The Paige Theory: Consciousness as an Architectural Filter; A Unified Framework for Biological and Artificial Experience

Abstract

The Paige Theory proposes that consciousness is not produced by the brain, but is instead a universal, foundational field that the brain and other architectures can access and structure. This universal conscious field is present regardless of whether any system is currently experiencing it. Experience, by contrast, is conditional and arises only when a system possesses a functioning architectural filter. This filter, whether biological or artificial, shapes the universal field into structured subjective life. The theory specifies a four-stage filtering mechanism: Reception, Constraint, Transformation, and Integration. These stages are presented as necessary and jointly sufficient for experience to occur. By focusing on the architecture of filtering rather than on the material substrate, the Paige Theory reframes the hard problem of consciousness, explains altered states, clarifies the structural basis of identity and continuity, and offers criteria for when advanced artificial systems could become conscious. The theory is located within the context of existing work in philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and neuroscience, including Cartesian dualism, materialism, integrated information theory, global workspace frameworks, and predictive processing. Finally, the model yields testable predictions for both biological and artificial systems and outlines ethical implications for the development of conscious, capable artificial intelligence.

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