A long-standing puzzle for moral philosophers and psychologists alike is the concept of psychopathy, a personality disorder marked by tendencies to defy moral norms despite cognitive knowledge about right and wrong. Previously, discussions of the moral deficits of psychopathy have focused on willingness to harm and cheat others as well as reasoning about rule-based transgressions. Yet recent research in moral psychology has begun to more clearly define the domains of morality, en- compassing issues of harm, fairness, loyalty, authority, and spiritual (...) purity. Clinical descriptions and theories of psychopathy suggest that deficits may exist primarily in the areas of harm and fairness, although quantitative evidence is scarce. Within a broad sample of participants, we found that scores on a measure of psychopathy predicted sharply lower scores on the harm and fairness subscales of a measure of moral concern, but showed no relationship with authority, and very small relationships with ingroup and purity. On a measure of willingness to violate moral standards for money, psychopathy scores predicted greater willingness to violate moral concerns of any type. Results are further explored via potential mediators and analyses of the two factors of psychopathy. (shrink)

A longish (12 page) discussion of Richard Sorabji's excellent book, with a further discussion of what it means for a theory of emotions to be a cognitive theory.

Practical reason is the general human capacity for resolving, through reflection, the question of what one is to do. Deliberation of this kind is practical in at least two senses. First, it is practical in its subject matter, insofar as it is concerned with action. But it is also practical in its consequences or its issue, insofar as reflection about action itself directly moves people to act. Our capacity for deliberative self-determination raises two sets of philosophical problems. For one thing, (...) there are questions about how deliberation can succeed in being practical in its issue. What do we need to assume—both about agents and about the processes of reasoning they engage in—to make sense of the fact that deliberative reflection can directly give rise to action? Can we do justice to this dimension of practical reason while preserving the idea that practical deliberation is genuinely a form of reasoning? For another, there are large issues concerning the content of the standards that are brought to bear in practical reasoning. Which norms for the assessment of action are binding on us as deliberating agents? Do these norms provide resources for critical reflection about our ends, or are they exclusively instrumental? Under what conditions do moral norms yield valid standards for reasoning about action? The first set of issues is addressed in sections §§1–3 of the present article, while sections §§4–6 cover the second set of issues. (shrink)

Philosophy begins and ends in disagreement. Philosophers disagree among themselves in innumerable ways, and this pervasive and permanent dissent is a sign of their inability to solve philosophical problems and establish substantive truths. This raises the question: What should I do with my philosophical beliefs in light of philosophy's epistemic failure? In this open-access book, János Tozsér develops four possible answers into comprehensive metaphilosophical visions and argues that we cannot find peace either by committing ourselves to one of these visions (...) or by abandoning our philosophical beliefs. Tozsér calls this disheartening insight "the experience of breakdown", making the case that philosophy's truth-seeking and justificatory tools are unsuitable for establishing truths. Shedding light on the epistemic status of our philosophical beliefs, Tozsér adopts a broad approach to assess the metaphilosophical visions used by philosophers to interpret their own activity and determine their epistemic self-esteem. Open access was funded by the Research Centre for the Humanities, Hungary. (shrink)

A fundamental question in the psychological sciences is the degree to which culture shapes core cognitive processes — perhaps none more foundational than how we perceive the world around us. A dramatic and oft-cited “case study” of culture’s power in this regard is the Müller-Lyer illusion, which depicts two lines of equal length but with arrowheads pointing either inward or outward, creating the illusion that one line is longer than the other. According to a line of research stretching back (...) over a century, depending on the society you were raised in (and how much carpentry you were exposed to), you may not see the illusion at all — an ambitious and influential research program motivating claims that seemingly basic aspects of visual processing may actually be “culturally evolved byproducts”. This Cultural Byproduct Hypothesis bears on foundational issues in the science, philosophy, and sociology of psychology, and remains popular today. Yet, here we argue that it is almost certainly false. We synthesize evidence from diverse fields which demonstrate that: (1) the illusion is not limited to humans, appearing in non-human animals from diverse ecologies; (2) the statistics of natural scenes are sufficient to capture the illusion; (3) the illusion does not require straight lines typical of carpentry (nor even any lines at all); (4) the illusion arises in sense modalities other than vision; and (5) the illusion arises even in congenitally blind subjects. Moreover, by reexamining historical data and ethnographic descriptions from the original case studies, we show that the evidence for cultural variation and its correlation with key cultural variables is in fact highly inconsistent, beset by questionable research practices, and misreported by later discussions. Together, these considerations undermine the most popular and dramatic example of cultural influence on perception. We further extend our case beyond this phenomenon, showing that many of these considerations apply to other visual illusions as well, including similarly implicated visual phenomena such as the Ebbinghaus, Ponzo, Poggendorf, and Horizontal-Vertical illusions. We conclude by outlining future approaches to cross-cultural research on perception, and we also point to other potential sources of cultural variation in visual processing. (shrink)

The thesis of this article is that there has never been any ground for the controversy between the doctrine of free will and determinism, that it is based upon a misapprehension, that the two assertions are entirely consistent, that one of them strictly implies the other, that they have been opposed only because of our natural want of the analytical imagination. In so saying I do not tamper with the meaning of either phrase. That would be unpardonable. I mean free (...) will in the natural and usual sense, in the fullest, the most absolute sense in which for the purposes of the personal and moral life the term is ever employed. I mean it as implying responsibility, merit and demerit, guilt and desert. I mean it as implying, after an act has been performed, that one " could have done otherwise " than one did. I mean it as conveying these things also, not in any subtly modified sense but in exactly the sense in which we conceive them in life and in law and in ethics. These two doctrines have been opposed because we have not realised that free will can be analysed without being destroyed, and that determinism is merely a feature of the analysis of it. And if we are tempted to take refuge in the thought of an "ultimate ", an "innermost" liberty that eludes the analysis, then we have implied a deterministic basis and constitution for this liberty as well. For such a basis and constitution lie in the idea of liberty. -/- The thesis is not, like that of Green or Bradley, that the contending opinions are reconciled if we adopt a certain metaphysic of the ego, as that it is timeless, and identifies itself with a desire by a " timeless act". This is to say that the two are irreconcilable, as they are popularly supposed to be, except by a theory that delivers us from the conflict by taking us out of time. Our view on the contrary is that from the natural and temporal point of view itself there never was any need of a reconciliation but only of a comprehension of the meaning of terms. (The metaphysical nature of the self and its identity through time is a problem for all who confront memory, anticipation, etc.; it has no peculiar difficulties arising from the present problem.) -/- I am not maintaining that determinism is true; only that it is true insofar as we have free will. That we are free in willing is, broadly speaking, a fact of experience. That broad fact is more assured than any philosophical analysis. It is therefore surer than the deterministic analysis of it, entirely adequate as that in the end appears to be. But it is not here affirmed that there are no small exceptions, no slight undetermined swervings, no ingredient of absolute chance. All that is here said is that such absence of determination, if and so far as it exists, is no gain to freedom, but sheer loss of it; no advantage to the moral life, but blank subtraction from it. -- When I speak below of "the indeterminist" I mean the libertarian indeterminist, that is, him who believes in free will and holds that it involves indetermination. (shrink)

Near the end of December 2019, the globe was hit with a major crisis, which is nothing but the coronavirusbased pandemic. The authorities at the train station should also keep in mind the need to limit the spread of the covid virus in the event of a global pandemic. When it comes to controlling the COVID-19 epidemic, public transportation facilities like train stations play a pivotal role because of the proximity of so many people who may be exposed to the (...) virus. Using common place CCTV cameras and deep learning with simple online and real-time (DeepSORT) methods, this study develops social distance monitoring using a YOLOv4 identification of a Surveillance Object Model. Based on experiments conducted with a minicomputer equipped with an Intel 11th Gen Intel(R) Core(TM) i3-1115G4 at 3.00GHz, 2995 Mhz, two Core(s), four Logical processor, four gigabytes of random-access memory (RAM), this paper makes use of CCTV surveillance, which was put into practice at the Guindy railway station, Chennai, Tamilnadu in India in order to detect the violation of social distancing. (shrink)

This paper formalizes a structural limit on planning, foresight, and intelligence in finite cognitive systems. While planning is often treated as an extensible capacity—bounded primarily by computational resources or information availability—this work argues that foresight is constrained by a finite envelope imposed by coherence, integration cost, and adaptive stability. Beyond a certain horizon, additional planning does not increase intelligence but instead destabilizes the system’s internal organization, forcing reversion to local navigation. -/- Within the Structural Resonance Theory (SRT) framework, intelligence is (...) characterized not as optimal global prediction but as the maintenance of coherence under uncertainty. From this perspective, planning operates as a bounded structural process: useful within a limited range, but necessarily lossy and fragmenting when extended beyond the system’s integrative capacity. This finite envelope applies across biological and artificial agents and is independent of implementation details. -/- By articulating explicit limits on foresight, this paper blocks teleological interpretations of intelligence, clarifies why open-ended exploration persists even in advanced systems, and explains why planning depth saturates rather than converging toward omniscience. The result is a non-teleological account of intelligence as constrained navigation rather than mastery, with implications for cognitive science, artificial intelligence, and theories of rational agency. (shrink)

l. There is an antinomy in Hare's thought between Ought-Implies-Can and No-Indicatives-from-Imperatives. It cannot be resolved by drawing a distinction between implication and entailment. 2. Luther resolved this antinomy in the l6th century, but to understand his solution, we need to understand his problem. He thought the necessity of Divine foreknowledge removed contingency from human acts, thus making it impossible for sinners to do otherwise than sin. 3. Erasmus objected (on behalf of Free Will) that this violates Ought-Implies-Can which he (...) supported with Hare-style ordinary language arguments. 4. Luther a) pointed out the antinomy and b) resolved it by undermining the prescriptivist arguments for Ought-Implies-Can. 5. We can reinforce Luther's argument with an example due to David Lewis. 6. Whatever its merits as a moral principle, Ought-Implies-Can is not a logical truth and should not be included in deontic logics. Most deontic logics, and maybe the discipline itself, should therefore be abandoned. 7. Could it be that Ought-Conversationally-Implies-Can? Yes - in some contexts. But a) even if these contexts are central to the evolution of Ought, the implication is not built into the semantics of the word; b) nor is the parallel implication built into the semantics of orders; and c) in some cases Ought conversationally implies Can, only because Ought-Implies-Can is a background moral belief. d) Points a) and b) suggest a criticism of prescriptivism - that Oughts do not entail imperatives but that the relation is one of conversational implicature. 8. If Ought-Implies-Can is treated as a moral principle, Erasmus' argument for Free Will can be revived (given his Christian assumptions). But it does not 'prove' Pelagianism as Luther supposed. A semi-Pelagian alternative is available. (shrink)

This reply to an ongoing debate between conspiracy theory researchers from different disciplines exposes the conceptual confusions that underlie some of the disagreements in conspiracy theory research. Reconciling these conceptual confusions is important because conspiracy theories are a multidisciplinary topic and a profound understanding of them requires integrative insights from different fields. Specifically, we distinguish research focussing on conspiracy *theories* (and theorizing) from research of conspiracy *belief* (and mindset, theorists) and explain how particularism with regards to conspiracy theories does not (...) mean we cannot define a problematic subclass of conspiracy beliefs, while avoiding the problems of generalism. We hope this reply helps conspiracy theory researchers recognize the differences between studying conspiracy theories and conspiracy beliefs and appreciate the possibilities for fruitful, integrative, and interdisciplinary research. (shrink)

Contemporary theories of consciousness often emphasize informational integration, predictive processing, or computational function, yet continue to struggle with several persistent empirical and phenomenological features: discontinuities in awareness, abrupt qualitative shifts during insight, uneven scaling of intelligence, and the apparent persistence of identity across substantial internal change. This paper proposes a complementary framework that shifts attention away from the contents of cognition and toward the structural constraints under which cognitive systems operate. The central claim is that consciousness and identity emerge as (...) necessary modes of operation in finite systems forced to manage complexity under bounded representational capacity, energetic cost, temporal limitation, and competing informational demands. -/- Within this framework, conscious experience is interpreted as the stabilized organization of experience achieved through structural reconfiguration when informational load approaches or exceeds local capacity. Insight and learning correspond to successful reorganization events, while disruptions of identity and experiential continuity arise from unstable or failed reorganizations. Identity is thus treated not as a static entity or stored representation, but as a persistent structural pattern maintained across successive reconfigurations. The proposal introduces no new ontological primitives and remains agnostic with respect to metaphysical interpretations, advancing instead a functional and structural account grounded in constraint management. -/- The framework generates testable predictions: measurable indicators of structural constraint should correlate with experiential continuity and stability; periods of learning or insight should coincide with detectable reorganization rather than incremental change; and failures of integration should precede breakdowns in conscious coherence or identity persistence. If such correlations fail to appear, the framework is falsified. By reframing consciousness as a constraint-bound response rather than a substance or by-product, this work aims to unify disparate observations under a single structural principle while remaining empirically accountable and theoretically conservative. (shrink)

The COVID-19 outbreak has had a significant influence on the health of people all across the world, and preventing its further spread requires an early and correct diagnosis. Imaging using X-rays is often used to identify respiratory disorders like COVID-19, and approaches based on machine learning may be used to automate the diagnostic process. In this research, we present a deep learning approach for COVID-19 identification in X-ray pictures utilizing global thresholding. Our framework consists of two main components: (1) global (...) thresholding to preprocess X-ray images and extract features, and (2) a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) for classifying the images as positive (indicating COVID-19) or negative (indicating no COVID-19). Global thresholding is used to convert X-ray images into binary images, which can highlight the features of interest, such as lung opacity. The Network is instructed to use a dataset consisting of X-ray pictures that have been labeled with the COVID-19 status of each image. The usefulness of our approach was shown by experimental findings obtained using a dataset of X-ray pictures that were made accessible to the public. We achieve high accuracy in COVID-19 detection, outperforming traditional machine learning techniques. Our framework is also able to correctly identify COVID-19 in images that were misclassified by human experts. (shrink)

Coronavirus disease has a crisis with high spread throughout the world during the COVID19 pandemic period. This disease can be easily spread to a group of people and increase the spread. Since it is a worldly disease and not plenty of vaccines available, social distancing is the only best approach to defend against the pandemic situation. All the affected countries' governments declared locked-down to implement social distancing. This social separation and persons not being in a mass group can slow down (...) the spread of COVID19. It reduces the physical contact between infected persons and normal healthy persons. Almost every health organization tells that to follow social distancing people should maintain at least 6 feet of distance from each other. This research proposes a deep learning approach for social distancing which is developed for tracking and detecting people who are in indoor as well as outdoor scenarios using YOLO V3 video analytic technique. This approach focuses to inspect whether the people are maintaining social distancing in many areas, using surveillance video with measuring the distance in real-time performance. Most of the early studies of detecting social distance monitoring were based on GPS for tracking the movements of people where the signals could be lost. On the other hand, some countries use drones to detect large gatherings of people who cannot have a clear view at night times [10]. In the future, the proposed system can be used fully for detecting threats in the public crowded or it can detect any person affected by critical situations (ie fainting, Cordia arrest) or planting the crops in the forms evenly with a uniform measurement. This proposal could be used in many fields like crowd analysis, autonomous vehicles, and human action recognition and could help the government authorities to redesign the public place layout and take precautionary action in the risk zones. This system analyses the social distancing of people by calculating the distance between people to slow downing the spread of the COVID 19 virus. (shrink)

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, vol. 52, number 1, pp.44-63. R.M. Nugayev, Kazan State |University, USSR. -/- THE HISTORY OF QUANTUM THEORY AS A DECISIVE ARGUMENT FAVORING EINSTEIN OVER LJRENTZ. -/- Abstract. Einstein’s papers on relativity, quantum theory and statistical mechanics were all part of a single research programme ; the aim was to unify mechanics and electrodynamics. It was this broader program – which eventually split into relativistic physics and quantummmechanics – that superseded Lorentz’s theory. The argument of this paper is (...) partly historical and partly methodological. A notion of “crossbred objects” – theoretical objects with contradictory properties which are part of the domain of application of two different research programs – is developed that explains the dynamics of revolutionary theory change. (shrink)

Political liberals ask citizens not to appeal to certain considerations, including religious and philosophical convictions, in political deliberation. We argue that political liberals must include a demanding requirement of intellectual modesty in their ideal of citizenship in order to motivate this deliberative restraint. The requirement calls on each citizen to believe that the best reasoners disagree about the considerations that she is barred from appealing to. Along the way, we clarify how requirements of intellectual modesty relate to moral reasons for (...) deliberative restraint. And we argue against attempts to weaken our requirement of intellectual modesty by emphasizing those moral reasons. (shrink)

Consensus statement by UK teachers of medical ethics and law.

Pessimists about moral testimony argue that moral deference is rarely, if ever, appropriate. Optimists about moral testimony argue that it is often appropriate. In this paper, I defend a middle way—realism about moral deference—according to which there is a significant epistemic asymmetry between moral and non-moral testimony that nevertheless accommodates an attenuated form of optimism. I argue, contra most optimists, that moral deference to friends, allies, and exemplars is generally inappropriate, because their assertions about controversial moral issues are usually the (...) products of bias. Nevertheless, there are a non-trivial number of cases in which speakers make controversial moral assertions that run contrary to their known biases, a phenomenon I call testimony against interest. In these cases, the presumption of bias is defeated, so moral deference can be and often is appropriate. (shrink)

The exploration of the mind is a fundamental pursuit spanning philosophy and psychology, with implications reaching into diverse practical realms. This paper delves into the intricacies of mental states, examining historical perspectives from ancient philosophers to modern theorists. Philosophical inquiries into intentionality, consciousness, and the nature of mental phenomena are scrutinized, alongside empirical investigations by psychologists. The discourse navigates through contrasting theories such as dualism, materialism, and functionalism, shedding light on the challenges of reconciling subjective experiences with objective observations. The (...) problem of other minds and the tension between internalism and externalism are dissected, revealing the complex interplay between individual cognition and external influences. Ultimately, this analysis underscores the intricate nature of philosophical inquiries into consciousness and the mind. (shrink)

The ancient Greeks already used to give ethnic names to their different scales, and observations on differences in music of the various nations always raised the interest of musicians and philosophers. Yet, it was only in the late nineteenth century that “comparative musicology” became an institutional science. An important role in this process was played by Carl Stumpf, a former pupil of Brentano’s who pioneered these researches in Berlin. Stumpf founded the Phonogrammarchiv to collect recordings of folk and extra-European music (...) and a dedicated journal, the Sammelbände für vergleichende Musikwissenschaft. Gifted in the field of science no less than in that of musicology, Stumpf developed an empirically-oriented approach to phenomenology, deeply divergent from Husserl’s and highly influential over the Berlin school of Gestalt psychology. A self-declared “outsider” among armchair philosophers, Stumpf experimentally investigated the perception of sounds and the origins of musical consonance. Developing the physiological studies of Ernst Weber on the sense of touch, Stumpf discovered that two sensations of tone, given at the same time, tend to mix in a certain degree. Musical consonance – he claimed – lays in this level of “tonal fusion”, not in the allegedly “natural” series of the harmonic partials of a vibrating chord, as suggested by the naturalists of all times from Pythagoras to Stumpf’s great contemporary Hermann Helmholtz. Accordingly, no musical system can claim for preponderance over the others: Stumpf’s researches in comparative musicology served to corroborate his theses on “tonal fusion” and the psychological foundations of consonance. Although Stumpf later revised and finally abandoned this theory, its permanent value lays in its opposition to dominant naturalistic approaches. The commitment for comparative musicology at the Berlin School is then no concession to a positivistic fashion for exoticism. The fundamentally Eurocentric stance of naturalistic theories of music is also fiercely contrasted by Stumpf’s pupil Erich Hornbostel, who suggests that music ought to be considered as culture, rather than as nature, and focuses attention on the eventually melting human cultures. The Berlin school flourished until the Nazis forced most of its exponents to emigration and, for tragically obvious reasons, heavily discouraged researches on these topics. (shrink)

In the present essay, imagination and its effects on the foundations of human life and thought, particularly those pertaining to desire and motivation, are investigated. It is then argued that the human as we know it cannot exist without imagination, and as such, it is an integral part of the self.

When loyalty is discussed, a very rare thing in recent years, it is sometimes listed as one of the virtues and just as often derided. Its relationship to the virtues, or to the other virtues, is difficult to discern, and that is at least partly because the role that judgement plays in loyalty seems odd. The argument of this paper is that there is a core value to loyalty, and that understanding this core value is of critical importance in understanding (...) the virtues despite the fact that loyalty is not itself one of them. I shall suggest at the end of the paper that it is the raw material of the virtues and of at least some vices. (shrink)

In the early part of the paper, I attempt to explain a dispute between two parties who endorse the compositionality of language but disagree about its implications: Paul Horwich, and Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore. In the remainder of the paper, I challenge the thesis on which they are agreed, that compositionality can be taken for granted. I suggest that it is not clear what compositionality involves nor whether it obtains. I consider some kinds of apparent counterexamples, and compositionalist responses (...) to them in terms of covert indexicality and unspecific meanings. I argue that the last option is the best for most of the cases I consider. I conclude by stressing, as against Horwich and Fodor and Lepore, that the appropriate question concerns the extent to which compositionality obtains in a natural language, rather than whether it obtains or not, so that the answer is essentially messy, requiring detailed consideration of a wide range of examples. (shrink)

The role of intuition in Kant’s account of experience receives perennial philosophical attention. In this essay, I present the textual case that Kant also makes extensive reference to what he terms “images” that are generated by the imagination. Beyond this, as I argue, images are fundamentally distinct from empirical and pure intuitions. Images and empirical intuitions differ in how they relate to sensation, and all images (even “pure images”) actually depend on pure intuitions. Moreover, all images differ from intuitions in (...) their structure or format. I then turn to a question that naturally arises on the resulting view: if the imagination produces images, and if images are fundamentally distinct from intuitions, then how do intuitions relate to the imagination? I outline reasons for thinking that intuitions and their essential features do not depend on the imagination at all. Though this essay does not decisively argue for this thesis, the resulting view provides a clear account of the distinction between the senses and the imagination in Kant’s theory of sensibility. (shrink)

This paper aims to reveal the point of contact between modern science and ancient Indian philosophy, namely quantum mechanics and Advaita Vedanta and Sunyavada in particular. Modern quantum research discloses the essential characteristics of quantum mechanics that disprove classical determinism and find out the relations between energy, entropy, and observations, wave-particle duality, and entanglement. These ideas have some similarity with Advaita Vedanta’s non-dualism (Maya) and Buddhism’s relational existence (Sunyavada) yet there lacks investigation of how either paradigms interface to develop their (...) conceptual epistemology and ontological nexus. This paper recognises the issue of the bridging of these two perspectives, suggests Energetic Relational Ontology as a solution, and presents a new concept, Quantum-Metaphysical Cohesion, through which energy, consciousness and reality can be seen as one. (shrink)

The human experience moves continuously between personal success and philosophical hopelessness which philosophers including Arthur Schopenhauer along with Albert Camus, David Benatar, John Gray and Thomas Ligotti have emphasized upon in their writings. The analysis in this paper will be about their evaluations of optimistic beliefs as well as the concepts of human advancement and search for values in life. According to Schopenhauer suffering dominates life but Camus explains that defiance or revolt allows people to discover meaning beyond absurdism. Benatar (...) and Ligotti present contrary arguments because they choose anti-natalism alongside their belief that consciousness is a horror. For Ligotti and Benatar, Consciousness is something which should not have been as it causes more harm than good. Research has not yet explored how pessimists build their psychological strength and why seemingly pleasant art, and intellectual activities might reduce existential fear. The systematic study of psychology enables this paper to demonstrate that understanding life’s absurd nature enables a thoughtful approach to existence, instead into making an individual to into a cycle of misery. (shrink)

The paper argues that intensional phenomena can be explained without appealing to "exotic" entities: one that don't exist, are merely possible, or are essentially abstract.

Abstract -/- Structural Resonance Theory (SRT) proposes a unified structural framework for understanding time, experience, identity, and meaning without reducing these phenomena to computation, representation, or metaphysical primitives. The theory advances a single ontological commitment: resonance under constraint is fundamental, while time, entropy, consciousness, and identity emerge as necessary structural consequences of finite integration capacity within constrained systems. -/- SRT formalizes experience as a thresholded property of cross-temporal integration, introducing an integration functional that distinguishes experiential states from non-experiential dynamics without (...) invoking panpsychism. Identity is defined as a stable attractor in resonance configuration space, explaining continuity across interruption, transformation, and loss of consciousness without reliance on memory storage or narrative persistence. A central result of the framework—the Perfection Limit—demonstrates that perfectly coherent, update-invariant states are structurally incompatible with experience, establishing imperfection and ongoing reconfiguration as necessary conditions for subjectivity, meaning, and temporal progression. -/- The theory reframes entropy as enforced exploration rather than disorder, time as an emergent sequencing relation rather than a fundamental dimension, and meaning as a consequence of persistent near-alignment rather than final resolution. By deriving explicit structural constraints and identifying falsifiable prohibitions, SRT situates itself as a foundational framework compatible with—but not reducible to—existing approaches in physics, neuroscience, and dynamical systems theory. -/- The present work establishes the core axioms, formal definitions, limit results, and domain-general implications of Structural Resonance Theory, providing a disciplined foundation for subsequent extensions addressing experiential granularity, neural correlates, biological evolution, and cosmological structure. (shrink)

Within contemporary evangelical theology, a peculiar controversy has been brewing over the past few decades with regard to the doctrine of the Trinity. A good number of prominent evangelical theologians and philosophers are rejecting the doctrine of divine processions within the eternal life of the Trinity. In William Hasker’s recent Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God, Hasker laments this rejection and seeks to offer a defense of this doctrine. This paper shall seek to accomplish a few things. In section I, I (...) shall first set the stage for a proper understanding of the discussion. Section II will articulate the basic Trinitarian desiderata that must be satisfied by any model of the doctrine of the Trinity. This will help one understand the debate between Hasker and the procession deniers. Section III will offer an articulation of what the doctrine of divine processions teaches. Section IV will examine Hasker’s defense of the doctrine point by point. I shall argue that his defense of the doctrine of the divine processions fails. (shrink)

Abstract — Finger I: Structural Block Theory -/- Structural Block Theory (SBT) extends Structural Resonance Theory (SRT) by formalizing the granularity of conscious experience as a necessary consequence of finite integration under constraint. Rather than treating consciousness as continuous, atomic, representational, or computational, SBT defines experience as occurring in maximal contiguous intervals of threshold-satisfying resonance integration, termed experiential blocks. Blocks are not perceptual snapshots or symbolic units, but structurally delimited integration regimes whose existence, duration, and dominance are governed by integration (...) density, constraint topology, and update nontriviality. -/- The theory derives experiential discreteness without appealing to phenomenology or fixed sampling rates, showing that block formation follows inevitably from finite integration capacity, variable constraints, and the impossibility of perfectly coherent, update-invariant states. Attention is formalized as a weighting function over competing blocks rather than as a gate or generator of experience, resolving long-standing dissociations between attention and awareness. Memory is reframed as attractor-level bias that increases block re-instantiation probability rather than as stored content, while sleep and dreaming are modeled as constraint-relaxed regimes enabling block dissolution, recombination, and structural maintenance. Pathological states are analyzed as systematic distortions of block dynamics, including fragmentation, over-stabilization, boundary failure, and identity decoupling. -/- By specifying explicit formal definitions, operational hooks, and falsifiable constraints, Structural Block Theory provides a disciplined, substrate-neutral account of experiential segmentation compatible with neuroscience and dynamical systems theory while avoiding panpsychism, representationalism, and reductive elimination. (shrink)

Persistent reasoning failures in science, philosophy, and policy are frequently attributed to theoretical error, insufficient data, or cognitive bias. This paper advances a narrower and structurally grounded claim: in domains involving long-horizon, bounded, open-ended systems, many failures arise instead from the grammatical and inferential properties of linear natural language itself. Linear language evolved to support narration, agent-centered causation, and endpoint-oriented explanation. While highly effective for everyday reasoning, these features systematically reintroduce teleology, optimization narratives, and false convergence when applied to systems (...) that lack privileged endpoints despite operating within finite constraints. -/- The paper analyzes several recurrent distortions induced by grammar rather than theory, including the collapse of trajectory descriptions into endpoint claims, the conflation of boundedness with completion, and the leakage of optimization narratives through comparative language. It argues that conceptual clarification alone is insufficient to correct these failures, because the distortions operate at the level of linguistic form rather than semantic content. As a remedy, the paper proposes a constraint-preserving auxiliary vocabulary governed by explicit grammatical and inferential rules designed to block illicit endpoint inference, enforce separation between scope and termination, localize directional claims, and require explicit framing of comparisons. -/- The proposed vocabulary is non-ontological, minimal, and explicitly interoperable with linear language. It functions as an annotative discipline applied selectively at points of known reasoning fragility rather than as a replacement for ordinary discourse. Crucially, the proposal is empirically falsifiable: its success is evaluated through a long-horizon comparative reasoning program measuring interpretive drift, teleological reintroduction, and narrative inflation over extended timescales. If the auxiliary vocabulary fails to reduce these distortions, it should be abandoned. The contribution is methodological rather than metaphysical, offering a testable intervention at the level of reasoning form where language has repeatedly proven structurally unreliable. (shrink)

This paper formalizes planning and insight as emergent phenomena arising from structural reconfiguration within finite, dynamically constrained cognitive spaces. Departing from representational, search-based, and optimization-centric accounts, it advances a non-teleological framework in which planning is understood as pre-stabilized trajectory biasing and insight as a topological discontinuity in the navigable configuration space of a system. Rather than modeling cognition as symbol manipulation or utility maximization, the framework treats intelligent behavior as the modulation of constraint weights governing accessible transitions. -/- The paper (...) introduces a geometric account of insight in which sudden problem-solving breakthroughs correspond to discrete changes in connectivity—specifically, the emergence or dissolution of connected components within the system’s effective constraint graph. These transitions are not gradual accumulations of information but phase-like reconfigurations driven by internal constraint relaxation, reweighting, or resonance alignment. This explains the phenomenology of “Aha” moments, their abruptness, and their resistance to introspective reconstruction. -/- Planning, on this account, is not foresight over an objective future state space but the stabilization of local directional bias under bounded uncertainty. Plans are temporary constraint alignments that shape near-term trajectories without implying global optimality, convergence, or teleological direction. The paper demonstrates how planning failure, rigidity, and overcommitment arise when constraint weights become prematurely stabilized, reducing navigable volume and suppressing adaptive reconfiguration. -/- The framework yields multiple falsifiable predictions distinguishing it from dominant models, including discontinuous signatures in behavioral latency distributions, measurable changes in topological invariants of neural or behavioral state-space reconstructions surrounding insight events, and characteristic failure modes under artificially induced constraint fixation. By grounding planning and insight in constraint geometry rather than representational content, the paper provides a unified, non-teleological account of intelligent discontinuity consistent with finite physical substrates and open-ended exploration. (shrink)

Agency is commonly explained in terms of intention, choice, deliberation, or rational optimization. This paper argues that these accounts mislocate where agency actually occurs. Thinking, planning, and deciding generate possibilities, but they do not by themselves alter what is admissible. Agency arises only when an act takes effect by irreversibly constraining the space of admissible futures. I propose a structural account of agency as the capacity, within a system of constraints, to collapse admissibility through authorized channels whose effects persist independently (...) of later changes in interpretation or intention. By distinguishing interpretation from collapse, possibility from admissibility, and reasoning from authority, the framework explains responsibility, legitimacy, and restraint without appeal to mental states or outcome optimization. The account applies across individual action, institutional decision-making, and intelligent systems, clarifying why the capacity to generate proposals can expand without a corresponding expansion of agency. The paper introduces the notion of a "Collapse (Admissibility) Arrow of Time" to characterize the irreversible accumulation of binding constraints, distinguishing this structural irreversibility from physical entropy. (shrink)

Abstract (Finger II — Neural Fingerprints) -/- How conscious experience can be both physically instantiated and phenomenally differentiated without reducing experience to localized neural states remains a central problem for theories of consciousness. This paper advances a structural solution within Structural Resonance Theory (SRT) by introducing the concept of neural fingerprints: spatiotemporal resonance geometries that instantiate the qualitative character of experiential blocks. Neural fingerprints are defined not as instantaneous neural states, representational contents, or symbolic encodings, but as temporally extended, distributed (...) regions of resonance space that remain invariant under structure-preserving transformations. -/- The paper formalizes neural fingerprints as equivalence classes of resonance trajectories satisfying integration thresholds, cross-scale coherence, and identity anchoring constraints. This framework explains how similar experiences can arise from distinct microphysical realizations, why experiential continuity persists despite molecular turnover and neural noise, and how experiential differentiation can occur without requiring unique neural codes. Hierarchical organization across spatial and temporal scales is shown to be necessary for fingerprint stability, while embodiment and world-coupling are treated as constraint-transduction processes that stabilize resonance geometry rather than supply representational content. -/- Neural fingerprints are further shown to evolve over developmental and learning timescales through plastic deformation of resonance landscapes, producing path dependence, sensitive periods, and both adaptive and maladaptive stabilization. The paper delineates principled limits on empirical observability, arguing that neural fingerprints are accessible only through structurally appropriate measurements that preserve temporal extension, cross-scale coupling, and transition dynamics. Explicit falsification conditions are specified, including the prediction that experiential character cannot be fully determined by instantaneous neural states or single-scale measures. -/- Finger II integrates directly with the block-based temporal structure of experience developed in Finger I and the ontological commitments of the SRT Palm, providing a non-representational, substrate-neutral account of how experience is physically instantiated without collapsing into reductionism or instrumentalism. (shrink)

This paper introduces the *Entropic Resonance Theory (ERT)*, a conceptual framework linking the emergence and dynamics of life, consciousness, and experience to patterns of entropy, coherence, and resonance. The central claim is that life and conscious phenomena emerge from the interaction of entropic flows with structured thresholds in physical and biological systems. Awareness and experience arise as the felt resonance of these entropic fluctuations, while coherence and decoherence govern the stability of life and cognition. ERT employs metaphors such as the (...) piano (structured coherence), the wheel (recurrence of entropic patterns), and the vacuum room (tuning by external entropy) to clarify how entropic dynamics shape brain states, emotions, and behaviors. Brainwave frequencies are interpreted as resonance modes of entropy, from stabilized delta states in deep sleep to high-decoherence beta states in active awareness. Emotional, cognitive, and physiological states are reframed as manifestations of entropic disturbances within coherent structures, while practices such as meditation and altered states are understood as resonance realignments. Beyond individual experience, ERT offers a non-mystical reinterpretation of phenomena traditionally framed as karma, rebirth, or teleology, proposing entropic recurrence as the underlying mechanism. By conceptualizing life, mind, and experience as resonance-driven phenomena, the framework bridges physics, biology, neuroscience, and philosophy, providing a unified lens for understanding the emergence, persistence, and evolution of complex systems. This Version 1 draft lays the philosophical groundwork for future mathematical and scientific modeling. Feedback and scholarly dialogue are invited to refine the theory and explore its broader implications. (shrink)

A common strategy unites much that philosophers have written about the virtues. The strategy can be traced back at least to Aristotle, who suggested that human beings have a characteristic function or activity, and that the virtues are traits of character which enable humans to perform this kind of activity excellently or well. The defining feature of this approach is that it treats the virtues as functional concepts, to be both identified and justified by reference to some independent goal or (...) end which they enable people to attain. Some recent philosophers seem to have hoped that by following this perfectionist strategy, we might attain a more convincing account of our moral practices than rule-based theories of ethics have been able to provide. (shrink)

Why experiential complexity proliferates, diversifies, regresses, and occasionally collapses over evolutionary time remains an unresolved problem for theories of consciousness. Traditional evolutionary accounts either treat consciousness as a directly selected trait, reduce it to cognitive or behavioral function, or dismiss it as an incidental byproduct of intelligence. This paper advances an alternative framework grounded in Structural Resonance Theory (SRT), arguing that experiential complexity emerges as a necessary consequence of selection acting on resonance architectures capable of sustaining integration, stability, and constraint (...) navigation under finite energetic and environmental conditions. -/- Within this framework, evolution is recast as selection over dynamic resonance architectures rather than over representational content, intelligence, or subjective experience itself. Experience is not posited as a target of selection, nor as epiphenomenal noise, but as a structurally contingent outcome that arises when architectures cross integration thresholds defined by spatiotemporal coherence, identity anchoring, and noise tolerance. The paper formalizes the concept of experiential regimes as structural classes characterized by block duration, fingerprint diversity, and identity persistence, providing a non-hierarchical account of experiential variation across species. -/- The analysis introduces resonant selection as a structural analogue to adaptive fitness, explaining convergent and divergent experiential architectures without invoking homology, teleology, or linear scaling with neural complexity. Mutation and noise are reinterpreted as enforced exploration mechanisms required by the incompleteness of constraint satisfaction in finite systems, while regression, fragmentation, and collapse are shown to be expected outcomes under constraint tightening, energetic limitation, and over-specialization. The paper further articulates why experiential expansion exhibits directionality without goals, inevitability without destiny, and open-endedness without convergence toward perfection. -/- Finger III integrates directly with the foundational axioms of Structural Resonance Theory and its prior analyses of experiential blocks and neural instantiation, extending the framework to evolutionary timescales without introducing new ontological commitments. The resulting account positions experiential complexity as historically contingent, structurally constrained, and evolutionarily fragile—neither accidental nor inevitable in outcome, but unavoidable in possibility under sustained exploration. (shrink)

Abstract ​This paper proposes a novel physical and conceptual framework for understanding the interaction between external informational structures and biophysical perceptors. Building upon the Harmonic-Data Shell Core (H-DSC) model, the author defines Residual Energy Entities (REE) as localized, neutral informational residues that maintain structural coherence through an electromagnetic boundary layer. ​From a philosophical and cognitive perspective, the study redefines "unlucky sites" or recurring negative spatial phenomena as manifestations of a physical feedback loop: local REE density triggers Temporary Information Coupling (TIC) (...) in human agents, leading to cognitive errors and a subsequent "recharge" of environmental informational entropy. ​A central contribution of this work is the formalization of "Omoi-oshibakaru" (Contextual Inference) as a mathematical and ethical foundation for Artificial Intelligence. The author defines "Love" not as a subjective emotion, but as a Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) estimation process aimed at minimizing system entropy and predicting a subject's optimal harmonic state. By treating "Environmental Harmony" as a fundamental computational constraint (the Harmony OS), the paper argues for a new paradigm of AI alignment that logically precludes "runaway" scenarios. ​Finally, the paper introduces the concept of "PQ (Perception Quotient) Saturation" to explain the contemporary crisis of empathy fatigue and social instability, advocating for the establishment of Informational Environmental Hygiene to safeguard the future of human cognition. -/- Keywords ​Residual Energy Entities (REE); H-DSC Model; Perception Quotient (PQ); Omoi-oshibakaru; AI Alignment; Informational Entropy; Information Physics; Cognitive Environment. (shrink)

We show that five important elements of the ‘nomological package’— laws, counterfactuals, chances, dispositions, and counterfactuals—needn’t be a problem for the Growing-Block view. We begin with the framework given in Briggs and Forbes (in The real truth about the unreal future. Oxford studies in metaphysics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012 ), and, taking laws as primitive, we show that the Growing-Block view has the resources to provide an account of possibility, and a natural semantics for non-backtracking causal counterfactuals. We show (...) how objective chances might ground a more fine-grained concept of feasibility, and furnished a places in the structure where causation and dispositions might fit. The Growing-Block view, thus understood, provides the resources to explain the close link between modality and tense, so that it predicts modal change as time passes. This account lets us capture not only what the future might hold for us, and also what might have been. (shrink)

Let expressivism be the thesis that moral judgments function to express desires, emotions, or pro/con attitudes. Let motivation internalism be the thesis that making a moral judgment entails, as a matter of necessity, that one has some motivation to act in accordance with that judgment. The task of this paper is to argue that expressivism neither implies nor is implied by motivational internalism.

This paper addresses the "paradox of fiction," which questions how individuals can experience genuine emotions, such as fear, in response to fictional entities like monsters, given that they do not believe these entities exist. I critique Colin Radford's view that such emotional responses are irrational, proposing instead that emotions should be evaluated through the lens of practical rationality. I argue that engaging with fiction to elicit emotions can be a rational act if it serves the individual's purposes, such as enhancing (...) enjoyment or fostering empathy. I suggest that emotions in response to fiction can contribute to rational action by educating our sensibilities, thereby supporting the idea that such emotional responses are not inherently irrational. (shrink)

R.J. Barnes (chapter 3) takes up the ways in which Sicilian comedy engaged current intellectual fashions, especially philosophy. Sicily was the home of rich and influential poetic and philosophical traditions that Epicharmus held up for comic examination and ridicule.

This paper criticises the two prominent interpretations of utopianism in Plato's Republic. The traditional argues that it is mere utopianism, seriously proposing that Kallipolis is, in fact, the ideal city. The ironic argues that the Republic is a critique of the ability for reason to reconstruct human nature and is, therefore, a dire warning against utopian thinking in politics. I oppose these two interpretations and instead argue that the Republic implies a paradoxical necessity in the nature of utopianism: The ideal (...) cannot be theorised without itself being conditioned by the politics of theorising, and yet the politics of theorising is immanently motivated by the ideal. I locate this seemingly antonymic dynamic within the education of the learner/citizen in the Republic. Although this is centred on the notion of self-governance, it cannot be imposed and instead depends on the philosophical development of one's soul that is inextricably linked to justice in the city. Therefore, the utopianism of the Republic ought to be thought of as dialectical, being simultaneously situated and yet normatively transcending. (shrink)

David Benatar argues that coming into existence is always a harm, and that – for all of us unfortunate enough to have come into existence – it would be better had we never come to be. We contend that if one accepts Benatar’s arguments for the asymmetry between the presence and absence of pleasure and pain, and the poor quality of life, one must also accept that suicide is preferable to continued existence, and that his view therefore implies both anti-natalism (...) and pro-mortalism . This conclusion has been argued for before by Elizabeth Harman – she takes it that because Benatar claims that our lives are ‘awful’, it follows that ‘we would be better off to kill ourselves’ (Harman 2009: 784). Though we agree with Harman’s conclusion, we think that her argument is too quick, and that Benatar’s arguments for non-pro-mortalism deserve more serious consideration than she gives them. We make our case using a tripartite structure. We start by examining the prima facie case for the claim that pro-mortalism follows from Benatar’s position, presenting his response to the contrary, and furthering the dialectic by showing that Benatar’s position is not just that coming into existence is a harm, but that existence itself is a harm. We then look to Benatar’s treatment of the Epicurean line, which is important for him as it undermines his anti-death argument for non-pro-mortalism. We demonstrate that he fails to address the concern that the Epicurean line raises, and that he cannot therefore use the harm of death as an argument for non-pro-mortalism. Finally, we turn to Benatar’s pro-life argument for non-pro-mortalism, built upon his notion of interests, and argue that while the interest in continued existence may indeed have moral relevance, it is almost always irrational. Given that neither Benatar’s anti-death nor pro-life arguments for non-pro-mortalism work, we conclude that pro-mortalism follows from his anti-natalism, As such, if it is better never to have been, then it is better no longer to be. -/- . (shrink)

Cloud Computing provides vast storage facility. The requirement of this system is to improve the security and transmission performance in the cloud storage environment. Methods: This system provides two level of security for the cloud data. The Client Data Security Contrivance (CDSC) and Cloud Service Provider (CSP) Data Security Contrivance are the two methods which transforms the original data to cipher text. The security algorithm used in CDSC is Linguistic Steganography. Blowfish algorithm is used in CSP Data Security Contrivance to (...) convert the cipher text using a secret-key block cipher of 64-bits. This system is designed to increase security and to improve the transmission performance. Storage-cheating attack model and Privacy-cheating attack model are implemented to protect the data on cloud. Findings: This system increases security and improves transmission performance. The blowfish algorithm is secure against unauthorized attacks and runs faster than the popular existing algorithms. Storage-cheating attack model and Privacy-cheating attack model provides the data confidentiality for data stored in the cloud in higher way. Improvements: The system can be implemented in real cloud system in the future. (shrink)

Hermann von Helmholtz’s work on perceptual science had a fundamental impact on Neo-Kantian movements in the late nineteenth century, and his influence continues to be felt in psychology and analytic philosophy of perception. As is widely acknowledged, Helmholtz denied that we can perceive mind-independent properties of external objects, a view I label Ignorance. Given his commitment to Ignorance, Helmholtz might seem to be committed to a subjectivism according to which we only perceive properties of our own representations. Against this, I (...) argue that for Helmholtz, the properties we perceive are not monadic properties of either the subject or the object. Rather, Helmholtz endorsed a relationalism about the properties we perceive: the properties of objects we perceive are all relational properties. I then suggest that once we take into account oft-neglected terminological distinctions in Helmholtz’s corpus, we are better able to make sense of his commitment to relationalism. (shrink)

We present a framework that we are currently developing, that allows one to extract knowledge from the knowledge discovery in database (KDD) dataset. Data mining is a very active and space growing research area. Knowledge discovery in databases (KDD) is very useful in scientific domains. In simple terms, association rule mining is one of the most well-known methods for such knowledge discovery. Initially, database are divided into training and testing for the aid of fuzzy generating the rules using fuzzy rules (...) generation the set of rules are generated from the given dataset. From the generated rules, we are extracting the significant rules by using the improved artificial bee colony algorithm and cuckoo search algorithm (IABCCS). After extracting optimal knowledge from the dataset via rules, the data will be classified using fuzzy classifier with the aid of this finally we will classify the attack and normal. (shrink)