Abstract

Raftopoulos suggests that realism can be defended only if it can be argued that perception includes _nonconceptual content_, to individuate objects in the perceiver’s environment. The perceptual mechanisms appealed to by Raftopoulos cannot serve to single out environmental objects uniquely; our perceptual systems must be able to exploit sortal distinctions of a very broad kind in order to achieve this task. It is further contended that Raftopoulos’ response to antirealism is question-begging, failing to tackle antirealism at its real philosophical roots. If one is to argue non-question-beggingly _from_ nonconceptual perceptual content _to_ realism, one needs to identify a species of nonconceptual content in perception which is introspectively accessible by the perceiver and suited by its intrinsic character to constitute good evidence for the existence of an external world conforming to the realist’s conception. This chapter sketches and defends this account of the nonconceptual content of perception.