Abstract

This chapter deals with the second of the three problems facing epistemological disjunctivism: the access problem. It starts by stating The Access Problem: (AP1) _S_ can know by reflection alone that her reason for believing the specific empirical proposition _p_ is the factive reason _R_. [Premise]; (AP2) _S_ can know by reflection alone that _R_ entails _p_. [Premise]; (APC) _S_ can know by reflection alone the specific empirical proposition _p_. [From (AP1), (AP2)]. It shows that the access problem for epistemological disjunctivism is neutralized since the problematic conclusion in question is never generated. Given that one of the other key prima facie problems for epistemological disjunctivism — the basis problem — is similarly ineffective, we are well on our way towards demonstrating that this proposal — and in particular, this proposal's endorsement of factive reflectively accessible reasons — has far more going for it than at first meets the eye.