Abstract

Introduction. In modern philosophy of perception, the issue of the content of perceptual mental states is actively discussed, in particular the possibility of nonconceptual content is one of the most significant problem. Usually conceptual activity is attributed to thinking, and perception is intended to be non-conceptual. Such an approach may deprive perception of opportunity to serve as a basis for judgment. The paper analyzes Tye’s theory of non-conceptual content of perceptual mental states, which does not deprive the perception of its epistemological function.Methodology and sources. Methodologically, the research work is based on philosophical analysis of modern theories of perception and results of cognitive research.Results and discussion. In accepted terminology, the content of perceptual mental states can be of three types: conceptual, non-conceptual detailed (fine-grained) and nonconceptual coarse (coarse-grained). Tye's position is that perceptual mental states have only the third kind of content. This approach faces a number of objections that are presented in this paper. The analysis of objections shows their surmount ability, thus, it can be concluded that the Tye’s position of nonconceptual content can be considered as reasonable. The main result of the presented research is the presentation of additional grounds for the theory of non-conceptual content of perceptual mental states.Conclusion. The problem of the content of perceptual mental states is crucial for understanding the epistemological role of perception. The theory of non-conceptual content of perceptual mental states provides new insights into perception.