries. It takes into account authors as different as Thomas Aquinas, Petrus Johannes Olivi, Dietrich von Freiberg, Johannes Duns Scotus, Petrus Aureoli, Hervaeus Natalis, Wilhelm von Ockham and Adam Wodeham. Upun reading this book, Kurt Flasch remarks that it "contains a wealth of discoveries and clarifications that are rare in this difficult field. [Perler] offers a masterly performance of concentration and art of representation [...]. Few books on medieval philosophy succeed so thoroughly in uniting historical and philosophical perspicacity such as this one". (shrink)

The relation-theory of mental acts proposes that a mental act is a kind of relative entity founded upon the mind and directed at the object of perception or thought. While most medieval philosophers recognized that there is something importantly relational about thought, they nevertheless rejected the view that mental acts are wholly relations. Rather, the dominant view was that a mental act is either in whole or part an Aristotelian quality added to the mind upon which such a relation to (...) the object can be founded. In this paper, I examine Durand of St.-Pourçain's defense of the relation-theory of mental acts against two objections raised against it: the first from John Duns Scotus, among others, and the second from an anonymous Thomist and Adam Wodeham. -/- . (shrink)

: In this paper I argue that the famous problems of dualism between mind (soul) and body, that is, the problems of interaction and unification, concerned philosophers already in a medieval Aristotelian tradition. The problems, although traceable earlier, become particularly visible after William Ockham in the early fourteenth century, and in formulating his own position on the animal and human souls I argue that Buridan realized these problems and laid down the only views on the soul he thought to be (...) possible in an Aristotelian framework. His discussion then sets the stage for the following centuries. In presenting the background to Buridan's discussion I treat Aquinas, Ockham, Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham. (shrink)

In recent philosophical debates about the nature of human emotions the intentionality of emotions plays a key part. The article explores how medieval philosophers of the late 13th and early 14th centuries accounted for the fact that our emotions, such as love, hate, anger and the like, are intentional mental states, states that are ‘of’ or ‘about something’. Since medieval philosophers agree that emotions are essentially movements of the appetitive powers, the intentionality of emotions is part of the broader problem (...) of the intentionality of our appetitive acts. Do emotions and other appetitive acts derive their intentionality from the relevant cognitive acts on which their occurrence depends? And if so, how? Are appetitive acts intrinsically intentional states? The contribution discusses these and similar questions, while special attention is given to authors such as Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Thomas of Bailly, Adam Wodeham and Gregory of Rimini. (shrink)

The third volume of The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts will allow scholars and students access in English, to major texts that form the debate over mind and knowledge at the center of medieval philosophy. Beginning with thirteenth-century attempts to classify the soul's powers and to explain the mind's place within the soul, the volume proceeds systematically to consider the scope of human knowledge and the role of divine illumination, intentionality and mental representation, and attempts to identify the object (...) of human knowledge in terms of concepts and propositions. The authors included are Henry of Ghent, Peter John Olivi, William Alnwick, Peter Aureol, William Ockham, William Crathorn, Robert Holcot, Adam Wodeham as well as two anonymous Parisian masters of arts. This volume will be an important resource for scholars and students of medieval philosophy, history, theology and literature. (shrink)

Medieval philosophers clearly recognized that emotions are not simply "raw feelings" but complex mental states that include cognitive components. They analyzed these components both on the sensory and on the intellectual level, paying particular attention to the different types of cognition that are involved. This paper focuses on William Ockham and Adam Wodeham, two fourteenth-century authors who presented a detailed account of "sensory passions" and "volitional passions". It intends to show that these two philosophers provided both a structural (...) and a functional analysis of emotions, i.e., they explained the various elements constituting emotions and delineated the causal relations between these elements. Ockham as well as Wodeham emphasized that "sensory passions" are not only based upon cognitions but include a cognitive component and are therefore intentional. In addition, they pointed out that "volitional passions" are based upon a conceptualization and an evaluation of given objects. This cognitivist approach to emotions enabled them to explain the complex phenomenon of emotional conflict, a phenomenon that has its origin in the co-presence of various emotions that involve conflicting evaluations. (shrink)

In reply to the question whether articles of faith can be demonstrated, William of Ockham articulated a peculiar thesis: Even though it is impossible to prove articles of faith in this life, the blessed in heaven could demonstrate our creditive propositions. In contrast to traditional views, William held that both conclusions drawn in heaven and conclusions drawn in this life are subject to the same criteria. This assumption led to a controversy between William's contemporaries, namely, Walter Chatton and Adam (...) Wodeham, who discussed whether theories of propositions are applicable to articles of faith. This essay tries to explain why the problem of demonstrating creditive propositions arose and in what way William's answer gave a new meaning to the dispute. (shrink)

Guillaume d'Ockham fut l'initiateur principal d'une approche sémantique aux phénomènes cognitifs: la pensée, pour lui, est un discours intérieur et il propose de l'analyser systématiquement à travers les catégories de la grammaire et celles — surtout — de la théorie nouvelle des « propriétés des termes » . On examine ici comment cette suggestion fut reçue chez les philosophes anglais du temps d'Ockham, en particulier: Gauthier Chatton, Hugues Lawton, le Pseudo-Campsall, Crathorn, Robert Holkot et Adam Wodeham. William of (...) Ockham initiated a semantical approach to cognitive phenomena: thought, for him, is a mental discourse and he proposes to analyse this discourse systematically with the help of the categories of grammar and that of the relatively new theory of « the properties of terms » . What is studied here is the reception of this suggestion among English philosophers in Ockham's own time, notably: Walter Chatton, Hugh Lawton, the Pseudo-Campsall, Crathorn, Robert Holcot and Adam Wodeham. (shrink)

The third volume of The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts will allow scholars and students access, for the first time in English, to major texts that form the debate over mind and knowledge at the center of medieval philosophy. Beginning with thirteenth-century attempts to classify the soul's powers and to explain the mind's place within the soul, the volume proceeds systematically to consider the scope of human knowledge and the role of divine illumination, intentionality and mental representation, and attempts (...) to identify the object of human knowledge in terms of concepts and propositions. The authors included are Henry of Ghent, Peter John Olivi, William Alnwick, Peter Aureol, William Ockham, William Crathorn, Robert Holcot, Adam Wodeham as well as two anonymous Parisian masters of arts. This volume will be an important resource for scholars and students of medieval philosophy, history, theology and literature. (shrink)

The third volume of The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts will allow scholars and students access in English, to major texts that form the debate over mind and knowledge at the center of medieval philosophy. Beginning with thirteenth-century attempts to classify the soul's powers and to explain the mind's place within the soul, the volume proceeds systematically to consider the scope of human knowledge and the role of divine illumination, intentionality and mental representation, and attempts to identify the object (...) of human knowledge in terms of concepts and propositions. The authors included are Henry of Ghent, Peter John Olivi, William Alnwick, Peter Aureol, William Ockham, William Crathorn, Robert Holcot, Adam Wodeham as well as two anonymous Parisian masters of arts. This volume will be an important resource for scholars and students of medieval philosophy, history, theology and literature. (shrink)

L'A. analizza un tema fondamentale nella «querelle» sui futuri contingenti del sec. XIV, cioè il concetto di potentia absoluta di Dio. Il tema fu interpretato secondo due opposte visioni: l'interpetazione «operativa» intendeva la potentia absoluta come un potere straordinario ed «eccezionale», mentre l'interpretazione «logica», sostenuta ad esempio da Bradwardine, riteneva la potentia absoluta una mera descrizione di possibilità teoriche. L'analisi di questo problema è condotta in base alle teorie di Giovanni Buckingham e di Giovanni di Mirecourt, con riferimenti alla posizione (...) di Bradwardine, Duns Scoto, Guglielmo di Ockham e Adam Wodeham. (shrink)

Modern logic is primarily concerned with formally valid arguments, namely arguments where the conclusion is a logical consequence of the premises. Intuitively, this means that the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises in virtue of their logical form alone. Such arguments form the backbone of philosophy, mathematics, and science in general: for instance, the famous Pythagorean Theorem is a logical consequence of the axioms of Euclidean geometry. However, the task of defining the concept of logical consequence is far from straightforward. (...) Logical consequence is the glue that holds our belief system together, but what holds the glue together? This question cuts deep into the very foundations of scientific knowledge. -/- The standard model-theoretic definition of logical consequence, originally formulated by Alfred Tarski in 1936, has been questioned by philosophers from various perspectives over the past few decades. John Etchemendy famously argues that Tarski’s account fails to capture the pre-theoretic, intuitive concept of logical consequence. Logical pluralists suggest that there is more than one correct concept of it. On the other hand, historians have pointed out that Tarskian definitions of logical consequence had already been proposed by Parisian logicians in the 14th century, and again by Bernard Bolzano in the 19th century. It has been suggested that their proposals may have captured the intuitive concept of logical consequence even better than Tarski’s. And yet, the fact that their proposals were not widely accepted at their own time suggests that the intuitive concept itself may have changed over time. -/- The aim of this dissertation is to analyse the continuities and discontinuities between Tarski’s account and its premodern precedents. My overall thesis is twofold. On one hand, I show that a Tarskian ‘substitutional’ criterion of logical consequence was more widespread in the 14th century than has been previously thought, and that it continued to be promoted by many prominent textbooks of logic in the early modern era until it was subsumed by the Aristotelian theory of the syllogism. On the other hand, I argue that the notion of logical form presupposed by most 14th-century authors was distinctively non-Tarskian. Back then, logical form was primarily about relationships among concepts, but it is now taken to be just about the structural properties of propositions. I suggest that Tarski is partly to blame for this transformation: his definition was successful precisely because he deliberately suppressed some philosophical intuitions to suit the needs of mathematical logicians. -/- The dissertation consists of five articles. Article I focuses on the theories of formal consequence by the 14th-century logician William of Ockham and his student Adam Wodeham. Both distinguished between two kinds of formal consequence (consequentia formalis), the first of which anticipates Tarski’s account, but their second kinds of formal consequence differ. I show that Wodeham’s two kinds of formal consequence are based on two kinds of logical form. -/- In Article II, I further develop and defend what I call the ‘dual form hypothesis’. I ask why the 14th-century Parisian tradition of formal consequence, as close as it is to Tarski’s definiton, was not as influential at the time as the rival British tradition. I argue that the two traditions were closer to each other than we have thought. They agreed that formal consequence involves a truth-preserving form, and only disagreed on whether that form is structural or conceptual. -/- Article III traces the early modern reception of the Parisian definition through a large-scale analysis of Early English Books Online, which contains almost all books printed in the British empire from the 15th to the 17th century. I show that Parisian-style definitions were surprisingly widespread in textbooks of logic that were used for teaching in Oxford, Cambridge, and Dublin for a long time. -/- In Article IV, I argue that Tarski’s definition of logical consequence is not a conceptual analysis (as Etchemendy and others have claimed) but a Carnapian explication. The point is that Tarski did not even try to capture the essence of a pre-existing everyday concept; on the contrary, he deliberately sacrificed some everyday intuitions on the altar of formal correctness. -/- Finally, Article V takes on the challenge of formalizing the medieval British definition of formal consequence in modern logic. I try out several approaches and conclude that Gillian Russell’s recent account of logical consequence can be applied to provide a fruitful formalization of the medieval notion. (shrink)