Aristotle: Definition

Disputes about ground and fundamentality are connected to a cluster of questions about essences, definitions, explanation, priority, and knowledge. Aristotle and Plato of course disagree on a number of these issues, but one of the least understood concerns the nature and value of “division,” i.e. seeking an account of something by successive divisions of a higher genus. Plato introduces his method of “collection and division” in especially grand terms—doing it successfully appears to be one of our highest intellectual achievements, and (...) a necessary means to understanding the real natures of fundamental kinds. Aristotle disputes the methods of Platonic division, but he thinks they have overestimated its epistemological value. Plato’s reasons for assigning division such high value are not always clear, but nor are Aristotle’s reasons for skepticism. As in recent disputes about the nature of ground, there is an underlying concern with working out what appear to be metaphysically important and broadly explanatory relationships which are not causal in the standard sense, and their relationship to philosophical and scientific aims of giving essence-specifying definitions. Re-evaluating their disagreement about definition-by-division thus promises to clarify their views on this cluster of topics as well as their connection to modern debates. (shrink)

When Aristotle questions the principle of unity in linguistic statements, or logoi, he gives the same two-part division in four very different places in the Aristotelian corpus: either a logos is one because it signifies a unity (ὁ ἓν σημαίνων), or it is one through the conjunction of a plurality (ἐκ πλειόνων συνδέσμῳ). However, in each of these occurrences, this alternative, and in particular its first branch, does not seem to refer to the same type of statement: sometimes it seems (...) to refer only to the definiens, sometimes it seems to refer also to the declaration. We will show that this discrepancy indicates that the nature of the unity signified by these logoi is not the same: where the definiens signifies a single object, the declaration signifies more the uniqueness of a relationship between two objects. We can therefore understand that this topical opposition between the two types of unity actually allows us to conceive of a wide variety of propositional units, units that depend on the theoretical context in which they are deployed. (shrink)

Em Metafísica Gamma 4, Aristóteles argumenta contra supostos negadores do Princípio da Não-Contradição. O argumento elêntico, assim chamado devido à sua estrutura argumentativa que se assemelha a uma refutação (elenchus), é a parte mais notória dessa argumentação. Esse argumento começa com uma fala de um interlocutor hipotético, que deve ao menos enunciar algum termo significativo. Em seguida, uma definição desse termo deve ser dada. Então, tendo afirmado uma definição, o interlocutor de Aristóteles não poderia contradizer o que enunciou, sob pena (...) de ininteligibilidade. Neste artigo, examinaremos as noções de significado e definição envolvidas neste argumento. Para tal, examinaremos a descrição do significado linguístico encontrada em De Interpretatione, bem como as discussões sobre definições de nomes de entidades fictícias desenvolvidas nos Segundos Analíticos. Concluiremos que as noções de definição e significado são centrais para o argumento elêntico, de tal modo que a força do argumento depende, em última instância, de aspectos da concepção aristotélica do processo de significação. (shrink)

There seems to be an inconsistency at the heart of Aristotle’s Metaphysics: a differentia is said both to presuppose its genus (in vii 12) and to be logically independent from it (in x 7). I argue that the relation of analogy resolves this inconsistency, restores the coherence of the concepts of differentia and species, and gives x 7 its rightful place in the development of the Metaphysics.

If the Aristotelian division has above all an epistemic and heuristic purpose, this article aims to examine the ontological appropriation of division by Aristotle in the Metaphysics, too often neglected by secondary literature. Division is also an ontological operation, insofar it governs the relationship between the eidos (which is identified, in the context of the central books of the Metaphysics, with the primary substance, i.e. what is properly speaking), its genus and the final differentia of this genus. More precisely, we (...) will show that division is a case of the hylemorphic relation: the genus is an (intelligible) matter to which the final differentia obtained by division is predicated, and which then acts as the formal cause of this genus being such a determined eidos. However, this ontological and hylemorphic dimension of Aristotelian division is largely compatible with its methodological use. (shrink)

Does Aristotle offer a definition of the soul? In fact, he rejects the possibility of defining the soul univocally. Because “life” is a homonymous concept, so too is “soul”. Given the specific causal role that Aristotle envisages for form and essence, the soul requires multiple different definitions to capture how it functions as a cause in each form of life. Aristotle suggests demonstrations can be given which express these causal definitions; I reconstruct these demonstrations.

Physics IV.10 (217b30–218a30) is pivotal in Aristotle’s discussion of time, preceding his own account from IV.11 onward. Aristotle presents three puzzles about the existence of time with reference to the “Now”. Modern interpretations often view this section as an aporetic prelude with Aristotle’s failure to provide explicit solutions. This paper examines Simplicius’ alternative interpretation, which draws upon the theory of proof and the syllogistic model from the Posterior Analytics. Simplicius contends that the arguments’ failure lies in their inability to fit (...) within the suitable syllogistic framework to establish a demonstrable definition of time, not in their aporetic nature. Every science has to prove the relation between (i) establishing whether X exists and (ii) showing what X is by establishing what the cause of X is. In evaluating Simplicius’ interpretation, this paper addresses two key aspects of the exegesis of IV.10: firstly, Simplicius can show why the “Now” is not part of the definition of time, and secondly, the ancient commentator underscores the close connection between the arguments in Physics IV.10 and the broader context of Aristotle’s discussion of time. Modern interpreters fail to address both of these issues. (shrink)

The place of matter in the definition of the sensible substance evolves over the course of Metaphysics books Z and H : whereas chapters 10 and 11 of book Z claim that matter must be excluded from the definiens of the sensible substance, chapter 2 of book H claims that it must include it. The present article will show that this difference in doctrine comes from a refinement of the way in which the causal priority of form is expressed in (...) the definition. First, in book Z, it is expressed by a reduction of the terms of the definiens to « parts of the form » only, a reduction which is immediately considered superfluous and unsatisfactory. In book H then, it will be by the position it occupies as a predicate of the matter that is precisely meant to express this priority. In this sense, the two sets of texts do not constitute a theoretic volte-face from Aristotle, but the refinement of a single model of definition expressing the priority of form. (shrink)

La structure du definiens fait l’objet de deux traitements apparemment contradictoires dans les textes aristotéliciens : certains textes avancent que l’énoncé par lequel est définie une chose ne peut pas prendre la forme d’une prédication, parce que cet énoncé doit exprimer uniquement ce qu’est la chose qui est objet de la définition et non pas lui attribuer des termes, tandis que d’autres textes, notamment dans la Métaphysique, semblent suggérer précisément l’inverse, à savoir que le definiens doit prendre la forme d’une (...) prédication. Le présent article se propose de lever cette tension apparente en prolongeant la thèse de Jacques Brunschwig selon laquelle la « prédication hylémorphique », c’est-à-dire la prédication de la forme à la matière, doit être distinguée de la prédication classique. Nous montrerons que la prédication, lorsqu’elle est hylémorphique, se distingue en ce qu’elle permet d’assurer l’unité des termes qu’elle articule – matière et forme sont en effet « une seule et même chose ». Or c’est précisément là ce qui fait défaut à la prédication classique, qui attribue toujours « une chose à une autre », et c’est ce qui lui interdit donc d’être la structure du definiens. La tension entre les textes portant sur la structure prédicative ou non du definiens peut alors être levée en affirmant que le definiens est bien une prédication, qui ne peut pas être une prédication au sens standard du terme, mais qui doit être une prédication d’une forme à une matière. (shrink)

: In APo II 3-7 Aristotle discusses a series of difficulties concerning definition, deduction, and demonstration. In this paper I focus on two interrelated but distinct questions: firstly, what are exactly the difficulties emerging from or alluded to in the discussion in II 3-7; secondly, whether and in what sense the discussion in II 3-7 can be considered an aporetic discussion with a specific role to play in the development of the argument in APo II.

My aim is to show that, in Posterior Analytics B 8, the conception of lunar eclipse brought about by pre-demonstrative knowledge (hoti) is deeply vague and radically different from the one obtained by demonstrative knowledge (dioti).

In this paper it is argued that there are relevant similarities of Aristotle's account of definition and Carnap's account of explication. To show this, first, Aristotle's conditions of adequacy for definitions are provided and an outline of the main critique put forward against Aristotle's account of definition is given. Subsequently, Carnap's conditions of adequacy for explications are presented and discussed. It is shown that Aristotle's conditions of extensional correctness can be interpreted against the backdrop of Carnap's condition of similarity once (...) one skips Aristotelian essentialism and takes in a Carnapian and more pragmatic stance. Finally, it is argued that, in general, a complementary rational reconstruction of both approaches allows for resolving problems of interpretational underdetermination. (shrink)

Donald Trump’s speeches and messages are characterized by terms that are commonly referred to as “thick” or “emotive,” meaning that they are characterized by a tendency to be used to generate emotive reactions. This paper investigates how emotive meaning is related to emotions, and how it is generated or manipulated. Emotive meaning is analyzed as an evaluative conclusion that results from inferences triggered by the use of a term, which can be represented and assessed using argumentation schemes. The evaluative inferences (...) are regarded as part of the connotation of emotive words, which can be modified and stabilized by means of recontextualizations. The manipulative risks underlying the misuse and the redefinition of emotive words are accounted for in terms of presuppositions and implicit modifications of the interlocutors’ commitments. (shrink)

In the tradition stemming from Aristotle through Aquinas, rational decision making is seen as a complex structure of distinct phases in which reasoning and will are interconnected. Intention, deliberation, and decision are regarded as the fundamental steps of the decision-making process, in which an end is chosen, the means are specified, and a decision to act is made. Based on this Aristotelian theoretical background, we show how the decision-making process can be modeled as a net of several patterns of reasoning, (...) involving the classification of an action or state of affairs, its evaluation, the deliberation about the means to carry it out, and the decision. It is shown how argumentation theory can contribute to our understanding of the mechanisms involved by formalizing the steps of reasoning using argumentation schemes, and setting out the value-based criteria underlying the evaluation of an action. Representing each phase of the decision-making process as a separate scheme allows one to identify implicit premises and bring the roots of ethical dilemma to light along with the means to resolve them. In particular, we will show the role of framing and classification in triggering value-based reasoning, and how argumentation theory can be used to represent and uproot the grounds of possible manipulations. (shrink)

This paper reconstructs the relationship between the now, motion, and number in Aristotle to clarify the nature of the now, and, thereby, the relationship between motion and time. Although it is clear that for Aristotle motion, and, more generally, change, are prior to time, the nature of this priority is not clear. But if time is the number of motion, then the priority of motion can be grasped by examining his theory of number. This paper aims to show that, just (...) as numbers are generated by the soul, time is not presupposed by motion, but emerges through the soul’s articulation of motion. Time is co-constituted by the soul and motion. The now is the key to understanding both the contribution of motion and soul to the being of time. The now is part of the soul’s articulation of motion, and sets the stage for an act that distinguishes a unit from its underlying motion. The now, then, sets up an abstraction by which the soul generates the temporal number from motion. Reconstructing this account of abstraction allows us to formulate more strongly Aristotle’s claim to the ontological dependence of time on motion. The paper then gives a systematic overview of the relationships between the now and number in order to address the question of whether the now might be extended. It closes with an examination of the possibility that motion depends on time, and how universal time is possible. (shrink)

I examine the difficulties involved in the Aristotelian proposal to identify the knowledge of “what it is” and “why it is”, in order to better understand the outlines that delimit it. I propose that the connections by which Aristotle links definition and explanation, and hence essence and cause, depend on the mutual convertibility between nominal expressions and predicative sentences.

ABSTRACT This is a review of David Bronstein's book "Aristotle on Knowledge and Learning: The Posterior Analytics" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

This chapter closely examines Aristotle’s account of inquiry in _Posterior Analytics_ 2.2. It discusses Aristotle’s claim that when one searches for any of the four objects of inquiry introduced in _Posterior Analytics_ 2.1 (‘the fact that’, ‘the reason why’, ‘if it is’, ‘what it is’), one is (ideally) seeking a ‘middle term’ (i.e., a cause). The distinction made in the previous chapter between subject- and attribute-focused inquiries is examined in light of Aristotle’s claim about the middle term. A further distinction (...) is drawn between two types of essence for which one might seek: causally complex essences (of the form A–C because of B), which belong to demonstrable attributes; and causally simple essences (of the form GD 1 …D n ), which belong to ‘subject-kinds’ (i.e., species and genera). The chapter also discusses an instance of Meno’s Paradox that arises from Aristotle’s account of inquiry in _Posterior Analytics_ 2.2. (shrink)

David Bronstein sheds new light on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics--one of the most important, and difficult, works in the history of western philosophy--by arguing that it is coherently structured around two themes of enduring philosophical interest: knowledge and learning. He argues that the Posterior Analytics is a sustained examination of scientific knowledge, an elegantly organized work in which Aristotle describes the mind's ascent from sense-perception of particulars to scientific knowledge of first principles. Bronstein goes on to highlight Plato's influence on Aristotle's (...) text, and argues against current orthodoxy that Aristotle is committed to the Socratic Picture of inquiry, according to which one should seek what a thing's essence is before seeking its demonstrable attributes and their causes. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the temporal order in which the four objects of inquiry (discussed in the previous two chapters) should (ideally) be sought. It first argues against the Intuitionist Picture, according to which one seeks and discovers at the same stage of inquiry a subject-kind’s demonstrable and essential attributes. It then argues against the Explanationist Picture, according to which one seeks and discovers at the same stage of inquiry a subject-kind’s essential attributes and the causes of its demonstrable attributes. It (...) then defends the Socratic Picture, according to which one first seeks and discovers what a subject-kind’s essence is and then one seeks and discovers its demonstrable attributes and their causes. The chapter then examines three important methodological passages all of which provide evidence for the Socratic Picture. Aristotle’s account of our acquisition of _nous_ of first principles is also discussed. (shrink)

This chapter closely examines Aristotle’s account of inquiry in _Posterior Analytics_ 2.1. It discusses the four objects of inquiry (‘the fact that’, ‘the reason why’, ‘if it is’, ‘what it is’), the temporal order (i.e., the stages) of inquiry, and the connection between inquiry and knowledge. A distinction is made between subject-focused inquiry (‘does S exist?’ ‘what is S?’) and attribute-focused inquiry (‘does P belong to S?’ ‘why does P belong to S?’). The chapter suggests that implicit in Aristotle’s account (...) of inquiry in _Posterior Analytics_ 2 is an account of how one acquires _nous_ (i.e., non-demonstrative scientific knowledge) of the first principles of science. The chapter ends with a discussion of different instances of Meno’s Paradox that arise from Aristotle’s account of inquiry in _Posterior Analytics_ 2.1. (shrink)

This chapter closely examines the last and most famous chapter of the _Posterior Analytics_: 2.19. It argues, against the standard view, that Aristotle’s aim is not to explain the whole route we must traverse in order to reach _nous_ of first principles. His aim is rather to argue, against Plato, that the route begins in perception. Aristotle’s account of our acquisition of _nous_ of first principles is found earlier in _Posterior Analytics_ 2, in his account of definitional inquiry. The chapter (...) also argues that in 2.19 Aristotle does not claim that induction is the way we learn first principles; rather, he claims that induction is the way we learn the preliminary accounts we rely on when we begin searching for them. The chapter also discusses the role of perception, memory, and experience in learning preliminary accounts. (shrink)

The Introduction first outlines the structure of the _Posterior Analytics_, which, this book argues, is elegantly organized around discussions of three types of learning: by demonstration, by definition, and by induction. It then provides an overview of the book by highlighting three central topics: Meno’s Paradox, the order of inquiry, and _nous_. It briefly discusses Meno’s Paradox, a puzzle from Plato’s _Meno_ according to which inquiry and learning are impossible. It then outlines the Socratic Picture of the order of inquiry, (...) to which (this book argues) Aristotle is committed. According to the Socratic Picture, one should seek what a thing’s essence is before seeking its demonstrable attributes and their causes. The Introduction ends with a discussion of what _nous_ (a form of scientific knowledge) is and how it is acquired. (shrink)

This chapter argues that two forms of scientific knowledge (_epistēmē_) fall under Aristotle’s definition in _Posterior Analytics_ 1.2: demonstrative scientific knowledge and non-demonstrative scientific knowledge, which Aristotle also calls _nous_. We have demonstrative scientific knowledge when we know that M, which is the cause of the fact that some attribute P belongs to some subject S, is the cause of the fact that P belongs to S and that P belongs to S by necessity (i.e., we know a demonstration). We (...) have non-demonstrative scientific knowledge (i.e., _nous_) when we know that E, which is the essence of S, is the cause because of which S is the very thing that it is and that S is the very thing that it is by necessity (i.e., we know a definition). Aristotle’s account of learning by demonstration is then re-examined in light of this discussion. (shrink)

This chapter discusses Stage 2 in the Socratic Picture of the order of inquiry, when we seek what a subject-kind is (i.e., its essence). The main focus is _Posterior Analytics_ 2.13. The chapter begins with a discussion of an important but difficult passage in which one can find the main outlines both of the Socratic Picture and of Aristotle’s account of how we acquire _nous_ of first principles (especially the definitions of subject-kinds). The chapter then discusses Aristotle’s account of how (...) we discover by the method of division the causally simple essences of subordinate subject-kinds (i.e., species). These essences are made up of the species’ genus and a number of differentiae. Aristotle’s rules for the selection of differentiae are closely examined. The chapter ends with a discussion of Aristotle’s account of how we discover by induction the causally simple essences of primary subject-kinds (i.e., genera). (shrink)

This chapter focuses on Stage 1 in the Socratic Picture of the order of inquiry, when we seek whether a subject-kind (such as triangle or animal) exists. Distinctions are made between primary and subordinate subject-kinds on the one hand and between subject-kinds in general and their demonstrable attributes on the other. The chapter also discusses a number of passages in the _Posterior Analytics_ in which, it is argued, Aristotle describes how students of a science learn by demonstration. The chapter ends (...) with a speculative account of how we discover the existence of subject-kinds (subordinate (i.e., species) and primary (i.e., genera)). (shrink)

This chapter closely examines Aristotle’s account of inquiry in _Posterior Analytics_ 2.8. It focuses on his account of how we discover by demonstration the causally complex essences of demonstrable attributes (such as eclipse and thunder). This discovery occurs at Stage 4 (of 5) in the Socratic Picture of the order of inquiry. Aristotle’s account is examined in light of the puzzles about demonstration and definition raised in _Posterior Analytics_ 2.3–7. The chapter argues that Aristotle describes two routes to knowledge of (...) causally complex essences. Both routes begin with the grasp of a preliminary account, and both solve the instance of Meno’s Paradox that arises from _Posterior Analytics_ 2.2. (shrink)

The main argument of the book is briefly summarized, with emphasis on the Socratic Picture of the order of inquiry and Aristotle’s account of how we acquire _nous_ of the first principles of a science.

This chapter examines Plato’s presentation of Meno’s Paradox in the _Meno_ and Aristotle’s reference to it in _Posterior Analytics_ 1.1. It also discusses a crucial claim closely connected to the puzzle: the Prior Knowledge Requirement for intellectual learning. _Meno_ 80d4–e5 is examined, and the differences and similarities between Meno’s puzzle and Socrates’s dilemma are discussed. Some key terms and concepts in Aristotle’s theory of knowledge and learning are then defined, including ‘learning’ (_mathēsis_) and ‘knowledge’ (_gnōsis_). The connection between the general (...) concept of knowledge (_gnōsis_) and its different species (including scientific knowledge (_epistēmē_)) is also examined. The chapter ends with an account of the instance of Meno’s Paradox in _Posterior Analytics_ 1.1. (shrink)

This chapter introduces the second of the three types of learning Aristotle discusses in the _Posterior Analytics_: learning by definition. This is the learning by which one acquires knowledge of the first principles (especially definitions) in a science. A definition, Aristotle says, is a statement of the essence of a thing. Aristotle’s different terms for definition (_horismos_, _horos_) and essence (_ti esti_, _to ti ēn einai_, _ousia_, _to einai_ for _x_) are noted, and the different methods (demonstration, division, and induction) (...) by which one learns by definition are discussed. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the differences between learning by definition and learning by demonstration. (shrink)

This chapter examines an important distinction Aristotle makes in the _Posterior Analytics_ between the sort of cause that is ‘the same’ and the sort of cause that is ‘different’. It argues that a cause is either the same as or different from the essence of the thing of which it is the cause. It further argues that all and only demonstrable attributes have causes that are different and that all and only subject-kinds have causes that are the same. The chapter (...) concludes with a discussion of Aristotle’s account of the different types of definition in _Posterior Analytics_ 2.10, focusing in particular on nominal accounts. (shrink)

This chapter argues, against a widely accepted view defended by Jonathan Barnes, that, for Aristotle, expert scientists can learn (i.e., acquire new scientific knowledge) by means of demonstration (a special sort of syllogism in which the premises state the causal explanation of the fact stated in the conclusion). The chapter surveys the textual evidence in support of the claim that experts learn by means of demonstration. It then examines Aristotle’s accounts in _Posterior Analytics_ 1.2 of scientific knowledge (_epistēmē_), demonstration, and (...) their connection. The chapter concludes by distinguishing between two types of learning by demonstration and explaining what each consists in. (shrink)

This chapter begins by discussing Aristotle’s account in _Posterior Analytics_ 1.4 of two ways in which an attribute P can belong ‘in itself’ to a subject S. In the first (‘in itself 1 ’), P is (part of) the essence of S. In the second (‘in itself 2 ’), S is part of the essence of P. The chapter then distinguishes between two models of demonstration. In a Model 1 demonstration, the middle term signifies the essence of the item signified (...) by the minor (subject) term (and the attribute demonstrated is an ‘in itself accident’ of the subject). In a Model 2 demonstration, the middle term signifies the essence of the item signified by the major (attribute) term (and the attribute demonstrated belongs ‘in itself 2 ’ to the subject). The chapter concludes with a discussion of how Aristotle might have integrated the two models of demonstration into a single coherent account of scientific explanation. (shrink)

To understand what ontologies do through their definitions, we propose a theoretical explanation of the functions of definitions in ontologies backed by empirical neuropsychological studies. Our goal is to show how these functions should motivate (i) the systematic inclusion of definitions in ontologies and (ii) the adaptation of definition content and form to the specific context of use of ontologies.

Aristotle was aware that living organisms tend to have parts and organs that are particularly well suited for exercising their psychic capacities in certain kinds of environments. Despite that awareness, however, Aristotle never tries to explain this. This chapter argues that the reason we do not find Aristotle addressing the ‘fit’ between organisms and their habitats is that his conception of the essence of a living being already includes those features of the habitat that are implicated in the kind's essential (...) activities and functions. Just as understanding what vision is involves understanding that it is of colour and that it takes place in a transparent medium, all of the vital capacities that comprise the soul or essence of a kind are ones that can only be understood in light of the objects that they are capacities upon which to act and by which to be affected. Consequently, the coordination between a kind of organism and its habitat is no surprise, given that the what-it-is-to-be for any kind of organism is partially constituted by the habitat in which its life is carried out. (shrink)

I argue that Topics VI does not contain any serious theory about definitions, but only a collection of advices for formulating definitions in a dialectical context, namely, definitions aiming to catch what the opponent means. Topics VI is full of inconsistencies that can be explained away by this approach: the inconsistencies reflect "acceptable opinions about definitions" that distinct groups of interlocutors accept. I also argue that the "topoi" need not be pieces of serious theory Aristotle is commited to. The "topoi" (...) must also be considered as "endoxa", namely, as accepted opinions about how it is legitimate to draw an inference. (shrink)

This chapter argues in favour of three interrelated points. First, I argue that demonstration (as expression of scientific knowledge) is fundamentally defined as knowledge of the appropriate cause for a given explanandum: to have scientific knowledge of the explanandum is to explain it through its fully appropriate cause. Secondly, I stress that Aristotle’s notion of cause has a “triadic” structure, which fundamentally depends on the predicative formulation (or “regimentation”) of the explanandum. Thirdly, I argue that what has motivated Aristotle to (...) choose the syllogism as a demonstrative tool was precisely the fact that syllogisms are apt to express causal relations in their triadic structure. Instead of complaining against Aristotle’s preference for the syllogisms as demonstrative tools, I argue that Aristotle was fully aware of the advantages of regimenting the explanandum into a predication. One of these advantages is to abandon a purely extensional standpoint and to highlight the importance of the notion of relevancy in explanation. (shrink)

I discuss Aristotle's treatment of essence and definition in Metaphysics VII.4. I argue that it is coherent and perfectly in accord with its broader context. His discussion in VII.4 offers, on the one hand, minimal criteria for what counts as definition and essence for whatever kind of object, but also, on the other hand, stronger criteria for a primary sort of definition and essence—and thereby it serves the interest of book VII in pointing to the explanatory power of the essence (...) of composite substances. (shrink)

This book analyzes the uses of emotive language and redefinitions from pragmatic, dialectical, epistemic and rhetorical perspectives, investigating the relationship between emotions, persuasion and meaning, and focusing on the implicit dimension of the use of a word and its dialectical effects. It offers a method for evaluating the persuasive and manipulative uses of emotive language in ordinary and political discourse. Through the analysis of political speeches and legal arguments, the book offers a systematic study of emotive language in argumentation, rhetoric, (...) communication, political science and public speaking. (shrink)

This paper discusses the contrast between scientific knowledge and opinion as it is presented by Aristotle in Posterior Analytics A.33. Aristotle's contrast is formulated in terms of understanding or not understanding some "necessary items". I claim that the contrast can only be understood in terms of explanatory relevance. The "necessary items" are middle terms (or explanatory factors) that are necessary for the fully appropriate explanation. This approach gives a coherent interpretation of each step in the chapter.

A discussão nos livros dos Tópicos giram em torno dos debates dialéticos e seus elementos. Aristóteles discorre sobre os gêneros, as propriedades e os chamados acidentes e suas relações predicativas em categorias. Interessa-nos, sobretudo, compreender o papel desempenhado pela Definição e qual sua relação com os demais instrumentos para a dialética.

This chapter is concerned with Socrates’ constructive views about how knowledge of definitions of the virtues can make positive contributions to his pragmatically oriented ethical research program. The first section focuses on his assertion in the _Euthyphro_ that knowledge of definitions can be used to diagnose cases of virtue and non-virtue. Here it is argued that this diagnostic function is undermined by his systematic preference for psychological over behavioural definitions of the virtues. The argument of the final sections is that (...) the logic of Socrates’ much-discussed argument in the _Euthyphro_ against the definition of piety as god-lovedness commits him to the view that definitions constitute the epistemic bedrock of his ethical theory, in the sense that they can be invoked to explain not only why virtuous acts or agents are virtuous, but also why they possess certain other explicable features. (shrink)

This chapter chiefly concerns the logical structure of _canonical model_ (or formal-cause) Aristotelian demonstrations, _viz_. those having definitions as their minor premises. The point of departure is Aristotle’s view that to have scientific knowledge of some fact is to know its cause (_aitia),_ which he thinks amounts to possessing a syllogistic demonstration in which the cause in question is signified by a “middle” term standing between the subject and predicate terms of the conclusion. Next, Aristotle’s fourfold classification of _aitiai_ (and (...) derivatively, of irreducibly different types of demonstrations) is examined, and arguments are given for the centrality of formal cause demonstration in his theory. It is then argued that this Aristotelian position is congenial to (and perhaps influenced by) Socrates’ views about the explanatory primacy of definitions in the _Euthyphro_. Next it is argued that there is a systematic explanatory incompleteness inherent in Aristotle’s canonical model demonstrations. The final section identifies the conclusions of such demonstrations with the _per se propria_ of the _Topics._. (shrink)

In this chapter it is first explained how Socrates’ pursuit of definitions emerges out his pragmatic program of testing and certifying ethical experts. Attention is then directed to his most prominent test for expertise, which requires that a genuine expert be able to produce and defend some sort of “account” upon demand. The final sections of this chapter are focused more narrowly on one specification of this general account-requirement, _viz_. that conveyed by the Priority of Definition principle. Next, the commonly (...) held view that this principle is somehow involved in the “paradox of inquiry” of the _Meno_ is considered and rejected. Finally, it is argued that this principle, when properly understood, does not commit Socrates to a vicious methodological circularity referred to in the literature as the “Socratic Fallacy”. (shrink)