Moods

This is the text of an invited talk exploring the connections between two apparently distinct notions of affect, sensory versus core affect. It is basically a progress report. It is exploratory and tentative. It starts from a mild puzzle about the apparent mismatch between the notion of affect that affective neuroscientists generally deploy and the notion of affect that emotion psychologists deploy. The notion favored by psychologists is the notion of core affect. The phenomenon studied by affective neuroscientists is usually (...) the notion of sensory affect. It's not clear how these two notions are related to each other. I'll present the main outlines of both notions, make some critical observations, and raise a few questions at the end. (shrink)

The philosophical debate around moods has mainly focused on whether and how their seeming recalcitrance to representationalist treatment can be overcome by accommodating moods’ apparent undirectedness through a peculiar representational structure. Through these theoretical efforts, though, most theorists have taken a double wrong turn (or so I argue), by maintaining that (i) (if directed,) moods are outwardly directed (i.e., directed toward something external to and independent of the subject’s mind) and (ii) moods are discrete mental states (on a par with (...) emotions, perceptual experiences, thoughts, etc.). By pointing at three as yet overlooked phenomenological features of moods—subjective salience, undetachability, and globality—I suggest that moods are (i) inwardly oriented (i.e., they pertain to the subjective aspect of experience and, if directed at all, they are directed toward one’s experiences) and (ii) structural features of consciousness (rather than discrete mental states). I thus explore a new approach to the nature of mood experience, one that aims to do justice to those phenomenological features: I call this the “ways of inner awareness” view. On this view, moods are ways of being aware of one’s own experiences. Different versions of the view may be developed, depending on various metaphysical commitments. I do not defend or recommend, here, any specific version. The aim of the paper is to motivate the general ways-of-inner-awareness approach to mood and hint at some possible ways it may be elaborated. (shrink)

Mental life exhibits both consciousness and intentionality: both subjective experience and object-directedness. Vision and mood pull us in opposite directions on the question of the relationship between the two. By holding tight to both pulls, and forcing them into a single framework, I formulate a general account of conscious intentionality as such – an account of how inner experience and external directedness cohabit in the structure of consciousness.

This book review of David E. Cooper’s Pessimism, Quietism and Nature as Refuge evaluates the work’s ideas on ways of life. The review begins by presenting a summary of Cooper’s work, focusing on his presentation and answer to the problem of managing the disquiet mood found in pessimistic misanthropes. This summary entails agreement with his rejections of amnesia, nihilism, and activism as potential solutions to disquiet. This review then emphasizes Cooper’s presentation of a new quietism – with roots in Daoism (...) and Confucianism, as well as the novel inclusion of refuge in nature – as the best way of accommodating disquiet in one’s life. Finally, the review presents two critiques of Cooper’s work; ideas that needed to be further explicated. First, the realizability of the quietism Cooper promotes, as his rejections of nihilism and activism are based on their impracticality. Second, how the quietist’s hope impacts their mood, since his goal is to provide a way for individuals to overcome a mood of disquiet. (shrink)

Suspension of judgment is a ubiquitous phenomenon in our lives. It is also relevant for several debates in contemporary epistemology (e.g., evidentialism/pragmatism; peer-disagreement/higher-order evidence; inquiry). The goal of this paper is to arrive at a better understanding of what suspension of judgment is. We first question the popular assumption that we call the Triad view according to which there are three and only three (paradigmatic) doxastic attitudes, namely, belief, disbelief, and suspension of judgment. We elaborate a cumulative argument regarding crucial (...) differences between belief/disbelief and suspension and conclude tentatively that suspension is not a doxastic state. On the constructive side, we defend the positive thesis (with special attention to justification/rationality and reasons for suspension) that suspension is rather an affective phenomenon, viz. a sort of mood. Finally, we consider further consequences of our view for contemporary debates in epistemology, and how it relates to ancient skepticism. (shrink)

Is profound sadness the secret gateway to creation? This paper explores the ontological paradox within Martin Heidegger’s thought, where Melancholy (Schwermut) is not treated as a psychological pathology to be cured, but as a fundamental "attunement" (Stimmung) that triggers radical creativity. By diving into the dark depths of the human condition, the study argues that melancholy serves as a "clearing" (Lichtung)—a space where the noise of the everyday world is silenced, allowing the truth of Being to emerge. Rather than being (...) a state of paralysis, Heideggerian melancholy is presented as the engine of authentic art and thought. It is the creative wrestling with the abyss that allows the philosopher and the artist to disclose a world that remains hidden from the "happy" and the conformist. (shrink)

Moods, orthodoxy holds, exist outside the space of reasons. A depressed subject may change their thoughts and behaviors as a result of their depression. But, according to this view, their mood gives them no genuine reason to do so. Instead, moods are mere causal influences on cognition. The issue is that moods, with their diffuse phenomenology, appear to lack intentionality (Directionlessness). But intentionality appears to be a necessary condition on rationality (The Content Constraint). Together, these principles conflict with the idea (...) that moods are rational states of mind (Mood Rationality). The inconsistency of these three principles is the Puzzle of Mood Rationality. Now to many, this puzzle is hardly vexing: we should reject Mood Rationality. But, I argue, Mood Rationality is true despite its unpopularity. Thus, we need another way of resolving the puzzle. To do so, I distinguish intentionality as a first‐personal, phenomenological notion from representation as a third‐personal, cognitive scientific notion. I then argue that moods satisfy a revised version of the Content Constraint and sketch an account of moods as representational but non‐intentional mental states, drawing on the Valuationist paradigm in affective neuroscience. I end by showing how this account enables us to explain moods’ rationality. (shrink)

This paper advances an analytic philosophical approach to atmospheres. We start by outlining three core characteristics of atmospheres: holism (an atmosphere is a holistic entity that emerges through the combinations of various aspects of the environment), affectivity (atmospheres are grasped corporeally and affectively), and quasi-objectivity (atmospheres cannot be captured in solely objective or solely subjective terms). We look at the most promising candidate theory of atmospheres, which defends that atmospheres supervene on affective affordances, and challenge it by casting doubt on (...) how far the concept of affective affordance can stretch in order to accommodate the relevant phenomenology, and by highlighting current controversies in the ontology of affordances. We then outline a more promising theory based on recent developments in the metaphysics of potentiality. According to the proposed theory, atmospheres are high-level nested relations of agent-environment joint potentialities. (shrink)

The view that moods are dispositions has recently fallen into disrepute. In this paper, we want to revitalise it by providing a new argument for it and by disarming an important objection against it. A shared assumption of our competitors (intentionalists about moods) is that moods are ‘diffuse’. First, we will provide reasons for thinking that existing intentionalist views do not in fact capture this distinctive feature of moods that distinguishes them from emotions. Second, we offer a dispositionalist alternative that (...) we think does better. Finally, we disarm the objection that is responsible for dispositionalism’s bad press. (shrink)

The two main subjectivist accounts of wellbeing, hedonism and desire-satisfactionism, focus on pleasure and desire (respectively) as the subjective states relevant to evaluating the goodness of a life. In this paper, I argue that another type of subjective state, mood, is much more central to wellbeing. After a general characterization of some central features of mood (§1), I argue that the folk concept of happiness construes it in terms of preponderance of good mood (§2). I then leverage this connection between (...) mood and happiness to argue that having certain mood patterns in one’s life is sufficient for having a good life (§3), and explore their potential necessity for a good life (§4). I close with discussion of the role that mood patterns might play within the three leading philosophical theories of wellbeing: hedonism (§5), desire-satisfactionism (§6), and objective-list theory (§7). (shrink)

A debate persists over how to distinguish manic states from non-manic ones (such as depressions). A lacuna exists amongst these efforts, where a specifically agentive account of mania would sit. An agentive account centers the manic person’s view of practical reasons, rationalizing their actions in the same way that sympathetic understandings rationalize the actions of more neurotypical agents. In this paper, I argue that mania restructures our agency by creating a pervasive sense of urgency. This urgency changes the kind of (...) handling that our practical reasons seem to call out for. Whilst this can make us less reliable as agents, I argue that this does not undermine the basic capacities on which personal autonomy is founded. The greater threat to manic agents’ autonomy is nonrecognition of this restructured agency, undermining autonomy in its social dimensions. Without an agentive account, we will fail to recognize distinctly manic agency when we see it, limiting our understanding of autonomy, and withholding recognition, fundamental to autonomy in its social dimensions, from manic agents. (shrink)

Does low mood have intentional content? If so, what is it? Philosophers have tried to answer both questions by appealing to low mood’s phenomenal character. However, appeals to phenomenology have not settled this debate. Thus, I take a different approach: I tackle both questions by examining low mood’s complex functional role in cognition. I argue that if we take this role into account, we have excellent reason to believe that low mood a) has content, and b) has the following indicative-imperative (...) content: Good events are, on average, less likely to occur than bad events & Limit [the subject’s] resource expenditure! (shrink)

摘要:【目的】 本文旨在超越西方情绪理论在分类学上的局限，通过整合《易 经》六十四卦的符号系统、《中庸》的"中和"哲学以及组合数学，构建一个名为 "情绪动态平衡模型"的新理论框架，以系统阐释情绪从本源到现象的完整谱系。 【方法】首先，将《中庸》"未发之中"界定为情绪系统的本源基准状态（对应乾 卦），将"发而中节之和"定义为情绪的理想功能状态；继而，借鉴卦爻结构提出 六个基本的情绪心理维度，通过二进制编码与六十四卦建立映射；最后，利用组 合数学严格推导情绪状态总数，并阐述其与中医脏腑功能的对应关系。【结果】 研究结果表明:（1）情绪系统存在一个本源基准状态（"未发之中"）与一个最佳 功能状态（"发而中节之和"），六十三种具体情绪状态是偏离此"中和"状态的表 现；（2）情绪状态的总数 TT 可由公式 T=∑k=16C(6,k)=63T=∑k=16​ C(6,k)=63 精确描述，并与六十四卦（除乾卦外）形成结构性映射；（3）该模 型在哲学基础、心理结构与生理机制上，实现了与中医情志理论及现代神经科学 视角的初步对接。【结论】本模型为理解复杂情绪提供了一个兼具文化底蕴、数 理逻辑与生理基础的全新范式，不仅为情绪分类学贡献了一个系统性框架，也 为未来的实证研究与临床应用开辟了跨学科的新路径。.

摘要：本文旨在系统探讨《黄帝内经》中提出的七情（喜、怒、忧、思、悲、恐、 惊）学说，并基于阴阳五行理论，构建一个阐释情志活动影响人体健康的结构化 模型。论文首次明确提出七情内在的阴阳属性划分（如怒为阳、郁为阴）及其与 五脏（肝、心、脾、肺、肾）五行配属的对应关系，揭示了情志致病的动态病理 学路径。通过跨学科的文献分析与理论思辨，本研究将《黄帝内经》“恬淡虚无， 真气从之”的核心养生理念，与现代神经科学、内分泌学的“稳态平衡”概念进 行深度对话与互释。研究提出：“恬淡虚无”可理解为一种理想的中枢情绪稳态， 而“真气从之”则是以此为基础的自主神经平衡与内分泌功能的最佳运行状态。 本文论证了负面情志通过“扰动气机”这一中介环节，破坏阴阳平衡与五行生克， 进而引发特定脏腑的神经功能紊乱与激素分泌失调，最终导致疾病的现代科学内 涵。本研究不仅为传统中医情志理论提供了清晰的现代化阐释框架，也为现代心 身医学、心理生理学及压力管理等领域提供了源自东方智慧的独特理论贡献与实 践启示。.

This paper critically examines the philosophical underpinnings of current experimental investigation into animal affect-related decision-making. Animals’ affective states are standardly operationalised by linking positively valenced states with “approach” behaviours and negatively valenced states with “avoidance” behaviours. While this operationalisation has provided a helpful starting point to investigate the ecological role of animals’ internal states, there is extensive evidence that valenced and motivational states do not always neatly align, namely, instances where “liking” does not entail “wanting” (and vice versa). To address (...) this limitation, this paper proposes the (re-)integration of dominance as a dimension of affect. In particular, I argue that dominance, construed as a measure of organisms’ self-assessed behavioural control, can provide the necessary nuance to understand animal affect-related decision-making. Thus, after addressing the theoretical and methodological challenges related to incorporating dominance into a definition of “core affect”, this paper introduces the “Valence-Arousal-Dominance” model of animal affect. This model is explored for its potential applications in two domains. Firstly, in the study of animal affect-related decision-making under predation risk, and secondly, in the study of animal wellbeing. Through these applications, this model aims to bring experimental paradigms of animal affect-related behaviour closer to ecologically relevant scenarios. (shrink)

The philosophical debate around the nature of moods has mostly focused on their apparent undirectedness: unlike mental states such as perceptual experiences, thoughts, and emotions, moods do not seem to be directed at any specific object, and indeed they do not seem to be directed at anything at all. In this paper, I want to draw attention to a different feature of moods, one that is as important and in need of explanation as their apparent undirectedness, but which has been (...) overlooked by most participants in the debate: the fact that moods involve a particularly marked salience of the subjective aspect of experience. I argue that any adequate theory of moods should account for this fact. I call this the “subjective salience desideratum.” In the bulk of the paper, I articulate and motivate the desideratum, show that extant theories of moods do not satisfy it, and offer a preliminary overview of possible (yet unexplored) theories that have the subjective salience desideratum at their core. (shrink)

There are three main accounts of the proper function of the low mood system (LMS): the social risk theory, the disease theory, and the propitiousness theory. Adjudicating between these accounts has proven difficult, as there is little agreement in the literature about what a theory of the LMS’s proper function is supposed to explain. In this article, drawing upon influential work on the evolution of other affective systems, such as the disgust system and the fear system, I argue that a (...) theory of the proper function of the low mood system should: (i) account for the reliable, distal causes and effects of the system’s activation, and (ii) explain how having a system that performed such a function increased fitness in ancestral environments. On this basis, I show that the proper function of the low mood system is to limit resource expenditure in relatively unpropitious circumstances, exactly as hypothesised by the propitiousness theory. (shrink)

Boredom—that inescapable accoutrement of human existence—is more than a common affective encounter. It is an experience of key phenomenological significance. Boredom gives rise to perceptions of meaninglessness, difficulties in effective agency, lapses in attention, an altered perception of the passage of time, and to an impressively diverse array of behavioral outcomes. Above all, it shapes our world and lives. Boredom’s presence demarcates what is engaging, interesting, or meaningful from what is not; it alerts us when we find ourselves in situations (...) that either are lacking in personal significance or cannot properly engage us; and it spurs us into action and thought. Within the phenomenological tradition, the importance of boredom has been highlighted by Martin Heidegger, who in his 1929-30 lecture course, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude (FCM) (Heidegger 1995), makes a case for its ontological significance. Notwithstanding Heidegger’s detailed engagement with it, boredom has not received sustained attention within the phenomenological tradition, even though phenomenology is particularly well suited to explicate the phenomenon of boredom. The aim of this entry is to present three different phenomenological perspectives on boredom. In doing so, it hopes to showcase not just what boredom is, according to phenomenology, but also what a phenomenology of boredom can reveal about human existence. (shrink)

Music can contaminate us. Sometimes, listeners perceive music as expressing some emotion (say, sadness), and this elicits the same emotion in them (they feel sad). What is musical contagion? This entry presents the main theories of musical contagion that crystallize around the challenge to the leading theory of emotions as experiences of values. How and why does music contaminate us? Does musical contagion elicit garden variety emotions, such as sadness, joy, and anxiety? Does music contaminate us by simply moving us? (...) Which role does imagination play in our affective responses to music? Is musical arousal elicited by automatic mimicry? What does musical contagion teach us about emotions? Musical contagion addresses fundamental theoretical and practical issues. (shrink)

-/- Zuk et al. (2023) examined researchers’ views on how deep brain stimulation may impact patients’ personality, mood, and behaviour (PMB). The team found that experts vary substantially in the notion of personality they employ. However, despite noting the lack of conceptual precision, no attempt was made at scientifically defining any of the involved concepts, so that the results of the different interviews remain largely incommensurable. In this comment, I am doing the interpretative work that the authors should have undertaken (...) following the descriptive part of the paper: first, disentangling the PMB cluster by defining what exactly constitutes personality, mood, and behaviour; and secondly, conceptualising the notion of personality change. I am arguing that what sets personality changes apart from other modifications is diachronic persistence. (shrink)

Dysmenorrhea, or menstrual pain, is regularly suffered by 45 to 95% of menstruating women. Despite its prevalence, and despite the philosophical importance of pain as a general phenomenon, dysmenorrhea has been all but completely overlooked in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind. This paper aims at rectifying this situation. We single out three properties of what is often considered the paradigmatic case of painful experience, what we call injury-centered pains, and argue that dysmenorrhea does not have any of them, and hence (...) that it does not neatly conform to the injury-centered model of pain. This calls into question the centrality of the injury-centered model, and suggests novel research avenues within theoretical debates on affectivity. (shrink)

In this thesis, I offer a novel, overarching account of the cognitive architecture, evolution, and disorders of the capacity for low mood. First, I offer novel arguments for the propitiousness theory, according to which the proper function of the low mood system (LMS) is to limit resource expenditure in unpropitious circumstances. Following this, I develop an original account of the intentional content of low mood, according to which low mood has the following indicative-imperative content: Good events are, on average, less (...) likely to occur than bad events & Limit [the subject’s] resource expenditure! Next, I argue that the LMS takes input from numerous sensory, interoceptive, and affective systems, but that higher cognition can only effect low mood indirectly—namely, by triggering low-mood-inducing emotions. Finally, I argue that (a) disorders are necessarily constituted by dysfunctional systems (systems that fail to carry out their proper function), (b) most cases of depression (severe, long-lasting low moods) are activations of properly functioning LMSs, and therefore (c) most cases of depression are not in fact disorders. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that at least some moods are affective episodes whose main difference from emotions is that their intentional objects, qua intentional objects, are not consciously available. I defend this claim by exposing an experiment where affective responses – moods, I maintain – are elicited by subliminal pictures (§2). I then show how everyday kinds of moods can also be plausibly interpreted as emotion-like affects whose intentional object is not conscious (§3). In the final section (§4), I (...) borrow the six criteria for rationality that de Sousa proposed in The rationality of emotion and show how they can be used to argue that, if we conceive of moods as such, then they too can be rational. (shrink)

Dans cet article, je propose d’analyser le concept de bonheur en termes d’humeurs positives. Je montre que cette analyse constitue une voie moyenne entre l’analyse du bonheur comme émotion et l’analyse du bonheur en termes de propensions émotionnelles. Je soutiens plus particulièrement qu’être heureux consiste à ressentir une humeur positive, quelle que soit cette humeur. Cette analyse est donc réductionniste – être heureux n’est rien d’autre qu’être de bonne humeur – et pluraliste –nos bonnes humeurs, dans toute leur diversité, constituent (...) autant de manières différentes d’être heureux. Afin de soutenir cette approche, je défends la thèse selon laquelle les humeurs sont des attitudes prospectives, consistant à évaluer l’impact affectif possible de notre environnement sur nos états motivationnels tels que nos désirs ou nos préférences. Je m’efforce ensuite d’explorer les relations que le bonheur entretient avec le bien-être à partir de cette analyse du bonheur comme bonne humeur. (shrink)

To be optimistic, it is standardly assumed, is to have positive expectations. I here argue that this definition is correct but captures only one variety of optimism – here called factual optimism. It leaves out two other important varieties of optimism. The first – focal optimism – corresponds to the idea of seeing the glass half full. The second – axiological optimism – consists in the view that good is stronger than bad. Those three varieties of optimism are irreducible to (...) each other and do not belong to a common kind. I define each of these, characterize their respective correctness conditions, and contrast hope with optimism. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Testimony from victims of gendered violence is often wrongly disbelieved. This paper explores a way to address this problem by developing a phenomenological approach to testimony. Guided by the concept of ‘disclosedness’, a tripartite analysis of testimony as an affective, embodied, communicative act is developed. Affect indicates how scepticism may arise through the social moods that often attune agents to victims’ testimony. The embodiment of meaning suggests testimony should not be approached as an assertion, but as a process of (...) ‘articulating an understanding’. This account is deepened in the discussion of testimony as a communicative act. It is argued that testimony must be considered as a relational whole, and thus our aim in receiving victims’ testimony should be to honour the relational conditions under which the truth of testimony can be heard. Approaching testimony as the collaborative process of enabling an understanding to be articulated can enhance our conception of gendered violence, whilst also better serving the victims of gendered violence by helping to overcome the lack of trust and excessive scepticism with which victims’ testimony is often met. (shrink)

This chapter argues at length for a central positive aspect of the view of emotions as _feelings-towards-values_, namely that the content of emotional experience—understood along the lines of _face value content_ from Chapter 1—is evaluative (hereafter the ECV). It first defends the ‘content-dependency’ claim, namely the idea that emotions are not self-standing relations to their particular objects. It then goes on to argue that emotional experiences, at least in paradigm cases, represent determinate higher-order thick evaluative properties of their objects (e.g. (...) the _beautiful, admirable, amusing, disgusting, dangerous_). It is then shown how in virtue of having evaluative content emotional experiences have a kind of content that can satisfy the roles outlined for _face value content_ in Chapter 1. The ECV is then defended against several objections and shown to be preferable to certain non-evaluative views. (shrink)

This chapter assesses a relatively neglected alternative to the evaluative content view (ECV). According to what I call the content-priority view (CPV), emotional experiences do _not_ have evaluative content. Rather, emotional experiences are responses to forms of _pre-emotional value awareness_, as what we are (or seem to be) aware of in having certain non-emotional evaluative states (where the latter are temporally prior to emotion). So, in the good cases, the view claims that emotions are responses to values that we are (...) _in fact_ aware of; alternatively, when the prior evaluative state falls short of this factive value-awareness they are responses to what we seem to be aware of (i.e. apparent values). The chapter argues that this view is unsuccessful as an account of the content of emotional experience. Numerous candidates for the relevant state of pre-emotional value awareness are considered and found wanting. (shrink)

This chapter outlines a framework for thinking about intentional experiences, in terms of their being distinct experiential modes with contents. First, the notion of an experiential mode is discussed, clarifying what such modes are. Next the discussion focuses on the notion of _face value content_, which is developed to reflect central ideas about the role of intentional content. The notion of the ‘particular object’ of intentional experience is introduced and face value content is defined as ‘the particular object represented as (...) being as certain way’. This notion of content is then tied to notions of accuracy, epistemic exploitability, phenomenal character, action, and introspection. Finally, some thoughts are offered on the notion of representation as operative in the study. (shrink)

This chapter addresses the role of the body in emotional experience with reference to the bodily-attitudinal view as defended by Deonna and Teroni. While there is much of interest in this proposal, there are significant objections which undermine its plausibility. However, after critiquing that bodily-attitudinal view, it is suggested that bodily feelings, of an action-ready kind, can serve as phenomenological enrichments of non-bodily felt valenced attitudes. Finally, it is argued that in many cases the phenomenology of felt action readiness is (...) a matter of the particular objects of emotional experience seeming to possess ‘demand character’, as _calling for_ specific actions. Consideration of the role of the body and action readiness in emotional experience allows for a critique of a significant competitor to the _feeling-towards-value_ view and leads to a more nuanced picture of the theory developed and defended in Chapter 4. (shrink)

This book proposes and defends a new theory of emotional experience. Drawing on recent developments in the philosophy of emotion, with links to contemporary philosophy of mind, it argues that emotional experiences are sui generis states, not to be modelled after other mental states – such as perceptions, judgements, or bodily feelings – but given their own analysis and place within our mental economy. More specifically, emotional experiences are claimed to be feelings-towards-values.

Building on the evaluative content view defended in Chapter 2, and following the rejection of the content-priority view in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 argues that we should understand emotional experiences as _sui generis_ non-doxastic experiences of value, where the value-representing component is a felt valenced attitude of (dis)favour. This felt valenced attitude is directed towards the particular object of the emotion, which is represented as possessing the relevant evaluative properties. The chapter begins by offering a critique of Perceptualism. It then (...) develops puzzling comments made by Peter Goldie on the notion of _feelings towards_ and explicates this notion along the lines of a non-bodily valenced attitudinal component as present in emotional experience. This account is a compelling way of substantiating notions of affective intentionality which are often appealed to in discussions of emotional intentionality but rarely clarified. Finally, a series of objections to the account are considered, which are responded to. (shrink)

The conclusion draws together, in a schematic way, the central claims that have been made across the various chapters, and how the _feeling-towards-value_ view has been developed and qualified. It also considers a specific extension of the view to moods, as affective experiences, and makes some final remarks on the epistemology of emotion and evaluative understanding.

The final chapter addresses a central issue in contemporary theorizing about emotional experience, namely the sense in which emotions are intelligible. The chapter focuses on an experiential and first-person sense of emotional intelligibility. This notion of emotional intelligibility is developed in terms of the intrinsic rational intelligibility of emotional experience. It is argued that we sometimes experience the felt valenced attitude component of an emotion as an appropriate response to the ‘demand’ of the value to be recognized, as a response (...) to the ‘power’ the value is experienced as possessing (resulting in the _values as affective powers_ view, or VAP). Cases of emotional recalcitrance, and their phenomenology of affective persistence, are then discussed. Finally, pathological cases are considered in which such intelligibility goes missing, and it is suggested that the combination of the _feeling-towards-value_ view and the VAP can account for such cases. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to offer a new theory of moods, according to which moods are perceptual experiences that represent undetermined objects as possessing specific evaluative properties. I start by listing a series of features that moods are typically taken to possess and claim that a satisfactory theory of moods must be able either to explain why moods genuinely possess these features or to explain these appearances away in a non-ad hoc way. I show that my account provides (...) a plausible explanation of all the main features of moods. I conclude by addressing some objections against my account. (shrink)

A very basic form of experience consists in feeling energetic, vital, alive, tired, dispirited, vigorous and so on. These feelings – which I call feelings of vitality or vital feelings – constitute the main concern of this paper. My aim is to argue that these feelings exhibit a distinctive form of affectivity which cannot be explained in terms of emotions, moods, background feelings or existential feelings and to explore different paths for their conceptualization. The paper proceeds as follows. After introducing (...) the topic (sect. 1), I show that these feelings cannot be subsumed under any of the current categories of the affective mind (sect. 2). Against this backdrop, I present and critically assess Scheler’s notion of vital feelings as an alternative model for capturing their distinctive nature (sect. 3). Next, I explore varieties of vital feelings by focusing on different levels of the bodily-felt experience (sect. 4) and analyze their specific form of self-involvement (sect. 5). Finally, I conclude by showing how the study of vital feelings might contribute to phenomenological bioethics (sect. 6). (shrink)

O argumentare a importanței dualiste a emoțiilor în societate, individual și la nivel de comunitate. Tendința actuală de conștientizare și control al emoțiilor prin inteligența emoțională are un efect benefic în afaceri și pentru succesul activităților sociale dar, dacă nu suntem atenți, poate duce la o alienare ireversibilă la nivel individual și social. Lucrarea se compune din trei părți principale: Emoții (Modele ale emoțiilor, Procesarea emoțiilor, Fericirea, Filosofia emoțiilor, Etica emotiilor), Inteligența emoțională (Modele ale inteligenței emoționale, Inteligența emoțională în cercetare (...) și educație, Filosofia inteligenței emoționale, Inteligența emoțională în filosofia orientală) și Inteligența emoțională în organizații (Munca emoțională, Filosofia inteligenței emoționale în organizații, Critica inteligenței emoționale în organizații, Etica inteligenței emoționale în organizații). În Concluzii prezint un rezumat al afirmațiilor din lucrare. CUPRINS: Abstract 1. Emoții 1.1 Modele ale emoțiilor 1.2 Procesarea emoțiilor 1.3 Fericirea 1.4 Filosofia emoțiilor 1.5 Etica emoțiilor 2. Inteligența emoțională 2.1 Modele ale inteligenței emoționale 2.1.1 Modelul de abilități al lui Mayer și Salovey 2.1.2 Modelul mixt al lui Goleman 2.1.3 Modelul mixt al lui Bar-On 2.1.4 Modelul de trăsături al lui Petrides 2.2 Inteligența emoțională în cercetare și educație 2.3 Filosofia inteligenței emoționale 2.3.1 Inteligența emoțională în filosofia orientală 3. Inteligența emoțională în organizații 3.1 Munca emoțională 3.2 Filosofia inteligenței emoționale în organizații 3.3 Critica inteligenței emoționale în organizații 3.4 Etica inteligenței emoționale în organizații Concluzii Bibliografie DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.32991.20640. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger is often credited as having offered one of the most thorough phenomenological investigations of the nature of boredom. In his 1929–1930 lecture course, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, he goes to great lengths to distinguish between three different types of boredom and to explicate their respective characters. Within the context of his discussion of one of these types of boredom, profound boredom [tiefe Langweile], Heidegger opposes much of the philosophical and literary tradition on boredom insofar (...) as he articulates how the experience of boredom can be existentially beneficial to us. In this chapter, we undertake a study of the nature of profound boredom with the aim of investigating its place within contemporary psychological and philosophical research on boredom. Although boredom used to be a neglected emotional experience, it is no more. Boredom’s causal antecedents, effects, experiential profile, and neurophysiological correlates have become topics of active study; as a consequence, a proliferation of claims and findings about boredom has ensued. Such a situation provides an opportunity to scrutinize Heidegger’s claims and to try to understand them both on their own terms and in light of our contemporary understanding of boredom. (shrink)

What it is about mood, as a specific type of affect, that makes it not easily amenable to standard models of rationality? It is commonly assumed that the cognitive rationality of an affective state is somehow depended upon how that state is related to what the state is about, its so called intentional object; but, given that moods do not seem to bear an intentional relation to an object, it is hard to see how they can be in the offing (...) for rational assessment. In the first part of the paper I outline three ways of attributing intentionality to moods, raising for each one of them a series of problems, thus casting doubt on the viability of an intentionalist grounding for the rationality of moods. I then move to an examination of the view of moods as background feelings, which are intimately related to how we perceive the world; however, in my view, that approach fails to provide standards of assessment that would permit appraising the mood itself as rational or irrational. Finally, I look at an account of moods as mechanisms whose function is to monitor the balance between environmental demands and one’s physical or psychological resources. That is a promising way to proceed in our exploration of mood states; it faces though some formidable phenomenological challenges. All in all, defending the rationality of moods calls for a rethinking of the assumptions that are prevalent in the current literature over the representational dimension of affective states. (shrink)

Moods are sometimes claimed to constitute an exception to the rule that mental phenomena are intentional (in the sense of representing something). In reaction, some philosophers have argued that moods are in fact intentional, but exhibit a special and unusual kind of intentionality: they represent the world as a whole, or everything indiscriminately, rather than some more specific object(s). In this paper, I present a problem for extant versions of this idea, then propose a revision that solves the problem but (...) also entrains an important change in our understanding of the nature of moods – and indeed of the nature of mind. What emerges is an intentionalist account that emphasizes the role of attitude rather than content in determining the character of moods. (shrink)

This article offers an account of moods as distinctive kinds of personal level affective-evaluative states, which are both intentional and rationally intelligible in specific ways. The account contrasts with those who claim moods are non-intentional, and so also arational. Section 1 provides a conception of intentionality and distinguishes moods, as occurrent experiential states, from other states in the affective domain. Section 2 argues moods target the subject’s total environment presented in a specific evaluative light through felt valenced attitudes (the Mood-Intentionality (...) thesis). Section 3 argues some moods are experienced as rationally intelligible responses, and so epistemically appropriate, to the way ‘the world’ presents itself (the Mood-Intelligibility thesis). Finally, section 4 discusses the epistemology of moods. (shrink)

This chapter traces the genealogy of the term atmosphere in the German language, identifies historical semantic shifts, and points to its grammatical specifics. The state of research on atmospheres is briefly summarized and an overview is offered of the various definitions of the term in different disciplines. Drawing on Timothy Morton’s theory of ambient poetics, and on Hermann Schmitz’s “new phenomenology,” four key characteristics of atmospheres are discussed and elaborated: their mereological constitution, their modal structure, their intensification at affective thresholds, (...) and their affective efficacy through suggestions of movement. (shrink)

Was ist Angst? Was sagt die Tatsache, dass wir bestimmte Ängste empfinden, über unser Selbstverständnis als Personen aus? Das Buch bietet eine differenzierte philosophische Analyse des Gefühls der Angst, die Einsichten der zeitgenössischen Debatte ebenso aufgreift wie Gedanken der existenzphilosophischen Tradition. Im Zentrum stehen die ebenso alltäglichen wie faszinierenden Phänomene selbstreflexiver und stimmungsmäßiger Angst. In Sprache und Stil ist das Buch analytisch, in Inhalt und Geist jedoch existenziell. Es versteht sich selbst als Übung in philosophischer Freiheit, in der es wesentlich (...) auch darum geht, Klarheit über das jeweils eigene Philosophieverständnis zu erlangen. (shrink)

In “Moods Are Not Colored Lenses: Perceptualism and the Phenomenology of Moods” Francisco Gallegos presents a challenge to a popular view about the phenomenology of being in a mood that he calls “perceptualism”. In this essay, I offer a partial defense of perceptualism about moods and argue that perceptualism and Gallegos’s preferred Heideggerian alternative need not be viewed as in opposition to one another.

According to intentionalism, the phenomenal character of experience is one and the same as the intentional content of experience. This view has a problem with moods (anxiety, depression, elation, irritation, gloominess, grumpiness, etc.). Mood experiences certainly have phenomenal character, but do not exhibit directedness, i.e., do not appear intentional. Standardly, intentionalists have re-described moods’ undirectedness in terms of directedness towards everything or the whole world (e.g., Crane, 1998; Seager, 1999). This move offers the intentionalist a way out, but is quite (...) unsatisfying. More recently, Angela Mendelovici (2013a, b) has suggested something that looks more interesting and promising: instead of re-describing moods’ phenomenology, she accepts its undirectedness at face value and tries to explain it in intentionalist terms. In this paper, I focus on and criticize Mendelovici’s proposal. As I will show, despite its prima facie virtues, the view is poorly motivated. For, contrary to what Mendelovici argues, introspection does not support her proposal—arguably, it provides some evidence against it. So, the problem that intentionalism has with moods is not solved, but is still there. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the phenomenal character of a mood experience wholly depends on affective modifications (appropriate for the mood in question) to the phenomenal characters of one's non-mood experiences. I argue that this view accounts for all distinctive aspects of mood phenomenology, in contrast to currently existing accounts of moods, each of which faces trouble accounting for some distinctive aspect of mood experience. I also explain how my view allows for holding both that moods seemingly lack intentional (...) objects and that their phenomenal character reduces to intentional content nonetheless. (shrink)

I argue that while the feeling of bodily responses is not necessary to emotion, these feelings contribute significant meaningful content to everyday emotional experience. Emotional bodily feelings represent a ‘state of self’, analysed as a sense of one's body affording certain patterns of interaction with the environment. Recognising that there are two sources of intentional content in everyday emotional experience allows us to reconcile the diverging intuitions that people have about emotional states, and to understand better the long-standing debate between (...) bodily feeling-based and appraisal-based theories of emotion. (shrink)

Being in a mood—such as an anxious, irritable, depressed, tranquil, or cheerful mood—tends to alter the way we react emotionally to the particular objects we encounter. But how, exactly, do moods alter the way we experience particular objects? Perceptualism, a popular approach to understanding affective experiences, holds that moods function like "colored lenses," altering the way we perceive the evaluative properties of the objects we encounter. In this essay, I offer a phenomenological analysis of the experience of being in a (...) mood that illustrates the limitations of the colored lens metaphor and demonstrates the basic inadequacy of the perceptualist account of moods. I argue that when we are in a mood, it is common to experience a kind of "emotional disconnection" in which we perceive evaluative properties that would normally elicit strong emotional reactions from us, but nonetheless we find that, in our present mood, we remain emotionally numb to these perceptions. Such experiences of "seeing but not feeling" are difficult to understand from within the perceptualist paradigm. Building on the work of Martin Heidegger, I sketch an alternative, phenomenological analysis of moods that can better account for experiences of emotional disconnection. On this alternative account, being in a mood does not merely alter the content of our perceptions but, rather, alters the way we interpret the overall significance of what we perceive, relative to a certain situational context. (shrink)