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(Top)
1
Description
2
Foundations
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2.1
Mechanism
2.2
Revelation principle
2.3
Implementability
2.3.1
Necessity
2.3.2
Sufficiency
3
Highlighted results
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3.1
Revenue equivalence theorem
3.2
Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanisms
3.3
Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem
3.4
Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem
3.5
Shapley value
3.6
Price discrimination
3.7
Myerson ironing
3.7.1
Proof
4
See also
5
Notes
6
References
7
Further reading
8
External links
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Mechanism design
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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Field of economics and game theory
