Legal decisions and theories are frequently condemned as formalistic, yet little discussion has occurred regarding exactly what the term "'formalism" means. In this Article, Professor Schauer examines divergent uses of the term to elucidate its descriptive content. Conceptions offormalism, he argues, involve the notion that rules constrict the choice of the decisionmaker. Our aversion to formalism stems from denial that the language of rules either can or should constrict choice in this way. Yet Professor Schauer argues that this (...) aversion to formalism should be rethought: At times language both can and should restrict decisionmakers. Consequently, the term "'formalistic" should not be used as a blanket condemnation of a decisionmaking process; instead the debate regarding decision according to rules should be confronted on its own terms. (shrink)

Constitutivists have tried to answer Enoch’s “schmagency” objection by arguing that Enoch fails to appreciate the inescapability of agency. Although these arguments are effective against some versions of the objection, I argue that they leave constitutivism vulnerable to an important worry; namely, that constitutivism leaves us alienated from the moral norms that it claims we must follow. In the first part of the paper, I try to make this vague concern more precise: in a nutshell, it seems that constitutivism cannot (...) provide an adequate account of the relation between the constitutive norms of agency and the particular ends the agent pursues. I then provide a broad outline of an interpretation of Kant’s formalism that is immune to this objection. I conclude that constitutivism is best understood as the upshot of a formalist view of categorical practical principles. (shrink)

Abraham Robinson’s philosophical stance has been the subject of several recent studies. Erhardt following Gaifman claims that Robinson was a finitist, and that there is a tension between his philosophical position and his actual mathematical output. We present evidence in Robinson’s writing that he is more accurately described as adhering to the philosophical approach of Formalism. Furthermore, we show that Robinson explicitly argued against certain finitist positions in his philosophical writings. There is no tension between Robinson’s mathematical work and (...) his philosophy because mathematics and metamathematics are distinct fields: Robinson advocates finitism for metamathematics but no such restriction for mathematics. We show that Erhardt’s analysis is marred by historical errors, by routine conflation of the generic and the technical meaning of several key terms, and by a philosophical parti pris. Robinson’s Formalism remains a viable alternative to mathematical Platonism. (shrink)

A simple mathematical extension of quantum theory is presented. As well as opening the possibility of alternative methods of calculation, the additional formalism implies a new physical interpretation of the standard theory by providing a picture of an external reality. The new formalism, developed first for the single-particle case, has the advantage of generalizing immediately to quantum field theory and to the description of relativistic phenomena such as particle creation and annihilation.

Frege says, at the end of a discussion of formalism in the Foundations of Arithmetic, that his own foundational program “could be called formal” but is “completely different” from the view he has just criticized. This essay examines Frege’s relationship to Hermann Hankel, his main formalist interlocutor in the Foundations, in order to make sense of these claims. The investigation reveals a surprising result: Frege’s foundational program actually has quite a lot in common with Hankel’s. This undercuts Frege’s claim (...) that his own view is completely different from Hankel’s formalism, and motivates a closer examination of where the differences lie. On the interpretation offered here, Frege shares important parts of the formalist perspective, but differs in recognizing a kind of content for arithmetical terms which can only be made available via proof from prior postulates. (shrink)

Mīmāṁsā, an Indian hermeneutics provides an exhaustive methodology to interpret Vedic statements. A formalism namely, Mīmāṁsā Inspired Representation of Actions has already been proposed in a preliminary manner. This paper expands the formalism logically and includes Syntax and Semantics covering Soundness and Completeness. Here, several interpretation techniques from Mīmāṁsā have been considered for formalising the statements. Based on these, instructions that denote actions are categorized into positive and prohibitive unconditional imperatives and conditional imperatives that enjoin reason, temporal action (...) and goal. These instructions are evaluated to three values S, V and N. If the instruction is executed with the intention of goal, then it acquires the value of S; if the intention of goal is present and the instruction is not executed, then it assumes the value of V; and if there is no intention of goal, then the instruction is evaluated to N. This formalism has also been applied in different computational settings such as AI planning, Robotics, task analysis and classification of natural language instructions. An outline of these applications and the comparison of this formalism with other relevant theories are also presented in this paper. (shrink)

A current focus of legal debate is the proper role of the courts in the interpretation of statutes and the Constitution. Are judges to look solely to the naked language of an enactment, then logically deduce its application in simple syllogistic fashion, as legal formalists had purported to do? Or may the inquiry into meaning be informed by perhaps unbridled and unaccountable judicial notions of public policy, using legal realism to best promote the general welfare? Judge Posner considers the concepts (...) of formalism and realism to be meaningful and useful in common law reasoning but in interpretation to be useless and, worse, forbidden. He analogizes unclear "orders" from a legislature to garbled battlefield communications, and argues that the duty of the recipient of those orders (the judge) is to advance as best he can the enterprise set on foot by the superiors. Case studies elaborate this thesis. Judicial decisions interpreting fixed texts, Judge Posner concludes, can be neither logically correct or incorrect, philosophically sound or unsound, until the ultimate jurist, time, has adjudged their results. (shrink)

In this paper we isolate a notion that we call "formalism freeness" from Gödel's 1946 Princeton Bicentennial Lecture, which asks for a transfer of the Turing analysis of computability to the cases of definability and provability We suggest an implementation of Gödel's idea in the case of definability, via versions of the constructible hierarchy based on fragments of second order logic. We also trace the notion of formalism freeness in the very wide context of developments in mathematical logic (...) in the 20th century. (shrink)

This dissertation is intended to provide a formalism for those generics that trigger nonmonotonic inferences. The formalism is to reflect intentionality and exception-tolerating features of generics, and has an emphasis on the axiomatization of generic reasoning that encodes nonmonotonicity. ;A modal conditional approach is taken to formalize the nonmonotonic reasoning in general at the level of object language. A serial of logic systems---MN, NID, NCUM, N STCUM---are constructed in an increasing strength of the characterized nonmonotonic inference relation. In (...) these systems, two binary modal operators ⩾ and > are introduced in their syntax, and a ⊛ function lifted from the traditional * function is deployed in their semantics. These systems are shown to be sound and complete with respect to certain classes of frames defined in the semantics. They are decidable as well. The nonmonotonic inference is argued to be a ternary relation "[phi], Gamma |∼ alpha", and is defined in the system NSTCUM. Many widely discussed nonmonotonic inference patterns such as Defeasible Modus Ponens, Defeasible Transitivity, the Penguin Principle etc. are justified. The specificity rule is proved to be a theorem of the system N STCUM. The impact of negated defaults on an inference is also investigated and accounted for. ;A canonical form to read off generics is proposed: All generic sentences with subject-predicate structure can be re-written into their canonical form S . If S is a plural noun phrase, it can be further refined to be . Normal objects are selected based on the "meaning" of the subject and predicate terms. The second parameter provides an aspect with respect to which certain objects of a kind are considered normal. Due to such a way to select normal objects, the drowning problem is solved. ;The inference behaviors of generics are axiomatized in the system G, which is a quantificational extension of the system NSTCUM. It is proved to be sound and complete with respect to the class of L⩾,G -frames. Those benchmark examples of generic inferences are examined in the system G. (shrink)

The development and applicability of complex numbers is often cited in defence of the formalist philosophy of mathematics. This view is rejected through an examination of hamilton's development of the notion of complex numbers as ordered pairs of reals, And his later development of the quaternion theory, Which subsequently formed the basis of vector analysis. Formalism, By protecting informal assumptions from critical scrutiny, Constrained rather than encouraged the development of mathematics.

Mark Blaug played a central role in the development of the field of the methodology of economics, alongside his theoretical work and contributions to the history of economic thought. The purpose, in this article, is to focus on his contributions to the topic of 'formalism in economics', in relation to his methodological commentaries on the Popperian and Lakatosian approaches to the philosophy of science. In Blaugian spirit, the discussion is related to economic theory and draws on the history of (...) economic thought. The argument focuses on the troublesome interface between theoretical and applied economics in mainstream economics. The article includes, as a case study, an assessment of new behavioural economics in Popperian and Lakatosian terms. The conclusion is that such an appraisal exercise—i.e., whether the research programme is progressive or degenerative—is clouded by the interface between the form of empiricism promoted by Popper and Lakatos and the methodological framework of mainstream economics. No conclusion is feasible independent of methodological approach. (shrink)

The objective of this article is to provide a formalism to deal with the special theory of relativity (STR, in short) as riewed by Reichenbach, according to which STR involves an ineradicableconventionality of simultaneity. One of the two postulates of STR asserts that, in empty space, the one-way speed of light relative to inertial frames is constant. Experimental evidence, however, is related to the constancy of the round-trip speed of light and has no bearing on one-way speeds. Following Reichenbach's (...) viewpoint, we relax the second postulate of STR, abandoning the constancy of the one-way speed of light to the more realistic one asserting the constancy of the round-trip speed of light. This, in turn, results in a formalism to deal with Reichenbach's special theory of relativity (RSTR, in short) in which the two one-way speeds of light in empty space, C±, in the two senses of a round-trip are arbitrarily selected in such a way that their harmonic mean is the measurable round-trip speed of light, c. Experimentally, RSTR and STR are indistinguishable and, hence, represent the same physical theory. It is only the formalism that we use to deal with STR which is extended in RSTR to accommodate the immeasurability of one-way velocities. The usefulness of the proposed formalism to study special relativity is demonstrated. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that recent sociological theory has become increasingly bifurcated into two mutually incompatible styles of theorizing that I label formalist and behavioral-realist. Formalism favors mathematization and proposes an instrumentalist ontology of abstract processes while behavioral-realist theory takes at its basis the "real" physical individual endowed with concrete biological, cognitive and neurophysiological capacities and constraints and attempts to derive the proper conceptualization of social behavior from that basis. Formalism tends to lead toward a conceptually independent (...) sociology that in principle requires only minimal reference to the empirical and ontological storehouse of other disciplines, while behavioral-realist theory leads to an interdisciplinary sociology that can be located within a hierarchy of behavioral sciences, leading to questions regarding the relationship between sociology and other disciplines as well as issues of transdisciplinary unification and possible interdisciplinary reduction. I explore the consequences of this split for the project of explanatory sociological theory within the context of how it has manifested itself in sociological network theory and social psychology. I close with a critique and assessment of formalist tendencies in sociological theorizing. (shrink)

This introductory essay to a symposium issue of The American Journal of Jurisprudence starts from the observation that the relation of legal realism and formalism can be (much) more complicated than is often assumed. Instead of setting realism and formalism in opposition only, a more productive way to proceed is to concentrate on the insights legal realists may gain from formalism and, vice versa, what modern formalists have to learn from legal realism. Natasha Sarna and Kevin Tobia, (...) Andrew Gold and Henry Smith, Shyamkrishna Balganesh and Taisu Zhang, Thilo Kuntz, Paul B. Miller, Emily Sherwin, and Marietta Auer consider these questions from different angles. This introductory essay brings the individual contributions together and indicates how their insights may interrelate. Moreover, it sketches avenues for future research. Section I takes up the theme of the use of concepts and conceptual change. Section II addresses tensions between realism and formalism. Section III closes the Introduction by charting two paths for future research. First, this essay argues that legal concepts, even where they constrain, may induce or facilitate legal creativity. Second, it considers the significance of a complex legal system for understanding approaches to legal concepts. (shrink)

This book offers, for the first time in aesthetics, a comprehensive account of aestheticism of the 19<SUP>th</SUP> century as a philosophical theory of its own right. Taking philosophical and art-historical viewpoints, this cross-disciplinary book presents aestheticism as the foundational movement of modernist aesthetics of the 20<SUP>th</SUP> century. Emerging in the writings of the foremost aestheticists - Oscar Wilde, Walter Pater, James Whistler, and their formalist successors such as Clive Bell, Roger Fry, and Clement Greenberg - aestheticism offers a uniquely synthetic (...) definition of art. It captures the artwork’s relations between form and content, art’s independent ontology and autonomy, art’s internal completeness, criticism, immunity to recruitment, the uniqueness of each medium, and musicality, as well as the logical-theoretical affiliation of art for art’s sake to epistemology, ethics and philosophy of language.<BR> Those are used by Michalle Gal to formulate a definition of art in terms of a theory of Deep Formalism, setting aestheticism, which aspires to preserve the artistic medium, as a critique of the current linguistic-conceptual aesthetics that developed after the linguistic turn of aesthetics. (shrink)

This book revisits the theory of the sources of international law from the perspective of formalism.

This chapter contains sections titled: Empty Formalism in the Philosophy of Right Kantian Reply Strategies Acknowledgments Notes Abbreviations References.

Aesthetic Formalism has fallen on hard times. At best it receives unsympathetic discussion and swift rejection. At worst it is the object of abuse and derision. But I think that there is something to be said for it. In this paper, I shall try to find and secure the truth in formalism. I shall not try to defend formalism against all of the objections to it.1 Instead I shall articulate a moderate formalist view that draws on aesthetic0nonaesthetic (...) determination and Kant’s distinction between free and dependent beauty. I shall examine four central art forms—painting, sculpture, lit-. (shrink)

Previous work has shown that spontaneous collapse of Fock states of identical fermions can be modeled as arising from random Rabi oscillations between two states. In this paper, a mathematical formalism is presented to incorporate this into many-body quantum field theory. This formalism allows for nonlocal collapse in the context of a relativistic system. While there is no absolute time-ordering of events, this approach allows for a coherent narrative of the collapse process.

Formulas are not only an instrument for formalising mathematical theories, but also the basis of formalism in the philosophy of mathematics. A formula is a finite sequence of primitive symbols from an alphabet.

This chapter presents the main formalism of the book, which is used in subsequent chapters to describe a variety of concepts in Husserlian phenomenology, and thereby unify them. A dynamical systems approach to Husserl is introduced, and several dynamical laws of Husserlian phenomenology are described. The first is an expectation rule according to which expectations are determined by what a person knows, sees, and does. The second is a learning rule according to which background knowledge is updated in a (...) specific way when experiences fulfill or frustrate prior expectations. In addition to these rules, a “supervenience function” is described, which associates how a thing is seen with a “trail set,” the set ways that thing is expected to look, relative to all possible ways of moving around it. This function further illustrates the explanatory dimension of phenomenology described in Chap. 2, whereby how we immanently experience things is determined by how we expect them to look relative to counterfactual movement patterns. (shrink)

Given the collapse hypothesis (CH) of quantum measurement, EPR-type correlations along with the hypothesis of the impossibility of superluminal communication (ISC) have the effect of globalizing gross features of the quantum formalism making them universally true. In particular, these hypotheses imply that state transformations of density matrices must be linear and that evolution which preserves purity of states must also be linear. A gedanken experiment shows that Lorentz covariance along with the second law of thermodynamics imply a nonentropic version (...) of ISC. Partial results using quantum logic suggest, given ISC and a version of CH, a connection between Lorentz covariance and the covering law. These results show that standard quantum mechanics is structurally unstable, and suggest that viable relativistic alternatives must question CH. One may also speculate that some features of the Hilbert-space model of quantum mechanics have their origin in space time structure. (shrink)

I develop Schopenhauerian musical formalism. First, I present a Schopenhauerian account of music with a background of his metaphysical framework. Then, I define meaningfulness as an analog to a Kantian notion of purposiveness and argue that, in light of Schopenhauer, music is meaningful as a direct manifestation of the universal will. Given the ineffable nature of what music points to, its form lacks any representation of meaning. Music is therefore the mere form of meaningfulness, and it is precisely this (...) mere form that gives rise to the infinite possibilities to ascribe it with a variety of musical meaning. (shrink)

The ramified legacy of Bernard Berenson’s writings within 20th century art historiography is both celebrated and maligned. In an effort to help reconcile this situation, this essay argues for the partial validity of Berenson’s peculiar version of art historical formalism by detailing its historical connections to the Pragmatist philosophy and psychology of William James and by analytically correlating Berenson’s arguments with recent work in aesthetics and the philosophy of perception. The essay examines the specific example of Berenson’s analysis of (...) Giotto’s paintings and leverages a Pragmatist interpretation of Berenson’s writings to frame Berenson’s known connections with other writers: including Adolf Hildebrand, Giovanni Morelli, and Walter Pater. In conclusion, the failure, potential, reception, and legacy of Berenson’s art historical scholarship are assessed in relation to Pragmatist ideas. Der vielfältige Einfluss von Bernard Berensons Schriften auf die Kunstgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts wird ebenso geschätzt wie verachtet. In dem Bestreben, diese Divergenzen zu berichtigen, versucht dieser Beitrag den Nachweis für die bedingte Gültigkeit von Berensons eigentümlicher Variante eines kunsthistorischen Formalismus zu erbringen, indem er einerseits seine historischen Verbindungen zur pragmatischen Philosophie und Psychologie von William James aufzeigt und indem er andererseits Berensons Argumentation ins Verhältnis zu aktuellen Debatten der wahrnehmungstheoretischen Ästhetik und Philosophie setzt. Am Beispiel von Berensons Interpretation der Gemälde Giottos führt dieser Essay eine pragmatische Analyse von Berensons Schriften durch und stellt diese ins Umfeld seiner Kontakte zu anderen Autoren: darunter Adolf Hildebrand, Giovanni Morelli und Walter Pater. Schließlich soll das Scheitern, das Potenzial, die Rezeption und das Erbe von Berensons kunsthistorischen Studien unter pragmatischen Gesichtspunkten bewertet werden. (shrink)

The chapter assesses—and rejects—an association commonly made by comparative lawyers between “formalism” or “positivism,” on the one hand, and lack of judicial reference to legal scholarship, on the other. It is argued that formalism and positivism, understood as judicial attitudes denying the exercise of discretion or denying the judicial ability to shape the content of the law by means of the exercise of personal judgment, are not incompatible with the regular use of standard legal scholarship by judges. To (...) use scholarship of the standard variety is to defer to experts. In some legal cultures it is to defer to scientists. Indeed, in hard cases, where mandatory sources of law issue unclear or incoherent prescriptions, scholarship may serve as a formalist judge’s last resort. Scholarship may be used to mitigate the impression that a judge is exercising discretion or relying on personal judgment. It follows that formalist judges have little reason to avoid scholarship; indeed they can use it (and indeed have used it) in their favor. (shrink)

Positivist theory, to state the obvious, is not held in high regard, at least among some members of U.S. legal academia. This position, it seems, is partly owed to alleged methodological deficiencies of the positivist approach: A formalist, or even “hyperformalist” theory, positivism, it is sometimes suggested, is destined to entail a “hypertextualist” and thus in any case inadequate view on interpretation. Focusing on the Kelsenian variety of legal positivism one may wonder whether this presumption actually proves to be correct. (...) Arguably Kelsen’s theory is to be understood as a formal approach to law. Still: Whether the appreciation of positivist thought as “formalist” or even “hyperformalist” actually does apply obviously depends on the definition of formalism. But, even if Kelsen’s theory of legal positivism is to be considered a formal approach to law, are the methodological consequences thus implied valid? Does the pure theory of law call for a purely formalist theory of interpretation? This essay argues it does not. (shrink)

When discussing Wilfrid Sellars’s philosophy, very little work has been done to offer a developmental account of his systematic views. More often than not, Sellars’s complex views are presented in a systematic and holistic fashion that ignores any periodization of his work. I argue that there is a metaphilosophical shift in Sellars’s early philosophy that results in substantive changes to his conception of language, linguistic rules, and normativity. Specifically, I claim that Sellars’s shift from a formalist metaphilosophy to one more (...) closely aligned with psychology allows for the construction of a normative conception of language. My central claim is that without his abandonment of earlier metaphilosophical commitments, Sellars could not hold what I call an external conception of normativity. It is this move away from a formalist notion of philosophy that allows Sellars to construct a normative picture of language. I conclude that because this substantive shift in philosophical commitments results from changes in Sellars’s metaphilosophical views, there is insight to be found in a meticulous periodization of his work. (shrink)

In 1939, Curry proposed a philosophy of mathematics he called formalism. He made this proposal in two works originally written then, although one of them was not published until 1951. These are the two philosophical works for which Curry is known, and they have left a false impression of his views. In this article, I propose to clarify Curry’s views by referring to some of his later writings on the subject. I claim that Curry’s philosophy was not what is (...) now usually called formalism, but is really a form of structuralism. (shrink)

In a series of recent papers, Professor Nick Zangwill has returned our attention to the merits of aesthetic formalism. In this paper, I seek to support formalism as an approach to understanding what counts as an aesthetic property by considering how this approach serves to illuminate identity conditions and critical assessment of a subset of allographic works of art I label “consumable”; these are works that exist as token art objects (as contrasted with art works) only within thetemporal (...) duration of their being reproduced and presented to their audiences. I look at three sorts of consumable art forms: food, theater plays, and dance. (shrink)

The recent discussions on “The Right and the Good” show that the reconciliation between formalism and teleology is still a problem. Some of the contending parties lean more strongly towards formalism, others towards teleology; but neither side has, I believe, done equal justice to formalism and teleology. To review the whole discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I propose to suggest in outline a theory which may possibly harmonize the essential tenets of both parties.

This volume examines the elements of formalism and decisionism in Russian legal thinking and, also, the impact of conservatism on the interplay of these elements. This combination leads to internal contradictions in theorizing about law and rights in Russian legal culture.

Let us look first at poetry. It is well known that by the fifteenth century, lyric poetry had undergone a radical transformation; the early lyric fluidity and formal variability had hardened into the nonlyric and even, some maintain, antilyric forms fixes which characterize the poetic formalism of late medieval France. Dispensing with the details of how and why this occurred, the essential point is that by the end of the Middle Ages, the poet in France and Burgundy saw himself (...) as an artisan of words, not as a singer.6 He refers to himself as a craftsman, and it is plain, sometimes painfully so, to anyone who reads the works that the rhétoriqueur is, indeed, an artisan of forms—or, if you will, an architecte de la parole, a specialist in verbal matter. He works words, sounds, metric and strophic forms into intricate patterns and arranges his elaborate designs in blocks of exact and harmonious symmetry. He is, in fact, from Machaut on, a virtuoso of the verbal equivalent of the architectural art of carrelage which adorned the princely château in which he worked and lived. No one familiar with the period will avoid noticing the strikingly similar types of patters in the poet’s works and in his surroundings.I have gathered elsewhere the visual documentation which bears out Zumthor’s suggestions quoted above with respect to the meticulously constructivist mentality of the Franco-Burgundian artisan. But the analogies I found are much more than perceptual. It is true that the elaborate designs on the walls, floors, ceilings, windows, woodwork, and so forth of the early Renaissance château are, indeed, composed of intricate blocks of material; but their function is not merely decorative, it is also narrative, with emblematic motifs and allegorical figures arrayed in linear patterns of “visual” discourse—the invariable “discours de la gloire” which silently proclaims the magnificence of the patron prince and proprietor of the château.7 6. A summary of internal and external factors in the transformation of lyric to Rhetoric is provided in my review of Die musikalische Erscheinungsform der Trouvèrepoesie by Hans-Herbert S. Räkel, in Romance Philology 34 : 250-58.7. This following collage of fragments from ML was constructed ôto serve as commentary on photographs of tile designs compared with verbal texts, in an earlier version of this paper, from which the examples in figs. 1-4 are taken.Culte de l’objet subtilement travaillé, au-delà de toute fonctionnalité primaire *** primat du labeur ardu, patient, du difficile, de l’inattendu *** les mots mêmes semblent travaillés d’un besoin de scientificité fictive, d’anoblissement par le savoir *** les … mots ne sont plus que les particules d’une parole dont la seule signification est globale *** matériau émancipé des contraintes de la phrase, transposé sur un plan où le signe devient le nom vide de ce signe *** goût du bricolage plutôt que de l’industrie; … du bariolage plus que du fondu et de la nuance; de l’équilibre numéral des parties plus que de la synthèse; du multiple plus que de l’un. Outil forgé martelé d’ “aornures” sans fonction utilitaire; enchâssements cubiques, coniques, pyramidaux, cruciformes du bâtiment … meubles marquetés, forrés de tiroirs minuscules et secrets [and so forth].For the iconography of these examples, see Emile Amé, Less Carrelages émaillés du Moyen Age et de la Renaissance, pp. 61-108. Jonathan Beck is associate professor of French at the University of Arizona. He is the author of Théâtre et propaganda aux débuts de la Réforme, a sequel to his edition and study, Le Concil de Basle: Le Origines du theater réformiste et partisan en France. (shrink)

Goodman’s account of the ‘grue’ paradox stands at a crossroads in the history of twentieth century epistemology. Published in 1954, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast is a reaction to the logical empiricist views that held sway in the first half of the last century and anticipates many of the conventionalist and/or relativist moves popular throughout the second half. Through his evaluation of Hume’s problem of induction, as well as his own novel reformulation of it, Goodman comes to reject a number of (...) the fundamental parts of logical empiricism. In particular, Goodman argues that the formal epistemic methods the logical empiricists wanted to rely upon are insufficient. This leads him to turn towards conventionalism, which is the basis of his rejection of the objective view of knowledge. In his conventionalism he is a precursor of writers such as Hanson, Kuhn and Feyerabend, who, seeing the inadequacy of formalism, sought to fill the gaps it left in epistemic methodology with scientific values, tacit knowledge and linguistic practices. Making use of Susan Haack’s distinction between three different kinds of foundationalism, we analyse Goodman’s position and its relation to the views of the logical empiricists. The two are reflections of each other in that, where the logical empiricists are foundationalists in their views on empirical evidence, methods used and objective criteria of justification, Goodman consistently opts for the corresponding coherentist options. As it turns out, this choice of options makes it impossible for Goodman to deal with the very objections he raises against the logical empiricists. In adding the new problem of induction to the old one, Goodman adds a problem which clearly can not be resolved by a purely syntactic solution. The charge Goodman raises is that logical empiricists cannot determine which predictions are sound and which are not. We argue that his method of identifying acceptable predictions based on the use of entrenchment is, in the end, arbitrary and only postpones the underlying problem. (shrink)

One of the ways our legal system has avoided confronting this ugly reality is through a commitment to legal formalism. Legal formalism allows us to ignore the social determinants that my AUSA friend saw every day as he prosecuted federal drug cases. As my colleague Professor Michael Seidman has suggested, legal formalism, which has been effectively critiqued and displaced by legal realism in many other areas of law, continues to exercise considerable influence over the way we think (...) about criminal law. This formalist approach, in my view, has strongly affected the way we approach the drug problem. One consequence is that we continue to pursue an increasingly futile war on drugs and refuse to see the issue in its broader, realist dimension. A little realism on the subject of drugs, I suggest, would go a long way. There is much to be said for formalism in the criminal law. Formalism, with its commitment to fair procedures, clear rules, and restricted discretion, is a necessary part of any fair system of criminal law. The sanctions involved in the criminal system are too severe to permit them to be allocated in an open ended discretionary or regulatory manner. The criminal law's commitment to formalism is thus not a fault, but a strength. Discretionary regulatory schemes too often invite subjective judgments susceptible to abuse, prejudice, and favoritism. Formalist rules, by contrast, are built on the promise of treating likes alike. Precisely for this reason, however, we ought to reconsider whether the criminal approach makes sense when there is substantial evidence that the commitment to equality has been seriously compromised. Our dual commitments to equality and to the reduction of the human damage that drug abuse inflicts suggest that we should reduce our reliance on the criminal justice system. Alternative approaches, such as treatment and rehabilitation, promise to be both more effective and more fair. (shrink)

This paper compares the outwardly similar structural formalisms of Marc- Antoine Laugier and Arthur Schopenhauer. Laugier purports to base his aesthetics on an historical argument from the “primitive hut”; but his preferences are really based on aversion to structurally and programmatically non-functional elements. His preferences show disregard for purely aesthetic considerations, such as pleasing proportions. Schopenhauer’s formalism is based on his cognitivist approach to aesthetics, according to which architecture is above all supposed to demonstrate relations between load and support, (...) but in spite of this shows greater sensitivity to sensory beauty. (shrink)

Joe L. Kincheloe (1950-2008) was one of North America's leading critical pedagogy scholars. He defined post-formalist thought in terms of deconstruction, affectivity, and non-linearity. His deconstruction focused on the context of ideas, ideologies, and teaching. It was a form of sociological deconstruction, and as such, inspired by Derrida, but different from him as well. In effect, Kincheloe was trying to marry Derrida to Foucault by making deconstruction see power in thought, relationships, and the world. Kincheloe's 'turn to affect' was inspired (...) by feminism and radical pedagogy. It was 'affect' focused on (in)justice and the social practices of repression. His 'self-other' construct was inherently politicized by his identification of 'unfreedom' with capitalism and the assumption that this link determines affect. Kincheloe assumed that linear rationality was inadequate to understanding human needs and hopes. Freedom as dynamism was seen to be inherently non-linear. The prison of rationality (it can only repeat the same, over and over again) was the crux of his critique of Newtonian-Cartesian linearity. Kincheloe attempted to construct a concept of 'place'--such as the classroom. But it was a particular, concrete classroom and not an abstract or theoretical one. Here, the three concepts could come together. 'Place' is context, and to understand it, deconstruction is needed. 'Place' exists as it is felt and requires affectivity; it is eventful, alive, and dynamic. It requires non-linearity to be understood. Post-formalism, Pedagogy Lives (in memory of Kincheloe's contribution) encompasses each of the basic principles of Kincheloe's post-formal thought. (shrink)

One can only look with favor upon the appearance of the English translation of this tremendously important work in the history of ethical theory in twentieth century European philosophy. We are also fortunate to have in Manfred Frings both the general editor of the German edition of the collected works of Scheler and a skillful translator of this significant work. In this work, Scheler hopes to mediate between Kant’s empty formalism and ethical relativism by developing an absolutistic ethics which (...) nonetheless does not focus on mere "duty" but on a definite moral "content". In the absence of an adjectival form for "content," Frings and Funk have decided to translate "die materiale Wertethik" by "non-formal ethics of values." Such an ethics centers on the absolute value of persons; thus the subtitle of the work: "A New Attempt toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism." Scheler’s method in this work is, as is well known, "phenomenological," i.e., concerned with intuiting the essence or absolute being of ethical values. There is a helpful bibliography, an index of names, and a detailed index of subjects.—J.D.C. (shrink)

The general properties of signals permit a nonaxiomatic reconstruction of the quantum “probability” formalism independent of the standard Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. Performance standards are specified for candidate clock, signaller, and reflector devices, and it is shown that the resulting formalism forces identification of a “probability”- or “intensity”-like structure as the absolute square of an amplitude, the relative phases of amplitudes appearing explicitly in the “probability” composition law. Inequalities are produced which on one interpretation reduce to the (...) Heisenberg relations, but it is pointed out that this reconstruction disqualifies position as an observable property of a signal. (shrink)

We introduce a class of forcing notions, called forcing notions of type S, which contains among other Sacks forcing, Prikry-Silver forcing and their iterations and products with countable supports. We construct and investigate some formalism suitable for this forcing notions, which allows all standard tricks for iterations or products with countable supports of Sacks forcing. On the other hand it does not involve internal combinatorial structure of conditions of iterations or products. We prove that the class of forcing notions (...) of type S is closed under products and certain iterations with countable supports. (shrink)

I draw lessons from experimental economics. I argue that the lack of mathematical formalism cannot be usefully thought as the cause of the underappreciation of contextual and generalizability considerations. Instead, this lack is problematic because it hinders a clear relationship between theory and quantitative predictions. I also advocate a pragmatic policy-focused approach as a partial remedy to the generalizability problem.