When formulating the concept of the impulse-image, Deleuze never tires of asserting that these images are saturated with death and obsessed by degradation. They stand at a curious intersection in the taxonomy of images, a constitutively in-between space: they are formally inserted between affection-image and action-image in The Movement-Image, but produce a direct passage to the time-image. However, they do not reach the time-image due to obsession by the negative effects of time. This (...) article introduces the concept of the impulse-image in Deleuze's work on the impulse and death instinct, in his fundamental texts of the 1960s and 1970s, including his collaboration with Félix Guattari. The death instinct in the late 1960s was a transcendental principle that acquired the form of the groundless or crack-up essential for the production of difference. It is at this time that Deleuze publishes Zola and the Crack-up, an embryonic essay for what would later become the impulse-image. In the 1970s, Deleuze, along with Guattari, fought the need to include a groundless force in the mould of the death instinct. Speaking of cinema in the 1980s, which is when he returns to the impulse theme, one finds characteristics of both preceding periods, especially the structure conceived in the 1960s (the incidence of the groundless as a transcendental force of disarticulation), associated with the criticism of the 1970s (a need to overcome the song of death to reach time and desire). However, Deleuze now stands apart, recognising a naturalistic image and admiring a practice of symptomatology, but pointing out that his own understanding of the world does not lie in it. With the impulse-images, Deleuze also plays a relevant role in studies of film naturalism, shaping a powerful concept for studies of contemporary naturalistic symptomatologies that emerge in situations of misery of civilisation. (shrink)

This study investigated the mediating roles of self-acceptance and self-esteem in the relationship between body image dissatisfaction and impulse buying, and tested the moderating effect of gender on the relationships. A sample of 374 college students and graduate students participated in the study. Results revealed that body image dissatisfaction positively associated with impulse buying; self-esteem plays a mediating role between body image dissatisfaction and impulsive buying; a serial indirect pathway emerged; the mediation path from self-acceptance (...) to self-esteem was stronger for female than that from male. The results underscore the importance of identifying the mechanisms that moderate the mediated path between body image dissatisfaction and impulse buying among students. These findings point to the potential implications about how to reduce impulse buying through improving body image satisfaction. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: -- Preface to the English edition \ Translators' Introduction \Preface to the French Edition \ 1. Theses on Movement: First Commentary onBergson \ 2. Frame and Short, Framing and Cutting \ 3. Montage \ 4. TheMovement-Image and its Three Varieties: Second Commentary on Bergson \ 5. ThePerception-Image \ 6. The Affection-Image Face and Close-Up \ 7. TheAffection-Image: Qualities, Powers, Any-Space-Whatevers \ 8. From Affect toAction: The Impulse Image \ 9. The (...) Action-Image: The Large Form \ 10. The Action-Image:The Small Form \ 11. Figures, or the Transformation of Forms \ 12. The Crisisof the Action-Image \ Glossary \ Notes \ Index. (shrink)

Although images are an integral part of historical research today, it is quite unusual that a historian is conceiving the image as a heuristic model instead of interpreting it in terms of representation (of an event or “its” time). In this article, I argue that in a long-term dialogue with image theory and by taking photographs of monuments and memory sites, Reinhart Koselleck discovered the image as an experimental space for thinking of historical time differently from linear (...) narrative. Koselleck's photographs of memory sites in particular may be viewed as an invitation to explore the intricate relations between individual perception now and then, experience, memory, and its cultural (trans-)formations. Seen this way, images can provoke new questions and give impulses for methodological reflection in historical research. (shrink)

The Hebrew Bible provides a rich language and manifold images of describing the beginning of life. It does not determine the status of the embryo in a technical way, but reflects general human experiences with the indeterminacy of prenatal life. Its attitude towards the beginning of life is always multi-dimensional, combining physical, personal, social and transcendental perspectives. The tension between theological explanations and human responsibility is reflected both in the Hebrew Bible and in modern bioethical discussions. Although texts like 1 (...) Sam 1-2 and Ps 139,13-16 were written in a completely different context, their way of speaking about this tension shows parallels with current themes. (shrink)

One of the less well-researched areas in the recent renaissance of the study of Reformed orthodoxy is anthropology. In this contribution, we investigate a core topic of Reformed orthodox theological anthropology, viz. its treatment of the human being as created in the image of God. First, we analyze the locus of the imago Dei in the Leiden Synopsis Purioris Theologiae. Second, we highlight some shifts of emphasis in Reformed orthodox treatments of this topic in response to the budding Cartesianism. (...) In particular, the close proximity of the unfallen human being and God was carefully delineated as a result of Descartes’s positing of a univocal correspondence between God and man; and the Cartesian suggestion that original righteousness functioned as a barrier for certain natural impulses, was rejected. Third, we show how, in response to the denial of this connection, the image of God was explicitly related to the concept of natural law. Tying in with similar findings on other loci, we conclude that Reformed orthodox thought on the imago Dei exhibits a variegated pattern of extensions, qualifications, and adjustments of earlier accounts within a clearly discernable overall continuity. (shrink)

Hormonal changes across the menstrual cycle have been shown to influence reward-related motivation and impulsive behaviors. Here, to compare neural mechanisms of cognitive impulse control during the mid-luteal phase (LP) versus during the late follicular phase (FP), we employed functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) with an event-related monetary delay discounting (EMDD) behavioral task (study 1) and then employed resting state (RS)-fMRI (study 2). The imaging data were analyzed and related to behavior-associated neural activation. In study 1, women in the (...) late FP showed a preference for sooner rewards while exhibiting enhanced activity in the dorsal striatum (DS), whereas women in the mid-LP showed a preference for delayed, higher-value rewards with enhanced activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). Discount rate (transformed k) in the EMDD task correlated with functional connectivity (FC) of the DS-dlPFC circuitry, consistent with the possibility that DS-dlPFC circuitry may regulate impulsivity. In study 2, the right dlPFC was significantly more active in mid-LP than in late FP, and this effect was sensitive to estradiol (E2) and relative E2 levels during mid-LP. The magnitude of DS-dlPFC FC correlated negatively with psychometric impulsivity scores during the late FP. These results replicated findings from study 1 and further indicated that relative E2 levels may play an important role in increasing cognitive control during the mid-LP, which provides new insight into the treatment of conditions characterized by hyper-impulsivity, such as obsessive-compulsive disorder, Parkinson disease, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. In conclusion, our results suggest that cyclical gonadal hormones affect cognitive control on impulsive behavior periodically, possibility via DS-dlPFC circuitry. (shrink)

Slow and meticulous methodological practices remain at the core of the collage technique, which gives rise to compositions of diverse figurative or abstract nature. Due to the constant exploration of new artistic territories (not only in terms of technique, but also in form and content), collage opens the door to imaginative worlds where anything is possible in a hybrid dimension. Furthermore, collage allows various expressive techniques to converge in a single artistic artifact, which, to collage artist Josep Renau, could also (...) represent forms of cultural and political commitment. The present chapter explores what happens when art and collage enter the university classroom in a course for initial teacher training. In our case study, we found collage encouraged the student participants to imagine, observe, demonstrate, explore, and experiment—with every single piece of paper that intertwined with another to shape an encounter. In the process of producing their piece of artwork, the student needed to know how to craft their design, use the different tools and materials, and let themselves become fully engaged in their specific dialogue with the objects, while, at the same time, internally restructuring themselves. There was a constant tension between that which was already known and that which was not, and individual sensitivities were embodied in the form of intense images, capturing the movement, the vibration, that which is surreal or symbolic, and the very archetypes of life. (shrink)

Bilder spielen in allen Schulfächern immer schon eine zentrale Rolle. Die intellektuellen Energien, die in den Bildungs- und Erziehungswissenschaften aufgewendet werden, um Fragen des Einsatzes von Bildern zu beantworten, wirken daher beachtlich. Eingeklammert bleiben dabei bisher jedoch Phänomene der Unsichtbarkeit, obwohl sie grundlegend für alles Bildliche sind. Denn sie gehören zu jener Dimension, die wir als "latent" bezeichnen. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit den Funktionen von Bildern in Lehrkontexten kann deshalb nur erfolgreich sein, wenn die philosophischen Debatten über "Latenz", die zwischen dem (...) Zeitalter der Aufklärung und dem frühen 21. Jahrhundert stattgefunden haben, Eingang in die bildungswissenschaftliche Theoriebildung finden. (shrink)

This paper analyzes human desire beyond frameworks that understand it merely as impulse, lack, motivation, or goal-directedness. It examines the process through which desire is compared with self-image and transformed into a task of self-alignment. Human beings want to eat, rest, be loved, be recognized, experience sexual attraction, create, and live freely. Yet the distinctive character of human desire does not lie simply in the existence of desire itself. Human beings experience desire while also interpreting themselves as beings (...) who have that desire. In this process, desire does not remain a simple state of wanting. It becomes a problem of self-interpretation, raising questions such as “Why do I want this?”, “Is this desire consistent with who I am?”, and “What kind of person am I, if I want this?” To explain this process, this paper proposes the concept of desire self-alignment. Desire self-alignment refers to the process through which human beings interpret and arrange desire within self-understanding when desire conflicts or becomes entangled with self-image, self-worth, relational position, bodily sensation, and the direction of life. This concept is distinct from mere rationalization. Whereas rationalization is closer to a defensive process that retrospectively justifies an already existing desire or action, self-alignment refers to a broader process through which desire is interpreted and positioned in relation to the self from the moment it emerges. This paper reviews existing theories of desire, self-determination theory, social comparison theory, self-discrepancy theory, self-regulation theory, cognitive dissonance, self-verification theory, second-order desire, and sexual script theory, while presenting an analytical focus distinct from these approaches. Existing theories have mainly explained what human beings desire, what levels desire has, what emotions arise from comparison and discrepancy, and how the gap between present and desired states is regulated. By contrast, this paper analyzes the pathways through which desire is processed after it encounters self-image. The model of desire self-alignment proposed in this paper consists of detection of importance, emergence of desire, self-reflection, comparison with self-image, attempted self-alignment, and outcome differentiation. Human beings first experience the moment when something ceases to be irrelevant to them. This detected importance is then transformed into wanting or avoidance. Afterward, human beings reflect on themselves as subjects of desire, compare the desire with their self-image, and attempt to arrange it within their lives. This process branches into integration, adjustment, suppression, defensive justification, fragmentation, and overidentification. Integration occurs when desire is placed within self-understanding and the direction of life. Adjustment occurs when desire is not denied, but its conditions and modes of expression are regulated. Suppression occurs when desire is pushed away as shameful or unacceptable. Defensive justification occurs when desire is protected as unquestionably right without sufficient examination. Fragmentation occurs when desire and self-image cannot be integrated, producing shame, self-loathing, and repetitive thought. Overidentification occurs when the fulfillment or frustration of desire expands into a judgment about the whole value of the self. Thus, the central problem of desire is not simply whether desire is strong or weak, but how desire relates to self-image and how that relation is processed. This paper treats sexual desire as a high-density case in which the structure of desire self-alignment becomes especially visible. Sexual desire has a biological basis, but in human beings it is entangled with bodily response, emotion, cognitive permission, self-image, relational safety, trust, mutuality, shame, gender norms, responsibility, and later memory. Human beings do not experience sexual attraction merely as a bodily response. They ask whether it is love, pleasure, loneliness, a need for recognition, whether it is consistent with their self-image, whether it is safe within a relationship, and whether they can bear its consequences. In this sense, sexual desire shows in compressed form how even basic desire becomes an event of self-interpretation in human beings. This paper also analyzes how contemporary society makes desire self-alignment more difficult. Contemporary society does not simply create desire from nothing. Rather, it activates desire more frequently, makes comparison more immediate, and allows desire to become attached to self-image more easily. Appearance, achievement, relationships, creativity, consumption, status, sexual imagery, and social recognition are continuously displayed and compared. In this environment, human beings may experience the feeling that they are insufficient before they can interpret what they actually desire. The problem of contemporary desire therefore lies not merely in the excess of desire, but in the repeated stimulation of desire before it can be sufficiently self-aligned. This paper further emphasizes that the mere presence of self-consciousness does not automatically guarantee mature desire processing. Self-consciousness creates an interpretive space between desire and action, but this space may lead not only to integration, but also to self-blame, defensive justification, or excessive loops of analysis. Human maturity, therefore, does not consist in the elimination of desire. It consists in the capacity to detect desire, distinguish its sources and meanings, interpret its tension with self-image, and arrange it within the direction of life. In conclusion, this paper locates the distinctive character of human desire not in the emergence of desire itself, but in the fact that desire is compared with self-image and transformed into a problem of self-interpretation. Human beings are not only beings who satisfy desire. They are also beings who ask what kind of beings they are through desire. Desire should therefore be understood not as a mere impulse or lack, but as a core structure through which human beings interpret themselves, arrange their lives, and form the direction of self-understanding. (shrink)

As philanthropic sales via live-streaming shopping have played an important role in alleviating the huge backlog of agricultural products during the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, this paper aims to study how online interaction in philanthropic marketing exerts influence on consumer impulse buying behaviors. We empirically explore four major dimensions of online interactions in philanthropic live-streaming sales, i.e., the live streamers’ image, the herd effect of consumers, the responsiveness of sellers, and the mutual trust between consumers. The results (...) reveal that the herd effect of consumers and the responsiveness of sellers could promote consumers’ empathy ability toward the growers of the products sold lively, whereas the live streamers’ image and the mutual trust between consumers have little effect on empathy promotions. Meanwhile, both the consumers’ empathy ability and the live streamers’ image positively affect consumers’ impulse buying behavior, which suggests a partial moderating role of consumers’ empathy ability. Lastly, by taking both social and business perspectives, we provide managerial implications for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of philanthropic live-streaming sales to alleviate social and economic pressure in emergencies. (shrink)

This book argues that Adorno's writings allow us to address what is arguably the central challenge of modern philosophy: how to picture a world beyond suffering and injustice without betraying its vital impulse. By re-appraising his writings on politics, philosophy, and art, Sebastian Truskolaski reconstructs Adorno's overall project from a radically new perspective. Taking his 'standpoint of redemption' at its starting point, whilst also dealing with his recurrent reference to the Old Testament ban on images, this book brings Adorno's (...) central concerns to bear on debates about Utopia that have come to define political visions across the political spectrum. (shrink)

Previous research suggests that exposure to nature may reduce delay discounting and thereby facilitate healthier dietary intake. This pre-registered study examined the impact of online exposure to images of natural scenes on delay discounting and food preferences. It was predicted that exposure to images of natural scenes would be associated with: lower delay discounting; higher desirability for fruits and vegetables ; and delay discounting would mediate the effect of nature-image exposure on food desirability. Adult participants were recruited to an (...) online between-subjects experiment in which they viewed a timed sequence of six images either showing natural landscape scenes or urban scenes. They then completed measures of mood, delay discounting and rated their momentary desire to eat four fruits and vegetables, and four energy-dense foods. There was no statistically significant effect of experimental condition on delay discounting or food desirability. Bayes factors supported the null hypothesis for discounting, and energy-dense food desirability, but provided no strong evidence for either hypothesis for F&V desirability. These findings indicate that brief online exposure to images of nature does not affect momentary impulsivity or energy-dense food preference, whereas for preference for less-energy dense foods, the evidence was inconclusive. (shrink)

This article deploys Spinoza’s ethic of joy alongside Deleuze and Guattari’s exposition of micropolitics to expose how fascist desires and affects bloom and circulate through digital communications ecosystems that generally promote a diffusion or decentralisation of power. Beyond the steady barrage of alt-right content conscientiously documented by liberal journalists and progressive watchdogs, a more persistent and widespread fascist impulse permeates the very forms of some of our most banal digitally mediated acts and encounters. Rather than a sole looming authoritarian (...) figurehead, the network itself – particularly with the new image paradigms propelled by apps such as Instagram and TikTok – has become the rallying point for the circulation of fascistic affects, burnished through the art and ethos of following: of rules, routines, protocols, accounts. I contend that a joyful passion accompanies much of this everyday experience of keeping up with one’s feeds, engaging the platforms, participating in the spectacles. This is what Sontag, interrogating the appeal of the Third Reich, calls the ‘joy of followers’, a joy in fascist belonging, which is to suggest that fascist movements thrive not only on the circulation of negative affects like hatred and fear, but also on the profusion of pleasure and affiliation. Deleuze’s Spinoza, resolutely anti-fascist, helps us parse this situation as it plays out in the social media sphere. Spinoza offers a bipartite conceptualisation of joy that allows us to diagnose the pleasures particular to fascist belonging and network belonging alike as passive, partial and indirect. Ultimately, what we today share with historical fascisms is a ubiquitous aesthetic that merges art with life and bodies with information, and a corresponding ethos that cultivates conformism, barbarises critical thought and redirects joyful impulses into reactionary social forms. As fascistic power relations spread anew through digital cultures’ newly evolving modes of visuality, hapticity, vibration and expression, one can observe something of what Deleuze calls ‘sad joy’, a sort of joy rooted in conquest and domination. The aim of this article is to root out such sad joys, to appreciate their appeal, and ultimately to reject them in all their various forms. (shrink)

In examining the visual culture of Victorian London during the years 1855–1870, Lynda Nead in her book Victorian Babylon explores the difficult and restless narrative of modernization that any of us who have read D. G. Rossetti's “The Burden of Nineveh” will recognize as crucial to the Victorian imagination. As Nead promptly establishes, Babylon for the Victorians was a trope evoking gain and loss, triumph and hubris, future and past ruination. Taking this ancient city as her titular image, then, (...) Nead aims to rearticulate urbanism and modernity, indeed challenging us to reconceive what we mean by “modernity.” Positioning her own arguments against the influential architectonics of Marshall Berman's All That Is Solid Melts into Air and favoring instead the writings of Michel Foucault, Walter Benjamin, and Michel de Certeau, Nead recasts modernity as an “untidy experience,” a “constant struggle with history”. Near her book's end, Nead provocatively claims: “Ruin is the resolution of the contradictory impulses of modernity”.Victorian Babylon explores the spaces of mid‐Victorian London and, more important, the experience of inhabiting those very spaces. This textual tour is divided tidily into three sections: a first on mapping and water, a second devoted to gas and light, and a third on obscenity, which Nead calls “improvement's other”. As Nead herself claims about the metropolitan travel literature she examines, her book speaks well to the eye. Victorian Babylon is a vicarious tour of London thanks to Nead's deft and abundant use of fresh images, which she has culled assiduously from private collections, archives, and especially illustrated nineteenth‐century periodicals. Her study thus takes us to fascinating places: readers travel along with John Hollingshead on his journey down to London's sewers; we are invited into Joseph Paxton's dreamscape of the Great Victorian Way; and we play for a night at Cremorne Pleasure Gardens, witnessing Madame Poitevin's balloon ride. We hesitantly enter the haunted and obscene Holywell Street.The catalogic abundance of Victorian Babylon works both to Nead's advantage and disadvantage. Surely the sheer range of Nead's material proves her points about the frenzy and incomprehensibility of modernity and the promiscuity of Victorian commercial culture. But invariably the variety of topics results in too much cursory analysis—a paragraph on photography followed by a paragraph on the International Health Exhibition; brief excursions into the realms of advertising, illustrated sheet music, and music halls. Subsequently, a reader might grow eager instead for book‐length studies of these issues. Yet the most egregious omission of an adequate treatment is the two‐page cursory overview of the picturesque. Here, Nead misses an opportunity to offer a more extended, theoretical treatment of the “metropolitan picturesque” and how this aesthetic category relates—or not—to the other psycho‐aesthetic touchstones for her work, which are the sublime and the urban uncanny. One might also rue the absence of an extended treatment of the relic versus the ruin at the book's close.The analysis of the book does grow stronger as it unfolds. The Cremorne Gardens in the second section make for interesting reading, and Nead is best at discussing London at night, the uncanny, and what she calls a poetics of gas. The final section on obscenity is most promising, for here the Babylonic polyphony of Victorian London—what Nead calls the twin mission, to build and destroy—hits the reader with full force. One might wish that Nead had spent a bit more time on obscenity before extending her treatment to the more symbolic, architectural expression of obscenity‐cum‐obsolescence, the Temple Bar. However, the fate of the Temple Bar is nicely evocative of the ruin and, thus, takes the reader full circle back to the ambiguities of modernity. (shrink)

This essay is an analysis of conscious perception and conscious memory. It tries to show that percepts and mental images (roughly, experientially, the same as Hume's "impressions and ideas") are sets of particles at the perceived stimulus objects and at the remembered stimulus objects. It is thus a theory of direct perception and direct memory, and a materialism but not a central state materialism. The percept (we claim) is an "appearance" of the stimulus object particles (perceived object particles) which is (...) due to the way the particles at the perceived object are interconnected (interrelated) by the networks of stimuli-plus-neuron-impulses starting from them. The same is true of the mental image. This essay is primarily an analysis of such networks--to show, we claim, how they make the sets of object particles seem to have sense qualities and gestalts and other properties of percepts and mental images. (shrink)

Proceeding from Lessing’s distinction between poetry and visual art, Boris Groys argues that language is not external to, but resides behind, the image. The image constitutes the scene of a frustrated linguistic desire. Modern visual art sought to avoid the obscenity of staging this unfulfilled desire by conducting a systematic ascetic repression of the linguistic impulse. This negation of linguistic desire culminated in Judd’s ‘specific ob jects’. Y et the modern image, Groys emphasizes with reference to (...) Greenberg and McLuhan, still transmits a message, namely that of its medium bearer. Modern artists torture the image and put it into a state of emergency or exception in which it confesses its interior. In the image’s sub-medium space, in turn, resides language. Avantgarde artists and modern media theorists share the wish to achieve durability by becoming the media of the media. The border between the image and language, Groys closes, can neither be stabilized nor abolished. (shrink)

The twentieth century began with the deconstruction of the image, as it is ending with the effort to restore it. Cubism, dada, and abstract expressionism took apart what, in their various ways, pop art, magic realism, and neoexpressionism have tried to put back together. Tonality in music and narrative in literature have undergone similar change.1 What has been at stake in each case has been the redefinition of a center, a normative or ordering principle as such. Yeats intuited this (...) general phenomenon in his famous observation that “the center cannot hold,” and though whether one applauds or, with Yeats, condemns the result, it is undeniable that the crisis of contemporary culture has been in large part experienced as a deprivation of norms.This sense of deprivation has been most apparent in the plastic arts. The fashioning of images has been one of the primary impulses of human art. It has been the basis of most systems of visual representation and constitutes the earliest record we have off art itself. Its loss or abandonment has been in good part responsible for the bewilderment and hostility much of the general public continues to express toward modern art.The experience of this loss, however, has not been confined to the public alone. For many artists, the sense of modern art’s expressive potential has been tempered by an anxiety about its ultimate direction.2 For these artists, the image had not been transcended but rather rendered inaccessible, and implicitly or explicitly they sought its restoration. At the same time, they were keenly aware that there could be no return to exhausted modes of representation, no looking back except as parody or quotation.3 1. Among the studies comparing changes across the arts in the early twentieth century are Georges Edouard Lemaître, From Cubism to Surrealism in French Literature , and Bram Dijkstra, The Hieroglyphics of a New Speech: Cubism, Stieglitz, and the Early Poetry of William Carlos Williams . More recently, visualization in cubist art and relativity theory has been compared in Linda Dalrymple Henderson, The Fourth Dimension and Non-Euclidean Geometry in Modern Art . For a general overview, see Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space, 1880-1918 . Marxist critics, notably Walter Benjamin, have long insisted on the relationship between modernism in the arts and the crisis of the traditional order.2. This is clearly visible in the work and writing of pioneers such as Kandinsky and Klee or, to take a later case, Adolph Gottlieb. The correspondence between Kandinsky and Schönberg is illuminating as well.3. Much of the neoimagistic art of the past twenty-five years falls into these categories, and thus signals a prolongation rather than a resolution of the crisis. Pop art was clearly an art of parody, while work of an artist such as Malcolm Morley might almost be taken as an illustration of Benjamin’s thesis about the work of art in an age of mechanical reproduction. His “imitations,” like those of Robert Lowell in verse, betray a deep anxiety about mastery and tradition. Much the same can be said for such musical compositions as Lukas Foss’ “Baroque Variations” and “Phorion” or Luciano Berio’s “Sinfonia,” to name but a random few among many. Robert Zaller is professor of history and head of the department of history and politics at Drexel University. He was formerly on the faculties of Queens College , the University of California at Santa Barbara, and the University of Miami. His books include The Parliament of 1621: A Study in Constitutional Conflict and The Cliffs of Solitude: A Reading of Robinson Jeffers. (shrink)

Mikhail Lifshits’ interpretation of the scholarly work of the Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico is analysed against the background of other Soviet interpretations. M. Lifshits authored the introductory article for the first complete translation of Vico’s Scienza Nuova in 1940. In the second half of the 1930s, interest in Vico’s ‘historical theory of knowledge’ was important for the struggle against so-called ‘vulgar sociology’ in the field of aesthetics and literary criticism. Besides this, Vico’s theory of the ‘historical cycle’ was close to (...) the interests M. Lifshits and G. Lukács and their circle in Stalin-era Moscow. This interest was connected with discussions about the preservation of the revolutionary impulse under the conditions of state socialism. However, such an interpretation of Vico restricted a wide spectrum of his scholarly work. In particular, Lifshits, as an opponent of social-constructivism tradition, ignored Vico’s well-known doctrine of verum factum. (shrink)

The article discusses some aspects of an ontology of the virtual, where the virtual is considered as a new type of entity that emerges through digital technologies. It is an ontological hybrid that combines body and image, object and event, internal and external. This virtual entity arises from the interaction between computer programming and the human body, enhanced by technological prosthetics. Although these entities are clearly artificial, they possess an innate impulse for change that is not tied to (...) their natural components, but to their nature as events. In this context, the term ‘hybrid’ refers to a fusion of the artificial and the natural, almost like a ‘living’ system. Virtual entities are not just objects or events, but also subjects, existing only through the encounter between digital writing and the bodies that interact with it. This leads to a conception of relationships as fundamental to the constitution of these entities, suggesting that the interactions themselves can give rise to new realities. (shrink)

Most authors who discuss willpower assume that everyone knows what it is, but our assumptions differ to such an extent that we talk past each other. We agree that willpower is the psychological function that resists temptations – variously known as impulses, addictions, or bad habits; that it operates simultaneously with temptations, without prior commitment; and that use of it is limited by its cost, commonly called effort, as well as by the person's skill at executive functioning. However, accounts are (...) usually not clear about how motivation functions during the application of willpower, or how motivation is related to effort. Some accounts depict willpower as the perceiving or formation of motivational contingencies that outweigh the temptation, and some depict it as a continuous use of mechanisms that interfere with re-weighing the temptation. Some others now suggest that impulse control can bypass motivation altogether, although they refer to this route as habit rather than willpower.It is argued here that willpower should be recognized as either or both of two distinct functions, which can be calledresolveandsuppression. Resolve is based on interpretation of a current choice as a test case for a broader set of future choices, which puts at stake more than the outcome of the current choice. Suppression is inhibiting valuation of (modulating) and/or keeping attention from (filtering) immediate alternatives to a current intention. Perception of current choices as test cases for broader outcomes may result in reliable preference for these outcomes, which is experienced as an effortlesshabit– a successful result of resolve, not an alternative method of self-control. Some possible brain imaging correlates are reviewed. (shrink)

Numbers have been identified with symbolic data forever. The profound association of both with acoustics, music, and sonic art from Pythagoras to current work is beyond reproach. Recently, sonification looks for ways to realize symbolic data (representing results or measurements) as well as “raw” data (signals, impulses, images, etc.) into compositions. In the strictest sense, everything in a computer is symbolic, that is, represented by 0s and 1s. In the arts, the digital age has broadened and enhanced the conceptual landscape (...) not simply through its servitude to the creative process, but as its partner. However, there is a rich history of the use of data that no doubt has paved the way for many of today’s experiments including my own. (shrink)

Self-harm is a potentially lethal symptom of borderline personality disorder (BPD) that often improves with dialectical behavior therapy (DBT). While DBT is effective for reducing self-harm in many patients with BPD, a small but significant number of patients either does not improve in treatment or ends treatment prematurely. Accordingly, it is crucial to identify factors that may prospectively predict which patients are most likely to benefit from and remain in treatment. In the present preliminary study, twenty-nine actively self-harming patients with (...) BPD completed brain-imaging procedures probing activation of the prefrontal cortex during impulse control prior to beginning DBT and after seven months of treatment. Patients that reduced their frequency of self-harm the most over treatment displayed lower levels of neural activation in the bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex prior to beginning treatment, and they showed the greatest increases in activity within this region after seven months of treatment. Prior to starting DBT, treatment non-completers demonstrated greater activation than treatment-completers in the medial prefrontal cortex and right inferior frontal gyrus. Reductions in self-harm over the treatment period were associated with increases in activity in right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex even after accounting for improvements in depression, mania, and BPD symptom severity. These findings suggest that pre-treatment patterns of activation in the prefrontal cortex underlying impulse control may be prospectively associated with improvements in self-harm and treatment attrition for patients with BPD treated with DBT. (shrink)

By creatively expanding Deleuze's concept of the time-image crystal, I productively fold together and engineer an encounter between two comparable cinematic movements otherwise separated by huge vistas of time and space. Here, I work to plicate the post-war Italian neorealist movement which Deleuze saw inaugurating the modern cinema, with a ‘postsocialist’ mainland Chinese movement that I playfully call ‘neo-realism’. The films of both historical moments formulate comparable break-away cinemas which are often considered moral or socially responsible art cinemas best (...) approached through André Bazin's ‘ontological’ film philosophy lens. By using Deleuze, however, I hope to move beyond these realist discussions to explore how both movements are also fruitfully thought in terms of introducing distinct yet analogous mental relations into the image during historical junctures defined by radically transforming psycho-geographies. Like Deleuze's discussions of neorealism, neo-realism is considered a loose impulse or mode that collectively bears witness to confusing and bewildering mental experiences from within a turbulent period of cultural, ideological and historical upheaval: which demands new ways of perceiving, thinking and acting. Without wanting to fall into a problematic auteur paradigm, I necessarily employ the films of Wang Xiaoshuai as emblematic examples of the wider impulse or trend. Indeed, Wang's films perfectly reify a new ethico-aesthetic form of Chinese cinema marked by a proliferation of new spaces, characters, experiences and narrative structures. Here, I also strive to do what Deleuze did not in his writing upon film, and explore the break-ups, breakdowns and breakthroughs in specific relation to a complex contextual web of political and cinematic ecosystems. Throughout this process I try to put Deleuze to work by using the films and context to re-interrogate and re-evaluate the time-image models as they appear within and across his Cinema books. (shrink)

Freud’s investigation into the unconscious sphere of the human psyche and its complex processes did not merely provide a heuristic tool for the interpretation and understanding of psychic manifestations; above all, it demythologized anthropocentric narcissism and the philosophical–metaphysical conviction that the self-conscious subject of modernity is governed by self-sufficiency and transparency and, consequently, is responsible for and in control of its thoughts, desires, and actions through autonomous will. The Freudian discovery of the unconscious overturns the Cartesian notion of subjectivity; it (...) questions the Cartesian equation subject = ego = consciousness. This “Copernican” displacement of the center of consciousness from the subjective ego to the unconscious structure of the psyche intimates the abyssal darkness of Being and the chaotic texture of the Cosmos, which cannot be incorporated into symbolic discourse, even though it traverses it and perpetually escapes it. -/- Thus, it problematizes—without transcending them—fetish concepts such as truth, reality, authenticity, propriety, appropriation, and belonging, and demonstrates that there exists no foundational knowledge nor any ultimate certainty, since all symbolic-cognitive systems, including science itself—of which Freud remained a restrained yet stubborn defender—constitute rationalizations in relation to the real, abstractions in relation to the concrete, generalizations in relation to the singular. Rationalized elements become idealized and are transformed into ideas, ideals, and principles referring to a metaphysical beyond, a transcendence of meaning. Freud reveals that symbolic institutions are idealizations—though he overlooks their deeper significance—and that imaginary identities and identifications are radical illusions. -/- Although he struggled to illuminate and exorcise the ancient shadows of irrationalism and belief in the supernatural, the undertaking fulfilled itself precisely through its failure. We say this because psychoanalysis—and this is due to Freud himself and not merely the Freudians—constitutes an “anti-theological” theology, an “anti-religious” meta-religion, whose metaphysical core possesses all the structural characteristics of both classical mythology and modern mythology, namely technology. Freud himself, to some extent, recognized this. -/- Freud’s entire project moves between what he himself calls instinctual mythology and the hope for a future pharmacodynamic and technical intervention. “The theory of instincts is, so to speak, our mythology, ” he writes in New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. “The future may teach us, let us hope, to act directly, through certain chemical substances, upon the quantities of energy and their distribution within the psychic apparatus, ” he says in An Outline of Psychoanalysis. -/- At this point, it is necessary to clarify the structural characteristics of mythology. The first is universality: a mythology constitutes a complete image of “humanity within the world.” Every mythology also possesses an origin—a decisive moment of revelation or diagnostic insight from which the entire system derives—and certain developmental stages linked through the logic of causality. Another element indicative of the mythological universe is the development of a particular language, emblematic images, metaphors, and dramatic scenarios. This language generates its own system of myths; it depicts the world through a series of foundational rituals, gestures, and symbols. -/- The great mythologies constructed in the West during the nineteenth century were not merely attempts to fill the void left by the erosion of organized religion and systematic theology under the pressure of techno-scientific rationality—above all, the decline of Christian theology and dogma. They themselves became a kind of substitute theology, organized according to rules, as symbolic images of the meaning of humanity and “reality.” These were systems of belief and argumentation marked by intense anti-religiosity. They posited as metaphysical principle a world without a metaphysical principle (God), and denied life after death. Yet their structure, ambitions, and demands upon believers remained profoundly metaphysical and religious, both strategically and in terms of their effects. -/- Freudian psychology, despite its metaphysical and metaphorical dimensions and its quasi-religious aspect, represents an exaltation of the organizing power of rational thought, which decisively contributed to the unveiling and exploration of the non-rational dimension of existence. Above all, it continued the process of dismantling anthropocentric narcissism, the egocentrism of the modern individual, the individualism and autism of the contemporary subject. Of course, Copernicus, Darwin, Marx, Nietzsche, Einstein, and others had preceded him. Freud continues the long therapeutic process against anthropocentric arrogance and hubris—a process that must continue and expand in the Space Age through the recognition that humanity participates in, belongs to, and communicates with the biosphere and the Universe as a whole, which exists not for colonization and conquest but for dwelling and hospitality. -/- The question that arises is this: Did Freudian mythology—and the other mythologies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—succeed in filling the existential void created by the disintegration of religion? Was the longing of soul and spirit for Truth satisfied? Was the nostalgia and thirst for the Absolute and the transcendent weakened? Did the impulse toward mystery subside? -/- The belief held by the intellectuals of humanistic nihilistic Enlightenment—that the rise of the sciences (mathematics, physics, social sciences, applied sciences) would satisfy humanity’s need for order, beauty, and moral integrity in a way surpassing revealed religion, thereby filling the vacuum created by religion’s collapse—a collapse for which science itself is causally and logically co-responsible—was not confirmed. The dominance of techno-scientific rationalism and abstract conceptual schemas, producing a truth that is abstract, neutral, and impersonal, despite its productive contributions and despite the catastrophes it caused, fulfilled only partially the expectations it had cultivated. -/- The sense of failure prevailing in a West that is planetary in scope yet declining, the anxiety, dissatisfaction, unease, and fear dominating the soul and spirit of humanity, the subtle feeling that nothing is truly under control, strengthen the irrational and absurd element of existence. This irrationality overcompensates for the loss of meaning through nostalgia for the Absolute, the transcendent, Truth, Innocence, and Harmony, reviving beliefs, myths, and dogmas of the past. (shrink)

This paper critiques the modern conception of the human being that has treated emotion as an obstacle to maturity or as the opposite of reason, and analyzes how emotion has historically been hierarchized, disciplined, and reconstructed into manageable forms. Modern society has not simply eliminated emotion. Rather, it has positioned emotion below reason and interpreted it as a sign of immaturity, irrationality, impulsiveness, and unprofessionalism, while actively demanding emotions useful to institutions and productivity—such as kindness, empathy, devotion, and positivity—through occupational (...) roles and emotional labor. In this sense, emotional suppression in modern society is not a demand for the absence of emotion, but a structure of emotional discipline that permits individuals to feel and express emotion only in socially acceptable ways. This paper argues that such emotional discipline is deeply connected to the modern image of the human being. Industrialization, bureaucracy, capitalist labor systems, and discourses of self-management have presented the ideal person as one who remains stable, predictable, and continuously functional. Within this structure, emotion is treated not as a core way in which human beings relate to the world, but as an internal variable that may interfere with functional performance. Sadness is repositioned as a decline in function that must be recovered from, anger as a risk that must be regulated, anxiety as a psychological state that must be managed, and vulnerability as a weakness that should be privately contained. As a result, human beings are constructed less as beings who understand their own emotions than as beings who must adjust their emotions to institutional demands. This paper also examines how emotional suppression has operated in conjunction with gendered power. Women have long been evaluated as irrational and less professional on the grounds of being “emotional,” while at the same time being disproportionately assigned the labor of noticing, regulating, and caring for the emotions of others. Men, by contrast, have been idealized as rational beings free from emotion; yet what has actually been prohibited is not emotion as such, but emotions such as sadness, fear, dependence, and vulnerability. Power-oriented emotions such as anger, dominance, and aggression have been relatively permitted as part of masculinity. The gendering of emotion therefore damages women and men in different ways and distorts human relationships into functional and self-protective structures. At the same time, this paper does not absolutize emotion as a pure truth that should simply be liberated. Emotion is important information, but it is not immediately truth. Some emotions accurately detect present danger, violation, loss, or love, while others may interpret the present inaccurately through their entanglement with past experiences, learned prejudice, self-defense, or distorted structures of meaning. What is needed, therefore, is neither the removal of emotion nor unconditional obedience to it, but a metacognitive capacity to feel emotion while reinterpreting where it arose, what it indicates, whether it is appropriate to the present situation, and what form of action it should or should not become. This paper redefines emotion not as a simple impulse, but as the first detection of meaning. Fear reveals the significance of danger; anger reveals violation and injustice; sadness reveals the depth of loss; and love reveals that another person has acquired a special position of meaning within one’s world. Emotion is the first signal that human beings are not indifferent to the world. Reason does not exist to replace or silence emotion, but to interpret and reconstruct the meaning and significance disclosed by emotion. Emotion and reason, therefore, should not be understood as opposites, but as a relation between prior detection and reflective interpretation. In conclusion, this paper moves beyond the emotionally restrained human being that modern society has presented as an ideal and proposes the metacognitive human being as an alternative model of maturity: a human being capable of enduring, interpreting, and responsibly expressing emotion. A society that suppresses emotion does not produce peaceful human beings, but may instead produce individuals who cannot read themselves and cannot understand the emotions of others. True maturity does not lie in eliminating emotion, but in receiving it as information while distinguishing it from action and interpreting its meaning. Human beings do not become complete by removing emotion; they come closer to themselves by understanding it. Emotion is not merely a weakness of humanity; it is evidence of the way human beings relate to the world. Human beings are shaken by emotion, and through interpreting that disturbance, they learn themselves. Human beings do not become whole by silencing emotion; they become more fully themselves when they learn to understand what emotion reveals. (shrink)

Arthur Rimbaud, a prominent figure in the late 19th-century literary scene, is often celebrated for his groundbreaking contributions to modernist poetry. His work, characterized by its experimental form and vivid imagery, embodies many of the philosophical tenets of modernism. This essay explores how the philosophy of modernism manifests in Rimbaud's poetry, focusing on themes of rebellion against tradition, fragmentation, subjectivity, symbolism, and alienation. -/- 1. Rebellion against Tradition -/- One of the hallmark features of modernist poetry is its defiance of (...) traditional forms and conventions. Rimbaud was a pioneer in this regard, rejecting the rigid structures of classical poetry in favor of free verse and unconventional rhythms. In works such as "A Season in Hell" ("Une Saison en Enfer"), Rimbaud employs a prose-poetic style that eschews the constraints of meter and rhyme, allowing for a more fluid and dynamic expression of thought. This rebellion against tradition reflects a broader modernist impulse to break free from the past and explore new artistic possibilities. -/- Fragmentation and Juxtaposition -/- Modernist poets often use fragmentation and juxtaposition to create complex layers of meaning and challenge readers' perceptions. Rimbaud's poetry is replete with abrupt shifts in imagery and tone, resulting in a disjointed yet evocative narrative. In "The Drunken Boat" ("Le Bateau Ivre"), for example, Rimbaud presents a series of vivid, seemingly unrelated images that collectively convey a sense of disorientation and liberation. This technique mirrors the fragmented nature of modern existence, as well as the modernist desire to capture the multiplicity of human experience. -/- 2. Subjectivity and Inner Experience -/- A key aspect of modernist philosophy is its emphasis on subjectivity and the inner workings of the mind. Rimbaud's poetry delves deeply into the realm of personal experience, exploring themes of identity, perception, and self-discovery. His work often blurs the line between reality and imagination, reflecting the modernist interest in the unconscious and the fluidity of human consciousness. In "A Season in Hell," Rimbaud's introspective journey becomes a vehicle for examining the complexities of the self and the elusive nature of truth. -/- Exploration of Identity and Self-Discovery -/- Rimbaud's poetry is marked by a profound introspection and a quest for self-discovery. In works such as "A Season in Hell" ("Une Saison en Enfer"), Rimbaud embarks on a journey of inner exploration, grappling with questions of identity and the nature of existence. The poem is a confessional and autobiographical narrative that delves into the poet's inner turmoil and existential angst. Through vivid and often surreal imagery, Rimbaud articulates the fragmented and fluid nature of the self, reflecting the modernist emphasis on the subjective experience of the individual. The theme of self-discovery is also evident in Rimbaud's famous assertion, "I is another" ("Je est un autre"), which encapsulates his belief in the multiplicity and fluidity of identity. This notion challenges the conventional understanding of a stable and coherent self, suggesting instead that identity is constantly shifting and evolving. Rimbaud's exploration of identity resonates with the modernist preoccupation with the inner life of the individual and the complexities of human consciousness. -/- Perception and the Unconscious Mind -/- Rimbaud's poetry often blurs the line between reality and imagination, reflecting his interest in the workings of the unconscious mind. His use of rich and evocative imagery invites readers to engage with his work on a deeply emotional and intuitive level. In "Illuminations," Rimbaud's prose poems are filled with dreamlike visions and hallucinatory landscapes that evoke the fluid and elusive nature of perception. The modernist fascination with the unconscious is evident in Rimbaud's exploration of altered states of consciousness. His poetry frequently delves into themes of intoxication, madness, and visionary experience, suggesting a desire to transcend the limitations of ordinary perception and access deeper layers of the mind. This exploration of the unconscious reflects the modernist belief in the power of art to reveal hidden truths and to illuminate the mysteries of the human psyche. -/- 3. Symbolism and Imagery -/- Rimbaud's use of rich, often surreal symbolism and imagery is a defining feature of his modernist sensibility. His poems are filled with metaphors and symbols that invite multiple interpretations and resonate on an emotional level. The imagery in "The Drunken Boat" is particularly striking, as Rimbaud conjures a kaleidoscopic vision of the natural world that transcends ordinary perception. This reliance on symbolism reflects the modernist belief in the power of art to evoke profound, often ineffable experiences. -/- Innovative Use of Imagery -/- Rimbaud's poetry is renowned for its striking and unconventional imagery, which often challenges readers to see the world in new and unexpected ways. In "The Drunken Boat" ("Le Bateau Ivre"), Rimbaud presents a series of vivid and hallucinatory images that evoke the disorienting experience of a boat adrift on the sea. The poem's imagery is rich and evocative, capturing the tumultuous and ever-changing nature of the protagonist's journey. For example, Rimbaud writes: > "I have seen the low-hanging sun spotted with mystic horrors, > Lighting up long violet coagulations > Like performers in very ancient dramas! > Waves rolling back the horizons and breaking forth in light." Through this kaleidoscopic vision, Rimbaud creates a sense of both wonder and disorientation, reflecting the fluid and unstable nature of reality. The imagery in "The Drunken Boat" serves to transport readers into a world of heightened perception, where ordinary experiences are transformed into extraordinary and often surreal visions. -/- Symbolism and Emotional Resonance -/- Rimbaud's use of symbolism is central to his poetic vision, allowing him to convey deep emotional and psychological truths through metaphor and allegory. In "A Season in Hell" ("Une Saison en Enfer"), Rimbaud employs a range of symbols to explore themes of suffering, redemption, and self-discovery. The poem's title itself is symbolic, suggesting a period of intense inner turmoil and transformation. -/- Throughout "A Season in Hell," Rimbaud uses symbolic imagery to represent his emotional state and spiritual journey. For example, the recurring motif of fire serves as a symbol of both destruction and purification. Rimbaud writes: > "I firmly intend to possess the truth and to behold the justice of victory! That will, is a ray of light! – Pride is the flame that devours me." Here, fire symbolizes the intense passion and inner conflict that drive the poet's quest for truth and self-understanding. The symbolic imagery in Rimbaud's poetry resonates on an emotional level, inviting readers to connect with the poet's inner experience and to reflect on their own journey of self-discovery. -/- . (shrink)

To raise the question of the nature of narrative is to invite reflection on the very nature of culture and, possibly, even on the nature of humanity itself. So natural is the impulse to narrate, so inevitable is the form of narrative for any report of the way things really happened, that narrativity could appear problematical only in a culture in which it was absent—absent or, as in some domains of Western intellectual and artistic culture, programmatically refused. As a (...) panglobal fact of culture, narrative and narration are less problems than simply data. As the late Roland Barthes remarked, narrative "is simply there like life itself . . . international, transhistorical, transcultural."1 Far from being a problem, then, narrative might well be considered a solution to a problem of general human concern, namely, the problem of how to translate knowing into telling,2 the problem of fashioning human experience into a form assimilable to structures of meaning that are generally human rather than culture-specific. We may not be able fully to comprehend specific thought patterns of another culture, but we have relatively less difficulty understanding a story coming from another culture, however exotic that culture may appear to us. As Barthes says, "narrative...is translatable without fundamental damage" in a way that a lyric poem or a philosophical discourse is not. · 1. Roland Barthes, "Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives," Music, Image, Text, trans. Stephen Heath , p. 79.· 2. The words "narrative," "narration," "to narrate," and so on derive via the Latin gnārus and narro from the Sanskrit root gnâ . The same root yields γνωριμος : see Emile Boisacq, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque , under the entry for this word. My thanks to Ted Morris of Cornell, one of our greatest etymologists. Hayden White, professor in the program of history of consciousness at the University of California, Santa Cruz, is the author of The Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism, The Greco-Roman Tradition, and Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe. " The Narrativization of Real Events" appeared in the Summer 1981 issue of Critical Inquiry. Critical Responses to the present essay include Louis O. Mink's "Everyman His or Her Own Annalist", and Marilyn Robinson Waldman's "The Otherwise Unnoteworthy Year 711: A Reply to Hayden White," both in the Summer 1981 issue of Critical Inquiry. (shrink)

On 15 October 1959, Rudolf Carnap, a leading member of the recently founded Vienna Circle, came to lecture at the Bauhaus in Dessau, southwest of Berlin. Carnap had just finished his magnum opus, The Logical Construction of the World, a book that immediately became the bible of the new antiphilosophy announced by the logical positivists. From a small group in Vienna, the movement soon expanded to include an international following, and in the sixty years since has exerted a powerful sway (...) over the conduct of the philosophy of science as well as over wide branches of philosophy, economics, psychology, and physics. The site of Carnap’s lecture that day, the Dessau Bauhaus, was a stunning building designed by Walter Gropius and dedicated just three years earlier. Protected by its flat roof and glass walls, the artists, architects, weavers, and furniture designers had made the school a citadel of high modernism. It was here that Carnap addressed an enthusiastic audience on “Science and Life.” “I work in science,” he began, “and you in visible forms; the two are only different sides of a single life.”1 In this paper I will explore this “single life” of which the new philosophy and the new art were to be different facets; in the process, I hope to cast light on the shared modernist impulses that drove both disciplines in the interwar years. 1. Rudolf Carnap, lecture notes for his Bauhaus lecture, “Wissenschaft und Leben,” prepared 1 Oct. 1929 and delivered 15 Oct. 1929, transcription from shorthand by Gerald Heverly, Carnap Papers in the Archives of Scientific Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh Libraries, University of Pittsburgh , document RC 110-07-49. Quoted by permission of the University of Pittsburgh. All rights reserved. Translations are my own unless otherwise noted. Peter Galison is associate professor in the departments of philosophy and physics at Stanford University, where he co-chairs the program in the history of science. His primary interest is in the history and philosophy of experimentation, the subject of his How Experiments End and Big Science: The Growth of Large-Scale Research, edited with Bruce Hevly . His current project is entitled Image and Logic: The Material Culture of Modern Physics. (shrink)

Traditional ideas about the basic nature of humanity are under attack as never before. The very attributes that make us human--free will, the permanence of personal identity, the existence of the soul--are being undermined and threatened by the current revolution in the science of the mind. If the mind is the brain, and therefore a physical object subject to deterministic laws, how can we have free will? If most of our thoughts and impulses are unconscious, how can we be morally (...) responsible for what we do? The Problem of the Soul shows the way out of these seemingly intractable paradoxes. Framing the conflict in terms of two dominant visions of the mind--the "manifest image" of humanistic philosophy and theology, and the scientific image--renowned philosopher Owen Flanagan demonstrates that there is, in fact, common ground, and that we need not give up our ideas of moral responsibility and personal freedom in order to have an empirically sound view of the human mind. (shrink)

Timothy Deane-Freeman traces Deleuze's remarks about the digital to reveal both their origins and implications. In so doing, we encounter a position which is fundamentally ambiguous. On the one hand, digital techniques are intimately related to what Deleuze calls 'societies of control', which deploy them in order to close down potential spaces of creativity and resistance. On the other, digital images take up the mantle of cinema, displacing habitual forms of cognition and forcing us to think in new ways. Deane-Freeman (...) traces these dual impulses through the images of cinema, television and social media, as well as explicating key Deleuzian concepts, including virtuality, immanence and the outside. (shrink)

After the Event Horizon Telescope Collaboration released in April 2019 the first empirical images of a black hole, an astrophysical object previously thought “unseeable,” much of the public discourse has approached these images as straightforward visual depictions of a black hole. This article challenges this view by showing that the first images of a black hole went beyond merely making an invisible cosmic object visible and that the images published in April 2019 were just the first in a series of (...) black hole images the researchers continue producing. Drawing primarily on Sybille Krämer’s concept of the cartographic impulse, the article demonstrates that the Event Horizon Telescope images are, first and foremost, epistemic tools. These epistemic tools enable researchers to actively explore various physical aspects and dynamic properties of a black hole’s immediate environment and test theoretical predictions about it, thus making this elusive environment empirically knowable. To demonstrate this, the article analyses the mapping operations that combined automated algorithmic procedures with expert human judgment and through which these images were produced, read, and interpreted. It also examines how the different Event Horizon Telescope images relate to one another, which particular epistemic functions they fulfil in the research context, under which conditions, and with which limitations, thus tracing how these images facilitate the production of new scientific knowledge about black holes. (shrink)

The work "Taboos on the teaching vocation" was read by the German social philosopher and representative of critical theory Theodor Adorno as a report on May 21, 1965 at the Berlin Institute for Educational Research. In this report, Adorno considered the socio-psychological and socio-cultural reasons that in the context of Western European culture have historically led to the social emergence of many psychological taboos on the pedagogical work of the school teacher. The philosopher theoretically deduced the dialectical connection between human (...) hostility and disgust for the work of the teacher from the cultural tradition of German society, which historically developed as late bourgeois. A characteristic feature of the attitude of the overly materialistic socio-cultural system was aversion to the work of the teacher as a "hungry job", that is, to a poorly paid profession. Another factor of public disgust for the work of teachers, the philosopher called the socio-cultural tradition of society, which as a closed society willingly practiced physical violence as a means of social coercion. According to this tradition, through the use of violence, the teacher must subordinate students to his authority, subordinate to social and school ideology. The historical result of such dialectics was the socio-cultural distortion of the image of the teacher, the castration of his image in social psychology, his self-alienation from the professional vocation and the ideological elimination of the power of his spirit. As an ideological alternative, Adorno suggested that society, if it consciously seeks democratic change, first of all take into account such young teachers who demonstrate the impulse of their individual spirit in the performance of their profession. According to the philosopher, only the spiritual freedom of such a young educator, a man who is capable of self-understanding, conscious of himself and his vocation, who reflects and is socially active, can democratize schools, devalue society and destroy dehumanized social traditions. First of all – in order to overcome the barbaric tradition of violence. (shrink)

In this fascinating but sometimes baffling book, the reader engages with a series of conditionals like the following: “If [the psychiatrist] Clérimbault manifests a delirium, it is because he discovers the tiny hallucinatory perceptions of ether addicts in the folds of clothing”. “If Leibniz’s principles [of identity and sufficient reason] appear to us as cries, it is because each one signals the presence of a class of beings that are themselves crying and draw attention to themselves by these cries...”. Deleuze’s (...) study is concerned with Leibniz and with leibnizianism; with the Baroque considered as a historical period and with the baroque considered as a persistent impulse in architecture, decoration, and in human thinking and system construction. Baroque and baroque are explorations, in his view, of curvilinearity, and Deleuze explores Leibniz’s use of mathematical analogies from topology, projective geometry and the calculus. But his attention in the book is mainly fixed on two Leibnizian images. The first image is that of the two-storied house, typically represented in baroque painting by an angelic realm in the upper half of the picture hovering above the human realm. In Leibniz’s writings, this translates into the world of matter and the world of intelligent, self-conscious spirits on the upper level. The second image is that of the fold, which appears in the pleats and draperies of Baroque costume, sculpture, and interior decoration, and which reappears in Leibniz’s mind-as-folded curtain, in his enveloped organisms, preformed under folds, and in the continuum, from whose recesses ever more numbers or particles can be pulled out. In clothing, waves, the brain, pleats of all sorts, surface disappears into interior. Deconstruction! But is it philosophy? Yes! Though Deleuze pulls his comparison-objects out of every corner of contemporary French culture, they are never arbitrary, and the book is focused clearly on its subject. (shrink)

In this article, the results of conceptualization of the definition of mind as an object of interdisciplinary applied research are described. The purpose of the theoretical analysis is to generate a methodological discourse suitable for a functional understanding of the mind in the context of the problem of natural language processing as one of the components of developments in the field of artificial intelligence. The conceptual discourse was realized with the help of the author's method of structural-ontological analysis, and developed (...) in the mainstream of the system-methodological tradition of the school of G.P. Shchedrovitsky and intended for descriptive research of subject areas of interdisciplinary objects of scientific study. As a result of the structural and ontological analysis of the super-system, the relevant place and role of the directly studied system (mind) are determined, and its primary process and material are localized and structural and functional connections are described. At the basic level, the mind is conceptualized as an energy process unfolding in a spatio-temporal environment and accompanied by archetypal structuring of neural impulses into images. The genesis of the system is separately analyzed by constructing a structural-ontological matrix that reflects the initial stage of the development of the mind. The primary process is concretized with the help of hetero- and homeostatic dichotomy, and also the most significant features of the consistent transformation of the material of the system and its ascent to verbal morphology are described. The structural-ontological comparison of the functioning of the verbal intelligence with the preverbal level has been carried out. The transformation of neural impulses of needs into words, as verbal units fixing semiotic values is analyzed. Structural-ontological connections that determine the reactive and prospective characteristics of the functioning of the system are disclosed. The position of the chronological primacy of "semiotic readiness" for language with respect to the debut of the latter as an information-sign model of the environment is argued. The hypothesis of domination at the initial stage of the development of the mind of exopsychic functions over endopsychic ones is formulated. The theoretical substantiation of the hypothesis of the inevitability of the ontology of language in the functional understanding of the mind is given, corresponding structural and ontological arguments are given, including those based on the ideas about the information relationship between affects and needs, according to the views of P.V. Simonov. The arguments are presented in favor of the non-alternative methodology of A. Turing in studies of artificial intelligence. (shrink)

A common perception of Spinoza casts him as one of the precursors, perhaps even founders, of modern humanism and Enlightenment thought. Given that in the twentieth century, humanism was commonly associated with the ideology of secularism and the politics of liberal democracies, and that Spinoza has been taken as voicing a “message of secularity” and as having provided “the psychology and ethics of a democratic soul” and “the decisive impulse to… modern republicanism which takes it bearings by the dignity (...) of every man,” it is easy to understand how this humanistic image developed. Spinoza’s deep interest in, and extensive discussion of, human nature may have contributed to the emergence of this image as well. In this paper, I will argue that this common perception of Spinoza is mistaken and that Spinoza was in fact the most radical anti-humanist among modern philosophers. Arguably, Spinoza rejects any notion of human dignity. He conceives of God’s - and not man’s - point of view as the only objective perspective through which one can know things adequately, and it is at least highly questionable whether he allows for any genuine notions of human autonomy or morality. The notions of ‘humanism’ and ‘anti-humanism’ have been discussed extensively -mainly among continental philosophers - since the end of World War II. Because these notions carry a variety of historical, ideological, and philosophical meanings, it is important to provide at the outset at least a rudimentary clarification of my use of these two terms. By ‘humanism’ I mean a view which (1) assigns a unique value to human beings among other things in nature, (2) stresses the primacy of the human perspective in understanding the nature of things, and (3) attempts to point out an essential property of humanity which justifies its elevated and unique status. This definition of philosophical humanism has only little in common with the historical notion of Renaissance humanism, and seems to match quite well the common understanding of philosophical humanism suggested by current philosophical dictionaries and encyclopedias. This notion of humanism should be understood in contrast to two competing positions. On the one hand, in contrast to the theocentric position that considers humanity to be radically dependent upon God, humanism affirms at least some degree of human independence. On the other hand, in contrast to the naturalist position which endorses the scientific examination of human beings just like any other objects in nature, humanists affirm the existence of a metaphysical and moral gulf between humanity and nature. This gulf assigns a special value to humanity and does not allow us to treat human beings like any other things in nature. For many humanists the nature/humanity gulf does not allow the application of the methods of natural sciences to the disciplines of the humanities. Humanism does not begin with modernity. In order to see how far back we can trace this position, we may recall Protagoras’ saying: “Man is the measure of all things, of things that are, that they are, and of things that are not, that they are not.” In modern philosophy, the humanistic position had regained dominant status since the Renaissance, and variants of this position were vigorously argued for by prominent thinkers such as Pico della Mirandola, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, and finally, Hegel. In this paper, I will argue that Spinoza was a foe, and not a friend, of this tradition. I suggest that, in contrast to these humanist philosophers, Spinoza considers man as a marginal and limited being in nature, a being whose claims and presumptions far exceed its abilities. “To what length will the folly of the multitude not carry them?.... [T]hey imagine Nature to be so limited that they believe man to be his chief part.” Arguably, Spinoza locates the origin of our most fundamental metaphysical and ethical errors in a human hubris which not only tries to secure humanity an exceptional place in nature but also attempts to cast both God and nature in its own human image. (shrink)

By referring to H. Bergson's theory about the evolutionary process, this article reflects on the antinomic character of the two fundamental tendencies of the vital movement, which are pure time and materiality. Starting from the importance of the image in this philosophy, it focuses on the Bergsonian ontology, questioning the notion of vital elan and how matter comes and the real-time is inscribed in it. By highlighting the ambiguity of the role played by materiality in the tensioning of vital (...) forces, the discussion explains that the original impulse establishes its antipode. Thus, it reveals the dramatic character that permeates the movement intrinsic to the history of life, in which effort and struggle are correlated to the limits of the impulse that moves it - and inevitable questions for the creative act that defines it. (shrink)

This Article doDespite obvious differences in the Aristotelian and Stoic theories of responsibility, there is surprisingly a deeper structural similarity between the two. The most obvious difference is that Aristotle is (apparently) a libertarian and the Stoics are determinists. Aristotle holds adults responsible for all our "voluntary" actions, which are defined by two criteria: the "origin" or cause of the action must be "in us" and we must be aware of what we are doing. An "involuntary" action, for which we (...) are not responsible, is one that fails to meet either one of these two criteria. Aristotle is a libertarian insofar as he insists that all voluntary actions are "in our power" to perform or not. As determinists the Stoics cannot admit this sort of freedom, but they still consider the agent to be a vital link in the chain of events, so they redefine what is "in our power" as what comes about "through us." The terminology is different, but I argue that these actions, for which the Stoics hold us responsible, are in fact coextensive with Aristotle's voluntary actions. An "impression" is the first necessary condition for action, and is a sort of visual image of the object stimulating one to act. The right sort of impression activates the agent's "impulse," an internal movement of soul or mind, which is the direct cause of action. But impulse is always accompanied by "assent," which is the mind's affirming the truth of the proposition that we ought to go after the object stimulating our impulse. Thus, since assent is a necessary condition for action, we always act knowing what we are doing. This means that all actions caused by our own impulse and assent are by Aristotle's criteria voluntary, where impulse provides the internal origin of the action and assent provides the awareness of what is being done. I conclude that the Stoic and Aristotelian classes of what one is responsible for are coextensive, their criteria defining responsible actions are nearly identical, and the only substantial difference is that Aristotle claims such actions are in our power to do or not do while the Stoics say that such actions are necessitated (by our internal nature as well as external factors). es not have an abstract. (shrink)

Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is considered to be one of the more common serious mental disorders, with a prevalence rate of about 1% (Heyman et al. 2006). It is characterized by obsessions, or compulsions, or both. According to the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association 1994), obsessions are “recurrent and persistent thoughts, impulses, or images that are experienced at some time during the disturbance, as intrusive and inappropriate and that cause marked anxiety or distress.” Compulsions, on the other hand, are repetitive behaviors (e.g., (...) hand washing, ordering, checking) or “mental acts that the person feels driven to perform in response to an obsession, or according to rules that must be applied .. (shrink)

Moral and legal notions engaged in clinical ethics should not only possess analytic clarity but a sound basis in empirical findings. The latter condition brings into question the expansion of the mature minor exception. The mature minor exception in the healthcare law of the United States has served to enable those under the legal age to consent to medical treatment. Although originally developed primarily for minors in emergency or quasi-emergency need for health care, it was expanded especially from the 1970s (...) in order to cover unemancipated minors older than 14 years. This expansion initially appeared plausible, given psychological data that showed the intellectual capacity of minors over 14 to recognize the causal connection between their choices and the consequences of their choices. However, subsequent psychological studies have shown that minors generally fail to have realistic affective and evaluative appreciations of the consequences of their decisions, because they tend to over-emphasize short-term benefits and underestimate long-term risks. Also, unlike most decisionmakers over 21, the decisions of minors are more often marked by the lack of adequate impulse control, all of which is reflected in the far higher involvement of adolescents in acts of violence, intentional injury, and serious automobile accidents. These effects are more evident in circumstances that elicit elevated affective responses. The advent of brain imaging has allowed the actual visualization of qualitative differences between how minors versus persons over the age of 21 generally assess risks and benefits and make decisions. In the case of most under the age of 21, subcortical systems fail adequately to be checked by the prefrontal systems that are involved in adult executive decisions. The neuroanatomical and psychological model developed by Casey, Jones, and Summerville offers an empirical insight into the qualitative differences in the neuroanatomical and neuropsychological bases of adolescent versus adult decision making. These and other data, as well as developing law bearing on the culpability of juvenile criminal offenders, argue for critically re-evaluating the expansion of the mature minor exception with regard to medical decision making, as well as in support of a rebuttable presumption in favor of treating minors as immature decisionmakers. The clinical ethics of adolescent medical decision making will need foundationally to be reconsidered. (shrink)

Philosophical Anthropology is one of the post-Husserlian splinters -- a dizzying mix and match of phenomeno-psycho-anthro-philosophical hyphenated schools of thought. It arose first in the 1920's out of the same intellectual promptings as existentialism, which it briefly rivaled. It differs from existentialism and other phenomenologies in fine ways which Landmann combs scrupulously, along with distinctions among the sub-specialties that have proliferated within the field itself. Fortunately, two more general premises distinguish it from other forms of anthropology. First, taking anthropology in (...) its broadest sense as man's search for a self-conception, it allows a signal, shaping importance to its own formulations: culturally speaking, and psychologically too, man tries, tends to fit his self-image. Second, embracing man and everything human as its focus, it assumes phenomenology's grandest claims: reconciliation of the inward and the outer, and, by inference at least, a proper holistic restoration of the essential human sphere. The impulse and the method are widely evident now and several disciplines seem to be quivering toward some such point of convergence. But it is a moot point whether Philosophical Anthropology will stake out the ground. Landmann traces it from its substantive origins with the Greeks down through its most niggling modern self-assertions in a strictly academic survey of high-philosophical or similarly accredited propositions, The argumentative appeals (Freud, Nietzsche) seem rather dated now; and there is a further difficulty in that the action and its object are one and the same, the medium, so to speak, is the message -- i.e., thought about man. While this is a necessary aspect of the method, it can be disorienting. Scholars, however, will know where they are, and this will admit admirably to conventional, general uses. (shrink)

"Perhaps more than any other scientist of our century, Edward O. Wilson has scrutinized animals in their natural settings, tweezing out the dynamics of their social organization, their relationship with their environments, and their behavior, not only for what it tells us about the animals themselves, but for what it can tell us about human nature and our own behavior. He has brought the fascinating and sometimes surprising results of these studies to general readers through a remarkable collection of books, (...) including The Diversity of Life, The Ants, On Human Nature, and Sociobiology. The grace and precision with which he writes of seemingly complex topics has earned him two Pulitzer prizes, and the admiration of scientists and general readers around the world.In Search of Nature presents for the first time a collection of the seminal short writings of Edward O. Wilson, addressing in brief and eminently readable form the themes that have actively engaged this remarkable intellect throughout his career.""The central theme of the essays is that wild nature and human nature are closely interwoven. I argue that the only way to make complete sense of either is by examining both closely and together as products of evolution.... Human behavior is seen not just as the product of recorded history, ten thousand years recent, but of deep history, the combined genetic and cultural changes that created humanity over hundreds of thousands of years. We need this longer view, I believe, not only to understand our species, but more firmly to secure its future.The book is composed of three sections. ""Animal Nature, Human Nature"" ranges from serpents to sharks to sociality in ants. It asks how and why the universal aversion to snakes might have evolved in humans and primates, marvels at the diversity of the world's 350 species of shark and how their adaptive success has affected our conception of the world, and admonishes us to ""be careful of little lives""-to see in the construction of insect social systems ""another grand experiment in evolution for our delectation.""The Patterns of Nature"" probes at the foundation of sociobiology, asking what is the underlying genetic basis of social behavior, and what that means for the future of the human species. Beginning with altruism and aggression, the two poles of behavior, these essays describe how science, like art, adds new information to the accumulated wisdom, establishing new patterns of explanation and inquiry. In ""The Bird of Paradise: The Hunter and the Poet,"" the analytic and synthetic impulses-exemplified in the sciences and the humanities-are called upon to give full definition to the human prospect.""Nature's Abundance"" celebrates biodiversity, explaining its fundamental importance to the continued existence of humanity. From ""The Little Things That Run the World""-invertebrate species that make life possible for everyone and everything else-to the emergent belief of many scientists in the human species' possible innate affinity for other living things, known as biophilia, Wilson sets forth clear and compelling reasons why humans should concern themselves with species loss. ""Is Humanity Suicidal?"" compares the environmentalist's view with that of the exemptionalist, who holds that since humankind is transcendent in intelligence and spirit, our species must have been released from the iron laws of ecology that bind all other species. Not without optimism, Wilson concludes that we are smart enough and have time enough to avoid an environmental catastrophe of civilization-threatening dimensions-if we are willing both to redirect our science and technology and to reconsider our self-image as a species.In Search of Nature is a lively and accessible introduction to the writings of one of the most brilliant scientists of the 20th century. Imaginatively illustrated by noted artist Laura Southworth, it is a book all readers will treasure.". (shrink)

This article attempts to determine whether Parmenides intended the chariot imagery of his poem to be construed allegorically, as argued by Sextus Empiricus. Modern interpreters have rejected the allegorical reading, arguing that Sextus was biased by Plato, the allegory's true author. There are, however, reasons to believe that a tradition (either native or imported) of employing the chariot image allegorically preexisted Plato and Parmenides. This article argues that Parmenides was drawing upon such a tradition and did portray mind as (...) a charioteer upon a path of knowledge, and impulse as the horses, requiring guidance in order to reach the destination. (shrink)

To relate theories of affordance and frame with the tradition of formal aesthetics, philosophical iconology and the life sciences (keyword Vitality Semiotics) is the starting point of the paper. According to this approach, the structural preconditions of images, as determined by materials, techniques and the composition of the design means, become essential. Through these structures, the producers are able to set impulses that become decisive for the interpretation of space and time or the "scene" as a dynamic event. Against the (...) social and cultural background of the recipients the "scene" gains a meaning to their life. This means to understand the productʼs conception and composition as an affordance which determines the framework of the reception conditions. The benefit of this approach lies in the identification of changes in the self-understanding and thus of trends in to new standards of societies. This is to be illustrated by Exekiasʼ drinking bowl around 540/30 BC in Munich. (shrink)

Postcolonial theory, particularly in its poststructuralist variant, presents important challenges to sociology's self-image, and open debate on these attempts to `unsettle' the modernist, Westernized disciplines is both conceptually and politically interesting. However, the postcolonial unsettling of sociology has to be actively extracted and reconstructed from the key texts of postcolonial theory - it is not transparently available as such - and this is the first main goal of the article. Particular attention is paid to the framings of these issues (...) by Stuart Hall, Homi Bhahba and Robert Young. Second, the article offers the elements of a counter-critique, pointing out where the anti-sociological impulses of postcolonialism are exaggerated or unfounded, and also indicating serious internal problems for postcolonial theory when it is pitched as a direct and superior alternative to the modernist sociological `imaginary'. The continuing centrality (and difficulty) of questions on the nature of and purpose of explanatory social theory and postcolonial cultural studies are discussed. (shrink)

This analytical study explores the poetry of the eminent pre-Islamic poet Imru’ al-Qays through a meticulous examination of the various stages of his life, highlighting the psychological and social reflections that left profound marks on his poetic journey. The research is grounded in the methodological premise that poetic creativity, in its fully developed form, cannot be comprehended apart from the historical, social, and psychological context within which it was shaped. Poetry, in this framework, is perceived as the result of a (...) complex interaction between the subjective and the objective, and hence must be interpreted through a composite approach that considers the poet’s engagement with his environment, society, and personal experiences. In this regard, the study focuses particularly on the transformation in Imru’ al-Qays’s poetic experience following the assassination of his father, Ḥujr ibn al-Ḥārith al-Kindī—a pivotal event that deeply altered his psychological structure and reshaped his views on life, death, and existence. This transformation manifested itself in the content and aesthetic form of his poetry, marking a decisive turning point in his literary persona. The study aims to address a significant gap in literary criticism, namely the scarcity of works that examine the artistic transformations of Imru’ al-Qays within a comprehensive psychosocial framework that incorporates observation, analysis, and interpretive depth. To this end, the poet’s life is divided into two main phases. The first phase represents his youth and early manhood, during which he appears as a rebellious figure defying tribal traditions, indulging in worldly pleasures, and pursuing sensory and aesthetic delight. His poems from this period are rich in vibrant and emotive imagery, depicting scenes of nature, descriptions of women, hunting adventures, and swift horses—conveyed through light and elegant expressions. Here, the poet presents the image of the “wandering prince,” breaking free from conventional restraints in pursuit of an independent poetic identity. The second phase begins with the tragic event of his father’s death, which marked a turning point in his life. From this moment onward, his poetry takes on a tone of sorrow, reflection, and a desire for vengeance. Themes of estrangement, loneliness, and existential anxiety emerge, with frequent symbols such as the desert, night, long journeys, and the horrors of war. His poems cease to serve merely descriptive or entertaining purposes, instead becoming profound expressions of his wounded self and inner struggle. Employing a qualitative interpretive method, the study combines literary analysis with psychological and sociological readings. Selected poems reflecting these transitional phases are analyzed with attention to words and symbols denoting pain, loss, vengeance, and alienation—thereby unveiling the emotional depth that underpins the poet’s inner world. The analysis affirms that the poet’s texts were not detached from his lived reality; rather, they were intimately woven from the fabric of his personal experience. The study concludes that Imru’ al-Qays’s poetic experience should not be reduced to a fleeting youthful impulse or arbitrary rebellion against tradition. On the contrary, it constitutes a complex experience stemming from the interplay of individual and collective dimensions, personal and tribal identity, and emotional and political dynamics. With its emotional richness and depth of imagery, his poetry offers a rare mirror of the self in the face of hardship and pain, representing a distinguished literary model within the corpus of pre-Islamic Arabic poetry. Accordingly, this study contributes a valuable perspective to Arabic literary criticism and presents a multidimensional framework for reinterpreting ancient poetry through the lenses of psyche, identity, and existential transformation. (shrink)

In this paper I wish to examine our imagination of the unity of the earth and the process of globalization by contrasting it with the early origins of mapping and measuring the globe. I will pay particular attention to the work of Abū Rayḥān Al-Bīrūnī. I will demonstrate that the assumptions which allowed for Al-Bīrūnī’s advances in the measurement of the globe were based upon a certain understanding of the relationship of place within the sacred order of the cosmos and (...) the role of reason in this connection. This carries over to his anthropological works which considers the history of other religions and cultures. It shows an approach where objectivity in scientific investigation can stand alongside a diversity of religious faiths or visions. I wish to use these insights to consider the positions of such Western writers on the philosophy of globe-formation, such as Carl Schmitt and especially Peter Sloterdijk. Sloterdijk understands the development of our imagination of the globe as a singular history which was achieved primarily through conquest. Comparing these thinkers is important because our understanding of geopolitics and globalization often involves imposing one definition of humanity, reality or the sacred, which marginalizes or vilifies those with differing views. I hope to demonstrate by these contrasts that a unified imagination of the earth through globalization poses extreme dangers, and that the fragmentation of the globe through many religious and secular and artistic projections is the only possibility for a future. That is: the possibility of a future is dependent upon many opposing images of a future. It is only by a return to the initial impulses which led such scientists as Al-Bīrūnī that a true relationship of the human to the earth can be preserved. (shrink)

I hypothesize that people engage in religious practices, in part, because such practices activate the frontal lobes. Activation of the frontal lobes is both intrinsically rewarding and necessary for acquisition of many of the behaviors that religions seek to foster, including self‐responsibility, impulse and emotion modulation, empathy, moral insight, hope, and optimism. Although direct tests of the hypothesis are as yet nonexistent, there is reasonably strong circumstantial evidence (reviewed herein) for it. Recent brain‐imaging studies indicate greater anterior activation values (...) and increased blood flow to frontal sites during prayer and meditation. Regular prayer is positively correlated with better overall mental health. Religiosity is correlated with higher levels of self‐monitoring, empathy, and moral insight and other positive behaviors and negatively correlated with depression and impulsive and risky behaviors. Independent data show that self‐monitoring, empathy, hope, and moral insight are all selectively associated with intact frontal function, whereas depression, impulsiveness, and drug and alcohol abuse are associated selectively with frontal dysfunction. If religious practices do indeed preferentially activate and stimulate development of the frontal lobes, (a) religious practices should be considered as possible adjuncts for some patients in treatment for mental health disorders, and (b) the frontal lobes (rather than the temporal lobes) should be considered the major brain site that supports the core components of religious experience. (shrink)

This article develops three interconnected arguments concerning the image of modernity as a revolutionary epoch and the way in which this image has been understood and theorized. These three lines of conceptualization, which can only be sketched in less rather than greater detail here, concern the constellation or figuration of modernity, its democratic dimension, and in reference to each, the work of Max Weber, especially The City. More specifically, the article argues that modern democracy is revolutionary when viewed (...) as an open and self-instituting articulation of political power. Its modern revolutionary impulse begins in the Italian Renaissance city-states, the German `free' cities, and the Swiss federation where urban autonomy was matched by the creation of elected forms of rulership and the development of federated circulations of power. (shrink)

Freud uses paradoxical and conflictual rhetoric to create an unstable and conflictual picture of the mind. Thus he diverges from both dominant traditions of thought in the West: the Judeo-Christian way of filling all gaps in meaning by putting a single omnipotent divinity in charge of them, and the Enlightenment quest for a final, causal language to describe reality. By both suggesting and displacing a plurality of perspectives on the unconscious, Freud's text mirrors what it claims happens in our minds, (...) in which unconscious impulses undermine the pretense of total rational self-control. Though Freud suggests that a mechanistic description of the mind may bring us nearer to the reality of the unconscious, he also explains that this reality will remain dark. He not only develops an ostensibly mechanistic vocabulary for unconscious mental processes, but also clarifies that his terminology is most fictional precisely when it seems most scientific. Hence, Freud's science of the unconscious cannot be assimilated to an empiricist position; its philosophical underpinnings are both Kantian and Nietzschean, with metaphors and analogies playing a crucial role. Two dramatic images, in which the mind appears as a domain of warring gods and a realm of political conflict, demonstrate that Freud did not regard the unconscious as some kind of true inner self. He depicts the mind in general and the unconscious in particular as a pagan, conflictual universe over which no god or goddess can gain exclusive control and where no rigid dictatorship is possible. (shrink)