Brazilian aerospace manufacturer Embraer and American defense giant Northrop Grumman are partnering to pitch Embraer’s KC-390 Millennium to the US Air Force and other foreign militaries, the two companies announced today. Under the new partnership, formalized by a memorandum of understanding, Northrop is studying ways to incorporate an autonomous boom refueling system into the KC-390, along with other mission equipment. The team up could help strengthen Embraer’s bid to break the Millennium into the lucrative US market as the Pentagon weighs future mobility options. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth “has been talking a lot about getting capability to the warfighter as fast as possible,” Tom Jones, the head of Northrop Grumman’s aeronautics division, said today during a briefing with reporters here from a hanger, looking out at a KC-390 on the tarmac. “And I think one of the great ways to do that is to take partnerships between companies that have complementary capabilities.” Bosco da Costa Jr., the president of Embraer’s defense division, added that the partnership affords the opportunity to “leverage this platform [the KC-390] to another level. “We do believe this platform will bring a winning value proposition to our customers around the globe, not only here in the US, but internationally,” da Costa said during the briefing. (Like other media, Breaking Defense accepted travel accommodations from the two companies for the visit, which included a flight in the KC-390.)

The new partnership comes after a similar agreement between Embraer and US defense contractor L3Harris fell apart in 2024. It would also represent a new foray by Northrop into the world of air refueling after the company won the original US Air Force KC-X contract in partnership with Airbus, only to be stymied by a protest from Boeing. Boeing went on to secure the eventual contract. Northrop and Embraer have a long road ahead, with significant development work needed to incorporate a boom that executives are aiming to be optional for buyers and retrofittable on existing aircraft while retaining multi-mission capability like moving cargo. A new boom would enable the Millennium to refuel a wider range of aircraft — including, crucially, those flown by the US Air Force — beyond those it can already gas up with a hose and drogue. According to Jones, the team would like to demonstrate a boom refueling capability in “low, single-digit years.” Developing a boom would also likely require considerable internal investment, meaning that an order from a big customer like the US Air Force would help sew up the business case. Asked if Northrop’s commitment to the partnership and boom development hinges on whether the US Air Force buys the aircraft for a next-gen tanker program known as NGAS, Jones mostly demurred. “Obviously, having the US Air Force invest in this capability, I think would be great. I believe there’s going to be a lot of international demand for this,” he said. “We’re starting the investment. We’re working the strategy of exactly how we come to market, how much internal investment, how much manufacturing investments. Those are all developments that are going to be [part of] the next stages we flesh out as we start operating under this MOU,” he added.

Embraer manufactures the KC-390 in Brazil, but has emphasized it’s ready to deepen its investment in the US by opening a dedicated Millennium facility. On Northrop’s side, Jones said the company would have to sort out where to perform its manufacturing tasks among its various sites. Executives additionally emphasized other opportunities for the partnership beyond the United States. Da Costa, for example, said the Netherlands and Czechia — two of several international customers to sign on to the Millennium in recent years — are interested in using the Millennium to refuel forthcoming fleets of the F-35, which require boom-based refueling. “I think if we only focus on the domestic market, we’re missing a much bigger picture of all the opportunity that’s really out there,” Jones said. “There’s a pretty large installed base of fighter aircraft around the world with all of our allies that we have that need fixed boom refueling capabilities, and right now they don’t have an option, like the option that we’re going to create together that’s behind us here right now,” he added, gesturing to a Millennium parked behind him.

Despite Britain currently lacking the capability to produce new main battle tanks, with only modernization of existing ones possible, the option of light tank procurement is not being considered. The country’s defense ministry responded to a parliamentary inquiry about possible light tank procurement, stating there is currently no need for them. At the same time, the British Ministry of Defence monitors potential market offerings, UK Defence Journal reports. Defense Express recalls that Britain’s plans currently involve keeping only 148 upgraded Challenger 3 tanks in service, manufactured from old Challenger 2 hulls. Of the 213 Challenger 2s in service, their hulls are quite worn, delaying the modernization process. The possibility of tank exports has not yet been ruled out. Britain currently lacks main battle tank hull production capability. The only factory capable of this, Vickers Tank Factory in Leeds, closed in 1999. It was demolished, with the site now being developed for residential housing. In other words, the British cannot produce new MBTs even in the medium term.

Britain can and does manufacture ASCOD chassis for the Ajax family of combat vehicles. These are ordered in six different versions, of which only two are combat vehicles, the Ajax reconnaissance vehicle itself (effectively an IFV) and the Ares APC. Though the ASCOD chassis has a stated maximum load capacity of 42 tons, quite sufficient for mounting a turret with a 105mm or even 120mm gun. An excellent example of such a vehicle is the M10 Booker, built precisely on this General Dynamics platform. At the same time, it should be noted that despite spending over $1.8 billion and 10 years on the light tank project, as well as producing 80 vehicles, the Pentagon has abandoned its M10 Booker light tank. The main concept of transporting two vehicles initially they wanted three on a C-17 could not be realized. In Britain, which has a quite powerful military transport aircraft fleet of 22 A400Ms and 8 C-17A Globemasters, the key benefit from light tanks could be ensuring 120mm caliber presence on the battlefield, or at least 105mm.

National champion BAE Systems has an updated version of the M8, which was promoted for the U.S. Army Mobile Protected Firepower light tank competition. Because the Pentagon objectively skewed requirements toward the M10 Booker project winner, development went no further. The turret could quite likely be transferred to ASCOD. At the same time, even despite debate about the tank’s place on the battlefield, the British Ministry of Defence position on light tanks may be entirely driven by the fact that the Ajax program has encountered such significant difficulties that undertaking any additional developments on this chassis may simply be ill-timed.

China has rapidly expanded its nuclear-powered-submarine fleet in recent years, and has now surpassed US submarine production rate, according to a new report by a London-based think tank. The increase in Chinese submarine numbers will present a growing challenge for western countries despite the continued qualitative differences of Chinese submarines compared to US and European designs, according to the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS).

ah, we gotta keep up the classic “the enemy couldn’t possibly have made anything of the same quality as us!” line

Writing in the IISS’s Military Balance blog, Senior Fellow for Military Capability and Data Assessment Henry Boyd and Research Fellow for Defence Procurement Tom Waldyn said that China launched 10 submarines with an estimated displacement of 79,000 tonnes between 2021 and 2025. These figures surpass the rate of submarine production in the US, which launched seven boats displacing 55,000 tonnes during the same period. “Most significantly, this includes the seventh and eighth Type 094 (Jin) nuclear-armed ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs), which come as part of the emergence of Beijing’s nuclear triad,” according to the authors. They noted that commercially available satellite imagery taken in early 2026 showed six Type 094s in total, spread between the Bohai Shipbuilding Heavy Industry Co (BSHIC) shipyard in Huludao, the 1st Submarine Base at Jianggezhuang, the Xiaopingdao test facility and the 2nd Submarine Base at Yalong Bay on Hainan Island. “Allowing for additional boats either on deterrence patrol or under cover for refit during this period, it is almost certainly the case that China has launched a seventh and eighth Type-094 in 2024 and 2025, respectively,” the authors conclude. The increase in Chinese submarine building capacity came about because of an expansion at the BSHIC shipyard in Huludao between 2019 and 2022, which saw the construction of a second submarine manufacturing hall and other facilities. The state-owned company is responsible for the construction of China’s fleet of nuclear-powered submarines.

In addition to the Type 094s, Bohai is also producing nuclear-powered guided-missile submarines (SSGN) for the People’s Liberation Army – Navy (PLAN), with the report suggesting that nine Type 093B (Shang III) boats have been launched between 2022 and this year, based on commercial satellite imagery of the facility and US government assessments. The Type 093B is an improved variant of the earlier Type-093A (Shang II) submarine deployed by the PLAN during the 2010s, with the authors stating that the upgraded design is reportedly fitted with a vertical launch system (VLS) for guided missiles. A new class of SSGN, that is known to already known to be in development and has been reported elsewhere as having been designated the Type 09V, has also been launched this month, according to the report. The VLS for these PLAN SSGNs are likely to carry anti-ship missiles such as the hypersonic YJ-19 displayed at China’s military parade in September last year, rather than land-attack missiles typically carried by US Navy SSGNs, reflecting the PLAN’s “primary focus on peer-level naval combat in the Western Pacific, compared to the wider expeditionary power-projection mission that the US Navy has held for decades.”

However, the report authors also note that the limiting factor for PLAN submarine operations were their relative noise levels rather than total inventory, noting that both the Type-093 and Type-094 hulls were noisier and therefore easier to track when deployed. “For this reason, the Type-094 SSBNs are currently believed to only operate in the relatively protected waters of the South China Sea, where other PLA assets are able to offer them some protection,” the authors conclude. However, that assessment comes with a big caveat: the understanding of sub noise levels was based on a 2009 US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) report, which said Chinese subs made noise comparable to late Cold War Soviet design.

China, one of the fastest developing countries in the world? yeah we’re going to just assume they’re at a 80s Soviet level of tech, why not!

In the past two days, the U.S. Air Force has sent six of its 16 E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) radar planes to bases in Europe. Two of those jets are now headed to the Middle East, and the others will likely follow, as a massive buildup of U.S. airpower continues ahead of potential strikes on Iran. The deployment of nearly 40 percent of all Air Force E-3s underscores how critical the aircraft remain, but also the challenges of meeting intense operational demands with a rapidly aging and shrunken-down fleet. It also further calls into question a puzzling Pentagon move to axe the purchase of replacement E-7 Wedgetail jets, which Congress has now reversed. … As of yesterday, a pair of E-3s had arrived at RAF Mildenhall in the United Kingdom after traveling from their home station at Elmendorf Air Force Base in Alaska. Four more AWACS jets from Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma had also touched down at Ramstein Air Base in Germany. Online flight tracking data shows that the E-3s at Mildenhall have now departed and are headed toward the Middle East. There is widespread expectation that those aircraft, as well as the ones at Ramstein, will eventually make their way to Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia. As noted, the U.S. Air Force currently has just 16 E-3s remaining in its inventory, roughly half the size of what it was just a few years ago. Six aircraft represent 37.5 percent of the total fleet. However, not all Sentry radar planes are available for operational tasking at any one time. For example, the average mission-capable rate for the E-3 fleet during the 2024 Fiscal Year was 55.68 percent, according to a story last year from Air & Space Forces Magazine. At the time of writing, this appears to be the most recent readiness data the Air Force has released for the E-3s. As such, the six forward-deployed AWACS jets represent an even larger percentage of the aircraft that can actually be sent out on real-world missions. This includes providing radar coverage for alert scrambles of fighter jets defending the homeland. This happens in some circumstances in the lower 48 states, but it is standard practice in Alaska, where there are usually a couple of E-3s typically stationed, with one on alert to launch in support of the fighters, which happens regularly. This is something we will come back to later on.

As TWZ has already noted, the deployment of E-3s to the Middle East is one of the clearest indicators that the final pieces for a major air campaign against Iran are falling into place. We made a similar observation about the appearance of AWACS aircraft flying close to the Venezuelan coast last December in the lead-up to the operation to capture that country’s dictatorial leader, Nicolas Maduro. The E-3 is best known as a flying radar station, with its array contained inside a spinning dome mounted on top of the rear of the fuselage. From its perch, the Sentry can track hostile and friendly air and naval movements across a broad area of the battlespace. Its look-down radar capability offers particular advantages for spotting and tracking lower flying threats, including drones and cruise missiles. Kamikaze drones, as well as cruise and ballistic missiles, would be a central feature in any Iranian retaliatory attacks on American assets on land and at sea in the Middle East. However, each Sentry, which typically flies with 13 to 19 mission specialists onboard in addition to a four-person flight crew, is much more than just its radar. It has other passive sensors and an advanced communications suite. Its combined capabilities make it a key battle management node during operations, and not just in the aerial domain. “The radar and computer subsystems on the E-3 Sentry can gather and present broad and detailed battlefield information. This includes position and tracking information on enemy aircraft and ships, and location and status of friendly aircraft and naval vessels. The information can be sent to major command and control centers in rear areas or aboard ships,” according to the Air Force. “In support of air-to-ground operations, the Sentry can provide direct information needed for interdiction, reconnaissance, airlift and close-air support for friendly ground forces. It can also provide information for commanders of air operations to gain and maintain control of the air battle.” Altogether, E-3 crews run the air battle, and also serve as a key battle management node during operations outside of the aerial domain. These command and control functions would be key in any future offensive operations against Iran, as well as for defending against any retaliation.

At the same time, the Air Force has been open for years now about the increasing challenges involved in operating and sustaining the E-3 fleet. The last new production Sentry aircraft were delivered in 1992, and were also some of the last derivatives of the Boeing 707 airliner to ever be produced. Air Force E-3s have received substantial upgrades since then, but the underlying aircraft are still aging and are increasingly difficult to support. Between 2023 and 2024, the Sentry fleet notably shrank from 31 aircraft down to its present size, in part to try to help improve overall readiness. The fact that U.S. E-3s are powered by long-out-of-production low-bypass Pratt & Whitney TF33 turbofans has been cited as a particular issue. … “We basically have 31 airplanes in hospice care, the most expensive care there is. And we need to get into the maternity business and out of hospices.”

As already noted, the remaining E-3 fleet has continued to struggle with readiness issues amid consistently high demand. These issues have been compounded by resistance over the years to acquiring a direct replacement. When the Air Force finally did decide to supplant at least a portion of the Sentry fleet with newer and more capable E-7 Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft, that effort turned into a protracted saga. The Air Force officially started down the road of acquiring E-7s in 2022, but the program became mired in delays and cost overruns. Last year, the Pentagon revealed its intention to axe the Wedgetail purchases in favor of an interim solution involving buying more of the U.S. Navy’s E-2 Hawkeye airborne early warning and control planes. That, in turn, would serve as a bridge to a longer-term Air Force goal of pushing most, if not all, airborne target tracking sensor layer tasks into space.

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Still, the truncated E-3 fleet clearly remains under immense strain. Sen. Murkowski’s comments last Summer also remain particularly relevant in light of the fact that two of the six E-3s recently sent across the Atlantic came from Elmendorf in Alaska. Recent tracking data suggests that there may only be one Sentry at Elmendorf now to meet operational needs in and around the High North, a part of the world that has only grown in strategic significance in recent years. There is also a question now about the availability of E-3 coverage should a crisis break out somewhere in the Indo-Pacific. If a major contingency were to emerge in the region tomorrow, the Air Force would be faced with a situation compounded not just by low availability rates and high demand elsewhere globally, but also the so-called ‘tyranny of distance.’ The sheer expanse of the Pacific, much of which is water, presents additional requirements when it comes to total coverage area and sortie generation rates to maintain a steady flow of aircraft on station around designated operating areas. Just getting to those areas and back could take many hours. Any future conflict in the region could occur over a massive total area, as well, which would be problematic for such a tiny fleet. All this is exacerbated by the age of the airframes and copious amount of maintenance to keep them flying in the best of conditions, let alone when deployed to the Pacific. As a point of comparison, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which would be fighting from its home turf during a major conflict in the Pacific, has made significant investments in a diverse and still growing array of airborne early warning and control aircraft. The Chinese see a force-multiplying need for these aircraft, and for large numbers of them to be able to cover a lot of territory at once, as you can read more about in this past TWZ feature.

Moving capabilities into space is an admirable goal, and has many advantages in theory, but the capabilities are not available now. Further, while some of the sensing can be distributed to other platforms and leveraged via advanced networking, there still is a place for an integrated and powerful airborne early warning and control solution, at least till the ‘all-seeing’ space layer is actually in place. Saving money now by leaving such a glaring gap, especially in the current security environment globally, appears bizarrely short-sighted.

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Last year, the U.S. government was able to reverse engineer a critical subcomponent for the 30,000-pound GBU-57/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) bunker buster bomb. Leveraging technology from the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) short-range ballistic missile saved years of work that would have otherwise been necessary to “eliminate obsolescence issues and meet operational demands.” The reverse-engineering effort also highlights the impacts of being locked into a single vendor, and underscores why the Pentagon is now pushing to make changes to, if not end this practice. Details about the reverse-engineered component and other aspects of the MOP program were contained in a recent U.S. Air Force contracting announcement regarding efforts to replenish stocks of those bombs following Operation Midnight Hammer. During that operation, B-2 Spirit stealth bombers dropped 14 GBU-57/Bs on Iranian nuclear facilities. The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC) had to produce a detailed justification for awarding a sole-source contract to Boeing for the production of new MOPs and the sustainment of the existing inventory. Boeing is the bomb’s current prime contractor. A redacted copy of that document is available online. “The Government has a follow-on need for additional production of [redacted] MOP Tail Kits with projected delivery starting 10 January 2028 to replace expended units and reach the United States Air Force’s [redacted],” the so-called Justification & Approval (J&A) document explains. “The Government has a need for replenishment production of GBU-57 MOP weapon system components.”

It is unclear what the total size of the GBU-57/B inventory was before or after Operation Midnight Hammer. As of 2015, prime contractor Boeing had delivered at least 20 of the bombs, according to the Air Force. However, additional orders have been reported over the years. In 2024, a story from Bloomberg had also said that a facility in Oklahoma was being expanded to help triple or even quadruple the annual output of these bombs. The MOP’s tail kit, also designated KMU-612/B, contains the bomb’s GPS-assisted inertial navigation system (INS) guidance package and other systems. It is combined with a BLU-127/B penetrating “warhead” and other components, including advanced fuzes designed to help produce the maximum destructive effect on a target after burrowing deep down into the ground, to create a complete GBU-57/B bomb, or all-up-round (AUR). “In August of 2025, the Government successfully reverse engineered a critical subcomponent of the MOP weapon system saving 4-years of design work and enabling the utilization of existing Army ATACMS technology to eliminate obsolescence issues and meet operational demands,” according to the J&A document. “However, the time to reverse engineer all MOP components would result in unacceptable delays in meeting mission requirements.” The MOP J&A does not elaborate on the ATACMS technology in question, or what company or companies may now be in line to produce the resulting subcomponent for the bombs. Lockheed Martin is the current prime contractor for ATACMS, a family of short-range ballistic missiles that you can read more about here. It should also be noted that the U.S. military’s reverse-engineering parts of key weapon systems is not entirely uncommon, especially if the original source of the components in question has gone out of business or otherwise no longer exists.

The J&A document says it would take an estimated 60 months, or five years, to create an entirely new MOP tail kit design and then go through the required processes to certify it for operational use. It also explains why the KMU-612/B tail kit, specifically, is so central to the need to award a new sole-source contract to Boeing. “With regards to IP [intellectual property] rights, The [Redacted] Company is the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) of the MOP weapon system and retains ownership of the intellectual property data associated with the munition’s tail kit,” it explains. “In particular, [redacted] owns the technical data package and manufacturing process methodologies of the tailkit unit entirely. [Redacted] has uniquely acquired expertise over a period of ~18 years of adapting this specialized weapon to meet evolving mission needs as MOP transitioned from proof-of-concept to full operational capability. This expertise pertains, but is not limited to, knowledge of the guidance algorithms, navigation systems, hardware components, specialized test equipment, and software critical to producing and sustaining the MOP weapon system.” “The other components and sub-components, as noted above, have been proprietary to [redacted] from the inception of this weapon system. The USG [U.S. government] does not own or control, via license or by other IP rights, any computer software, methodologies, or technical drawings,” the document adds. “[Redacted] was queried in August 2025 as to the potential of selling IP rights to the USG for the MOP weapon system and the USG was denied.”

lol. lmao

That being said, “over the course of the ~18 years of MOP development to the AURs acquired today the USG has, at certain junctures, been able to separate from the sole-source environment for this weapon with Boeing,” the J&A notes. “The USG was able to break away the Warhead Cases for the MOP under a weapon design agent effort, thereby giving the USG complete IP control over the Warhead TDP. Based on the IP ownership of this TDP the USG awards contracts competitively.”

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The details in the MOP J&A document also underscore broader issues surrounding IP rights and ‘vendor lock’ in the U.S. defense contracting space that have increasingly been coming to the forefront in recent years. Competition inherently creates opportunities to lower costs and diversify supply chains. A broader supplier base also offers benefits when it comes to scaling up production of key subcomponents and complete systems. The continued extent of Lockheed Martin’s control over the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program is perhaps the most widely known example of the negative impacts of vendor lock. U.S. officials have been outspoken about the maintenance and sustenance challenges this has created, especially when it comes to the timely sourcing of spare parts, and the operational risks this creates. TWZ previously explored the particular issues surrounding the F-35 in an in-depth feature. Foreign F-35 operators, especially in Europe, are now also facing regular questions about what could happen to the jets if the U.S. were to cut off access to various sustainment pipelines in light of new diplomatic strains with Washington. Just this past weekend, Dutch State Secretary for Defense Gijs Tuinman caused a stir when he asserted it would be possible to “jailbreak an F-35 just like an iPhone” if necessary, as you can read more about here.

In recent years, successive U.S. administrations have made securing greater IP rights and ensuring opportunities for competition key elements in negotiating new defense contractors. As an example, the Air Force previously made clear that avoiding the F-35 program’s vendor lock was a top priority for the acquisition of the F-47 sixth-generation stealth fighter. President Donald Trump’s administration is now pursuing a host of new contracting reforms, in part to further break up the locks that private companies have on programs like the Joint Strike Fighter. “We will enable third-party integration without prime contractor bottlenecks. Success will be measured by the ability of qualified vendors to independently develop, test and integrate replaceable — excuse me, replacement modules at the component level throughout the system life cycle,” War Secretary Pete Hegseth said in a speech last November. “There’s no more complacency and no more monopolies.” At that time, Hegseth had also acknowledged Byzantine processes and other contracting hurdles that the U.S. military had created for itself over the years. How “the sole-source environment” surrounding the GBU-57/B continues to evolve now remains to be seen. A successor to that bomb, called the Next Generation Penetrator (NGP), is also now in development, and Boeing is involved in that effort, too. The Pentagon’s experiences with MOP, together with the new contracting reform push, are likely to inform how the replacement weapons are acquired. In the meantime, U.S. authorities continue to try to free elements of the MOP program from vendor lock, including now by repurposing technology originally designed for the ATACMS short-range ballistic missile.

The new BAE Systems plant for manufacturing 155mm artillery ammunition, located in Glascoed, has not yet begun operations. This is despite earlier plans to start production in the summer of 2025 and to supply both domestic demand and Ukraine. According to The Guardian, the opening has been delayed by six months. The facility was expected to boost shell output sixteenfold through the introduction of new explosive manufacturing technologies. It was also designed to be highly automated and require minimal personnel. BAE Systems confirmed the delay, explaining that it followed a mid-2025 decision to double the plant’s originally planned capacity. The company reports that construction has been completed and that testing is currently underway, although no revised launch date has been announced.

The Glascoed facility is part of a broader £150 million (approximately $204 million) investment program aimed at expanding munitions production across the United Kingdom. Notably, it is the only project within this package that has not yet become operational. Under the production scheme, 155mm shell bodies are manufactured in Washington before being transported to Glascoed for filling with explosives. The explosives themselves are to be produced on site, reducing dependence on imports from the United States and France.

BAE Systems’ current annual output is reported at just 3,000 to 5,000 artillery shells. Even with a sixteenfold increase, production would reach approximately 80,000 rounds per year — a relatively modest figure, particularly compared to Germany’s stated goal of producing 1.1 million shells annually by 2027. From Defense Express’ perspective, delays in launching such a facility are clearly a negative signal. However, if the postponement is indeed tied to doubling planned capacity, the delay may ultimately prove justified — as 80,000 rounds per year is significantly better than 40,000. Beyond domestic expansion, BAE Systems is also cooperating with Poland to establish similar ammunition production facilities, reportedly including the transfer of automation technologies comparable to those implemented in the UK.

The Swiss government has found itself in an unusual and increasingly difficult position regarding its order for five Patriot batteries. Although the contract was signed in 2021, in 2025 the United States decided to prioritize deliveries of Patriot systems to Ukraine and formally notified Bern of that decision. Since then, U.S. authorities have not provided updated delivery timelines for Switzerland. Moreover, the price of the already contracted systems is expected to increase. Against this backdrop, the Swiss government suspended further advance payments in autumn 2025. By that point, approximately 650 million Swiss francs (around $846 million at the current exchange rate) had already been transferred. According to the Swiss outlet Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ), citing its own sources, the government is now "considering contingency plans in the event of further delays, including the possible evaluation of alternative suppliers." Despite repeated inquiries to Washington, no concrete information regarding revised delivery schedules has been provided.

It is important to note that U.S. arms exports are conducted by the federal government rather than directly by manufacturers. Switzerland, like other countries, signed its Patriot contract with the U.S. government under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) framework. Such agreements typically do not include penalty clauses for delays, and no country has so far attempted legal action against Washington over non-performance. The Patriot issue must also be viewed in the broader context of Switzerland’s separate contract for F-35 Lightning II fighter jets. That agreement is likewise facing uncertainty, as the original $6.55 billion price for 36 aircraft has reportedly increased to at least $9.1 billion due to the absence of a fixed-price clause. The situation is further complicated by trade tariffs introduced by the current U.S. administration and growing concerns in Europe about the reliability of American security guarantees. As a result, potential adjustments to Switzerland’s F-35 procurement are also under active discussion.

At present, however, delivery timelines for Patriot remain the primary concern. Any alternative system would likewise require time for contracting, production, and delivery. Before considering options such as the Franco-Italian SAMP/T NG or Israel’s David’s Sling, Swiss authorities would need assurances that these systems could be delivered sooner than the delayed Patriot batteries. Another unresolved issue concerns the recovery of funds already paid. The officially announced cost of the five Patriot batteries was 1.987 billion Swiss francs (approximately $2 billion at the time of signing and around $2.6 billion at current exchange rates). The 650 million francs already transferred represent nearly one-third of the total contract value. The situation is particularly challenging for Switzerland, which, while maintaining its longstanding policy of neutrality, has blocked the re-export of weapons to Ukraine and has even decommissioned legacy systems such as the Rapier air defense system and nearly 2,000 associated missiles. At present, the country lacks not only missile defense capabilities but also a sufficiently robust ground-based air defense network. In addition to the aging Rapier systems, Switzerland operates FIM-92 Stinger MANPADS and Oerlikon GDF anti-aircraft guns paired with the Skyguard fire control system, as well as five ordered IRIS-T SLM batteries.

Belgium, gradually transitioning to fifth-generation F-35 fighters from Lockheed Martin, continues considering orders for additional aircraft. The Belgian government approved the desire to purchase 11 more F-35As back in July 2025. Emphasis was placed on their final production taking place at facilities in Italy, where aircraft are assembled for Italian and Dutch air forces. Belgium has not simply maintained this idea but is actively conducting preparatory work toward signing a contract expected in 2026. Belgian Defense Minister Theo Francken confirmed this in an interview with Breaking Defense. Defense Express notes that if the order is finalized, the Belgian Air Force will expand its fleet to 45 fighters, following the April 2020 order for 34 F-35s. This procurement replaced approximately 50 F-16s then in service with their air force, with plans to complete re-equipment by 2028.

Delivery problems with new fighters have pushed the timeline rightward. Belgium formally has 11 new F-35s now, but eight of these fighters remain in the U.S., serving for pilot and technician training. If a firm contract for 11 more fifth-generation fighters is signed, Belgium will likely receive them in the 2030s. The country must also prepare a significant sum, as the first 34 F-35s cost Belgium approximately €4.5 billion according to available data, about €132 million per aircraft in a comprehensive package. Six years later, F-35 costs have jumped, as evidenced by the Czech contract, so Belgium should expect the price for 11 fighters to approach €2 billion.

Preparations for the imminent signing of the new order proceed despite ongoing debate about an alleged F-35 remote kill switch, which does not exist, unlike the very real critical dependence on the U.S. for software updates, repair, and fighter maintenance. The U.S. genuinely holds what makes the F-35 a stealth aircraft in its hands, not the coating or shape, but Mission Data Files. Despite the U.S. no longer being a security ally for Europe, F-35 procurement continues. Moreover, despite direct threats regarding the 51st state, Canada has also approved funding for a second batch of F-35s.

Donald Trump is planning to scale back some tariffs on steel and aluminium goods as he battles an affordability crisis that has sapped his approval ratings ahead of November’s midterm elections. The US president hit steel and aluminium imports with tariffs of up to 50 per cent last summer, and has expanded the taxes to a range of goods made from those metals including washing machines and ovens. But his administration is now reviewing the list of products affected by the levies and plans to exempt some items, halt the expansion of the lists and instead launch more targeted national security probes into specific goods, according to three people familiar with the matter. The people said trade officials in the commerce department and US trade representative’s office believed the tariffs were hurting consumers by raising prices for goods such as pie tins and food and drink cans. Trump’s tariff blitz has pushed US duties to their highest level since before the second world war. But the president has repeatedly walked back some of his stiffest levies amid voter anger at the US’s affordability crisis. More than 70 per cent of US adults rate economic conditions as fair or poor, according to a Pew Research Center poll published this month. About 52 per cent of Americans think Trump’s economic policies have made conditions worse.

The administration has already provided carve-outs for popular food products in a bid to tame grocery price inflation for ordinary Americans. It also called a truce in its trade war with China after Beijing retaliated with its own tariffs. The move to soften the steel and aluminium tariffs, which were among the earliest introduced in Trump’s second term, comes as economists say that Americans are paying for the levies, undercutting the president’s claim that foreign companies would bear the burden. Trump’s trade war has also brought political backlash, even from some allies. On Wednesday, members of Trump’s own Republican Party joined Democrats as the US House of Representatives voted to overturn Trump’s tariffs on Canada — delivering a major rebuke of his trade war on the US’s second-biggest trading partner. Trump is expected to veto the bill, leaving the levies in place. Several Republican lawmakers face tough election battles in their home states in November’s midterm elections amid voter anxiety about the impact of tariffs on small businesses and consumers. The latest move on the metals tariffs is also designed to bring clarity to an increasingly complicated lobbying process in Washington that has emerged since Trump imposed the levies. The administration has so far largely allowed US businesses to lobby for products made of steel and aluminium made by rival foreign producers to be hit with tariffs, in a so-called inclusion process. The process has been run by the commerce department, which has mostly approved the requests from domestic companies, which have cited the “national security” risks associated with goods including bicycle parts. But the mechanism has led to a sprawling list of household goods subjected to tariffs of up to 50 per cent on their metal content. Officials felt the tariff regime was “too complicated to enforce”, one person said, and needed to be simplified.

Countries including the UK, Mexico and Canada as well as EU members could stand to benefit from any easing of the US’s tariffs on goods made of steel and aluminium. One European business leader, who declined to be named, said they knew of a company that had sent four identical containers of machinery to the US and was charged different rates for each one. The commerce department last offered US companies an opportunity to nominate foreign suppliers to be hit with tariffs in October, but blew past its own 60-day deadline to greenlight new levies. As part of that round, American manufacturers of mattresses, cake tins and bicycles all lobbied for extra duties on foreign businesses. “Steel is not just a commodity, it is a national security asset,” said Kevin Dempsey, president and CEO of the American Iron and Steel Institute. “It is critical that the US government maintain the Section 232 national security steel tariffs, said Dempsey, who added they “are essential to prevent this overcapacity from fuelling new surges of harmful imports into the US market, which would cause a profound threat to American national security and undermine the health of the American steel industry”. The close to 100 filings underscore the broad range of items that companies are now arguing pose a national security risk to the US. One company argues in its filing that “without bread, buns, baguettes, crusty rolls, cakes, muffins and the like”, soldiers in the US military “will not be able to maintain a healthy diet”. The commerce department, the US trade representative’s office and the White House all declined to comment.

As the world’s geopolitical elite gather later this week at the Munich Security Conference, many European analysts and policymakers will urge their governments to develop the means to defend themselves in response to the Trump administration’s policies over the past year. First, there is a rift over values and sovereignty. The 2025 US National Security Strategy warned European allies of “civilizational erasure” as a result of immigration, vowing that the United States would “cultivate resistance” against mainstream political forces in Europe. Second, President Donald Trump repeatedly demanded control of Greenland, the territory of NATO ally Denmark, and refused to rule out force to do so. After European allies stood by Denmark, Trump finally ruled out force, but he continued to insist that the United States must control Greenland. Finally, the Trump administration has repeatedly demanded that European allies provide for their own security, with the United States in only a supporting role. As a result of Trump’s policies, many in Europe no longer trust the United States to fulfill its obligations under NATO’s Article 5. As European leaders discuss steps toward defense independence, however, they face three significant roadblocks in their way.

1. Europe Still Depends on the United States for “Critical Enablers”

Given the Trump administration’s demand that Europeans take more responsibility for their own defense, it makes perfect sense that Trump pushed allies to spend more on their armed forces. As such, the allied commitment at NATO’s 2025 Hague summit to spend 3.5 percent of GDP on defense and an additional 1.5 percent on defense-related needs is a step in the right direction. However, spending more will not be sufficient to achieve defense independence. European allies will need to develop special capabilities that they currently rely on the United States to provide. These “critical enablers” include integrated intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, strategic airlift, missile defense, and suppression of enemy air defense. To attain these capabilities, European allies will also have to coordinate with one another, and it will take time to acquire them and deploy them effectively to defend the continent.

2. Europe’s Varying Threat Perceptions on Russia

My research, including 98 original interviews with policymakers and analysts from six leading NATO countries, suggests that allies perceive different threats and different levels of threat. For over a decade, allies such as Poland have been laser-focused on the threat Russia poses and willing to take all steps necessary to address it. A senior Polish national security official told me, “Russia is a resurgent, revisionist, post-colonial power aiming to rebuild its empire and its sphere of influence.” In Germany, I heard a similar view that Russia is a significant threat to German and European security (though aspects of German identity are limiting its response). Polish and German threat perceptions explain their defense spending decisions. Poland plans to spend 4.8 percent of its GDP on defense in 2026, whereas Germany’s 2026 budget of €108 billion is almost 50 percent more than its 2024 budget (€74.5 billion). In France and the UK, there is less intense concern about the threat posed by Russia. In Paris and London, I heard concerns about Russia’s capabilities and intentions regarding Europe. For example, a French Defense Ministry official told me: “Protecting Europe is most important because of its proximity to France, and Russia poses a great threat to European security.”

Policymakers and analysts in both countries believe, however, that their independent nuclear arsenal means that Russia would not directly target British or French territory. Accordingly, the threat from Moscow is less pressing. Why does this lower level of concern with Russia matter? Reporting suggests that neither the UK nor France—the second and third largest economies in Europe—is on track to achieve NATO spending targets prior to 2035. In interviews in Rome, I repeatedly heard that the most significant threat to Italy is instability in the Mediterranean, which fuels uncontrolled migration. As a result, the Italian government struggles to justify increases in defense spending. Italy’s government met the 2 percent of GDP spent on defense target not through new spending but by reclassifying existing spending. Italy’s defense minister recently said that his government hopes—contingent on fiscal constraints—to spend 2.5 percent of GDP on defense by 2028. Lest one think Italy does not matter, Italy is Europe’s fourth-largest economy, and other allies on NATO’s Southern Flank share its lack of concern with Russia.

3. France and the UK’s Post-Imperial Identity vs. Italy and Germany’s Pacifist Identity

The historical experiences and identities of leading European allies provide a final challenge on the road to European defense independence. Many of the people I interviewed in France and the UK consider their countries to be global powers because of their experience at the helm of global empires. Today, global power identity underpins each country’s global military posture—the UK has significant troop contingents deployed to Bahrain, Brunei, and Cyprus; France has large contingents of “sovereignty” forces deployed from South America to the South Pacific and “prepositioned” forces in the Ivory Coast, Djibouti, and Chad. The fact that Britain and France have a global power identity also means that they continue to structure their militaries, at least in part, around the need to deploy small, highly trained military contingents worldwide. The UK and France’s global military posture and structure are not an issue if the United States continues to lead in providing for European security. If, however, Europe is to attain defense independence, all hands must be on deck, and the posture and structure of European allies must focus on the threat from Russia. In Italy and Germany, the historical legacy of bloody and disastrous expansionism in World War II means that the publics of both countries harbor deep skepticism toward defense spending and the use of military force. These anxieties are present in the German debate on conscription, with the military ultimately accepting a voluntary model that many believe is insufficient to address the Russian threat. Italy’s pacifism is manifest in a lack of public support for defense spending and a military that has been used in recent years for peace operations abroad and domestic policing. Pacifism in Germany and Italy stands in the way of the moves both countries would have to make to contribute to European defense independence.

How Europe Can Overcome Its Roadblocks

Given these roadblocks, what should be done? Policymakers need to speak clearly and regularly about the necessity of costly steps European governments must take to be responsible for their own defense. In so doing, they must be sensitive to threat perceptions and identity. For example, German General Alexander Sollfrank recently said, “Deterrence only works if it’s credible. We must be ready to fight so that we do not have to fight.” General Sollfrank made clear that greater military means are necessary if the Germans want to avoid war. Europe’s leaders must make the case to their people that sacrifices are necessary to ensure the continent avoids future war.

uh, yeah, good luck with that

The decision to send the Ford Carrier Strike Group (CSG) from the Caribbean to the Middle East was made after the Navy’s top officer said he would give “push back” against such an order over concerns about the welfare of the crew and the condition of the ship after being deployed for so long. The carrier departed Norfolk last June for the Mediterranean. It was later dispatched to the Caribbean last October by President Donald Trump to take part in a mission that ultimately resulted in the capture of Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro. Trump’s new deployment order for the Ford came as he is considering whether to attack Iran amid ongoing negotiations and after sending the Abraham Lincoln CSG to U.S. Central Command area of operations. “I think the Ford, from its capability perspective, would be an invaluable option for any military thing the president wants to do,” Adm. Daryl Caudle, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), told a small group of reporters, including from The War Zone, last month at the Surface Navy Association’s (SNA) annual symposium. “But if it requires an extension, it’s going to get some push back from the CNO. And I will see if there is something else I can do.” Caudle didn’t provide any specifics about what actions he would take to forestall an extension.

Regardless, the order to send the Ford CSG to the Middle East will extend its time away from its homeport even further. The ship won’t even get to the region until near the end of this month and it’s unclear how long it will be needed there, although Trump has mentioned something of a loose timeline. “I guess over the next month, something like that,” Trump said Thursday in response to a question about his timeline for striking a deal with Iran on its nuclear program. “It should happen quickly. They should agree very quickly.” There is also a chance that the Ford could be ordered to turn around should a deal be reached with Iran. Trump also said it would be “very traumatic” for Iran should no deal be reached. On Friday, Trump gave reporters his rationale for ordering the Ford to the Middle East. “We’ll need it if we don’t make a deal,” the U.S. president told reporters.

“The strike group’s current deployment has already been extended once, and its sailors were expecting to come home in early March,” The New York Times, which was first to report that the Ford was ordered to the Middle East, noted. “The new delay will further jeopardize the Ford’s scheduled dry dock period in Virginia, where major upgrades and repairs have been planned.”

NO MAINTENANCE, ONLY DEPLOYMENT

It is publicly unknown what discussions the CNO had with senior administration and Pentagon officials and whether he raised any objections or sought alternatives to keeping the Ford at sea longer than anticipated. We have reached out to his office and will update this story with any details provided. We also reached out to the White House and Joint Chiefs of Staff, which referred us to the CNO’s office. At the SNA conference, Caudle emphasized that there is a price to be paid for the strike group after being away from homeport for more than 200 days under often intense conditions. That was almost exactly a month ago. “I am a big non-fan of extensions, and because they do have significant impact,” Caudle explained. “Number one, I’m a sailors-first CNO. People want to have some type of certainty that they’re going to do a seven-month deployment.” Beyond affecting people, extensions also have a detrimental impact on the ship in addition to its previously noted dry dock schedule. “So now, when the ship comes back, we expected the ship to be in this level of state in which it was used during that seven-month deployment, when it goes eight, nine-plus months, those critical components that we weren’t expecting to repair are now on the table,” Caudle pointed out. “The work package grows, so that’s disruptive.”

In addition to the maintenance issues Caudle brought up at the SNA conference, the Ford also is also plagued by sewage issues. You can read more about how detrimental deferred maintenance is to carriers — or any U.S. Navy warship for that matter — that get their deployments extended in our deep dive here. It is not unusual for there to be two carriers deployed to the Middle East region. For instance, a year ago, the U.S. Navy had both the USS Harry S. Truman and the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carriers in the Middle East at the same time, engaged in combat operations against Yemen-based Houthi rebels. However, the Navy has 10 active carriers after the Nimitz, the service’s oldest, returned to port in December ahead of a scheduled decommissioning. There are scheduling and logistical support limits to how many can be out at sea at the same time without massive disruptions down the line. The USS Eisenhower, the last carrier to make an extended deployment, has seen its planned maintenance extended for a half year and counting as a result of the additional strain of being away from its home port for so long. The Navy’s Fiscal Year 2026 budget shows that work on the ship was supposed to have been completed last July, but it is still unfinished. The lack of availability reverberates across the rest of the fleet. That in turn limits the options commanders have when planning or preparing for contingencies and puts the overall carrier availability plan out of whack.

As for the rest of the fleet, three other carriers are in various maintenance periods taking them out of action for extended periods. In addition, the USS George Washington is forward deployed to Japan, two carriers are preparing for deployment and two are in post-deployment mode. The move to send the Ford to the Middle East comes amid a growing buildup of forces ahead of a potential conflict with Iran. In addition to the Ford, the Pentagon is also dispatching a peculiarly small number of Air Force tactical aircraft to the Middle East, joining a limited number of aircraft already there on land and sea.

The move to send the Ford to the Middle East comes amid a growing buildup of forces ahead of a potential conflict with Iran. In addition to the Ford, the Pentagon is also dispatching a peculiarly small number of Air Force tactical aircraft to the Middle East, joining a limited number of aircraft already there on land and sea. In addition to the Lincoln, there are also at least nine other warships in the region, including five Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyers. Submarines are also there, but their presence is not disclosed, and there are more than 30,000 troops on bases around the Middle East. Another CSG, with its embarked tactical aircraft and Aegis-equipped escorts, would certainly bolster America’s firepower in the Middle East. As we have frequently pointed out, even with the jets that are there and those arriving, there is not enough tactical airpower there now for a major sustained operation. A second CSG would provide significant help. It remains unknown what orders Trump will give or when, but a second carrier strike group in the region gives him more options.

also a few excerpts from the article about sewage trouble linked above, just to top this off

The world’s largest aircraft carrier is experiencing difficulties with a service that is an integral part of every sailor’s life — the bathroom. … The complications primarily involve the Ford’s vacuum collection, holding and transfer system, or VCHT, which transports and disposes wastewater by sucking fecal matter through pipes using pressure. … NPR also reportedly obtained copies of emails that showed there were 205 breakdowns with the toilets over a span of four days. One of the emails placed the onus on sailors and said they were mistreating and destroying the sewage system. Carter confirmed to Military Times in an emailed statement that the Ford averaged about one maintenance call per day and that those calls were often the result of “improper materials being introduced to the system.”

what are the sailors flushing down those toilets

The bathroom issues aboard the Ford, meanwhile, are not a new phenomenon. A 2020 Government Accountability Office report pointed out that the sewage pipes woven throughout the ship were too narrow to properly serve the flushes of the 4,000-plus crew members onboard. To unclog the toilets, the Navy has been forced to spend $400,000 per flush of a unique acidic chemical designed to flush out and unburden the strained pipes.

Deliver what we ask for on time. That’s the terse message two maritime service chiefs are sending to industry. “What I need is: when I have a contract with you, you deliver it on time. That’s really what I need. I don’t know how to sugarcoat that. It’s impossible to sugarcoat that. I need my stuff on time,” Adm. Daryl Caudle, chief of naval operations, told attendees Wednesday at the annual WEST Conference. “We just have to be very transparent about that. So I’d rather, you know, go into that contracting strategy and negotiation with that in mind, and be very honest about that.” Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Eric Smith agreed: “If it’s going to be delayed, well, that’s a you problem. That’s not a me problem, because I paid for something and I expect to get it.”

dang, if only there was some way for the government to hold corporations accountable… shame no such concept exists!

Smith, who shared the stage with Caudle, said the goal is to buy what Marines need at the “best cost.” “I know what I need. I’m a recovering requirements officer. I need a missile that shoots [200] miles. If you have something that you can give me for the same cost and on the same performance, same schedule, but it goes 250 miles, then that’s great. I’ll take it,” Smith said, as an example. The service chiefs acknowledged how erratic government funding and single-year appropriations affect private industry. “We do owe industry a time horizon [where] they can stabilize their workforce,” Caudle said. “I don’t know why I don’t have a five-year horizon with the shipyards that do my surface ship maintenance,” which could give companies the time to plan ahead. Smith pushed the need for multi-year funding, suggesting the services and industry sync messaging to Capitol Hill to advocate for it. Congress “can appropriate multi-year funding” but doesn’t like to, Smith said. The result is single-year funding that could mean “$100 million this year and it’s nothing the next year. And you can’t, you can’t operate that way. So I think we have to collaborate…on our messaging to the Hill that, ‘Hey, we need multi-year funding.”

‘Everything costs what it costs’

Keeping costs down without sacrificing quality or on-time delivery is a longstanding conundrum for military procurement. But while there’s general reticence towards higher costs, especially for large platforms like ships, it’s a reality the Navy must accept, Smith said. “I don’t want to pay, you know, $4 billion for a ship. Neither does my shipmate [Adm.] Daryl Caudle, but that’s what it costs to have pipefitters, steamfitters, welders, electricians build the ship,” and have a livable wage, Smith said. “Everything costs what it costs.” Smith’s comments come as shipbuilders look to boost wages—with some reports of success—as a way to attract and keep the workers essential to meeting maritime national security needs. But simply increasing wages may not be enough, argued Ronald O’Rourke, a recently retired naval analyst and researcher for the Congressional Research Service. Those wages need to be at a level that distinguishes shipbuilding not only from competing sectors in a given region, but from other manufacturing jobs. “It’s widely recognized that to attack this issue, wages and benefits need to be increased to help re-establish a larger wage differential between shipbuilding jobs and service sector jobs. Less widely recognized is that wages and benefits also need to be increased to help establish more of a wage differential between shipbuilding jobs and other manufacturing jobs. The government reported last year that there were about 400,000 manufacturing jobs that were unfilled,” O’Rourke said during a separate shipbuilding panel Wednesday.

Those same skilled workers may also be lured by the boom in AI data centers nationwide.

lol. lmao

In a report to the White House in October, OpenAI claimed data centers and energy infrastructure would need about 20 percent of the nation’s existing skills trade workforce over the next five years. “So people interested in going into manufacturing and construction work have a choice of jobs—and a lot of those jobs are done in settings that are more comfortable than shipbuilding,” O’Rourke said.

Industrial codevelopment of the French-German-Spanish Next-Generation Fighter (NGF) is almost certainly headed for collapse, with negotiations between Airbus and Dassault halted on the next phase of the project amid a long-running industrial dispute over leadership and workshare, an industry source said today. The future fighter jet is the driving force behind Europe’s multibillion-dollar Future Combat Air System that also includes development of new weapons, drone swarms, sensors and a “combat cloud” communications network. And though “no funeral” of FCAS is expected this week, clarity around launching the effort’s Phase 2 is needed, according to the industry source, who spoke on background on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference to bluntly discuss the state of negotiations. “Why negotiate” on Phase 2 when opposing views on cooperation exist between Airbus and Dassault?” asked the source. The new phase was planned to involve production and flight of a NGF demonstrator later this year, but once phase 1B finishes in April, NGF will be condemned to its end.

At a political level, outstanding issues are proving “more difficult than meets the eye,” said the industry source, pointing to delayed meetings between Berlin and Paris aimed at resolving issues and offering a new way forward. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said Wednesday that the future of the program will be made clear soon, according to Reuters. Earlier this week French President Emmanuel Macron replied “Non” when media pressed him on whether FCAS is dead. While the jet agreement may be on the verge of collapse, the source did state that a restructuring of FCAS to focus on shareable technologies is still feasible — but two distinct fighter jets, one potentially developed by Germany and Spain, the other by France, forms the likeliest basis of new long-term industry planning. This approach would “make FCAS more resilient because the requirements of the [three] armed forces are different,” said the industry source, despite a clear understanding that since FCAS was launched in 2017, France has been eyeing a carrier capable future fighter while Germany was looking for more of an air superiority type.

Not everyone is sold on the prospect of Europe potentially investing in three future fighter jets, as Italy, the UK and Japan are also developing a platform under the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP). “It’s crazy. [We] have to stop this idea,” Theo Francken, Belgium’s Defense Minister told Breaking Defense today. “I think that’s too expensive to make three [different aircraft]. “It’s better to have one huge program” that includes a cloud network and Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA),” he added. Brussels holds FCAS observer status, but “we don’t have a lot of information,” about the latest political and industrial developments relating to the troubled project,” stressed Francken. “It is between the key players. … I’m not certain it will end up well. It will be problematic, I assume.”

FCAS isn’t the only program facing uncertainty. As the NGF heads for collapse, the fate of France’s participation in Europe’s Eurodrone program also looks increasingly uncertain, with the industry source stating that interest from Paris appears to be fading. Initially launched in 2016 and valued at an estimated cost of $7.3 billion, the Eurodrone Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) remotely piloted drone also involves Germany, Italy and Spain. The aircraft, which has been troubled by delays and inflated costs. The aircraft is under development for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance purposes and to reduce Europe’s reliance on non-European solutions like the US MQ-9B.

A gearbox failure forced a Marine Corps V-22 to make an emergency landing on Feb. 3, days before Navy leaders briefed lawmakers on fixes being implemented for the troubled tiltrotor aircraft. A MV-22B with the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing landed in the Tactical Flight Training Area on Oahu, Hawaii, “after experiencing an in-flight malfunction,” according to an emailed statement from the aviation wing. None of the crew was injured

but the aircraft will “require maintenance actions and repairs” before returning to its home station, the statement said. An investigation into the mishap is ongoing. A gearbox failure was the root cause of a 2023 Air Force Osprey crash that killed eight airmen and a 2022 crash that killed five Marines. Naval Air Systems Command confirmed in an emailed statement that the Osprey belonged to the wing’s VMM-268 squadron and added that “the aircrew executed the precautionary procedure in accordance with established standards, remaining fully committed to safety.” The incident happened a week before a Feb. 10 briefing about the Osprey program by Naval leaders to Congress. They discussed efforts to address recommendations in two watchdog reports released late last year, and said some of the permanent fixes won’t be fully implemented until the 2030s. News of the latest mishap was made public by Rep. Joe Courtney, D-Conn, during the hearing. “Your office was very good about notifying, I think, a number of us,” Courtney told Brig. Gen. David Walsh, NAVAIR’s program executive officer for air anti-submarine warfare, assault and special mission programs. “There was a crack in the gearbox that was detected just, actually, last week or so.”

Since 2022, four V-22 crashes have killed a total of 20 service members. Investigations blamed failures within the Osprey’s proprotor gearbox and sudden surges in power after a clutch slip, known as a hard clutch engagement. After the crashes, the Pentagon imposed range and other limits on V-22 flights. A person familiar with the Feb. 3 incident told Defense One that the MV-22B does not have the permanent mechanical solution for the gearbox yet and that it is flying in a restricted status. He said the interim gearbox on the aircraft was in its early flight hours. “It looks like this is going to be a situation where a gearbox failed within the realm of what we would expect because of the interim solution,” the person said. “Some of these gear boxes have that infant mortality where if something is going to happen, we expect it to happen within X amount of hours.”

uh… is “infant mortality” a widely used allegory about parts failure in the engineering field :huh:

In the Marine Corps’ 2026 aviation plan, released the same day as the House hearing, the service praises the Osprey as the “cornerstone” of its air-ground task forces. “The MV-22 Osprey provides unmatched operational flexibility due to its combination of speed, range, payload, and aerial refueling capability,” the document reads. The service began replacing its gearboxes this month and is “estimated to result in an unrestricted operational fleet by December 2027,” according to the service’s aviation plan. The gearbox upgrades are to be finished for the Air Force and Navy in 2029 and the Marine Corps in 2033, according to a Feb. 11 statement by NAVAIR. Vice Adm. John Dougherty, NAVAIR’s commander, told lawmakers on Tuesday that completely redesigned Input Quill Assemblies to remedy hard clutch engagements should be fielded in late 2027. The Marines plan to install its new assemblies in 2028, the service’s aviation plan said. In December, the Government Accountability Office and NAVAIR separately issued reports that said the V-22 Joint Program Office failed to adequately assess and address mounting safety risks, even as service members died. No Navy rotorcraft had more "systems safety risk assessments”—that is, unresolved catastrophic parts problems, the reports said. Only one other aircraft type—the F-35—had more than the V-22’s 28.

On Tuesday, Courtney told Navy leaders that the service “should explore the possibility of legislative action to codify elements of these recommendations,” akin to the late Sen. John McCain’s push for naval safety reforms after a string of ship collisions in 2017. That “would send a powerful message to our service members and the public that ‘real change is happening.’” he said.