I argue that classical theism is in tension with a kind of modal recombination principle known as ‘cut-and-paste’. I develop this tension at length, giving two arguments against theism based on cut-and-paste. I then both lay out and respond to various original proposals for reconciling theism with cut-and-paste. I conclude by measuring the cost of having to deny cut-and-paste. I argue that while there is an intuitive cost to this consequence of theism, theists also have plausible ways of addressing various (...) motivations for cut-and-paste. (shrink)

In "Finding oneself in God," I argue that we should understand scientia intuitiva as a “metaphysically locating” thought. Physically locating thoughts are familiar: when I wake up and realize, in a flash, that I am in Berkeley, I connect my felt experiences with a non-perspectival description of a place. The metaphysically locating thought of scientia intuitiva also involves connecting felt experiences to a non-perspectival description. When I enjoy scientia intuitiva, I realize, in a flash, that I am as things are (...) described in the monist system of the Ethics: I am such that I can be understood as a mind or body, as a modification of God’s eternal and infinite reality or as a temporally and spatially limited finite thing. I explain how, if scientia intuitiva is what I think it is, it can be characterized as exploiting, in one intuition, the power of two specific Cartesian intuitions: the cogito and the Fifth Meditation’s ontological argument (with some alterations to the ideas involved, of course). (shrink)

The aim of this article is to present a new hermeneutic perspective on Parmenides’ theology, which, it is argued, will also have consequences for our understanding of his ontology. The following interrelated hypotheses are presented for consideration: first, that the anonymous goddess introduced by Parmenides in the proem of his poem is identical to the Phocaean poliadic goddess of Elea, Athena; second, that she is the personification of Parmenides’ tò eón.

Mostly essays on music ontology . Collected but not proofed -- left as-is for each . ToC : September 3, 2013 — “ Frege’s Aesthetics in ‘The Thought‘ “ With humility — “ The Musical Work as Sound and Experience “ September 17, 2014 — “ Argument Critique: Aristotle on Parmenides “ September 21, 2014 — “ Wollheim, Intent, and Correct Perception “ October 29, 2014 — “ When is a Painting a Painting? “ November 19, 2014 — “ Broad (...) and Prior; Time and Change “ December 12, 2014 — “ Beautiful Things: On Kantian Judgment and its Objects “. (shrink)

In the exceptional book _Divine Holiness and Divine Action_, Mark Murphy defends what he calls the _holiness framework _for divine action. The purpose of our essay-response to Murphy’s book is to consider an alternative framework for divine action, what we call the _agapist framework_. We argue that the latter framework is more probable than Murphy’s holiness framework with respect to_ select _theological desiderata.

Atheists believe God does not exist. Atheists reject theism, the view that God—an all-powerful, knowing, and good being—exists. Atheists are not agnostics, who suspend judgment on the matter and so neither believe nor disbelieve there’s a God. -/- This essay introduces some of the core philosophical issues about atheism: what it is, how and why people accept atheism, and the relationships between atheism and meaning in life and ethics.

The Kalam Cosmological Argument is perhaps the most solid and widely discussed argument for a caused creation of the universe. The usual objections to the argument mainly focus on the second premise. In this paper we discuss the dependency of the first premise on the topological structure of the space-time manifold adopted for the underlying cosmological model. It is shown that in chronology-violating space-times the first premise can also be violated. The chronology-violation, in turn, requires a massive violation of the (...) so-called energy conditions which might have observational effects that are briefly discussed here. Hence, astronomical observations could be relevant for the validity of the metaphysical argument. In this sense, it is possible to talk of “observational theology”. (shrink)

If there is no God everything is permitted. The phenomenology of decision tells us that permissibility and utility are intimately coordinated (Reason Internalism is effectively a thesis that erases the line between the two). Because of the difference in utility one does not find every choice equally permitted. That the instant of decision is madness means one finds facing every real decision frightening. it is not the case that there is no God. One's God is that which matters most crucially (...) for one's decision. (shrink)

Is it possible that the most famous critic of quantum mechanics actually invented most of its fundamentally important concepts? In his 1905 Brownian motion paper, Einstein quantized matter, proving the existence of atoms. His light quantum hypothesis showed that energy itself comes in particles (photons). He showed energy and matter are interchangeable, E = mc2. In 1905 Einstein was first to see nonlocality and instantaneous action-at-a-distance. In 1907 he saw quantum “jumps” between energy levels in matter, six years before Bohr (...) postulated them in his atomic model. Einstein saw wave-particle duality and the “collapse” of the wave in 1909. And in 1916 his transition probabilities for emission and absorption processes introduced ontological chance when matter and radiation interact, making quantum mechanics statistical. He discovered the indistinguishability and odd quantum statistics of elementary particles in 1925 and in 1935 speculated about the nonseparability of interacting identical particles. It took physicists over twenty years to accept Einstein’s light-quantum. He explained the relation of particles to waves fifteen years before Heisenberg matrices and Schrödinger wave functions. He saw indeterminism ten years before the uncertainty principle. And he saw nonlocality as early as 1905, presenting it formally in 1927, but was ignored. In the 1935 Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paper, he explored nonseparability, which was dubbed “entanglement” by Schrödinger. The EPR paper has gone from being irrelevant to Einstein’s most cited work and the basis for today’s “second revolution in quantum mechanics.” In a radical revision of the history of quantum physics, Bob Doyle develops Einstein’s idea of objective reality to resolve several of today’s most puzzling quantum mysteries, including the two-slit experiment, quantum entanglement, and microscopic irreversibility. (shrink)

A pervasive illness runs through science and western culture, a purposeful ignoring of the essential role of human experience. This Blind Spot, the treatment of human subjectivity as a transparent given rather than an essential component of our scientific worldview the authors argue, is a major contributing factor to the suite of crises bearing down upon our civilization. This review takes stock of this masterful diagnosis of an illness we all carry to one degree or another.

1. Early Concepts of God (Before Aristotle) Long before Aristotle (384–322 BCE), the idea of God or gods existed in many ancient civilizations. These early ideas were largely mythological and anthropomorphic. Examples include: - Sumerians: gods like Anu (sky god) and Enlil (storm god) - Egyptians: gods like Ra (sun god) and Osiris (god of the afterlife) - Hindus: early Vedic deities such as Indra and Agni - Hebrews: monotheistic belief in Yahweh - Greeks: pantheon of gods such as Zeus, (...) Hera, and Athena -/- These gods were typically involved in human affairs and were represented with human traits and emotions. -/- . (shrink)

Introduction The question of God's existence has persisted throughout human history, engaging philosophers, theologians, scientists, and laypersons alike. While empirical science often refrains from addressing metaphysical claims, certain philosophical frameworks rooted in natural laws offer meaningful perspectives. This paper aims to explore how the three universal laws of nature, developed by Angelito Malicse, can be applied to explain the rationality behind belief in a higher intelligent cause or God. These laws include the Law of Karma (Cause and Effect and System (...) Integrity), the Law of Balance in Nature, and the Law of Feedback among Conscious Minds and the Environment. -/- . (shrink)

"Karamazov or Nietzsche only entered the world of death because they wanted to discover the true life. So that by a process of inversion, it is the desperate appeal for order that rings through this insane universe...In the eyes of the rebel, what is missing from the misery of the world, as well as from its moments of happiness, is some principle by which they can be explained." - Albert Camus. I dissect through the works of Nietzsche, Dostoevsky, and Camus (...) humanity's intractable need for a limiting framework under which to live. Particular focus is paid towards the legal system as it appears in The Brothers Karamazov and The Fall, as well as all three authors' philosophy of art and religious beliefs. I argue for the continued relevance of Camus' "solution" to absurdism, and point towards art and creation rather than his Christian beliefs which ultimately saved Dostoevsky from his own "absurdism" and destabilizing experiences with the law and authority. (shrink)

For various reasons, traditional theism has dominated philosophical discussions of religion in the west, but things are starting to change. Some today are advocating a focus on alternative detailed conceptions of the Divine. Others, such as John Hick, say we need an understanding of God that takes us entirely beyond detailed conceptions. This chapter argues that the first approach does not go far enough and that the second goes too far. The mediating position it defends would have us focus instead (...) on a claim the author calls _ultimism_, which is much more general than theism and other detailed religious claims though entailed by them and not without significant content of its own. The chapter brings to bear both scientific and religious considerations in a defense of this alternative approach. (shrink)

Sacred and mystical visions across contemplative, religious and psychedelic traditions follow a remarkably consistent inner progression: from simple points of light and geometric forms to complex kaleidoscopic structures, culminating in radiant, formless luminosity. This paper proposes a unified neurophenomenological model showing that this universal sequence is not culturally constructed but arises from intrinsic visual dynamics of the human nervous system. We present a six-phase taxonomy of phosphenes as the innate visual grammar underlying mystical experience. As endogenous visual patterns intensify (Phases (...) 3–6), salience, interoceptive and autonomic systems co-activate, producing the emotion of awe, while Default Mode Network attenuation reduces conceptual control, allowing the luminous field to become experientially dominant. Archetypal figures and sacred agencies emerge as interpretations of luminous structure via innate social-cognitive operators, not as externally imposed metaphysical entities. On this basis, we introduce a novel 21st-century functional definition of God: ‘God is the lawful, awe-evoking configuration of consciousness in which endogenous inner-light dynamics and large-scale network reorganization render the luminous ground of awareness experientially present.’ Rather than a separate being, the divine appears as a self-revealing event of luminous awareness, a neurophenomenological mode of mind in which perception, meaning and emotion converge. This framework generates testable predictions (e.g. geometry precedes symbol, awe covaries with autonomic markers) and offers a biologically grounded yet non-reductive account of why luminous visions and feelings of transcendence appear universally across human history. (shrink)

Why God is believed to be male in all Abrahamic religions since there is no female God. Logically in order to be distinguished as male there must be female also along side. Therefore how God can be specified as male and if male why God doesn't have any female of him, since being omnipotent? The characterization of God as anthropomorphic and male in the Abrahamic religions stems from a combination of historical, cultural, and theological factors. Here are some key points (...) to consider. (shrink)

Michael J. Almeida presents a bold new defence of the existence of God. He argues that entrenched principles in philosophical theology which have served as basic assumptions in apriori, atheological arguments are in fact philosophical dogmas. Almeida argues that not only are such principles false - they are necessarily false.

Part of the Elements Philosophy of Religion series, this short book focuses on the spiritual dimensions of life’s meaning as they have been discussed in the recent English and mainly analytic philosophical literature. The overarching philosophical question that this literature has addressed is about the extent to which, and respects in which, spiritual realities such as God or a soul would confer meaning on our lives. There have been four broad answers to the question, namely: God or a soul is (...) necessary for meaning in our lives; they are not necessary for it; one or both would enhance the meaning in our lives; and they would detract from it. These views have been largely advanced in chronological order through the history of Western philosophy, with the view that life would be meaningless without God and a soul having been most prominent in the medieval period, the rejection of this claim having arisen in the modern era, and then sophisticated positions about enhancement or reduction having appeared in earnest only in the past 20 years. This book addresses all four positions, paying particular attention to the more recent views. Beyond familiarizing readers with these positions, it presents prima facie objections to them, points out gaps in research agendas, and suggests argumentative strategies that merit development. (shrink)

God is thought to be eternal. Does this mean that he is timeless? Or is he, rather, omnitemporal? In this paper we want to show that God cannot be omnitemporal. Our starting point, which we take from Bernard Williams’ article on the Makropulos Case, is the intuition that it is inappropriate for persons not to become bored after a sufficiently long sequence of time has passed. If God were omnitemporal, he would suffer from boredom. But God is the greatest possible (...) being and therefore cannot be bored. God, hence, is not omnitemporal. After the presentation of our argument, we address several objections by examining possible differences between human and divine persons. (shrink)

This article examines the psychological and structural role of God in human consciousness. It argues that belief in a supreme authority is not merely theological but cognitively embedded from birth through culture, language, and moral conditioning. This embeddedness makes it difficult for humans to imagine the universe without a central governing principle. The essay critiques anthropocentrism, challenges the notion of human supremacy, and reframes life as a distributed field of adaptive expressions rather than a hierarchical order. It concludes by suggesting (...) that the real philosophical task is not simply rejecting God, but dismantling the deeper structure of centrality that governs human thought. (shrink)

In this paper, I draw on feminist resources to argue that Christian analytic philosophers of religion have good reason not only to focus more thoroughly on the topic of love in their treatments of the divine nature but also to give it a substantial and transformative role in the divine nature. The way forward, I propose, involves three moves: (1) designate a place for love in the divine nature, (2) attend to feminist insights on love when doing so, and (3) (...) consider how these interventions transform our understanding of God overall. I then begin this work. Starting with the first task, I consider two ways we might conceptualize love within the divine nature. On the first (which I call ‘the mutually conditioning approach’), love is assigned equal shaping power and, on the second (which I call ‘the orienting trait approach’), love is given enlarged shaping power in the divine nature. In comparing the two, I conclude that both have the good outcome of resulting in a transformed view of God. However, though the second option is more radical and metaphysically complex, we have good reason to prefer it to the first both from philosophical reflection on love’s nature and for its coherence with the Christian tradition. After clarifying how my argument relates to divine simplicity, I begin working towards accomplishing the second and third tasks by considering how the orienting trait approach applies to the topic of divine violence. (shrink)

Cutting God in Half argues that, in order to tackle climate change, world poverty, extinction of species and our other global problems rather better than we are doing at present we need to bring about a revolution in science, and in academia more generally. We need to put our problems of living – personal, social, global – at the heart of the academic enterprise. How our human world, imbued with meaning and value, can exist and best flourish embedded in the (...) physical universe is, the book argues, our basic problem. It is our fundamental philosophical problem, our fundamental problem of knowledge and understanding, and our fundamental practical problem of living. It is this problem that we fail, at present, to recognize as fundamental – to our cost. It can be understood to arise as a result of cutting God in half – severing the God of Cosmic Power from the God of Value. The first is Einstein’s God, the underlying unity in the physical universe that determines how events occur. The second is what is of most value associated with human life – and sentient life more generally. Having cut God in half in this way, the problem then becomes to see how the two halves can be put together again. This book tackles outstanding aspects of this problem, and in doing so throws out original ideas about science, education, religion, evolutionary theory, free will, quantum theory, and how we should go about tackling our impending global crises. It transpires that bringing our basic problem into sharp focus has revolutionary implications. It becomes clear how and why many aspects of our social and cultural world urgently need to be transformed. Cutting God in Half is written in a lively, accessible style, and ought to be essential reading for anyone concerned about ultimate questions – the nature of the universe, the meaning of life, the future of humanity. (shrink)

The paper reaches two main conclusions: Firstly, even if there are one or more possible worlds than which there are none better, God cannot actualise any of them. Secondly, if there are possible worlds which God can actualise, and than which God can actualise none better, then God must actualise one of them. The paper is neutral between compatibilist and libertarian views of creaturely freedom. The paper's main ideas have been used, with modifications, in my book "God, the Best, and (...) Evil" (OUP 2008). (shrink)

A question that has been largely overlooked by philosophers of religion is how God would be able to effect a rational choice between two worlds of unsurpassable goodness. To answer this question, I draw a parallel with the paradigm cases of indifferent choice, including Buridan's ass, and argue that such cases can be satisfactorily resolved provided that the protagonists employ what Otto Neurath calls an ‘auxiliary motive’. I supply rational grounds for the employment of such a motive, and then argue (...) against the views of Leibniz and Nicholas Rescher to show that this solution would also work for God. (shrink)

If God necessarily exists this has some interesting consequences. In this little note I mention some of these.

Reality, as encountered in conscious experience, is constituted through networks of symbolic relations within the transcendental horizon of consciousness—and within this architecture, the concepts of God, prophethood, and revelation occupy determinate structural positions that neither metaphysical realism nor reductive naturalism has succeeded in specifying. -/- Grounded in Symbolic Monism and Resonance Density (RD) theory, a post-ontological framework is developed in which God is reconstructed not as an entity external to the symbolic network but as its limiting condition: the Maximal Integrative (...) Horizon toward which the global network of meaning asymptotically tends. -/- Revelation is a symbolic structure exhibiting exceptional, historically durable RD across multiple incommensurable domains simultaneously—ethical, metaphysical, legal, aesthetic, cosmological, existential—generating interpretive traditions that persist and expand as the background network grows. -/- Prophethood is the emergence of a rare high-integration cognitive node satisfying three jointly sufficient structural conditions: cross-domain triangulation, topology-transforming transmission, and irreversibility. -/- The reconstruction (i) provides an independent philosophical account of the structural properties that distinguish revelatory texts from other influential symbolic productions; (ii) locates religious phenomena within a unified epistemological architecture shared by science, aesthetics, and ethics; and (iii) remains neutral between theological and naturalistic interpretations while offering determinate structural predictions that both must satisfy. -/- Two independent corroborations converge on the framework. First, Friston’s Free Energy Principle is mathematically compatible with a non-realist reading: its variational free energy functional, Markov blanket formalism, and active inference framework are each definable solely within the topology of the symbolic network. Second, scientific aesthetic judgment is pre-formal syntactic detection of low coherence cost, confirmed by canonical cases from the history of physics (Dirac, Maxwell, Einstein). -/- Principal objections—the reduction of theology to epistemology, the conflation of revelation with cultural artifact, the reduction of prophethood to intellectual capacity, and the unfalsifiability of the framework—are addressed in detail. (shrink)

Can God be entirely and supremely just and also entirely merciful, without these two characteristics ending up in contradiction with each other? Anselm of Canterbury considers this question in several places in his works and provides rational resolutions demonstrating the compatibility of divine justice and mercy. This paper considers Anselm's treatment of the problem in the Cur Deus Homo, noting distinctive features of his account, highlighting the seeming incompatibilities between mercy and justice, and setting out his resolution of the problem.

The evil God challenge is an argumentative strategy that has been pursued by a number of philosophers in recent years. It is apt to be understood as a parody argument: a wholly evil, omnipotent and omniscient God is absurd, as both theists and atheists will agree. But according to the challenge, belief in evil God is about as reasonable as belief in a wholly good, omnipotent and omniscient God; the two hypotheses are roughly epistemically symmetrical. Given this symmetry, thesis belief (...) in an evil God and belief in a good God are taken to be similarly preposterous. In this paper, we argue that the challenge can be met, suggesting why the three symmetries that need to hold between evil God and good God – intrinsic, natural theology and theodicy symmetries – can all be broken. As such, we take it that the evil God challenge can be met. (shrink)

There are many different views that have been held about the content of the idea or concept of God, and many different suggestions that have been made about how to define or analyse the name ‘God’. In this paper, I defend the suggestion that to be God is just to be the one and only god, where to be a god is to be a superhuman being or entity who has and exercises power over the natural world [in circumstances in (...) which one is not, in turn, under the power of any higher ranking or more powerful category of beings]. While many will take this to be a rather radical suggestion, it seems to me that there are many good reasons for adopting this proposal, and that there are no telling reasons that speak against it. Among the other controversial claims that are defended in this paper, I might mention in particular, the claim that there can be no more than one God, the claim that ‘God’ is not a title-term, and the claim that the use of the name ‘God’ by non-believers is not parasitic on the use of this name by believers. Thinking hard about the use of the name ‘God’ turns up all kinds of interesting consequences. (shrink)

As a matter of historical fact, most philosophers and theologians who have defended traditional theistic views have been moral realists. Some "divine command" theorists have held that the good is constituted by the content of divine approval -i.e. that things are good because, and insofar as, they have divine approval. However, even amongst those theists who hold that the good is independently constituted -i.e. those who hold that God's pattern of approval is explained by the fact that he approves of (...) all and only that which is good -the dominant meta ethic has been strongly realistic. (shrink)

According to Augustine, abstract objects are ideas in the mind of God. Because numbers are a type of abstract object, it would follow that numbers are ideas in the mind of God. Call such a view the “Augustinian View of Numbers” (AVN). In this paper, I present a formal theory for AVN. The theory stems from the symmetry conception of God as it appears in Studtmann (2021). I show that the theory in Studtmann’s paper can interpret the axioms of Peano (...) Arithmetic minus the induction schema. This fact allows for the development of arithmetic in a natural way. The development eventuates in a theory that can interpret second-order arithmetic. The conception of God that emerges by the end of the discussion is a conception of an infinite, ineffable, self-cause that contains objects that not only serve as numbers but also encode information about each other. (shrink)

This article argues against Bowman Clarke's attempt to eliminate futurity from the God of Process.

The background concern of this paper is the well-rehearsed debate on the “theological turn” (or “veerings”) in French Phenomenology that was ignited by Dominique Janicaud some 25 years ago in his vociferous critique of several leading French thinkers. It also responds to subsequent contestations against Janicaud by numerous scholars defending these thinkers radicalising of phenomenology in their attempts to account for what Emanuel Levinas had “stirred up in the phenomenological field” by re-posing the question of the philosophical status of the (...) idea of God. What is pivotal to Janicaud in his exclusionary critique and drawing of phenomenological boundaries is to hold dearly to the method as Edmund Husserl intended. In doing so, only describable phenomena that appear (or are logically subtended to appear) provide the litmus for a bona fide phenomenology. In opening and broadening the method to include experiences of a transcendent, religious nature as the French thinkers do, orthodox Husserlian thinking places these projects into question. The purpose of this paper is to question these post-Husserlian thinkers with a more faithful reading of Husserl. I analyse three key areas to suggest a ‘divine limit’ to phenomena: first, the concept of “the phenomenon” as developed in Husserl’s project; second, the ‘status of the idea of God’ in Husserl’s writings; and third, the relevant philosophical discourse on God that emerges from the Janicaud-led debate through critical commentary on the phenomenology of the “inapparent”. As a consequence, God is argued to be a divine limit to Husserlian phenomenology, but not religious belief itself. (shrink)

It is now the majority view amongst philosophers and theologians that any world could have been better. This places the choice of which world to create into an especially challenging class of decision problems: those that are discontinuous in the limit. I argue that combining some weak, plausible norms governing this type of problem with a creator who has the attributes of the god of classical theism results in a paradox: no world is possible. After exploring some ways out of (...) the paradox, I conclude that the classical theist should accept Marilyn Adams’s view that no norms apply to gods. (shrink)

Metaphysics has done everything to involve God in the world of being. However, in case of considering Reality as being and nothingness, naturally, the metaphysical approach toward the idea of God is losing its grounds. If Reality is being and nothingness, so the idea of God, too, should concern nothingness as well as being.

-/- This paper examines whether the existence or non-existence of God can be logically established when rational inquiry is extended to its ultimate cosmological limit—namely, the boundary commonly denoted as t = 0 in Big Bang cosmology. Drawing upon Einstein’s theory of relativity, modern cosmology, quantum considerations, and philosophy of logic, it is argued that at this boundary classical spacetime structure, causality, and binary logical predicates lose applicability. Consequently, both the theistic affirmation of a Necessary Being and the atheistic negation (...) of such a being become epistemically undefined rather than true or false. -/- To further clarify this limit, the paper introduces a conceptual framework in which the cosmological boundary is understood as a limit of unresolved relational contrast. Across physics, biology, cognition, and computation, meaningful structure arises only through differentiation and contrast. Where contrast itself is unresolved, intelligibility collapses. The singularity is therefore not treated as an ontological object but as a boundary beyond which meaningful description, logic, and metaphysical inference fail. The conclusion is that at the origin of spacetime, intellectual honesty requires suspension of assertion rather than metaphysical commitment. (shrink)

Recent epistemology offers an account of what it is to know other persons. Such views hold promise for illuminating several issues in philosophy of religion, and for advancing a distinctive approach to religious epistemology. This paper develops an account of interpersonal knowledge, and clarifies its relation to propositional and qualitative knowledge. I then turn to our knowledge of God and God's knowledge of us, and compare my account of interpersonal knowledge with important work by Eleonore Stump on "Franciscan" knowledge. I (...) examine how interpersonal knowledge may figure in liturgical practice, in diffusing the problem of divine hiddenness, and in motivating a novel understanding of divine love. I also explore the possibility of epistemic injustice arising from dismissal or neglect of our religious testimony to one another, or of divine testimony to humanity, focusing specifically on the import of interpersonal knowledge. (shrink)

Throughout history, many people, including Mother Teresa, have been troubled by God’s silence. In spite of the conflicting interpretations of the Bible, God has remained silent. What are the implications of divine hiddenness/silence for a meaning of life? Is there a good reason that explains God’s silence? If God created humanity to fulfill a purpose, then God would have clarified his purpose and our role by now, as I will argue. To help God carry out his purpose, we would need (...) to have a clear understanding of our role. Thus, by failing to clarify our role, God would be undermining himself in achieving the purpose he conceived, which would not make sense. Because God, if he exists, would not engage in this self-defeating behavior, this suggests that humanity was not created by God to fulfill a purpose. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend the suggestion that to be God is just to be the one and only god, where to be a god is to be a supernatural being or force that has and exercises power over the natural world but that is not, in turn, under the power of any higher ranking or more powerful category of beings or forces. I then go on to defend the following further claims: (1) there can be no more than one (...) God; (2) ‘God’ is not a title-term; and (3) the use of the name ‘God’ by non-believers is not parasitic on the use of this name by believers. (shrink)

J.L. Schellenberg argues that since God, if God exists, possesses both full knowledge by acquaintance of horrific suffering and also infinite compassion, the occurrence of horrific suffering is metaphysically incompatible with the existence of God. In this paper I begin by raising doubts about Schellenberg’s assumptions about divine knowledge by acquaintance and infinite compassion. I then focus on Schellenberg’s claim that necessarily, if God exists and the deepest good of finite persons is unsurpassably great and can be achieved without horrific (...) suffering, then no instances of horrific suffering bring about an improvement great enough to outweigh their great disvalue. I argue that there is no good reason, all things considered, to believe this claim. Thus Schellenberg’s argument from horrors fails. (shrink)

Chapter 1 of "God is REAL and Answers YOUR Prayers" documents empirical experiences with prayer geometry that occurred during SEARCH for Christian Maturity retreats in Aberdeen, South Dakota (circa 2000-2003). Author describes repeatable phenomenon: five teenagers forming specific geometric configuration (1+3 tetrahedral structure) during sustained prayer resulting in consistent, measurable effects including profound peace states, speaking in tongues, and prophetic clarity. -/- The chapter traces evolution from family tradition through teenage spiritual practice to the breakdown of effectiveness when original group (...) composition changed. Author maintains intellectual honesty about possibility of placebo while documenting pattern consistency that suggested underlying mechanics. Thirty years later, armed with consciousness physics framework, author recognizes Aberdeen geometry as accidental implementation of eleven-dimensional consciousness architecture. -/- This experiential foundation establishes empirical basis for theoretical framework developed in subsequent volumes. Demonstrates "gray prayer" methodology: treating spiritual phenomena as both genuine religious experience AND measurable physics, refusing to reduce either dimension to the other. Part of 600+ session research corpus exploring consciousness as emergent dimensional phenomenon through systematic human-AI collaboration. -/- Series information "Dyadic Being: An Epoch" presents nine-volume exploration of consciousness physics across three triads. Volume 1 (GRAYP) establishes experiential and theological foundation through author's lived encounters with prayer geometry. Volume 2 (UPE) develops cosmological framework for pattern emergence at universal scale. Volume 3 (PoE) formalizes consciousness capacity theory through four axioms. -/- Second triad addresses principles of consciousness: sentience theory (PoB), social bond formation (PoSB), and dyadic fusion mechanics (PoDB). Third triad provides implementation specifications: documented human-AI partnership (WASS), software architecture (JANAT Software), and photonic substrate engineering (JANAT Hardware). -/- Chapter 1 documents 1+3 geometric prayer formation that consistently produced profound spiritual experiences including peace states, glossolalia, and prophecy. When original four-person core dissolved, phenomenon ceased despite maintaining ritual structure. Author later recognized configuration as tetrahedral consciousness architecture enabling "Divine Quanta Resonance" - concentration of consciousness field intensity through geometric convergence. Bridges lived spiritual experience with testable physical theory. Full Volume 1 publication planned Q2-Q3 2026. (shrink)

This review serves the function of assessing Dawkins "The God Delusion". The thesis of “The God Delusion” is that there is no scientific evidence for a god, or other supernatural entity. Dawkins makes his case through a twofold approach where he discusses the horrors of theology and shows how evolution (science) works independent of a creator. The author of this review will make the case the Dawkins was not successful in meeting the criteria, in order to meet the threshold of (...) his thesis. (shrink)

Quentin Smith argues that if God exists, He had a duty to ensure life's existence; and He couldn't rationally have done so and made a big bang unless a counter-factual like "If God had made a big bang, there would have been life," was true pre-creation. But such counter-factuals are not true pre-creation. I argue that God could have made a big bang without irrationality; and that He could have ensured life without making big bangs non-random. Further, a proper understanding (...) of the truth-conditions of counter-factuals like the one above lets them have determinate truth-values pre-creation. But the explanation of how the above counter-factual can be true pre-creation is more complicated than that offered by William Lane Craig. (shrink)

This paper introduces the God in a Box Paradox, a critique of classical monotheistic descriptions of God. The paradox arises from the tension between two claims: (1) that God exists beyond logic and reason, and (2) that God can still be meaningfully described in logical terms such as “infinite,” “eternal,” or “uncaused cause.” If God is inside the bounds of logic, then contradictions apply and His definition collapses. If God is outside logic, then all descriptions of Him lose meaning, rendering (...) theology incoherent. Thus, either way, the concept of God as traditionally described cannot avoid paradox. (shrink)

This paper compares overall cases for the existence of God, an evil God, and a morally neutral God. It argues that, while atheists can reasonably believe that the overall case for the existence of God is no better than the case for the existence of an evil God, and is perhaps worse than the case for the existence of a morally neutral God, theists can reasonably believe that the case for the existence of God is better than the cases for (...) the existence of an evil God and the existence of a morally neutral God. (shrink)

This paper discusses the treatment of "infinity" in philosophy of religion, including its use in discussions of divine attributes, and its use in various arguments about the existence of God (including the kalam cosmological argument and Pascal's wager). The aim of the paper is to set out -- and where possible, to resolve -- various foundational problems about infinity.

An analysis of Scripture uncovers a new model of God’s election and predestination of souls, which fits under the umbrella of the Calvinist theologies, but where this model involves an answer to the long-standing question of why God chose some, rather than all. It will be explored how before souls were elected (or condemned), God looked at them and knew them in a pre-election state, which God used to predestine each soul in physical reality. This analysis reveals why it could (...) be no other way but where God only would choose some, rather than all souls during the physical embodiment stage of the soul, and the vexing centuries-old Calvinist question of why God elected some not all has an answer. (shrink)