This article examines how emerging technologies – particularly artificial intelligence – disrupt the moral and institutional foundations of contemporary military practice. While strategic documents from the United States, NATO, and other major actors anticipate profound institutional transformation driven by AI, their treatment of ethics largely confines itself to legal compliance and technical safeguards, leaving the ethical role of military leadership in managing disruptive change underexamined. Drawing on Seumas Miller’s distinction between social institutions that are merely instrumental to collective goods and (...) those whose defining ends are constitutive of such goods, the article argues that the military belongs to the latter category. Because the military’s core function – defending the sovereignty of a polity – is itself morally significant, technological disruption of its organizational structures simultaneously constitutes ethical disruption. The article thus reconceives change management during periods of technological transition as calling for a specific kind of military prudence, a practical wisdom exercised within and through the institution’s role-mediated ethical practices. By analyzing three concrete modes of techno-moral disruption, the article shows how AI may reshape ethical standards, redistribute professional knowledge, and alter organizational ethos, and why navigating these transformations responsibly is a central task of military virtue. (shrink)

The ancient virtue of practical wisdom has lately been enjoying a remarkable renaissance in management literature. The purpose of this article is to add clarity and bring synergy to the interdisciplinary debate. In a review of the wide-ranging field of the existing literature from a philosophical, theological, psychological, and managerial perspective, we show that, although different in terms of approach, methodologies, and justification, the distinct traditions of research on practical wisdom can indeed complement one another. We (...) suggest a conciliatory conception of the various features of practical wisdom in management. This we take as a point of departure for a discussion of the significant implications of the subject for the theory and practice of management and for the direction of further research in the field. (shrink)

This article echoes those voices that demand new approaches and ‹senses’ for management education and business programs. Much of the article is focused on showing that the polemic about the educative model of business schools has moral and epistemological foundations and opens up the debate over the type of knowledge that practitioners need to possess in order to manage organizations, and how this knowledge can be taught in management programs. The article attempts to highlight the moral dimension of management through (...) a reinterpretation of the Aristotelian concept of practical wisdom. I defend the ideas that management is never morally neutral and that Aristotelian practical wisdom allows the recovery of moral considerations in management practice. I analyze the impact and implications that the introduction of practical wisdom in business schools entails for the conception and objectives of management education. This view reconfigures management education in terms of attention to values, virtues and context. Therefore, management programmes should prepare students to critically evaluate what they hear and to make decisions coherent with their values and virtues. In the final section, I reflect on the pedagogical implications of this approach. I point out that an integrated model of ethics and practical wisdom promotes education of cognition and education of affect as well. I provide an example to illustrate my perspective and to support my conclusions. (shrink)

This paper argues that practical wisdom represents a useful framework for understanding the synthesis of the scientific, technical, and moral dimensions of medical practice and may, therefore, guide the meaningful integration of concepts of competence and character into the education and support of both the technical and moral agency of medical professionals. The authors show the importance of practical wisdom in three distinct domains: (1) in effective deliberation in clinical judgments; (2) in helping clinicians flourish by (...) making wise decisions in light of the moral and emotional challenges they face in their practice; and (3) in helping physicians navigate between the rights of patients, the physician’s own moral good, and the objective good intrinsic to medicine. To promote the physician’s own moral good and the objective good intrinsic to medicine, the authors propose a philosophical position, the agential view, that preserves an essentialist view of medicine but emphasizes the necessity to develop a personal moral philosophy of clinical practice. (shrink)

Practical wisdom (hereafter simply “wisdom”) is the intellectual virtue that enables a person to make reliably good decisions about how, all-things-considered, to live and conduct herself. Because wisdom is such an important and high-level achievement, we should wonder: what is the nature of wisdom? What kinds of skills, habits and capacities does it involve? Can real people actually develop it? If so, how? I argue that we can answer these questions by modeling wisdom on (...) expert decision-making skill in complex areas like firefighting. I develop this expert skill model of wisdom using philosophical argument informed by relevant empirical research. I begin in Chapter 1 by examining the historical roots of analogies between wisdom and practical skills in order to motivate the expert skill model. In Chapter 2, I provide the core argument for the expert skill model. I then use the remaining chapters to pull out the implications of the expert skill model. In Chapter 3, I show that the expert skill model yields practical guidance about how to develop wisdom. In Chapter 4, I address the objection, due to Daniel Jacobson, that wisdom is not a skill that humans could actually develop, since skill development requires a kind of feedback in practice that is not available for all-things-considered decisions about how to live. Finally, in Chapter 5, I apply the expert skill model to the question, much discussed by virtue ethicists, of whether a wise person deliberates using a comprehensive and systematic conception of the good life. (shrink)

BackgroundMedical ethics has recently seen a drive away from multiple prescriptive approaches, where physicians are inundated with guidelines and principles, towards alternative, less deontological perspectives. This represents a clear call for theory building that does not produce more guidelines. Phronesis (practical wisdom) offers an alternative approach for ethical decision-making based on an application of accumulated wisdom gained through previous practice dilemmas and decisions experienced by practitioners. Phronesis, as an ‘executive virtue’, offers a way to navigate the practice (...) virtues for any given case to reach a final decision on the way forward. However, very limited empirical data exist to support the theory of phronesis-based medical decision-making, and what does exist tends to focus on individual practitioners rather than practice-based communities of physicians.MethodsThe primary research question was: What does it mean to medical practitioners to make ethically wise decisions for patients and their communities? A three-year ethnographic study explored the practical wisdom of doctors (n = 131) and used their narratives to develop theoretical understanding of the concepts of ethical decision-making. Data collection included narrative interviews and observations with hospital doctors and General Practitioners at all stages in career progression. The analysis draws on neo-Aristotelian, MacIntyrean concepts of practice- based virtue ethics and was supported by an arts-based film production process.ResultsWe found that individually doctors conveyed many different practice virtues and those were consolidated into fifteen virtue continua that convey the participants’ ‘collective practical wisdom’, including the phronesis virtue. This study advances the existing theory and practice on phronesis as a decision-making approach due to the availability of these continua.ConclusionGiven the arguments that doctors feel professionally and personally vulnerable in the context of ethical decision-making, the continua in the form of a video series and app based moral debating resource can support before, during and after decision-making reflection. The potential implications are that these theoretical findings can be used by educators and practitioners as a non-prescriptive alternative to improve ethical decision-making, thereby addressing the call in the literature, and benefit patients and their communities, as well. (shrink)

Practical wisdom eliminativism has recently been proposed in both philosophy and psychology, on the grounds of the alleged redundancy of practical wisdom (Miller 2021 ) and its purported developmental/psychological implausibility (Lapsley 2021 ). Here we respond to these challenges by drawing on an improved version of a view of practical wisdom, the “Aretai model”, that we have presented elsewhere (De Caro et al. 2021 ; Vaccarezza et al. 2023 ; De Caro et al. forthcoming (...) ). According to this model, practical wisdom is conceptualized: (i) as virtuousness _tout court_, i.e., as the _ratio essendi_ of the virtues, and (ii) as a form of ethical expertise. By appealing to the first thesis, we counter the charge of psychological implausibility, while we rely on the second thesis to address the accusation of redundancy. In conclusion we argue that the Aretai model implies a significant paradigm shift in virtue ethics. Practical wisdom emerges as both necessary and sufficient for virtuousness, thereby downsizing – without eliminating entirely – the role that individual virtues play in our ethical lives. (shrink)

This paper argues that Aristotelian practical wisdom (phronēsis) is a state of conviction (pistis) in the goodness of our goals based on proper grounds. This state of conviction can only be achieved if rational arguments and principles agree with how things appear to us. Since, for Aristotle, passions influence appearances, they can support or undermine our conviction in the goodness of ends. For this reason, we cannot be practically wise without virtuous dispositions to experience appropriate passions. Along the (...) way, I argue that this reading allows us to explain the shortcomings of self‐controlled and akratic agents. (shrink)

The revival of virtue ethics in contemporary moral philosophy had a major impact on business ethicists, among whom the virtues have become a staple subject of inquiry. Aristotle’s phronēsis is one of those virtues, and a number of texts have examined it in some detail. But analyses of phronēsis in business ethics have neglected some of its most significant and interesting elements. In this paper, I dissect two neglected components of practical wisdom as outlined in Book VI of (...) the Nicomachean Ethics: sunesis, a capacity to perceptively evaluate testimony, and gnomē, a capacity to rightly discern exceptions to ‘universal’ moral rules. Practical wisdom is a product of experience, so I examine the role that experience plays in the development of these deliberative capacities, asking what it is that the practically wise will have taken away from their experiences. It is, in particular, everyday, ‘mundane’ experience that begets these excellences, so I concentrate specifically on that kind of experience in the domains of sunesis and gnomē as I search for insights about how we develop phronēsis and how we might better do what is right. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Practical wisdom has received scant attention in business ethics. Defined as a disposition toward cleverness in crafting morally excellent responses to, or in anticipation of, challenging particularities, practical wisdom has four psychological components: knowledge, emotion, thinking, and motivation. People's experience, reflection, and inspiration are theorized to determine their capacity for practical wisdom-related performance. Enhanced by their abilities to engage in moral imagination, systems thinking, and ethical reframing, this capacity is realized in the form of (...) wisdom-related performance. This can be manifested either in wise business decisions or through their performance as mentors, advice givers, or dispute handlers. (shrink)

Featuring original essays from leading scholars in philosophy and psychology, this volume investigates and rethinks the role of practical wisdom in light of the most recent developments in virtue theory and moral, social and developmental psychology. The concept of phronesis has long held a prominent place in the development of Aristotelian virtue ethics and moral education. However, the nature and development of phronesis is still in need of investigation, especially because of the new insights that in recent years (...) have come from both philosophy and science. The essays in this volume contribute to the debate about practical wisdom by elucidating its role in empirical psychology and advancing important new research questions. They address various topics related to practical wisdom and its development, including honesty, ecocentric phronesis, social cognitive theory, practical wisdom in limited-information contexts, Whole Trait Theory, skill models, the reciprocity of virtue, and challenges from situationism. Practical Wisdom will interest researchers and advanced students working in virtue ethics, moral psychology, and moral education. (shrink)

Background: Practical wisdom, understood as knowing how to be or act in any present situation with clients, is believed to be an essential part of the knowledge needed to be a professional mental health worker. Exploring processes of adapting, extending knowledge and refining tacit knowledge grounded in mental health workers’ experiences with being in practice may bring awareness of how mental health workers reflect, learn and practice professional ‘artistry’. Research question: The aim of the article was to explore (...) mental health workers’ processes of development and learning as they appeared in focus groups intended to develop practical wisdom. The main research question was ‘How might the processes of development and learning contribute to developing practical wisdom in the individual as well as in the practice culture?’ Research design: The design was multi-stage focus groups, and the same participants met four times. A phenomenological hermeneutical method for researching lived experience guided the analysis. Participants and context: Eight experienced mental health workers representing four Norwegian municipalities participated. The research context was community-based mental health services. Ethical considerations: The study was reported to Norwegian Social Data Services, and procedures for informed consent were followed. Findings: Two examples of processes of re-evaluation of experience (Association, Integration, Validation, Appropriation and Outcomes and action) were explored. The health workers had developed knowledge in previous encounters with clients. In sharing practice experiences, this knowledge was expressed and developed, and also tested and validated against the aims of practice. Discussions led to adapted and extended knowledge, and as tacit knowledge was expressed it could be used actively. Discussion: Learning to reflect, being ready to be provoked and learning to endure indecisiveness may be foundational in developing practical wisdom. Openness is demanding, and changing habits of mind is difficult. Conclusion: Reflection on, and confrontation with, set practices are essential to building practice cultures in line with the aims of mental health services. (shrink)

This chapter argues that practical wisdom understood according to the classic Christian tradition of Thomas Aquinas can contribute to reflection on complex decision-making when considering new genetic technologies such as CRISPR-Cas9 and their potential relationship to human flourishing. Christian theology conceives of the goal of human life as perfection of virtues, according to a beatific vision where Christ is the image of God for all those in the community of believers. Flourishing is therefore conceived in very different terms (...) compared with secular notions of individual health or longevity. Further, practical wisdom works at the level of the individual, family, society, and nation in a way that confronts a tendency to stress individual autonomy in secular medical ethics. The implications of this perspective are discussed in light of current debates on the new genetics. (shrink)

What is practical wisdom? What does a practically wise person know? It is widely held that a person is practically wise if and only if the person knows how to live well, and that a person knows how to live well only if the person knows what is good or important for well‐being. The question is: What is it that contributes to or constitutes well‐being known by a wise person? A theory of wisdom without a substantive answer (...) to this question can never be seriously tested and used in practice. In this paper, I propose a fully articulated theory of wisdom by integrating the skill theory of wisdom with the success theory of well‐being, arguing that practical wisdom is a skill conducive to well‐being conceived as attitude success. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to address the complex relationships within the geography of virtues. Based on the recent prototypical theories of concepts as idealized cognitive models arising from abstraction, the article argues that the relations between virtues are asymmetrical, with a prototypical virtue characterizing the whole category and specific virtues being character traits or skills derived from the prototypical virtue. It also argues that the most promising candidates for the role of prototypical virtue are phronesis (practical (...) class='Hi'>wisdom) and the virtue of care, for their ability to represent and elicit any virtuous behavior when the situation calls for them. It therefore confronts the two options, which embody competing perspectives. In the concluding section, it proposes two possible directions for further research to settle in favor of one of the candidates. The article can be taken as an illustration of the potential of prototype theory for analyzing ethical concepts. (shrink)

The prevailing accounts of Aristotle's view of practical wisdom pay little attention to all the intellectual capacities discussed in Nicomachean Ethics Book 6. They also contrast the phronimos with the wicked, the continent or the incontinent, rather than with those who have 'natural virtue' (innate or habituated), and thereby they neglect the importance of experience, through which those capacities are acquired. When we consider them, we can see what sort of experience is needed and hence what sort aspirants (...) to full virtue should be trying to acquire. It turns out that much of the knowledge such experience yields is just plain worldly knowledge. But it is not to be despised on that account. The phronimos must meet a threshold of knowledge that he will, indeed, share with some of the wicked, but will have a superior version that goes beyond theirs. (shrink)

Roughly speaking, proper virtue is natural virtue plus practical wisdom. Aristotle’s Reciprocity of Virtue thesis says that while people may possess only _some_ natural virtues, a person with _any_ proper virtue possesses _every_ proper virtue.Most interpreters take practical wisdom to be the knowledge of _which_ acts are virtuous. To act well, people must balance different values against each other. The practical wisdom necessary to act well in any sphere covers all spheres. Acquiring it thus (...) produces all of the virtues.By contrast, this chapter argues that practical wisdom is the knowledge of _why_ acts are virtuous. To know why, people must understand the role of virtues in a happy life. If naturally virtuous people are missing only this knowledge, then they have good habits. They already know which acts are right. Reciprocity of virtue turns out to be a precondition, rather than a result of practical wisdom acquisition. (shrink)

This article argues, from a critical realist perspective, that it would be beneficial to extend thinking on how personal and social education could become more central to students’ learning. We explore how constructive-informed arrangements which emphasize cognitive skills and affective qualities could be realized through experiential approaches to learning. Our theorizing is informed by neo-Aristotelian thinking on the importance of identifying mutually acceptable value commitments which can cultivate practical wisdom as well as generally benefit society. Thereafter, we outline (...) how the recent writings of Tiberius could inform thinking on how, epistemologically and ethically, a first person perspective on learning and personal growth could connect with normative decision making on how to make good life choices. We conclude by briefly highlighting the methodological potential of using outdoor learning environments to help students make informed and wise judgements which show evidence of discernment, deliberation and effective decision making. (shrink)

This paper defends a neo-Aristotelian conception of practical wisdom as a virtue that enables human agents to reflect on and direct their lives toward virtuous ends over time. This view is sometimes assumed to require a commitment to an intellectualist Grand End or blueprint view. On that view, practical wisdom would require philosophical insight and an implausibly well worked out set of weighted preferences. In this paper, I aim to show that particularists can and should take (...) on much of what was thought to belong to the Grand End view. I argue for a conception of practical wisdom as a virtue of extended action that accounts for overarching ends without the need to appeal to an unrealistic, intellectualized blueprint for life. Further, on the view advocated here, as in Aristotle, practical wisdom is a virtue of substantial rationality and a different capacity from instrumental rationality in that it requires reflection on what constitutes a good human life. This is not high-minded philosophical reflection and is, in fact, something rather mundane that draws on the same rational capacities we deploy to assess the goodness of actions. (shrink)

This paper maps out various options for thinking about two issues: the structural relationship between practical wisdom and the moral virtues, and the various functions of practical wisdom. With the help of a case study of the virtue of honesty, three main concerns are raised for what I call the Standard Model of practical wisdom. Two other models, the Socratic Model and the Fragmentation Model, are also critically evaluated. I end by taking seriously an (...) eliminativist approach according to which the trait of practical wisdom does not exist. (shrink)

This article is about a virtue ethical approach to the professional ethics of teaching, centred around the ideal of _phronesis_ (practical wisdom) in an Aristotelian sense. It is grounded empirically in extensive research conducted at the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues into teachers and other UK professionals, and it is grounded theoretically in recent efforts to revive an Aristotelian concept of _phronesis_ as excellence in ethical decision-making. The article argues for the need for a virtue-based approach to (...) professional practice, based on time-honoured Aristotelian assumptions and culminating in a conceptually viable construct of _phronesis_ as a psycho-moral integrator and adjudicator. After setting some of the historical background in Sect. 1, Sect. 2 charts the most relevant empirical findings. Section 3 introduces a call for _phronesis_ as a guide to virtue-based professional ethics: its role, nature, and methods of instruction. Section 4 adds some caveats and concerns about if and how _phronesis_ can be cultivated as part of teacher training. Finally, Sect. 5 offers some concluding remarks about the novelty and radicality of the approach on offer in this article. (shrink)

Normative reasons for action are facts or considerations that contribute to the justification of an action. Sometimes, normative reasons for action conflict: one reason may favor doing something, while another may favor not doing it. These conflicts can be so radical that it seems difficult, if not impossible, to judge which reason should ultimately guide one’s actions. According to a theory of practical rationality known as reasons pluralism, there are some radical cases of conflict among normative reasons for action (...) in which there can be no fact of the matter about what one ought to do. This is because normative reasons fall into a plurality of types, and normative reasons of different types are incommensurable with one another. However, reasons pluralism is compatible with a principle that would enable us to judge when a normative reason of one type overrides a normative reason of another type. I will argue that this “Override Principle” is a facet of practical wisdom—an intellectual virtue. Practical wisdom, as Aristotle construed it, involves the ability to order one’s ends into a coherent system that allows for the attainment of a good life. The Override Principle is sure to be one criterion by which those endowed with practical wisdom would order their ends. (shrink)

The challenges facing us today require practical wisdom to allow us to react appropriately. In this paper, we argue that at a group level, we will make better decisions if we respect and take into account the moral judgment of agents with diverse styles of cognition and moral reasoning. We show this by focusing on the example of autism, highlighting different strengths and weaknesses of moral reasoning found in autistic and non-autistic persons respectively.

IntroductionRecent work in virtue theory has breathed new life into the analogy between virtue and skill.See, for example, Annas ; Bloomfield ; Stichter ; Swartwood . There is good reason to think that this analogy is worth pursuing since it may help us understand the distinctive nexus of reasoning, knowledge, and practical ability that is found in virtue by pointing to a similar nexus found outside moral contexts in skill. In some ways, there is more than an analogy between (...) skill and virtue. Clearly, both are what might be called ‘practical states,’ that is, conditions of agents with regard to action. For some virtue theorists, the analogy is superseded in favor of a claim to identity. As Paul Bloomfield puts it:… adopting the thesis that virtues are skills hands us a viable moral epistemology by reducing the problem of moral epistemology to the analysis of the epistemology of diagnosis and problem solving employed by doctors, navigators, and .. (shrink)

In the context of the recent revival of virtue ethics, the notion of character formation under the rational guidance of Aristotle's notion of phronesis, or practical wisdom, has been exalted as the principal aim of moral education. However, this is not unproblematic insofar as the promotion of Aristotelian phronesis seems to operate on rather different levels or to be ambivalent between the two rather different (and demonstrably separable) aims or goals of fostering reasonably sound deliberation and judgment concerning (...) “right” or good (moral or other) agency or action and the allegedly optimal (empirical) psychological ordering of cognition and affect to the end of good or commendable human character. In this paper, David Carr argues that while the first of these aims is by and large educationally acceptable and defensible, the second is neither a desirable nor coherent educational goal. (shrink)

This article investigates whether Aristotelian practical wisdom could be considered as an advantageous "sense" in management practice and as an alternative rationality to that defended by modern tradition. Aristotelian practical wisdom is re-conceptualised in order to emphasise the intuitive component of practical wisdom, an aspect often sidelined by business ethicists. Levinas' insights are applied to Aristotelian practical wisdom in such a way that the role of emotion in moral action would be reinforced. (...) It is argued that the role of emotion in moral action and wise deliberation requires re-definition in accordance with the indeterminate character of the moral. Moreover, I argue Levinas' approach might be helpful to bring to light the conflictual aspect inherent in being prudential. By reinterpreting the intuitive component of practical wisdom as Levinas' moral impulse, wisdom theory is expanded to include the face, and to better account for the conflictive and the emotional aspects of phronesis. This approach enables practical wisdom to be understood as a human "sense" in ways that assist how we manage and understand contemporary organizations. (shrink)

Wisdom, long a topic of interest to moral philosophers, is increasingly the focus of social science research. Philosophers have historically been concerned to develop a rationally defensible account of the nature of wisdom and its role in the moral life, often inspired in various ways by virtue theoretical accounts of practical wisdom (phronesis). Wisdom scientists seek to, among other things, define wisdom and its components so that we can measure them. Are the measures used (...) by wisdom scientists actually measuring what philosophers have in mind when they discuss practical wisdom? I argue that they are not. Contemporary measures of wisdom and its components may pick out some necessary prerequisites of practical wisdom, but they do not measure a philosophically plausible practical wisdom or its components. After explaining the argument and defending it against objections, I consider its implications. Should wisdom scientists ignore the philosophical conception of practical wisdom in favor of other conceptions, revise their methods to try to measure it, or continue the interdisciplinary study of practical wisdom without expecting to measure it? I make a preliminary argument for the third option. (shrink)

In recent times, daily, ordinary medical practices have incontrovertibly been developing under the condition of complexity. Complexity jeopardizes the moral core of practicing medicine: helping people, with their illnesses and suffering, in a medically competent way. Practical wisdom (a modification of the Aristotelian phronèsis) has been proposed as part of the solution to navigate complexity, aiming at the provision of morally good care. Practical wisdom should help practitioners to maneuver in complexity, where the presupposed linear ways (...) of operating prove to be insufficient. However, this solution is unsatisfactory, because the proposed versions of practical wisdom are too individualistic of nature, while physicians are continuously operating in varying teams, and dealing with complicated technologies and pressing structures. A second point of critique is, that these versions are theory based, and thus insufficiently attuned to the actual context of everyday medical practices. Now, our proposal is to use an approach of practical wisdom that enables medical practices to counter the complexity issue and to re-invent the moral core of medical practicing as well. This implies a practice oriented approach, as thematized by practice theory, qualitative empirical research from the inside, and abduction from actual performed practical wisdom towards an apt understanding of phronèsis. (shrink)

Philosophically, practical wisdom has been discussed within the context of virtue ethics as a deliberative process or one dependent on a constellation of other virtues. The context of virtue ethics provides additional relevant concepts to consider when defining and measuring practical wisdom. Broadening the psychological perspective to consider the practice of deliberation within decision-making or to examine the contributions of other virtues will advance the understanding of the nuances related to doing the right thing, at the (...) right time, for the right reason toward a moral end. At the same time, with a more developed biological perspective, there can be advancements in the complexity and completeness of the biological model underlying the psychological processes of practical wisdom. Importantly, with a well-developed science of practical wisdom, one can foster behavioral changes in a professional agent conducive to making professionally wise choices. The aim of this collection of essays by experts in the field of practical wisdom is to bring together these multidisciplinary perspectives on the conceptualization of practical wisdom to guide a meaningful integration of concepts of competence and character with care into the education and support of medical professionals. (shrink)

Clinical decision making is a challenging task that requires practical wisdom—the practised ability to help patients choose wisely among available diagnostic and treatment options. But practical wisdom is not a concept one typically hears mentioned in medical training and practice. Instead, emphasis is placed on clinical judgement. The author draws from Aristotle and Aquinas to describe the virtue of practical wisdom and compare it with clinical judgement. From this comparison, the author suggests that a (...) more complete understanding of clinical judgement requires its explicit integration with goals of care and ethical values. Although clinicians may be justified in assuming that goals of care and ethical values are implicit in routine decision making, it remains important for training purposes to encourage habits of clinical judgement that are consciously goal-directed and ethically informed. By connecting clinical judgement to patients' goals and values, clinical decisions are more likely to stay focused on the particular interests of individual patients. To cultivate wise clinical judgement among trainees, educational efforts should aim at the integration of clinical judgement, communication with patients about goals of care, and ethical reasoning. But ultimately, training in wise clinical judgement will take years of practice in the company of experienced clinicians who are able to demonstrate practical wisdom by example. By helping trainees develop clinical judgement that incorporates patients' goals of care and ethical reasoning, we may help lessen the risk that ‘clinical judgement’ will merely express ‘the clinician's judgement.’. (shrink)

Recent reflection on the professional knowledge of teachers has been marked by a shift away from more reductive competence and skill-focused models of teaching towards a view of teacher expertise as involving complex context-sensitive deliberation and judgement. Much of this shift has been inspired by an Aristotelian conception of practical wisdom (phronesis) also linked by Aristotle to the development of virtue and character. This has in turn led recent educational philosophers and theorists – inspired by latter-day developments in (...) virtue ethics and virtue epistemology – to investigate the contribution of various forms of virtue to the effective practice of teaching. In this light, the present paper undertakes further exploration of the logical geography of virtue, character and practical deliberation in teaching. (shrink)

Practical wisdom is the sine qua non of good conduct for Aristotelian virtue ethicists. Aristotelians conceive it as the virtue responsible for the intellectual side of good conduct, which involves having the right goal and deliberating well about what fulfils that goal, among other tasks. But is there any such trait as practical wisdom? Given the diversity of jobs practical wisdom is asked to do (seven goals are often enumerated), there may be a cluster (...) of traits corresponding to what Aristotelians are talking about, so there really isn’t one trait. In this paper, I defend a traditional Aristotelian position on practical wisdom, arguing that it is one thing despite having different functions. Following Thomas Aquinas, we can see practical wisdom as having parts. Those parts may be psychological components (integral parts) of the trait, or they may be derivative functions (virtual parts), things that someone with practical wisdom is also able to do because they have practical wisdom. Still, practical wisdom is one because it is a trait that functions to enable us to pursue the good as good; it possesses what I will call here ‘practical unity’ as the master virtue of praxis or acting well full stop. (shrink)

Practical Wisdom and the Character of Administrative Decisions The purpose of this paper is to show that, while judicial decisions might be productively examined through the lens of the virtue of justice, as an instance of proportionate allocation of goods and evils according to law, the same kind of assessment reveals very little about administrative decisions. The reason is that administrative decisions entail a different kind of reasoning, one that is primarily concerned with the assessment of reality. Administration (...) is the realisation of the will of the (constitutional) State. It is what allows us to take the legal and political order and make something out of it, by transforming reality in a certain way – it is a bridge between the abstract order and the facts of the world as it is. I will argue that practical wisdom offers a useful template to examine administrative decisions, as it allows us to see how they entail the complex interaction between the ends of the State and the nuances of reality. Practical wisdom, after all, is wisdom in action, and combines an understanding of the abstract goals with the correct identification of what the particular circumstances of life require. It is thus the paradigmatic shape of administration in its ideal form. (shrink)

The main topics are Aristotle on the structure and psychology of rational choice ; on practice and production; on practical versus theoretical truth; on particulars as the sphere of practice; on ends and means in deliberation; and on the relation of character and intelligence in practical wisdom. The chapter argues against “Grand End” interpretations of this Aristotelian virtue.

The practice of medicine is a complex endeavor requiring high levels of knowledge and technical capability, and the capacity to apply the skills and knowledge to do the right thing in the right way, for the right reason, in a particular context. The orchestration of the virtues, managing uncertainty, applying knowledge and technical skills to a particular individual in a particular circumstance, and exercising the virtues in challenging circumstances, are the tasks of practical wisdom. Centuries ago, Aristotle suggested (...) that capacities for wise action are developed through practice, experience, and reflection. Neuroscience and cognitive psychology are now beginning to contribute to our understanding of the complex interplay between emotion, cognition, and behavior that is necessary for wise action, and how this capacity for wise action can be developed. In this paper, I propose that wisdom offers an appropriate true north for medical education. Wisdom shifts the focus beyond the simple acquisition of knowledge and technical skills and integrates essential virtues like compassion, trustworthiness, humility, and the balancing of the virtues, into the professional formation for medical students. Informed by the humanities, the neurosciences, and the social sciences, we must now integrate the skills and practices necessary to the development of practical wisdom into medical education at all levels. (shrink)

In an effort to meet growing stakeholder demands for transparency, accountability, and responsibility, many large organizations globally have voluntarily adopted the Global Reporting Initiative guidelines. Moreover, triggered by recent management transgressions, the ancient virtue of practical wisdom has gained increased attention from management scholars, who argue that the Aristotelian concept, with its interdisciplinary nature, has the capacity of turning management back into a holistic, contextual, and virtue-orientated practice. Especially the fact that practical wisdom is firmly based (...) on normative values, coupled with the emphasis on experience and practice, makes it well suited as a leitmotif for sustainable and responsible management. This conceptual paper builds on the link between practical wisdom and sustainability. I argue that the GRI may be regarded as an example of procedural practical wisdom in the context of sustainability reporting, specifically in terms of its emphasis on the holistic and situational dimensions, articulated through the concepts of materiality analysis and stakeholder dialogue. Practical implications, limitations, and avenues for further research are discussed. (shrink)

Practical wisdom is the virtue of thought that enables us to grasp truth as it appears in the realm of actions or, in other words, practical truth. The chapter offers a detailed examination of all the functions of the calculative part of the soul that are correctly or virtuously fulfilled, thanks to our possessing practical wisdom: (1) to correctly understand what happiness is and from which activities and practical ends it eventuates; so practical (...) wisdom involves what Aristotle calls “political science,” which is a knowledge of universals; (2) to inquire about and find out the appropriate means or ways to attain the ends that we consider to further happiness, which requires (2a) correct deliberation (euboulia) and (2b) cleverness (deinotêta); (3) to get a correct perception (aisthêsis) of the particular constituents of each moral action within its particular circumstances (what I call “phronetic perception”); (4) to have the virtue of judging correctly the things deliberation is about, which is comprehension (sunesis); (5) to trigger the doing of the action itself, which Aristotle explains in terms of (5a) deliberate choice (prohairesis) and (5b) prescriptive power (epitaktikê). I conclude by examining the definition of practical wisdom in VI 5–6 and the distinction of its sub-branches in VI 8. I argue that by approaching these functions as intertwining spokes of practical wisdom, we are in a position not only to properly understand Aristotle’s cryptic comments about practical wisdom itself but also the elusive notion of practical reason. (shrink)

Gopal Sreenivasan’s new book, Emotion and Virtue, is an incredibly rich and impressive achievement. It is required reading for anyone working on issues related to character. In the spirit of book discussions in this journal, I will focus less on raising objections and more on exploring how the discussion could be extended in new directions or connected with related topics. The plan is to focus on four topics: (i) the scope of Sreenivasan’s project, (ii) his response to the situationist challenge, (...) (iii) some implications of his view for practical wisdom, and (iv) his account of virtue conflicts. (shrink)

Practice wisdom is needed because the challenges people face in life, work and society are not simple and require more than knowledge, actions and decision making capabilities. In professional practice wisdom enhances people's capacity to succeed and evolve and to assist their clients in achieving positive, relevant and satisfying outcomes. Practice Wisdom: Values and Interpretations brings diverse views and interpretations to an exploration of what wisdom in professional practice means and can become: academically, practically and inspirationally. (...) The authors reflect on core dimensions of practice wisdom like ethics, mindfulness, moral virtue, particularisation and metacognition. The chapter authors tackle the trials that practice wisdom seekers encounter including the demand for resilience, perseverance, finding credibility and humility in practice wisdom, and linking wisdom into evidence for sound professional decision making. Readers are invited to consider what the place of practice wisdom encompasses in pursuing good practice outcomes amidst the turmoil and pressure of professional practice today. Do the imperatives of evidence-based practice and accountability leave enough space for wise practice or is wisdom seen by modern practice worlds as unnecessary, antiquated, unrealistic and redundant? Without a doubt these questions are answered positively in this book in support of the place and value of practice wisdom in professional practice today. (shrink)

Practical wisdom and critical thinking are clearly related, but there is a dearth of research on the specifics of their interrelationship. Developed conceptions of both practical wisdom and critical thinking are needed to achieve a more detailed understanding of their interrelationship. For practical wisdom we favored a conception from the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues at the University of Birmingham, England, adding to it the notions of mindware and learnable intelligence. We surveyed the (...) work of critical thinking pioneers and noted connections with practical wisdom. Then we considered wonder, the attitude that helps encourage critical open-mindedness about questions that need to be raised in the exercise of practical wisdom. Next, we looked at educational efforts to enhance practical wisdom and critical thinking. Finally, we make recommendations for further research. We hope to have provided a “map” that will aid the explorations of others interested in these important topics. (shrink)

Book VI of the EN, which deals primarily with _phronēsis_, the excellence of the practical intellect, contains much that is of great importance for the understanding of Aristotle's ethical theory. Aristotle divides phronēsis into its main kinds or varieties: political wisdom and practical wisdom are the same state of mind, but their essence is not the same. Of the wisdom concerned with the city, the architectonic form of practical wisdom is legislative wisdom. (...) To have legislative wisdom is to understand the nature of human happiness, including above all the life of theoretical contemplation, and to be able to frame political constitutions and laws required for the attainment of happiness. (shrink)

Aristotle took practical wisdom to include cleverness, and something more. The hard question, that he does not explicitly answer, is what this something more is. On my interpretation, the practically wise are not merely more knowledgeable about what is good for people. They are also better able to discern all the values at stake, in whatever circumstances they find themselves. This is an ability that good people develop, typically rather late in life, provided they are masters of their (...) own affairs. According to Aristotle, this development is stunted by wickedness and also by wretchedness. It follows from his account that attempts to teach this virtue are not likely to succeed unless teachers have opportunities for developing practical wisdom through their work. Aristotle’s arguments give us reasons to doubt that teachers can help their students to become virtuous and wise, if their own way to earn a living is not conductive to human flourishing. If we take his message to heart, we should, first and foremost, think about how to steer clear of wretched work conditions, where teachers’ moral agency is narrowly circumscribed. (shrink)

Mentoring is a natural setting for senior employees to render ethics advice and consultation to junior employees. Two studies examined the question of whether those who mentor are more practically wise than those who do not. Although four different measures of practical wisdom were used, no differences were detected. However, mentors were shown to be more politically skilled than non-mentors.

Management has changed in the last few decades, in what Khurana (2007) called “the unfulfilled promise of management as a profession”. Nowadays, it is not difficult to affirm that the trends he already observed then have been confirmed and even increased. The invasion of the field of management, mainly by economics, but also by other disciplines, has continued and gone further, leaving schools (and their graduates) in the hands of the market. If markets and organizations have often been seen as (...) two alternative ways of organizing human cooperation, markets seem today to be managing organizations through mainstream economism, which consists in believing that the elementary notions of economics that we can find in any introductory textbook are a good description of the real world of organizations and the economy. This paper intends to formally establish that intellectual virtues (knowledge) and moral virtues (justice mainly) are necessary to bring actions into practice successfully. We will show how the decisions of both consumers and organization employees depended both on the knowledge they possess, (more specifically, Aristotelian practical wisdom and the “information of time and place” that Hayek 1945 considered fundamental for an efficient allocation of resources); and that, besides, this kind of Hayekian information and practical wisdom push in the same direction. Finally, that to put those decisions into practice the development of moral virtues, mainly justice as well as temperance are needed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Practical Wisdom and Moral Imagination in Sense and SensibilityKaren StohrThere is no single virtue more important to Aristotle's ethical theory than the intellectual virtue of phronesis, or practical wisdom. Yet for all its importance, it is not easy to make sense of this virtue, either in Aristotle's own writings or in virtue ethics more generally. Insofar as Aristotle defines it, he does so opaquely, saying (...) it is "a state grasping the truth, involving reason, concerned with action about things that are good or bad for a human being." 1Practical wisdom is a form of knowledge aimed fundamentally at acting well. It requires both a general understanding of what is worthwhile in human life and the ability to act in ways that reflect that understanding. 2 My goal in this paper is to explore the latter aspect of practical wisdom in its application to ordinary social behavior. The circumstances that will interest me here are often thought to be the domain of manners or decorum, rather than morals proper. Although no one who takes Hume seriously can deny the moral significance of manners, the relationship between one's inner state of character and how that character is expressed in seemingly mundane behavior has received insufficient attention from moral philosophers. 3 In such a task, there can be few better places to begin than with Jane Austen, whose novels reveal the intricacies of ordinary moral behavior with extraordinary acumen.I shall use Austen's Sense and Sensibility to examine the skill associated with knowing how to behave rightly in the sense we associate with propriety or decorum. This skill is essential to pleasant social life, and hence, on the Aristotelian view, to human flourishing. Yet it is often lacking, even among those who have sound moral principles and good hearts. Well-meaning people frequently say or do what is inappropriate. [End Page 378] Consider, for instance, how common it is for kindly disposed people to say to bereaved friends things like, "it's all for the best" or "be thankful for your other healthy children" or "you're young, you'll marry again." The intricacies of offering sympathy are hard to get right, and otherwise good people can unwittingly leave behind disasters in their wakes.The skill of acting well in complex social situations has interesting links to the capacity for moral imagination. Engaging in imaginative identification with others is essential to empathy. 4 Without suggesting that empathy is at the root of all fluid social interactions, I shall argue that certain characteristic failures to act well in that sphere are imaginative failures. In other words, insofar as the exercise of practical wisdom is present in the realm of manners, it requires moral imagination.Failures of moral imagination, however, can take different forms and have different social effects. I shall use two of Austen's characters in Sense and Sensibility—Marianne Dashwood and Mrs. Jennings—to illustrate different ways in which inadequate imaginative capacity can impede the exercise of practical wisdom. The contrast I shall draw is with Elinor Dashwood, to whom I ascribe practical wisdom in full. 5 This contrast is especially interesting because it is not always very sharp: all three characters have fundamentally good moral principles and warm hearts. Yet unlike Elinor, Mrs. Jennings and Marianne routinely fail to act well, and in characteristic ways. Despite the differences in their characters, they have in common an inability to use moral imagination appropriately. The moral errors of Marianne and Mrs. Jennings occur in relatively insignificant circumstances, but the errors themselves point to something deeper about how the virtue of practical wisdom functions in ordinary moral practice.In exploring the link between moral imagination and moral practice, it will help to remember Aristotle's emphasis on the reciprocity between practical wisdom and the moral virtues. Aristotle held that that practical wisdom is necessary for the exercise of the moral virtues and that conversely, the moral virtues are necessary for the exercise of practical wisdom. 6 The justification for the first of these two claims is clearest in the context of Aristotle's doctrine of the mean. Since what counts as a virtuous action depends on features... (shrink)

Fowers et al. (2017)recently made a general argument for virtues as the characteristics necessary for individuals to flourish, given inherent human limitations. For example, people can flourish by developing the virtue of friendship as they navigate the inherent (healthy) human dependency on others. This general argument also illuminates a pathway to flourishing during the COVID-19 pandemic, the risks of which have induced powerful fears, exacerbated injustices, and rendered life and death decisions far more common. Contexts of risk and fear call (...) for the virtue of courage. Courage has emerged more powerfully as a central virtue among medical personnel, first responders, and essential workers. Longstanding inequalities have been highlighted during the pandemic, calling for the virtue of justice. When important personal and public health decisions must be made, the central virtue of practical wisdom comes to the fore. Wise decisions and actions incorporate the recognition of relevant moral concerns and aims, as well as responding in fitting and practical ways to the specifics of the situation. Practicing courage, justice, and practical wisdom illuminates a path to flourishing, even in a pandemic. (shrink)

By defending practical wisdom (phronesis) as a multidimensional virtue that complements the moral virtues, we offer a critique of “practical wisdom eliminativism”, with special attention to the context of medicine, arguing that the core dimensions of practical wisdom enjoy broad consensus. As the meta-virtue that demonstrates excellence in ethical decision-making, practical wisdom recognizes and employs the best means to achieve good and worthwhile ends by integrating goals, perception of context, moral virtues, deliberation, (...) reason-guided emotion, and motivation. In medicine, practical wisdom encompasses patient-centered deliberation directed toward ends of health and flourishing that promote the patient’s good. To counter the notion that practical wisdom is a redundant concept (the eliminativist view), we provide philosophical arguments, evidence from medical practitioners, and psychometric data from a detailed empirical study of US and UK adults. Practical wisdom has survived for more than 2300 years as a unified and unifying intellectual meta-virtue that guides the moral virtues. We believe the reasons we put forward explain why phronesis should be expected to endure as a meaningful, multidimensional concept reflecting the nature of moral deliberation in response to practical challenges in life and medicine. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Adolescence has been highlighted as a significant period in an individual’s character development and autonomous decision-making. Social cognitive theories of character emphasise the importance of the interaction between person and context in making decisions which promote the good. A Grounded Theory methodology was used to explore how adolescents apply their virtue beliefs when faced with moral dilemmas, an ability which has been called ‘practical wisdom’ in some theories of character development. Eighteen participants aged 12–15 took part in (...) interviews to explore their moral decision-making processes. The findings suggest the interaction between adolescents’ virtue beliefs and contextual factors can vary according to the individual’s prior experience, the factors salient to them within the immediate context (particularly social and emotional factors) and the weight they assign to possible consequences of their decisions. The study concludes that adolescents’ moral decision-making processes vary between individuals and across situations, with social cognitive theories of decision-making offering a possible explanation for these variations. (shrink)

Confucianism, since the time of Confucius, emphasizes “practical wisdom” as the realization of philosophy. This approach accentuates the practical aspects of wisdom rather than the analytical rationale of the intellect. Emphasis on practical wisdom persistently reinforces a moral foundation that is not differentiated from personal virtue. At the same time, practical wisdom in Confucianism stresses self-cultivation, or the complete transformation of the self, derived from the internal state of the heart/mind (xin 心). (...) Finally, Confucian insists that practical wisdom must be transformed into practical action. (shrink)