Epistemological disjunctivism

Oxford: Oxford University Press (2012)
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Abstract

Epistemological disjunctivism in outline -- Favouring versus discriminating epistemic support -- Radical scepticsim.

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Reprint years

2014

Call number

BD161.P7492 2012

ISBN(s)

9780199557912   0199557918   9780198708964   0198708963   9780191743290

DOI

10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.001.0001

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Chapters

Introduction.  (pages 1-10)
§1.  (pages 13-16)
§2. Motivating Epistemological Disjunctivism.  (pages 17-19)
§3. Three Prima Facie Problems for Epistemological Disjunctivism.  (pages 20-22)
§4. Metaphysical and Epistemological Disjunctivism.  (pages 23-24)
§5. Seeing That P and Knowing That P.  (pages 25-34)
§6.  (pages 35-45)
§7. Resolving the Access Problem.  (pages 46-53)
Introductory Remarks.  (pages 63-64)
§1. The Relevant Alternatives Account of Perceptual Knowledge.  (pages 65-67)
§2. Relevant Alternatives and Closure.  (pages 68-72)
§3. Three Epistemic Principles: Discrimination, Evidential Transmission, and Favouring.  (pages 73-77)
§4. Favouring and Discriminating Epistemic Support.  (pages 78-81)
§5. Diagnosis.  (pages 82-85)
§6. A Two-Tiered Relevant Alternatives Theory.  (pages 86-90)
§7. Favouring versus Discriminating Epistemic Support and Epistemological Disjunctivism.  (pages 91-100)
Introductory Remarks.  (pages 109)
§1. Radical Scepticism.  (pages 110-112)
§2. Mooreanism.  (pages 113-115)
§3. Contemporary Neo-Mooreanism.  (pages 116-121)
§4. A Simpleminded Epistemological Disjunctivist Neo-Mooreanism.  (pages 122-124)
§5. Motivating Epistemological Disjunctivist Neo-Mooreanism.  (pages 125-130)
§6. Overriding versus Undercutting Anti-Sceptical Strategies.  (pages 131-135)
§7. Radical Scepticism and Quietism.  (pages 136-140)
§8. Knowing and Saying That One Knows.  (pages 141-150)
§9. Concluding Remarks.  (pages 151-152)

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Duncan Pritchard
University of California, Irvine

Citations of this work

Reliabilist Epistemology.Alvin Goldman & Bob Beddor - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2013 - Dissertation, Princeton University
An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2020 - The Philosophical Review 129 (1):1-51.

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