Network Working Group Sean Turner
Internet Draft IECA
Intended Status: Standards Track March 27, 2014
Expires: September 28, 2014
EST Extensions
draft-turner-est-extensions-01.txt
Abstract
The EST (Enrollment over Secure Transport) protocol defined a Well-
Known URI (Uniform Resource Identifier): /.well-known/est. EST also
defined several path components that clients use for PKI (Public Key
Infrastructure) services, namely certificate enrollment (e.g.,
/simpleenroll). In some sense, the services provided by the path
components can be thought of as PKI management-related packages.
There are additional PKI-related packages a client might need as well
as other security-related packages, such as firmware, trust anchors,
and symmetric, asymmetric, and encrypted keys. This document also
specifies the PAL (Package Availability List), which is an XML
(Extensible Markup Language) file that clients use to retrieve
packages available and authorized for them. This document extends
the EST server path components to provide these additional services.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2. Authentication and Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3. TLS Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4. URI Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.5. Content-Transfer-Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.6. Key Words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Locate Available Packages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1. PAL Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.1. PAL Package Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1.2. PAL Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2. Request PAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3. Provide PAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3. Distribute EE Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.1. EE Certificate Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2. EE Certificate Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4. Distribute CRLs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.1. CRL Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2. CRL Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5. Symmetric Keys, Receipts, and Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.1. Symmetric Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.1.1. Distribute Symmetric Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.1.2. Symmetric Key Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.2. Symmetric Key Receipts and Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.2.1. Provide Symmetric Key Receipt or Error . . . . . . . . 23
5.2.2. Symmetric Key Receipt or Error Response . . . . . . . 24
6. Firmware, Firmware Receipts, and Firmware Errors . . . . . . . 24
6.1. Firmware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.1.1. Distribute Firmware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6.1.2. Firmware Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6.2. Firmware Receipts and Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6.2.1. Provide Firmware Package Receipt or Error . . . . . . 25
6.2.2. Firmware Receipt or Error Response . . . . . . . . . . 26
7. Trust Anchor Management Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
7.1. TAMP Status Query, Trust Anchor Update, Apex Trust
Anchor Update, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Community Update, and Sequence Number Adjust . . . . . . . . 27
7.1.1. Request TAMP Packages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
7.1.2. Return TAMP Packages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
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7.2. TAMP Response, Confirm, and Errors Packages . . . . . . . 28
7.2.1. Return Responses, Confirms, and Errors . . . . . . . . 28
7.2.2. Responses, Confirms, and Errors Response . . . . . . . 28
8. Asymmetric Keys, Receipts, and Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
8.1. Asymmetric Key Encapsulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
8.2. Asymmetric Key Package Receipts and Errors . . . . . . . . 30
9. PAL & Certificate Enrollment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
11.1. PAL Name Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
11.2. PAL Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
11.3. PAL Package Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
12. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Appendix A. Example Use of PAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Appendix B. Additional CSR Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Appendix C. Example ASN.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1. Introduction
The EST (Enrollment over Secure Transport) protocol [RFC7030] defines
the Well-Known URI (Uniform Resource Identifier) /.well-known/est to
support selected PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) related services
with path components such as simple enrollment with /simpleenroll,
rekey/renew with /simplereenroll, etc. A server that wishes to
support additional PKI-related services and other security-related
packages could use the same .well-known URI by defining additional
PCs (Path Components). This document defines six such PCs:
o /pal - The PAL (Package Availability List) provides a list of all
known packages available and authorized for a client. By
accessing the service provided by this path component (PC) first,
the client can walk through the PAL and download all the packages
necessary to begin operating securely. The PAL essentially
points to other PCs including the PCs defined in this document as
well as those defined in [RFC7030], which include /csrattrs,
/fullcmc, /simpleenroll, /simplereenroll, and /cacerts. The /pal
PC is described in Section 2.
o /eecerts - EE (End-Entity) certificates are needed by the client
when they invoke a security protocol for communicating with a
peer (i.e., they become operational and do something meaningful
as opposed to just communicating with the infrastructure). If
the infrastructure knows the certificate(s) needed by the client,
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then providing the peer's certificate avoids the client having to
discover the peer's certificate. This service is not meant to be
a general purpose repository to which clients query a
"repository" and then get a response; this is purely a push
mechanism. The /eecerts PC is described in Section 3.
o /crls - CRLs (Certificate Revocation Lists) are also needed by
the client when they validate certificate paths. CRLs from TAs
(Trust Anchors) and intermediate CAs (Certification Authorities)
are needed to validate the certificates used to generate the
client's certificate or the peer's certificate, which is provided
by the /eecerts PC, and providing them saves the client from
having to "discover" them and then retrieve them. CRL
"discovery" is greatly aided by the inclusion of the CRL
Distribution Point certificate extension [RFC5280], but this
extension is not always present in certificates and requires
another connection to retrieve them. Like the /eecerts PC, this
service is not meant to be a general purpose repository to which
clients query a repository and then get a response; this is
purely a push mechanism. The /crls PC is described in Section 4.
o /symmetrickeys - In some cases, clients use symmetric keys when
communicating with their peers. If the client's peers are known
by the server a priori, then providing them saves the client or
an administrator from later having to find, retrieve and install
them. Like the /eecerts and /crls PCs, this service is not meant
to be a general purpose repository to which clients query a
repository and then get a response; this is purely a push
mechanism for the keys themselves. However, things do not always
go as planned and clients need to inform the server about any
errors. If things did go well, then the client, if requested,
needs to provide a receipt. The /symmetrickeys PC is described
in Section 5.
o /firmware - Some client firmware and software support automatic
updates mechanism and some do not. For those that do not, the
/firmware PC provides a mechanism for the infrastructure to
inform the client that a firmware and software updates are
available. Because updates do not always go as planned and
because sometimes the server needs to know whether the package
was received and processed, this PC also provides a mechanism to
return errors and receipts. The /firmware PC is defined in
Section 6.
o /tamp - To control the TAs in client trust anchor database,
servers use the /tamp PC to request that clients retrieve a TAMP
query, update, and adjust packages and clients use the same PC to
return response, confirm, and error packages. The /tamp PC is
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defined in Section 7.
This document also extends the /est/serverkeygen PC [RFC7030] to
support the return of receipts and errors as well as encapsulating
the returned keys in additional CMS content types. See Section 8.
While the motivation is to provide packages to clients during
enrollment so that they can perform securely after enrollment, the
services defined in this specification can be used after enrollment.
1.1. Definitions
Familiarity with Using Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) to Protect
Firmware Packages [RFC4108], Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)
[RFC5272], Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Encrypted Key Package
[RFC6032], Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652][RFC6268],
Trust Anchor Management Protocol (TAMP) [RFC5934], Cryptographic
Message Syntax (CMS) Content Constraints Extension [RFC6010], CMS
Symmetric Key Package Content Type [RFC6031], Enrollment over Secure
Transport protocol [RFC7030], CMS Key Package Receipt and Error
Content Types [ID.housley-ct-keypackage-receipt-n-error] is assumed.
Also, familiarity with the CMS protecting content types signed data
and encrypted data is assumed; CMS signed data and encrypted data
are defined in [RFC5652] and encrypted key package is defined in
[RFC6032].
In addition to the definitions found in [RFC7030], the following
definitions are used in this document:
Agent: An entity that performs functions on behalf of a client.
Agents can service a) one or more clients on the same network as the
server, b) clients on non-IP based networks, or c) clients that have
an air gap [RFC4949] between themselves and the server; interactions
between the agent and client in the last cases are beyond the scope
of this document. Before an agent can service clients, the agent
must have a trust relationship with the server, be authorized to act
on behalf of clients.
Client: A device that ultimately consumes and uses the packages to
enable communications. In other words, the client is the end-point
for the packages and an agent may have one or more clients. To avoid
confusion, this document henceforth uses the term client to refer to
both agents and clients.
Package: An object that contains one or more CMS content types.
There are numerous types of packages: Asymmetric Keys, Symmetric
Keys, Encrypted Keys, CRLs, Public Key Certificate Management,
Firmware, Public Key Certificates, and TAMP packages. All of these
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packages except the public key certificates and CRLs, which are
already digitally signed, are digitally signed and encapsulated in a
CMS signed data [RFC5652][RFC6268]; Firmware receipts and errors,
TAMP responses, confirms, and errors, as well as Key Package receipts
and errors can be optionally signed. Certificate and CRLs are
included in a package that uses signed data, which is often referred
to as a degenerate CMS or "certs-only" or "crls-only" message
[RFC5751][RFC6268], but no signature or content is present; hence the
name certs-only and crls-only.
1.2. Authentication and Authorization
Client and server authentication as well as client and server
authorization are as defined in [RFC7030]. The requirements for each
are discussed in the request and response sections of each of the PCs
defined by this document.
The requirements for the TA database is as specified in [RFC7030] as
well.
1.3. TLS Cipher Suites
TLS cipher suite and issues associated with them are as defined in
[RFC7030].
1.4. URI Configuration
As specified in Section 3.1 of [RFC7030], the client is configured
with sufficient information to form the server URI [RFC3986]. Like
EST, this configuration mechanism is beyond the scope of this
document.
1.5. Content-Transfer-Encoding
A Content-Transfer encoding of "base64" [RFC2045] is used for all
client server interactions.
1.6. Key Words
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119].
2. Locate Available Packages
The PAL (Package Availability List) is an XML (Extensible Markup
Language) [XML] file that furnishes information for packages that are
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currently available and authorized for retrieval by a client. It
provides client specific:
o Advertisements for available packages that can be retrieved from
the server;
o Notifications to begin public key certificate management or to
return package receipts and errors; and,
o Advertisement for another PAL.
A client can use this service to determine all of the security-
related products for bootstrapping or to periodically poll the server
in order to determine if there are updated packages available for it.
To get the /pal PC, the client and server need to mutually
authenticate each other with TLS and authorize each other. Clients
retrieve their PAL and processes it to determine the packages
available for it.
| |
Client | Establish TLS | Server
| Session |
|<-------------------->|
| |
| Request PAL |
| (HTTP GET Request) |
|--------------------->|
|<---------------------|
| Deliver PAL |
| (HTTP GET Response) |
| |
| Request package by |
| specified URI |
| (HTTP GET or POST |
| Request) |
|--------------------->|
|<---------------------|
| Deliver requested |
| CMS package product |
| (HTTP GET or POST |
| Response) |
| |
repeat as necessary
Figure 1 - /pal Message Sequence
The client MUST authenticate the server as specified in [RFC7030] and
the client MUST verify server's authorization as specified in
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[RFC7030].
The server MUST authenticate the client as specified in [RFC7030] and
the server MUST verify client authorization as specified in
[RFC7030].
PAL support is OPTIONAL. It is shown in figures throughout this
document but clients need not support the PAL to access services
offered by the server.
2.1. PAL Format
Each PAL is composed of zero (i.e., minOccurs=0) or more entries,
each of which is composed of the following four elements all of which
MUST be present (i.e., minOccurs=1):
o The <type> element uniquely identifies each package that a client
may retrieve from the server with a 4-digit field. The PAL
Package Types are defined in Section 2.1.1.
o The <date> element is a 20-character field that contains either:
* The date and time (expressed as Generalized Time: YYYY-MM-
DDTHH:MM:SSZ) that the client last successfully downloaded the
identified package from the server, or
* 0001-01-01T00:00:00Z (i.e., 0), if:
- There is no indication the client has successfully downloaded
the identified package, or
- The PAL entry corresponds to a pointer to the next PAL or the
server is requesting a package from the client (e.g.,
certification request, receipt, error).
o The <size> element indicates the size in bytes of the package. A
package size of zero (i.e., "0" without the quotes) indicates
that the client needs to begin a transaction or return an error
or receipt.
o The <info> element provides either an SKI (Subject Key
Identifier), DN (Distinguished Name), Issuer and Serial Number
tuple or a URI. When a URI is included it indicates the location
where the identified package can be retrieved. When a DN, SKI,
or Issuer Name and Serial Number tuple is included it points to a
certificate that is the subject of the notification (i.e., the
certificate to be rekeyed/renewed).
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Clients are often limited by the size of objects they can consume,
the PAL is not immune to these limitations. As opposed to picking a
limit for all clients, a special package type is defined, see Section
2.1.1, to indicate that another PAL is available. Servers can use
this value to limit the size of the PALs provided clients.
When the <date> element is not zero (i.e., 0001-01-01T00:00:00Z) it
MUST be represented in a form that matches the dateTime production in
"canonical representation" [XMLSCHEMA]. Implementations SHOULD NOT
rely on time resolution finer than seconds and MUST NOT generate time
instants that specify leap seconds.
2.1.1. PAL Package Types
Table 1 lists the PAL package types that are defined by this
document:
NOTE: DS is Digital Signature and KE is Key Establishment.
Package Package Description
Number
-------- ---------------------------------------------------
0000: Reserved
0001: Additional PAL value present
0002: X.509 CA certificate
0003: X.509 EE certificate
0004: X.509 ARL
0005: X.509 CRL
0006: Start DS certificate enrollment
0007: DS certificate enrollment (success)
0008: DS certificate enrollment (failure)
0009: Start DS certificate re-enrollment
0010: DS certificate re-enrollment (success)
0011: DS certificate re-enrollment (failure)
0012: Start KE certificate enrollment
0013: KE certificate enrollment (success)
0014: KE certificate enrollment (failure)
0015: Start KE certificate re-enrollment
0016: KE certificate re-enrollment (success)
0017: KE certificate re-enrollment (failure)
0018: Asymmetric Key Package (PKCS#8)
0019: Asymmetric Key Package (CMS)
0020: Asymmetric Key Package Receipt or Error
0021: Symmetric Key Package
0022: Symmetric Key Package Receipt or Error
0023: Firmware Package
0024: Firmware Package Receipt or Error
0025: TAMP Status Query
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0026: TAMP Status Query Response or Error
0027: Trust Anchor Update
0028: Trust Anchor Update Confirm or Error
0029: Apex Trust Anchor Update
0030: Apex Trust Anchor Update Confirm or Error
0031: Community Update
0032: Community Update Confirm or Error
0033: Sequence Number Adjust
0034: Sequence Number Adjust Confirm or Error
Table 1 - PAL Package Types
PAL package types are essentially hints about the type of package the
client is about to retrieve or is asked to return. Savvy clients can
parse the packages to determine what has been provided, but in some
instances it is better to know before retrieving the package. The
hint provided here does not obviate the need for clients to check the
type of package provided before they store it possibly in specially
allocated locations (i.e., some clients might store Root ARLs
separately from intermediate CRLs). For packages provided by the
client, the server is asking the client to provide an enrollment
package, receipt or error.
The PAL package types have the following meaning:
0000 Reserved: Reserved for future use.
0001 Additional PAL value present: Indicates that this PAL entry
refers to another PAL by referring to another /pal URI, which
is defined in this section. This PAL package type limits the
size of PALs to a more manageable size for clients.
0002 X.509 CA certificate: Indicates that one or more CA certificates
[RFC5280] are available for the client by pointing to a
/cacerts URI, which is defined in [RFC7030].
0003 X.509 EE certificate: Indicates that one or more EE certificate
[RFC5280] is available for the client by pointing to an
/eecerts URI, which is defined in Section 3.
0004 X.509 ARL: Indicates that one or more ARL (Authority Revocation
List) [RFC5280] is available for the client by pointing to a
/crls URI, which is defined in Section 4.
0005 X.509 CRL: Indicates that one or more CRL (Certificate
Revocation List) [RFC5280] is available for the client by
pointing to a /crls URI, which is defined in Section 4.
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Note: See Section 9 for additional information about PAL and
certificate enrollment interaction. See Appendix B for
additional informative information.
0006 Start DS (Digital Signature) certificate enrollment: Indicates
that the client begin enrolling their DS certificate. The PAL
entry points to a /csrattrs URI, which is defined in
[RFC7030].
0007 DS certificate enrollment (success): Indicates that the client
retrieve a successful certification response. The PAL entry
points to a /simpleenroll or a /fullcmc URI for package
retrieval, which are both defined in [RFC7030].
0008 DS certificate enrollment (failure): Indicates that the client
retrieve a failed certification response for a DS certificate.
This PAL entry points to a /simpleenroll or a /fullcmc URI
for package retrieval.
0009 Start DS certificate re-enrollment: Indicates that the client
rekey/renew a DS certificate. The PAL entry points to a
/simplereenroll or a /fullcmc URI.
0010 DS certificate re-enrollment (success): See PAL package type
0007.
0011 DS certificate re-enrollment (failure): See PAL package type
0008.
NOTE: The KE (Key Establishment) responses that follow use the
same URIs as DS certificates.
0012 Start KE certificate enrollment: See PAL package type 0006.
0013 KE certificate enrollment (success): See PAL package type 0007.
0014 KE certificate enrollment (failure): See PAL package type 0008.
0015 Start KE certificate re-enrollment: See PAL package type 0009.
0016 KE certificate re-enrollment (success): See PAL package type
0007.
0017 KE certificate re-enrollment (failure): See PAL package type
0008.
Note: The variations on the asymmetric key packages is due to
the number of CMS content types that can be used to protect
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the asymmetric key; the syntax for the asymmetric key is the
same but additional ASN.1 is needed to include it in a signed
data (i.e., the ASN.1 needs to be a CMS content type not the
private key info type). See Section 8 of this document for
additional information. See Section 9 for additional
information about server key generation using the /fullcmc
URI.
0018 Asymmetric Key Package (PKCS#8): Indicates that an asymmetric
key generated by the server is available for the client; the
package is an asymmetric key without additional encryption as
specified in Section 4.4.2 of [RFC7030]. The PAL entry points
to a /serverkeygen or a /fullcmc URI, which are defined in
[RFC7030].
0019 Asymmetric Key Package (CMS): See PAL package type 0018. The
difference being that the package available is an asymmetric
key package [RFC5958] that is signed and encapsulated in a
signed data content type, as specified in Section 4.4.2 of
[RFC7030].
0020 Symmetric Key Package: Indicates that a symmetric key package
[RFC6031] is available for the client by pointing to a
/symmetrickeys URI, which is defined in Section 5.
0021 Symmetric Key Package Receipt or Error: Indicates that the
server wants the client to return a key package receipt or an
error [ID.housley-ct-keypackage-receipt-n-error] to the
/symmetrickeys/return URI, which is defined in Section 5.
0022 Firmware Package: Indicates that a firmware package [RFC4108] is
available for the client using the /firmware URI, which is
defined in Section 6.
0023 Firmware Package Receipt or Error: Indicates that the server
wants the client to return a firmware package receipt or error
[RFC4108] using the /firmware/return URI, which is defined in
Section 6.
Note: The /tamp and tamp/return URIs are defined in Section 7.
0024 TAMP Status Query: Indicates that a TAMP Status Query package
[RFC5934] is available for the client using the /tamp URI.
0025 TAMP Status Query Response or Error: Indicates that the server
wants the client to return a TAMP Status Query Response or
Error [RFC5934] using the /tamp/return URI.
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0026 Trust Anchor Update: Indicates that a Trust Anchor Update
package [RFC5934] is available for the client using the /tamp
URI.
0027 Trust Anchor Update Confirm or Error: Indicates that the server
wants the client to return a TAMP Anchor Update Confirm or
Error [RFC5934] using the /tamp/return URI.
0028 Apex Trust Anchor Update: Indicates that a TAMP Apex Anchor
Update package [RFC5934] is available for the client using the
/tamp URI.
0029 Apex Trust Anchor Update Confirm or Error: Indicates that the
server wants the client to return an Apex Trust Anchor Update
Confirm or Error [RFC5934] using the /tamp/return URI.
0031 Community Update: Indicates that a TAMP Community Update package
[RFC5934] is available for the client using the /tamp URI.
0032 Community Update Confirm or Error: Indicates that the server
wants the client to return a Community Update Confirm or Error
[RFC5934] using the /tamp/return URI.
0033 Sequence Number Adjust: Indicates that a TAMP Sequence Number
package [RFC5934] is available for the client using the /tamp
URI.
0034 Sequence Number Adjust Confirm or Error: Indicates that the
server wants the client to return a Sequence Number Adjust
Confirm or Error [RFC5934] using the /tamp/return URI.
2.1.2. PAL Schema
The name space is specified in Section 11.1. The fields in the
schema were discussed earlier in Sections 2.1 and 2.1.1.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
xmlns:pal="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pal"
targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pal"
elementFormDefault="qualified" attributeFormDefault="unqualified"
version="1.0">
<xsd:annotation>
<xsd:documentation>
This schema defines the types and elements needed
to retrieve client packages from the server.
</xsd:documentation>
</xsd:annotation>
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<!-- ===== Element Declarations ===== -->
<xsd:element name="pal" type="pal:PAL" />
<!-- ===== Complex Data Element Type Definitions ===== -->
<xsd:complexType name="PAL">
<xsd:annotation>
<xsd:documentation>
This type defines the Package Availability List (PAL).
</xsd:documentation>
</xsd:annotation>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name="message" type="pal:PALEntry" minOccurs="0">
<xsd:annotation>
<xsd:documentation>
Contains information about the package and a link that
the client uses to download the package.
</xsd:documentation>
</xsd:annotation>
</xsd:element>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name="PALEntry">
<xsd:annotation>
<xsd:documentation>
This type defines a product in the PAL.
</xsd:documentation>
</xsd:annotation>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name="type" type="pal:PackageType"
minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1">
</xsd:element>
<xsd:element name="date" type="pal:GeneralizedTimeType"
minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1">
</xsd:element>
<xsd:element name="size" type="pal:PackageSizeType"
minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1">
</xsd:element>
<xsd:element name="info" type="pal:PackageInfoType"
minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1">
</xsd:element>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name="PackageInfoType">
<xsd:annotation>
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<xsd:documentation>
This type allows a choice of X.500 Distinguished Name,
Subject Key Identifier, Issuer and Serial Number tuple,
or URI.
</xsd:documentation>
</xsd:annotation>
<xsd:choice>
<xsd:element name="dn" type="pal:DistinguishedName" />
<xsd:element name="ski" type="pal:SubjectKeyIdentifier" />
<xsd:element name="iasn" type="pal:IssuerAndSerialNumber" />
<xsd:element name="uri" type="pal:ThisURI" />
</xsd:choice>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name="IssuerAndSerialNumber">
<xsd:annotation>
<xsd:documentation>
This type holds the issuer Distinguished Name and
serial number of a referenced certificate.
</xsd:documentation>
</xsd:annotation>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name="issuer" type="pal:DistinguishedName" />
<xsd:element name="serial" type="xsd:integer" />
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
<!-- =====Simple Data Element Type Definitions ===== -->
<xsd:simpleType name="PackageType">
<xsd:annotation>
<xsd:documentation>
Identifies each package that a client may retrieve from
the server with a 4-digit field.
</xsd:documentation>
</xsd:annotation>
<xsd:restriction base="xsd:string">
<xsd:maxLength value="4" />
</xsd:restriction>
</xsd:simpleType>
<xsd:simpleType name="GeneralizedTimeType">
<xsd:annotation>
<xsd:documentation>
Indicates the date and time (YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SSZ) the
client last acknowledged successful receipt of the
package or 0001-01-01T00:00:00Z if there is no indication
the package has been downloaded or the PAL entry
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corresponds to a pointer to the next PAL.
</xsd:documentation>
</xsd:annotation>
<xsd:restriction base="xsd:dateTime">
<xsd:pattern value=
"((000[1-9])|(00[1-9][0-9])|(0[1-9][0-9]{2})|
([1-9][0-9]{3}))-((0[1-9])|(1[012]))-((0[1-9])|
([12][0-9])|(3[01]))T(([01][0-9])|(2[0-3]))
(:[0-5][0-9])(:00)Z" />
<xsd:minInclusive value="2013-05-23T00:00:00Z" />
</xsd:restriction>
</xsd:simpleType>
<xsd:simpleType name="PackageSizeType">
<xsd:annotation>
<xsd:documentation>
Indicates the package's size.
</xsd:documentation>
</xsd:annotation>
<xsd:pattern value="[0-9]+" />
</xsd:simpleType>
<xsd:simpleType name="DistinguishedName">
<xsd:annotation>
<xsd:documentation>
This type holds an X.500 Distinguished Name.
</xsd:documentation>
</xsd:annotation>
<xsd:restriction base="xsd:string" />
<xsd:maxLength value="1024" />
</xsd:simpleType>
<xsd:simpleType name="SubjectKeyIdentifier">
<xsd:annotation>
<xsd:documentation>
This type holds a hex string representing the value of a
certificate's SubjectKeyIdentifier.
</xsd:documentation>
</xsd:annotation>
<xsd:restriction base="xsd:hexBinary" />
<xsd:maxLength value="1024" />
</xsd:simpleType>
<xsd:simpleType name="ThisURI">
<xsd:annotation>
<xsd:documentation>
This type holds a URI, but is length limited.
</xsd:documentation>
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</xsd:annotation>
<xsd:restriction base="xsd:anyURI" />
<xsd:maxLength value="1024" />
</xsd:simpleType>
</xsd:schema>
2.2. Request PAL
Clients request their PAL with an HTTP GET [RFC2616] using an
operation path of "/pal".
2.3. Provide PAL
If the server has a PAL for the client, the server response MUST
contain an HTTP 200 response code with a content-type of
"application/xml" [RFC3023] and a Content-Transfer-Encoding of
"base64".
When the server constructs a PAL, an order of precedence for PAL
offerings is based on the following rationale:
o /cacerts and /crls packages are the most important because they
support validation decisions on certificates used to sign and
encrypt other listed PAL items.
o /csrattrs are the next in importance, since they provide
information that the server would like the client to include in
its certificate enrollment request.
o /simpleenroll, /simplereenroll, and /fullcmc packages items are
next in importance, since they can impact a certificate used by
the client to sign CMS content or a certificate to establish keys
for encrypting content exchanged with the client.
* A client engaged in a certificate management SHOULD accept and
process CA-provided transactions as soon as possible to avoid
undue delays that might lead to protocol failure.
o /symmetrickeys, /firmware, /tamp, and /eecerts packages
containing keys and other types of products are last. Precedence
SHOULD be given to packages that the client has not previously
downloaded. The items listed in a PAL may not identify all of
the packages available for a device. This can be for any of the
following reasons:
The server may temporarily withhold some outstanding PAL items to
simplify client processing.
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If a CA has more than one certificate ready to begin a certificate
management protocol with a client, the server will provide a notice
for one at a time. Pending notices will be serviced in order of the
earliest date when the certificate will be used.
When rejecting a request the server specifies either an HTTP 4xx
error, or an HTTP 5xx error.
All other return codes are handled as specified in Section 4.2.3 of
[RFC7030] (i.e., 202 handling and all other HTTP response codes).
3. Distribute EE Certificates
Numerous mechanisms exist for clients to query repositories for
certificates. The service provided by the /eecerts PC is different
in that it is not a general purpose query for client certificates
instead it allows the server to provide peer certificates to a client
that the server knows through an out-of-band mechanism that the
client will be communicating with. For example, a router being
provisioned that connects to two peers can be provisioned with not
only its certificate but also with the peers' certificates.
The server need not authenticate or authorize the client for
distributing an EE certificate because the package contents are
already signed by a CA (i.e., the certificate(s) in a certs-only
message are already signed by a CA). The message flow is similar to
Figure 1 except that the connection need not be HTTPS:
| |
Client | Establish TLS | Server
| Session |
|<-------------------->|
| |
| Request PAL |
| (HTTP GET Request) |
|--------------------->|
|<---------------------|
| Deliver PAL |
| (HTTP GET Response) |
| |
| Request EE Cert(s) |
| (HTTP GET Request) |
|--------------------->|
|<---------------------|
| Deliver EE Cert(s) |
| (HTTP GET Response) |
| |
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Figure 2 - /eecerts Message Sequence
3.1. EE Certificate Request
Clients request EE certificates with an HTTP GET [RFC2616] using an
operation path of "/eecerts".
3.2. EE Certificate Response
The response and processing of the returned error codes is identical
to that in Section 3.1.3 of [RFC7030] except that the certificate
provided is not the one issued to the client but is instead one of
more client's peer certificates is returned in the certs-only
message.
Clients MUST reject EE certificates that do not validate to an
authorized TA.
4. Distribute CRLs
CRLs are needed in many instances to perform certificate path
validation [RFC5280]. They can be obtained from repositories if
their location is provided in the certificate. However, the client
needs to parse the certificate and perform an additional round trip
to retrieve them. Providing CRLs at the time of bootstrap would
obviate the need for the client to parse certificate and aid those
clients who might be unable to retrieve the CRL. Clients are free to
obtain CRLs on which they rely from sources other than the server
(e.g., a local directory). The /crls PC allows servers to distribute
CRLs at the same time clients retrieve their certificate(s) and CA
certificate(s) as well as peer certificates.
The server need not authenticate or authorize the client for
distributing a CRL because the package is already signed by a CA
(i.e., the CRLs in a certs-only message are already signed by a CA).
The message flow is as depicted in Figure 2 but with "CRL(s)" instead
of "EE Cert(s)".
4.1. CRL Request
Clients request CRLs with an HTTP GET [RFC2616] using an operation
path of "/crls".
4.2. CRL Response
The response and processing of the response is identical to that in
Section 3.1.3 of [RFC7030] except that instead of providing the
issued certificate one of more CRLs are returned in the certs-only
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message.
Clients MUST reject CRLs that do not validate to an authorized TA.
5. Symmetric Keys, Receipts, and Errors
In addition to public keys, clients often need one or more symmetric
keys to communicate with their peers. The /symmetrickeys PC allows
the server to distribute symmetric keys to clients.
Distribution of keys does not always work as planned and clients need
a way to inform the server that something has gone wrong; they also
need a way to inform the server, if asked, that the distribution
process has successfully completed. The /symmetrickeys/return PC
allows client to provide errors and receipts.
Clients MUST authenticate the server and clients MUST check server's
authorization.
The server MUST authenticate clients and the server MUST check the
client's authorization.
HTTP GET [RFC2616] is used when the server provides the key to the
client (see Section 5.1) using the /symmetrickeys path component;
HTTP POST [RFC2616] is used when the client provides a receipt (see
Section 5.2) or an error (see Section 5.2) to the server with the
/symmetrickeys/return path component.
5.1. Symmetric Keys
Servers use /symmetrickeys to provide clients symmetric keys;
symmetric key package is defined in [RFC6031].
The TLS cipher suite used to return the symmetric key MUST offer
commensurate cryptographic strength with the symmetric key being
delivered to the client. As with the /serverkeygen PC defined in
[RFC7030], the default distribution method of the symmetric key uses
the encryption mode of the negotiated TLS cipher suite. Keys are not
protected by preferred key wrapping methods such as AES Key Wrap
[RFC3394] or AES Key Wrap with Padding [RFC5649] because encryption
of the symmetric key beyond that provided by TLS is OPTIONAL.
Therefore, the cipher suite used to return the symmetric key MUST
offer commensurate cryptographic strength with the symmetric key
being delivered to the client. The cipher suite use MUST NOT have
NULL encryption algorithm as this will disclose the unprotected
symmetric key. It is strongly RECOMMENDED that servers always return
encrypted symmetric keys.
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The following depicts the protocol flow:
| |
Client | Establish TLS | Server
| Session |
|<-------------------->|
| |
| Request PAL |
| (HTTP GET Request) |
|--------------------->|
|<---------------------|
| Deliver PAL |
| (HTTP GET Response) |
| |
| Req Symmetric Key |
| (HTTP GET Request) |
|--------------------->|
|<---------------------|
| Res Symmetric Key |
| (HTTP GET Response) |
| |
Figure 3 - /symmetrickeys Message Sequence
5.1.1. Distribute Symmetric Keys
Clients request the symmetric key from the server with an HTTP GET
[RFC2616] using an operation path of "/symmetrickeys".
5.1.2. Symmetric Key Response
If the request is successful, the server response MUST have an HTTP
200 response code with a Content-Type of application/cms [ID.turner-
application-cms-media-type] and a Content-Transfer-Encoding of
"base64". The optional application/cms parameters SHOULD be included
with the Content-Type to indicate the protection afforded to the
returned symmetric key. The returned content varies:
o If additional encryption is not being employed, the content
associated with application/cms is a base 64-encoded DER-encoded
[X.690] symmetric key package.
o If additional encryption is employed, the content associated with
application/cms is a base 64-encoded DER-encoded enveloped data
that encapsulates a signed data that further encapsulates a
symmetric key package.
o If additional encryption and origin authentication is employed,
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the content associated with application/cms is a base 64-encoded
DER-encoded signed data that encapsulates an enveloped data that
encapsulates a signed data that further encapsulates a symmetric
key package.
o If CCC (CMS Content Constraints) [RFC6010] is supported and
additional encryption is employed, the content associated with
application/cms is a base 64-encoded DER-encoded encrypted key
package content type [RFC6032] that encapsulates a signed data
that further encapsulates a symmetric key package.
o If CCC is supported and additional encryption and additional
origin authentication is employed, the content associated with
application/cms is a base 64-encoded DER-encoded signed data that
encapsulates an encrypted key package content type that
encapsulates a signed data that further encapsulates a symmetric
key package.
Encrypted key package provides three choices to encapsulate keys,
encrypted data, enveloped data, and authenticated data, with
enveloped data being the mandatory to implement choice. How the
server knows whether the client supports the encrypted key package is
beyond the scope of this document.
When rejecting a request, the server specifies either an HTTP 4xx
error, or an HTTP 5xx error.
If a symmetric key package is digitally signed, the client MUST
reject it if the digital signature does not validate back to an
authorized TA.
[RFC3370], [RFC5753], [RFC5754], [RFC6033], [RFC6160], and [RFC6161]
provide algorithm details for use when protecting the symmetric key
package.
5.2. Symmetric Key Receipts and Errors
Clients use /symmetrickeys/return to provide symmetric key package
receipts; the key package receipt content type is defined in
[ID.housley-ct-keypackage-receipt-n-error]. Clients are configured
to automatically return receipts after processing a symmetric key
package, return receipts based on processing of the key-package-
identifier-and-receipt-request attribute [ID.housley-ct-keypackage-
receipt-n-error], or return receipts when prompted by a PAL entry.
Servers can indicate that clients return a receipt by including the
key-package-identifier-and-receipt-request attribute in a signed data
as a signed attribute. However, this attribute only appears when
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additional encryption is employed (see Section 5.1.2).
Clients also use /symmetrickeys/return to return symmetric key
package errors; the key package error content type is defined in
[ID.housley-ct-keypackage-receipt-n-error]. Clients are configured
to automatically return errors after processing a symmetric key
package or based on a PAL entry.
The following depicts the protocol flow:
| |
Client | Establish TLS | Server
| Session |
|<-------------------->|
| |
| Request PAL |
| (HTTP GET Request) |
|--------------------->|
|<---------------------|
| Deliver PAL |
| (HTTP GET Response) |
| |
| Return Receipt/Error |
| (HTTP POST Request) |
|--------------------->|
|<---------------------|
| (HTTP POST Response) |
| status code only |
| no content |
| |
Figure 4 - /symmetrickeys/return Message Sequence
5.2.1. Provide Symmetric Key Receipt or Error
Clients return key receipts and errors to the server with an HTTP
POST [RFC2616] using an operation path of "/symmetrickeys/return" and
a Content-Transfer-Encoding of "base64". The returned content
varies:
o The key package receipt is digitally signed [ID.housley-ct-
keypackage-receipt-n-error], the Content-Type is application/cms
[ID.turner-application-cms-media-type] and the associated content
is signed data, which encapsulates a key package receipt.
o If the key package error is not digitally signed, the Content-
Type is application/cms and the associated content is key package
error.
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o If the key package error is digitally signed, the Content-Type is
application/cms and the associated content is signed data, which
encapsulates a key package error.
The optional application/cms encapsulatingContent and innerContent
parameters SHOULD be included with the Content-Type to indicate the
protection afforded to the receipt or error.
[RFC3370], [RFC5753], [RFC5754], and [ID-turner-ct-keypackage-
receipt-n-error-algs] provide algorithm details for use when
protecting the key package receipt or key package error.
5.2.2. Symmetric Key Receipt or Error Response
If the client successfully provides a receipt or error, the server
response has an HTTP 200 response code with no content.
When rejecting a request, the server specifies either an HTTP 4xx
error, or an HTTP 5xx error.
If a key package receipt or key package error is digitally signed,
the server MUST reject it if the digital signature does not validate
back to an authorized TA.
6. Firmware, Firmware Receipts, and Firmware Errors
Servers distribute object code for cryptographic algorithms and
software with the firmware package [RFC4108].
Clients MUST authenticate the server and clients MUST check server's
authorization.
Server MUST authenticate the client and the server MUST check the
client's authorization.
The /firmware PC uses an HTTP GET [RFC2616] and the /firmware/return
PC uses an HTTP POST [RFC2616]. GET is used when the client
retrieves firmware from the server (see Section 6.1); POST is used
when the client provides a receipt (see Section 6.2) or an error (see
Section 6.2).
6.1. Firmware
The /firmware URI is used by servers to provide firmware packages to
clients.
The message flow is as depicted in Figure 3 modulo replacing
"Symmetric Key" with "Firmware Package".
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6.1.1. Distribute Firmware
Clients request firmware from the server with an HTTP GET [RFC2616]
using an operation path of "/firmware".
6.1.2. Firmware Response
If the request is successful, the server response MUST have an HTTP
200 response code with a Content-Type of "application/cms"
[ID.turner-application-cms-media-type] and a Content-Transfer-
Encoding of "base64". The optional encapsulatingContent and
innerContent parameters SHOULD be included with Content-Type to
indicate the protection afforded to the returned firmware. The
returned content varies:
o If the firmware is unprotected, then the Content-Type is
application/cms and the content is the base 64-encoded DER-
encoded [X.690] firmware package.
o If the firmware is encrypted, then the Content-Type is
application/cms and the content is the base 64-encoded DER-
encoded encrypted data that encapsulates the firmware package.
o If the firmware is signed, then the Content-Type is
application/cms and the content is the base 64-encoded DER-
encoded signed data that encapsulates the firmware package.
When rejecting a request, the server specifies either an HTTP 4xx
error, or an HTTP 5xx error.
If a firmware package is digitally signed, the client MUST reject it
if the digital signature does not validate back to an authorized TA.
[RFC3370], [RFC5753], and [RFC5754] provide algorithm details for use
when protecting the firmware package.
6.2. Firmware Receipts and Errors
Clients use the /firmware/return PC to provide firmware package load
receipts and errors. Clients can be configured to automatically
return receipts and errors after processing a firmware package or
based on a PAL entry.
The message flow is as depicted in Figure 4 modulo the receipt or
error is for a firmware package.
6.2.1. Provide Firmware Package Receipt or Error
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Clients return firmware package receipts and errors to the server
with an HTTP POST [RFC2616] using an operation path of
"/firmware/return" and a Content-Transfer-Encoding of "base64". The
optional encapsulatingContent and innerContent parameters SHOULD be
included with Content-Type to indicate the protection afforded to the
returned firmware. The returned content varies:
o If the firmware load receipt is not digitally signed, the
Content-Type is application/cms [ID.turner-application-cms-media-
type] and the content is the base 64-encoded DER-encoded firmware
load receipt.
o If the firmware load receipt is digitally signed, the Content-
Type is application/cms and the content is the base 64-encoded
DER-encoded signed data encapsulating the firmware load receipt.
o If the firmware load error is not digitally signed, the Content-
Type is application/cms and the content is the base 64-encoded
DER-encoded firmware load error.
o If the firmware load error is digitally signed, the Content-Type
is application/cms and the content is the base 64-encoded DER-
encoded signed data encapsulating the firmware load error.
[RFC3370], [RFC5753], and [RFC5754] provide algorithm details for use
when protecting the firmware load receipt or firmware load error.
6.2.2. Firmware Receipt or Error Response
If the request is successful, the server response MUST have an HTTP
200 response code with no content.
When rejecting a request, the server MUST specify either an HTTP 4xx
error, or an HTTP 5xx error.
If a firmware load receipt or firmware load error is digitally
signed, the server MUST reject it if the digital signature does not
validate back to an authorized TA.
7. Trust Anchor Management Protocol
Servers distribute TAMP packages to manage client trust anchor
databases; TAMP packages are defined in [RFC5934]. TAMP will allow
the flexibility for a device to load authorities while maintaining an
operational state. Unlike other systems that require new software
loads when new PKI Roots are authorized for use, TAMP allows for
automated management of roots for provisioning or replacement as
needed.
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Clients MUST authenticate the server and clients MUST check server's
authorization.
Server MUST authenticate the client and the server MUST check the
client's authorization.
The /tamp PC uses an HTTP GET [RFC2616] and the tamp/return PC uses
an HTTP POST [RFC2616]. GET is used when the server requests that
the client retrieve a TAMP package (see Section 7.1); POST is used
when the client provides a confirm (see Section 7.2), provides a
response (see Section 7.2), or provides an error (see Section 7.2)
for the TAMP package.
7.1. TAMP Status Query, Trust Anchor Update, Apex Trust Anchor Update,
Community Update, and Sequence Number Adjust
Clients use the /tamp PC to retrieve TAMP packages: TAMP Status
Query, Trust Anchor Update, Apex Trust Anchor Update, Community
Update, and Sequence Number Adjust. Clients can be configured to
periodically poll the server for these packages or contact the server
based on a PAL entry.
The message flow is as depicted in Figure 3 modulo replacing
"Symmetric Key" with the appropriate TAMP message.
7.1.1. Request TAMP Packages
Clients request the TAMP packages from the server with an HTTP GET
[RFC2616] using an operation path of "/tamp".
7.1.2. Return TAMP Packages
If the request is successful, the server response MUST have an HTTP
200 response code with Content-Transfer-Encoding of "base64" and a
Content-Type of:
o application/tamp-status-query for TAMP Status Query
o application/tamp-update for Trust Anchor Update
o application/tamp-apex-update for Apex Trust Anchor Update
o application/tamp-community-update for Community Update
o application/tamp-sequence-adjust for Sequence Number Adjust
As specified in [RFC5934], these content types are digitally signed
and clients must support validating the packages directly signed by
TAs. For this specification, client MUST support validation with a
certificate and clients MUST reject it if the digital signature does
not validate back to an authorized TA.
[RFC3370], [RFC5753], and [RFC5754] provide algorithm details for use
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when protecting the TAMP packages.
7.2. TAMP Response, Confirm, and Errors Packages
Clients return the TAMP Status Query Response, Trust Anchor Update
Confirm, Apex Trust Anchor Update Confirm, Community Update Confirm,
Sequence Number Adjust Confirm, and TAMP Error to servers using the
/tamp/return PC. Clients can be configured to automatically return
responses, confirms, and errors after processing a TAMP package or
based on a PAL entry.
The message flow is as depicted in Figure 4 modulo replacing
"Receipt/Error" with the appropriate TAMP response, confirm, or
error.
7.2.1. Return Responses, Confirms, and Errors
Clients provide the TAMP responses, confirms, and errors to the
server with an HTTP POST using an operation path of "/tamp/return".
The Content-Transfer-Encoding is "base64" and the Content-Type is:
o application/tamp-status-query-response for TAMP Status Query
Response
o application/tamp-update-confirm for Trust Anchor Update Confirm
o application/tamp-apex-update-confirm for Apex Trust Anchor Update
Confirm
o application/tamp-community-update-confirm for Community Update
Confirm
o application/tamp-sequence-adjust-confirm for Sequence Number
Adjust Confirm
o application/tamp-error for TAMP Error
As specified in [RFC5934], these content types should be signed. If
signed, a signed data encapsulates the TAMP content.
[RFC3370], [RFC5753], and [RFC5754] provide algorithm details for use
when protecting the TAMP packages.
7.2.2. Responses, Confirms, and Errors Response
If the request is successful, the server response MUST have an HTTP
200 response code with no content.
When rejecting a request, the server MUST specify either an HTTP 4xx
error, or an HTTP 5xx error.
If the package is digitally signed, the server MUST reject it if
digital signature does not validate back to an authorized TA.
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8. Asymmetric Keys, Receipts, and Errors
[RFC7030] defines the /serverkeygen PC to support server-side
generation of asymmetric keys. Keys are returned either as an
unprotected PKCS#8 when additional security beyond TLS is not
employed or as a CMS asymmetric key package content type that is
encapsulated in a signed data content type that is further
encapsulated in an enveloped data content type when additional
security beyond TLS is requested. Some implementations prefer the
use of other CMS content types to encapsulate the asymmetric key
package; this document extends the content types that can be returned
in Section 8.1.
[ID.housley-ct-keypackage-receipt-n-error] defines content types for
key package receipts and errors. This document extends the
"/serverkeygen" PC to add support for returning receipts and errors
for asymmetric key packages in Section 8.2.
8.1. Asymmetric Key Encapsulation
CMS supports a number of content types to encapsulate other CMS
content types; [RFC7030] includes one such possibility; note that
when only relying on TLS the return key is not a CMS content type.
This document extends the CMS content types that can be returned.
If the client supports CCC [RFC6010], then the client can indicate
that it supports encapsulated asymmetric keys in the encrypted key
package [RFC5958] by including the content type attribute [RFC2985]
in the CSR (Certificate Signing Request), aka the certification
request, it provides to the server. If the server knows a prior that
the client supports the encrypted key package content type, then the
client need not include the content type attribute in the CSR.
In all instances defined herein, the Content-Type is
"application/cms" [ID.turner-application-cms-media-type] the Content-
Transfer-Encoding is "base64". The optional encapsulatingContent and
innerContent parameters SHOULD be included with Content-Type to
indicate the protection afforded to the returned asymmetric key
package.
If additional encryption and origin authentication is employed, the
content associated with application/cms is a base 64-encoded DER-
encoded signed data that encapsulates an enveloped data that
encapsulates a signed data that further encapsulates an asymmetric
key package.
If CCC (CMS Content Constraints) is supported and additional
encryption is employed, the content associated with application/cms
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is a base 64-encoded DER-encoded encrypted key package content type
that encapsulates a signed data that further encapsulates an
asymmetric key package.
If CCC is supported and additional encryption and additional origin
authentication is employed, the content associated with
application/cms is a base 64-encoded DER-encoded signed data that
encapsulates an encrypted key package content type that encapsulates
a signed data that further encapsulates an asymmetric key package.
Encrypted key package provides three choices to encapsulate keys,
encrypted data, enveloped data, and authenticated data, with
enveloped data being the mandatory to implement choice.
8.2. Asymmetric Key Package Receipts and Errors
Clients are configured to automatically return receipts after
processing an asymmetric key package, return receipts based on
processing of the key-package-identifier-and-receipt-request
attribute [ID.housley-ct-keypackage-receipt-n-error], or return
receipts when prompted by a PAL entry.
Servers can indicate that clients return a receipt by including the
key-package-identifier-and-receipt-request attribute [ID.housley-ct-
keypackage-receipt-n-error] in a signed data as a signed attribute.
The protocol flow is identical to that depicted in Figure 4 modulo
the receipt or error is for asymmetric keys.
The server and client processing is as described in Section 5.2.1 and
5.2.2 modulo the PC, which for Asymmetric Key Packages is
"/serverkeygen/return".
9. PAL & Certificate Enrollment
The /fullcmc PC is defined in [RFC7030]; the CMC (Certificate
Management over Cryptographic Message Syntax) requirements and
packages defined in [RFC5272], [RFC5273], [RFC5274], and [RFC6402].
This section describes PAL interactions.
Under normal circumstances the client-server interactions for PKI
enrollment are as follows:
Client Server
--------------------->
POST req: PKIRequest
Content-Type: application/pkcs10
or
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POST req: PKIRequest
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime
smime-type=CMC-request
<--------------------
POST res: PKIResponse
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime
smime-type=certs-only
or
POST res: PKIResponse
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime
smime-type=CMC-response
if the response is rejected during the same session:
Client Server
--------------------->
POST req: PKIRequest
Content-Type: application/pkcs10
or
POST req: PKIRequest
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime
smime-type=CMC-request
<--------------------
POST res: empty
HTTPS Status Code
or
POST res: PKIResponse
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime
smime-type=CMC-response
if the request is to be filled later:
Client Server
--------------------->
POST req: PKIRequest
Content-Type: application/pkcs10
or
POST req: PKIRequest
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime
smime-type=CMC-request
<--------------------
POST res: empty
HTTPS Status Code
+ Retry-After
or
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POST res: PKIResponse (pending)
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime
smime-type=CMC-response
--------------------->
POST req: PKIRequest (same request)
Content-Type: application/pkcs10
or
POST req: PKIRequest (CMC Status Info only)
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime
smime-type=CMC-request
<--------------------
POST res: PKIResponse
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime
smime-type=certs-only
or
POST res: PKIResponse
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime
smime-type=CMC-response
With the PAL, the client begins after pulling the PAL and a Start
Issuance PAL package type essentially adding the following before the
request:
Client Server
--------------------->
GET req: for PAL
<--------------------
GET res: PAL
Content-Type: application/xml
--------------------->
GET req:
<--------------------
GET res: PAL
Content-Type: application/csr-attrs
For immediately rejected request, CMC works well. If the server
prematurely closes the connection, then the procedures in Section
8.2.4 of [RFC2616] apply. But, this might leave the client and
server in a different state. The client could merely resubmit the
request but another option, documented herein, is for the client to
instead download the PAL to see if the server has processed the
request. Clients might also use this process when they are unable to
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remain connected to the server for the entire enrollment process; if
the server does not or is not able to return a PKIData indicating a
status of pending, then the client will not know whether the request
was received. If a client uses the PAL and reconnects to determine
if the certification or rekey/renew request was processed:
o Clients MUST authenticate the server and clients MUST check
server's authorization.
o Server MUST authenticate the client and the server MUST check the
client's authorization.
o Clients retrieve the PAL using the /pal URI.
o Clients and servers use the operation path of "/simpleenroll",
"simplereenroll", or "/fullcmc", based on the PAL entry, with an
HTTP GET [RFC2616] to get the success or failure response.
Responses are as specified in [RFC7030].
For server generated keys using the /fullcmc PC [ID.turner-cmc-
serverkeygeneration], the asymmetric public key [RFC5958] is returned
along with the certificate.
10. Security Considerations
This document relies on many other specifications. For HTTP, HTTPS,
and TLS security considerations see [RFC2616], [RFC2818], and
[RFC5246]; for URI security considerations see [RFC3986]; for content
type security considerations see [RFC4073], [RFC4108], [RFC5272],
[RFC5652], [RFC5751], [RFC5934], [RFC5958] [RFC6031], [RFC6032],
[RFC6268], [RFC6402], and [ID.housley-ct-keypackage-receipt-n-error];
for algorithms used to protect packages see the security
considerations in: [RFC3370], [RFC5649], [RFC5753], [RFC5754],
[RFC5959], [RFC6033], [RFC6160], [RFC6161], [RFC6162] and [ID-turner-
ct-keypackage-receipt-n-error-algs]. For random numbers need when
generating keys see [RFC4086].
11. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to perform three registrations: PAL Name Space, PAL
XML Schema, and PAL Package Types.
11.1. PAL Name Space
This section registers a new XML namespace [XMLNS],
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:TBD" per the guidelines in [RFC3688]:
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URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:TBD
Registrant Contact: Sean Turner (turners@ieca.com)
XML:
BEGIN
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN"
"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en">
<head>
<title>Package Availability List</title>
</head>
<body>
<h1>Namespace for Package Availability List</h1>
<h2>urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:TBD</h2>
<p>See RFC TBD</p>
</body>
</html>
END
11.2. PAL Schema
This section registers an XML schema as per the guidelines in
[RFC3688].
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:pal
Registrant Contact: Sean Turner turners@ieca.com
XML: See Section 2.1.2.
11.3. PAL Package Types
This section registers the PAL Package Types. Future PAL Package
Types registrations are to be subject to Expert Review, as defined in
RFC 5226 [RFC5226]. Package types MUST be paired with a media type.
The initial registry values are found in Section 2.1.1.
12. Acknowledgements
Thanks in no particular order go to Paul Hoffman, Brad McInnis, Max
Pritikin, Francois Rousseau, Chris Bonatti, and Russ Housley for
taking time to provide comments.
13. References
13.1. Normative References
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[RFC2045] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message
Bodies", RFC 2045, November 1996.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., Masinter,
L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.
[RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
November 2000.
[RFC3023] Murata, M., St. Laurent, S., and D. Kohn, "XML Media
Types", RFC 3023, January 2001.
[RFC3370] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
Algorithms", RFC 3370, August 2002.
[RFC3394] Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, September 2002.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
January 2004.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, January 2005.
[RFC4073] Housley, R., "Protecting Multiple Contents with the
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 4073, May 2005.
[RFC4108] Housley, R., "Using Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) to
Protect Firmware Packages", RFC 4108, August 2005.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, May
2008.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC5272] Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management over CMS
(CMC)", RFC 5272, June 2008.
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[RFC5273] Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management over CMS
(CMC): Transport Protocols", RFC 5273, June 2008.
[RFC5274] Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management Messages
over CMS (CMC): Compliance Requirements", RFC 5274, June
2008.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC5649] Housley, R. and M. Dworkin, "Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm", RFC 5649, September
2009.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, September 2009.
[RFC5751] Ramsdell, B. and S. Turner, "Secure/Multipurpose Internet
Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message
Specification", RFC 5751, January 2010.
[RFC5753] Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Use of Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms in Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS)", RFC 5753, January 2010.
[RFC5754] Turner, S., "Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic
Message Syntax", RFC 5754, January 2010.
[RFC5934] Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor
Management Protocol (TAMP)", RFC 5934, August 2010.
[RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958, August
2010.
[RFC5959] Turner, S., "Algorithms for Asymmetric Key Package Content
Type", RFC 5959, August 2010.
[RFC6010] Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, "Cryptographic
Message Syntax (CMS) Content Constraints Extension",
RFC 6010, September 2010.
[RFC6031] Turner, S. and R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS) Symmetric Key Package Content Type", RFC 6031,
December 2010.
[RFC6032] Turner, S. and R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax
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(CMS) Encrypted Key Package Content Type", RFC 6032,
December 2010.
[RFC6033] Turner, S., "Algorithms for Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS) Encrypted Key Package Content Type", RFC 6033,
December 2010.
[RFC6160] Turner, S., "Algorithms for Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS) Protection of Symmetric Key Package Content Types",
RFC 6160, April 2011.
[RFC6161] Turner, S., "Elliptic Curve Algorithms for Cryptographic
Message Syntax (CMS) Encrypted Key Package Content Type",
RFC 6161, April 2011.
[RFC6162] Turner, S., "Elliptic Curve Algorithms for Cryptographic
Message Syntax (CMS) Asymmetric Key Package Content Type",
RFC 6162, April 2011.
[RFC6268] Schaad, J. and S. Turner, "Additional New ASN.1 Modules for
the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public Key
Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 6268, July 2011.
[RFC6402] Schaad, J., "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)
Updates", RFC 6402, November 2011.
[RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
"Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030, October 2013.
[XML] W3C, "Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 (Fifth
Edition)", W3C Recommendation, November 2008,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/2006/REC-xml-20060816/>.
[XMLSCHEMA]
Malhotra, A. and P. Biron, "XML Schema Part 2: Datatypes
Second Edition", World Wide Web Consortium Recommendation
REC-xmlschema-2-20041082, October 2004,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/2004/REC-xmlschema-2-20041028>.
[ID.turner-cmc-serverkeygeneration]
Schaad, J., Turner, S., and P. Timmel, "CMC Extensions:
Server Key Generation", work-in-progress, draft-turner-cmc-
serverkeygeneration.
[ID.housley-ct-keypackage-receipt-n-error]
Housley, R., "CMS Key Package Receipt and Error Content
Types", work-in-progress, draft-housley-ct-keypackage-
receipt-n-error.
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[ID-turner-application-cms-media-type]
Turner, S., Housley, R., and J. Schaad, "The
application/cms media type", work-in-progress, draft-
turner-application-cms-media-type.
[ID-turner-ct-keypackage-receipt-n-error-algs]
Turner, S., "Algorithms for Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS) Key Package Receipt and Error Content Types", work-
in-progress, draft-turner-ct-keypackage-receipt-n-error-
algs.
[X.690] ITU-T Recommendation X.690 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8825-1:2002.
Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER).
13.2. Informative References
[RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
November 2000.
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", FYI
36, RFC 4949, August 2007.
[XMLNS] Hollander, D., Bray, T., and A. Layman, "Namespaces in
XML", World Wide Web Consortium First Edition REC-xml-
names-19990114, January 1999,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-xml-names-19990114>.
Appendix A. Example Use of PAL
This is an informative appendix. It includes examples protocol
flows.
Steps for using a PAL include:
1. Access PAL
2. Process PAL entries
2.1. Get CA Certificates
2.2. Get CRLs
2.3. Get CSR attributes
2.4. Enroll: simple enrollment, re-enrollment, or full CMC
2.5. Get Firmware, TAMP, Symmetric Keys, or EE Certificates
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Client Server
---------------------> -+
GET req: | /pal
<--------------------- |
GET res: PAL |
Content-Type: application/xml |
|
---------------------> -+
GET req: | /cacerts
<--------------------- |
GET res: CA Certificates |
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-smime |
smime-type=certs-only |
|
---------------------> -+
GET req: | /crls
<--------------------- |
GET res: CRLs |
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-smime |
smime-type=certs-only |
|
---------------------> -+
GET req: | /csrattrs
<--------------------- |
GET res: attributes |
---------------------> -+
POST req: PKIRequest | /simpleenroll &
Content-Type: application/pkcs10 | /simplereenroll
|
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime | /fullcmc
smime-type=CMC-request |
|
<-------------------- |
(success or failure) |
POST res: PKIResponse | /simpleenroll
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime | /simplereenroll
smime-type=certs-only | /fullcmc
|
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime | /fullcmc
smime-type=CMC-response |
|
--------------------> -+
GET req: | /firmware
<-------------------- | /tamp
GET res: Firmware, TAMP Query | /symmetrickeys
+ Updates, Symmetric Keys |
Content-Type: application/cms |
|
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---------------------> -+
POST res: Firmware Receipts or Errors, | /firmware/return
TAMP Response or Confirms or Errors, | /tamp/return
Symmetric Key Receipts or Errors, | /symmetrickeys/
| return
|
Content-Type: application/cms |
<-------------------- |
POST res: empty |
(success or failure) |
--------------------> -+
GET req: | /eecerts
<-------------------- |
GET res: Other EE certificates |
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime |
smime-type=certs-only |
The figure above shows /eecerts after /*/return, but this is for
illustrative purposes only.
Appendix B. Additional CSR Attributes
This is an informative appendix.
In some cases, the client is severely limited in its ability to
encode and encode ASN.1 objects. If the client knows a csr template
is being provided during enrollment, then it can peel the returned
csr attribute, generate its keys, place the public key in the
certification request, and then sign the request. To accomplish
this, the server returns a PKCS7PDU attribute [RFC2985] in as part of
the /csrattrs (the following is pseudo ASN.1 and is only meant to
show the fields needed to accomplish returning a template
certification request):
pKCS7PDU ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX ContentInfo
ID pkcs-9-at-pkcs7PDU
}
pkcs-9-at-pkcs7PDU OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
at(25) 5
}
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The ContentInfo is a PKIData:
PKIData ::= SEQUENCE {
reqSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedRequest,
}
Where TaggedRequest is a choice between the PKCS #10 or CRMF
requests.
TaggedRequest ::= CHOICE {
tcr [0] TaggedCertificationRequest,
crm [1] CertReqMsg,
}
Or, the Content Info can be a signed data content type that further
encapsulates a PKIData.
Appendix C. Example ASN.1
TO DO: Include BASE64 encodings of ASN.1 encodings of selected
packages. They're a lot smaller than the ASN.1 pretty prints and
there are tons of available to tools to convert.
Authors' Addresses
Sean Turner
IECA, Inc.
3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106
Fairfax, VA 22031
USA
EMail: turners@ieca.com
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