Operation CuckooBees was a cyber espionage campaign targeting technology and manufacturing companies in East Asia, Western Europe, and North America since at least 2019. Security researchers noted the goal of Operation CuckooBees, which was still ongoing as of May 2022, was likely the theft of proprietary information, research and development documents, source code, and blueprints for various technologies. Researchers assessed Operation CuckooBees was conducted by actors affiliated with Winnti Group, APT41, and BARIUM.[1]
Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
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Enterprise | T1087 | .001 | Account Discovery: Local Account |
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the |
.002 | Account Discovery: Domain Account |
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the |
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Enterprise | T1071 | .001 | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols |
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors enabled HTTP and HTTPS listeners.[1] |
Enterprise | T1560 | .001 | Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility |
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the Makecab utility to compress and a version of WinRAR to create password-protected archives of stolen data prior to exfiltration.[1] |
Enterprise | T1547 | .006 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Kernel Modules and Extensions |
During Operation CuckooBees, attackers used a signed kernel rootkit to establish additional persistence.[1] |
Enterprise | T1059 | .003 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell |
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used batch scripts to perform reconnaissance.[1] |
.005 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic |
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors executed an encoded VBScript file using |
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Enterprise | T1543 | .003 | Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service |
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors modified the |
Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System |
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors collected data, files, and other information from compromised networks.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application |
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors exploited multiple vulnerabilities in externally facing servers.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1133 | External Remote Services |
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors enabled WinRM over HTTP/HTTPS as a backup persistence mechanism using the following command: |
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Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery |
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used |
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Enterprise | T1574 | .001 | Hijack Execution Flow: DLL |
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the legitimate Windows services |
Enterprise | T1036 | .005 | Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors renamed a malicious executable to |
Enterprise | T1135 | Network Share Discovery |
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the |
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Enterprise | T1027 | .010 | Obfuscated Files or Information: Command Obfuscation |
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors executed an encoded VBScript file.[1] |
.011 | Obfuscated Files or Information: Fileless Storage |
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors stroed payloads in Windows CLFS (Common Log File System) transactional logs.[1] |
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Enterprise |