Background Relational autonomy is an alternative concept of autonomy in which an individual is recognized as embedded into society and influenced by relational factors. Social context, including social location, political structure, and social forces, significantly influence an agent to develop and exercise autonomy skills. The relational approach has been applied in clinical practice to identify relational factors impacting patient autonomy and decision-making, yet there is a knowledge gap in how these factors influence the demonstration of relational autonomy in the (...) context of medical decisions of adults. Objective The present study targeted the existing knowledge of what and how relational factors impact individuals making medical decisions using the theoretical framework of relational autonomy. Methods A meta-synthesis study was utilized. Four electronic databases, including Embase, OVID Medline, CINAHL, and PubMed, were searched, along with gray literature and reference lists, to identify relevant studies. Results 23 studies reporting 21 qualitative and two mixed-method studies were reviewed. Four themes emerged from the qualitative findings: (1) supportive relationships facilitate an individual’s relational autonomy; (2) obtaining comprehensive information from broader sources helps individuals exercise relational autonomy; (3) undue family pressure impedes the exercising of patient relational autonomy; and (4) healthcare providers’ dominant voice hampers the demonstration of relational autonomy. Conclusions Applying relational autonomy to assist adults in making well-considered decisions is essential. The meta-synthesis suggests establishing a supportive relationship between individuals, healthcare providers, and family. A supportive relationship will allow healthcare providers to make judgments in line with an individual’s values and wishes with the aim of promoting relational autonomy. Advance care planning was proposed as the effective solution to obtain a consensus between individuals and their families while respecting an individual’s values and preferences. Furthermore, it is considered crucial for healthcare providers to appreciate an individual's values and incorporate their preferences into recommendations. (shrink)

Hobbes on Demonstration and Construction DAVID GAUTHIER 1~ IN 1656 Hobbes published Six Lessons to the Professors of Mathematics, with an Epistle Dedicatory to the Marquis of Dorchester, Lord Pierrepont. In this Epistle, Hobbes distinguishes the demonstrable from the indemonstrable arts: "demonstrable are those the construction of the subject whereof is in the power of the artist himself, who, in his demonstration, does no more but deduce the consequences of his own operation" . Although this passage, with the (...) explication Hobbes offers for it and the consequences he draws from it, and a similar discussion in De homine, published two years later, have not been unnoticed, their significance for Hobbes's account of science in general, and civil philosophy or politics in particular, has not, I think, been I am grateful to the University of East Anglia for appointing me a Visiting Research Fellow during the period in which the first draft of this paper was written. A second draft was presented at the Third Quadrennial International Fellows Conference of the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh, sponsored by the Florence Center for the History and Philosophy of Science. I am grateful for the remarks of my commentator, J. E. McGuire, and for the discussion. I am also grateful for the comments of the two referees who read this paper for the Journal of the History of Philosophy. References to Hobbes's works appear as.. (shrink)

This paper highlights an important distinction underlying the possibility of inquiry, between first _identifying the subject of inquiry and ultimately _explaining it: that the former can be achieved before and without the latter is a presupposition of inquiry. I believe Aristotle is keenly aware of this in _Posterior Analytics, II.8, where he shows how a scientific demonstration can "manifest" a definition. I argue that such a demonstration consists of two sorts of syllogisms, one identifying the definiendum, the other (...) explaining it. Further, this distinction is tied in crucial ways to two others: between existence and essence, and between particular and universal. (shrink)

In the course of his argument, Suarez rejects any "physical" demonstration, which would employ the Aristotelian principle, "Everything which is moved is moved by another," in order to pass from motion to a First Mover. Other topics that he treats include, in Disputation 28, the analogy of being between God and creatures, and in Disputation 29, the fact that there is only one God who is the creator of all else."--BOOK JACKET.

A teacher initially requested consultation services to address the behavior of three of her general education first grade students. This paper describes the decision rnaking process that led to the development of a class-wide intervention modeled after Barrish, Saunders, and Wolf’s (1969) Good Behavior Game. The paper focuses on how direct observation data, teacher and student input and preferences, andprevious research led to the development, implementation, and evaluation of an intervention that appeared to reduce disruptive behaviors across the entire class.

특수주의, 상대주의, 회의주의 그리고 허무주의와 같은 이 시대적 징후들이 우리가 처한 철학적 문제 상황을 극복할 수 있는 유일한 대안을 제공할 수 있다는 주장들이 도처에 만연해 있다. 그 결과 권력과 살인은 의미 있는 것이 되고, 최후 수단으로 주장될 수도 있다. 하지만 기근, 빈곤, 착취, 질병, 기아 등에 대한 대안이 무관심, 이기주의 그리고 냉소주의가 될 수 없는 것처럼, 폭력적이고, 잔혹하며, 파괴적인 행위에 대한 유일한 대안이 폭력, 파괴, 투쟁 그리고 전쟁이 아님을 우리가 원하고 희망해야 한다면 우리는 이런 행동과 행위 그리고 기준과 가치를 비판하고 (...) 그 ‘무근거성’을 증명할 수 있는 절대적인 하나의 해결점을 ‘합리적 · 도덕적’ 근거로부터 찾아야 할 것이다.BR 합리적인 것은 논증하는 것, 즉 논증하는 것의 논리, 인식개념과 진리개념, 인간 사유의 인식능력, 현실적인 것의 인식, 이성 일반을 밝히는 것과 연관해서 필수적이며, 근본적으로 ‘이론적’ 규정이다. 이론적 규정에서 중요한 것은 인식론적이고, 근거지음론적이며 그리고 존재론적인 ‘근거규정’들이다. 이를 철학적으로 해명하는 작업이 곧 ‘철학적 최종근거지음’ 이다.BR 이러한 맥락에서 필자는 철학적 최종근거지음의 증명 문제를 논증하기 위하여 먼저 최종근거지음 증명의 수행 방법을 고찰하고(2), 이어서 최종근거지음 증명을 위해 전제된 범주들과 원리들은 어떤 것이 있는지를 논의한 후에(3) 선험적 객관적 최종근거지음 증명의 가능성을 타진하면서(4) 이 글을 마무리하고자 한다(5). (shrink)

Aristotle seeks to resolve the problems raised in Posterior Analytics B.3–7 by arguing that our practices of definition and explanation are interdependent. It is not possible to define kinds without appeal to their causal structure, nor is it possible to single out the relevant causal structure without appeal to what is required for good definition. This is why Aristotle holds that the answer to the questions, ‘What is F?’ and ‘Why is F as it is?’ are the same. Neither definition (...) nor explanation can be completed without assistance from the other. (shrink)

In this chapter, I discuss some problems of Kant’s logic corpus while recognizing its richness and potential value. I propose and explain a methodic way to approach it. I then test the proposal by showing how we may use various mate- rials from the corpus to construct a Kantian demonstration of the formal rules of thinking (or judging) that lie at the base of Kant’s Metaphysical Deduction. The same proposal can be iterated with respect to other topics. The said (...) demonstration will have cleared the path for such iterations. (shrink)

Locke famously claimed that morality was capable of demonstration. But he also refused to provide a system of demonstrative morality. This paper addresses the mismatch between Locke’s stated views and his actual philosophical practice. While Locke’s claims about demonstrative morality have received a lot of attention it is rare to see them discussed in the context of his general theory of demonstration and his specific discussions of particular demonstrations. This paper explores Locke’s general remarks about demonstration as (...) well as his claims about demonstration in natural philosophy, mathematics, and morality. Careful attention to these detailed discussions motivates a reevaluation of Locke’s views on demonstrative knowledge of morality. Specifically, while Locke did believe that some demonstrative moral knowledge might be in-principle available to us he also believed that facts about the difficulty of demonstration meant that this knowledge would in-practice be largely unattainable. (shrink)

How many scientific demonstrations can a single phenomenon have? This paper argues that, according to Aristotle's theory of scientific knowledge as laid out in the Posterior Analytics, a single conclusion may be demonstrated via more than one explanatory middle term. I also argue that this model of multiple demonstration is put into practice in the biological writings. This paper thereby accomplishes two related goals: it clarifies certain relatively obscure passages of the Posterior Analytics and uses them to show how (...) Aristotle explains biological phenomena by reference to both final and material causes in the Parts of Animals. The first part of the paper explains the account of multiple demonstration present in the Posterior Analytics and distinguishes it from another kind of plural explanation rejected by Aristotle. The second part of the paper turns to the biological explanation in the Parts of Animals and shows how Aristotle's account of multiple demonstrations works in practice. The paper thus provides evidence for the claim that the ‘applied’ reasoning on display in the biological works is in harmony with the framework of the logical treatises, and thus may also shed light on questions of the unity of the Aristotelian corpus. (shrink)

Kant famously insists that free will is a condition of morality. The difficulty of providing a demonstration of freedom has left him vulnerable to devastating criticism: critics charge that Kant's post-Groundwork justification of morality amounts to a dogmatic assertion of morality's authority. My paper rebuts this objection, showing that Kant offers a cogent demonstration of freedom. My central claim is that the demonstration must be understood in practical rather than theoretical terms. A practical demonstration of x (...) works by bringing x into existence, and what the demonstration of freedom brings into existence is a moral will, a will regulated by the moral law and capable of acting in accordance with it. Since to act morally is to act freely, bringing a moral will into existence actualizes our capacity for freedom and demonstrates that we possess it. To confirm the viability of such a demonstration, Kant must establish that agents can regulate their wills by practical principles, and that practical judgments are efficacious of themselves (i.e., that non-Humean motivational internalism is true). Kant, I argue, is successful on both counts. (shrink)

This paper analyzes a classification of different types of demonstration introduced by Alfarabi in his Kitāb al-Burhān. Alfarabi identifies eight combinations of demonstrative syllogisms, grouped in function of the different types of per se relations expressed by their premises and conclusions, where terms are definitionally connected with one another. The list contains a total of thirty-nine moods illustrated by a rich array of examples drawn from various scientific disciplines, including arithmetic, geometry, and natural philosophy. The combinations and moods are (...) discussed extensively by Averroes in the section of his Epitome of the Organon devoted to the Posterior Analytics and in his Quaesita on logic. Alfarabi’s classification also possibly inspired a simplified taxonomical effort in Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Burhān. (shrink)

The reception of the rational sciences, scientific practice, discourse and methodology into Arabic Islamic society proceeded in several stages of exchange with the transmitters of Iranian, Christian-Aramaic and Byzantine-Greek learning. Translation and the acquisition of knowledge from the Hellenistic heritage went hand in hand with a continuous refinement of the methods of linguistic transposition and the creation of a standardized technical language in Arabic: terminology, rhetoric, and the genres of instruction. Demonstration more geometrico, first introduced by the paradigmatic sciences-mathematics, (...) astronomy, mechanics-and adopted by philosophers embracing the cosmology of Neoplatonism, was complemented and superseded by the methods of syllogistic demonstration. Faced with the establishment of philosophy as a demonstrative science, which claimed absolute and universal knowledge, even the hermeneuti. (shrink)

Persons with visual impairments (hereafter PVI) detect and discover obstacles and road conditions by touching with a white cane when walking on the streets. In one training session, an Orientation and Mobility specialist (hereafter SPT) guided a PVI by grasping and moving the cane that the PVI was holding. We conducted a multimodal analysis of two instruction sequences, one a "proving and achieving" demonstration (Sacks in Lectures on conversation, Blackwell, 1992) and the other a "learnable" (Zemel and Koschmann, in (...) Discourse Stud 16:163–183, 2014) demonstration. The achieving demonstration proved the assessment of the PVI's performance. In the "learnable" demonstration, the PVI was able to receive and perform the most critical part of the "learnable" of the long contact touch without the aid of talk. Sharing a single cane touch is an efficient way for both the guiding SPT and the guided PVI to jointly experience and understand the environmental features. The SPT did not need to verbally confirm that the guided touch was accountable to the PVI and seemed confident that intersubjectivity with the PVI had been established. A unique form of being with others and achieving intersubjectivity in society was identified. In traditional learning instruction, it has been assumed that the learnable is presented and communicated visually and audibly. However, through guided touch learnable is presented and conveyed effectively in the cases of this paper. It seems that the sense of touch has been considered to be just for the occasion, but this is an example of something that is not just for the occasion but is consequential, that is, usable for further occasions. The data is in Japanese. (shrink)

The label idios apodeixis/logos «particular demonstration or argument» of Gorgias is known to us only from the third section of the little work attributed to Aristotle under the title De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia. Its authenticity seems to be unjustly questioned. We try to show that from the Aristotelian perspective we can properly understand the context of Gorgias’ own argument from his lost treatise On Not-Being or On Nature. Parmenides – using implicitly the polysemy of the verb ἔστιν/εἶναι – presented (...) a certain ontological argument «being is, because being is being». Gorgias, however, makes a parody of this by offering a meontological argument: «not-being is because not-being is not-being». Consequently Gorgias then attempts to demonstrate, by means of refutation, that «it is not either to be or not be», i.e. «nothing is». We propose, thus, a reconstruction of Gorgias’ account of meonological and nihilistic argumentation. In this context we find in Plato’s Sophist and in Aristotle’s writings certain allusions to Gorgias’ idios apodeixis, which have not been sufficiently recognized and properly interpreted. (shrink)

I argue that Aristotle’s late-antique commentators read into his theory of demonstration the notion of tekmeriodic proofs in attempt to integrate into the theory of demonstration the assumption that the principles of demonstration should be evident. In so doing, I trace the late antique commentators’ view to Alexander of Aphrodisias’ discussion of the principles of demonstration, showing how his assumption that the principles of demonstration should be evident underlies their notions of tekmeriodic proofs.

This article seeks to shine some light on the teaching demonstration from the perspective of observers using three guiding attributes of effective teaching: connection, commitment, and coachability. Discussing what observers are looking for and how observers interpret what is seen, the article presents the basic forms, common myths, and practical wisdom for teaching demonstrations. By reframing the goals of the teaching demonstration, the article demystifies a key part of the campus interview for the academic job market.

There is agreement neither concerning the point that is being made in Posterior analytics 96b15–25 nor the issue Aristotle intends to address. There are two major lines of interpretation of this passage. According to one, sketched by Themistius and developed by Philoponus and Eustratius, Aristotle is primarily concerned with determining the definitions of the infimae species that fall under a certain genus. They understand Aristotle as arguing that this requires collating definitional predictions, seeing which are common to which species. Pacius, (...) on the other hand, takes Aristotle to be saying that a genus is studied scientifically through first determining the infimae species that fall under that genus. This interpretation attributes to Aristotle a distinction between primary and derivative subjects. I argue for Pacius’s interpretation, defending it against Barnes’s objections.Author Keywords: Demonstration; Definition; Aristotle; Species; Principles. (shrink)

In her sole philosophical treatise, The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, Anne Conway (1631-1679) offers a demonstration of the proposition that, in addition to God and creatures, there is a being whose essence is the medium between God’s essence and creatures’ essence. We offer an interpretation of Conway’s demonstration that reveals its dependence on a rational principle ('PME'): if beings with extreme natures are united, then they are united by means of a being whose nature (...) is the medium between the extremes. We also assess the extent to which Conway offers a justification for her metaphysics by demonstrating her claims from principles known by the understanding. Conway’s philosophical demonstrations are suggestive of a rationalist position on which her metaphysics may be proved from a small number of propositions established independent of experience. However, we ultimately argue that Conway’s philosophical methodology is not rationalist in this sense: for Conway is willing to take our daily experience as the evidence for a metaphysical principle, and also to argue for her philosophy on the basis of a consensus among authoritative texts. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to help to clarify the role which Aristotle gives to definition in his theory of demonstration. I shall begin by examining his handling of the relations between definition and demonstration in chapters 8-10 of the second book of the Posterior Analytics, in order to provide an outline for an interpretation of Aristotle's thought. Secondly, I shall examine chapter 10 in more detail, bringing out the contrast between the commentary by Averroes and that (...) of Grosseteste. I have chosen these two commentators because, both being generally magnificent interpreters of Aristotle, as far as the nature and types of definition are concerned their understanding of Aristotle is strikingly different. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s pre-occupation with the notion of limit (of thought, sense, and language), was described by Alain Badiou as an aesthetic one. The limit is aesthetic because it is not an object to be theorized nor a concept, but rather, what has to be demonstrated, made to be seen, clearly displayed. In this paper, the conjunction between limits, as highlighted in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, and the act of aesthetic demonstration is explored, both in the aesthetic tradition and in contemporary thought about (...) art, in order to explain why the limit which is aesthetically set, cannot be crossed. (shrink)

"It is an interesting and largely unexplored question whether Aristotle is in practice faithful to the general idea of science, and to the rules of method, sketched in his Analytics".It is this issue, "the Problem of Demonstration," which this study is concerned to explore. The objective of this study is not so much to render a detailed and definitive solution to the problem, but rather to suggest a context within which such a solution may be reached. Further, this study (...) is intended not as an historical critique of an historical question in a classical author but as a philosophical enquiry into the roots, in Aristotle, of a perennial philosophical question. The structure of the study is as follows: In the first chapter the problem is stated, and the possible modes of response to the problem are briefly canvassed, in order to set the framework of the response to be offered here. The second chapter attempts, through an examination of certain texts from the Posterior Analytics and elsewhere, to specify and to raise objections to the particular elements in the traditional inter¬ pretation of Aristotle's methodological intentions which have generated the problem of demonstration. Aristotle's teachings concerning the nature of knowledge include reference both to the distinctive object of knowledge and to the psychology of knowing. At one time Aristotle gives a more subjective and psychological, at other times a more object-based account of what is essential to knowledge. In the third chapter it is suggested that we must examine the manner in which Aristotle accommodates these two aspects when he comes to design a methodology of science. Aristotle's views on the aim of science are, therefore, examined as a source of insight into the balance struck between these two aspects in his writings. It is here argued that when we attempt to understand Aristotle's methodological intentions concerning the apodeictic syllogism we must not underestimate the importance in Aristotle's thought of the doctrine. It is this doctrine which, chiefly, enables Aristotle to produce a methodological doctrine which is consistent with his accounts of the nature of knowledge. Chapter four considers the evidence for understanding the Analytics as a training in critical technique, and why Aristotle feels that the apodeictic syllogism is unsuited to the task of communicating findings. The principal theme of this chapter is an examination of the Aristotelian doctrine which holds that the logical training as provided by the Analytics constitutes a and, as such, is unsuited to the task of publication. Chapter five draws together the results of the discussion, and attempts to reconstruct the specific Aristotelian context which renders Aristotle's theory and practice coherent, and which may make it possible to determine the degree of consistency operative throughout his works. A model is presented which, it is suggested, reflects the position intended by Aristotle for those bodies of demonstrated judg¬ ments prefigured in the Posterior Analytics within the economy of Aristotle's methodological theory and practice in science and philosophy. (shrink)

Samuel Clarke was by far the most gifted and influential Newtonian philosopher of his generation, and A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, which constituted the 1704 Boyle Lectures, was one of the most important works of the first half of the eighteenth century, generating a great deal of controversy about the relation between space and God, the nature of divine necessary existence, the adequacy of the Cosmological Argument, agent causation, and the immateriality of the soul. Together (...) with the other texts presented in this edition, it also provides the best introduction to Clarke's philosophical views, which, in addition to their intrinsic interest, are historically important for the light they shed both on the philosophical positions within the Newtonian circle and on the exchange between Clarke and Leibniz, the most famous philosophical controversy of the eighteenth century. (shrink)

Broadly speaking, ancient concepts of causality in terms of explanatory priority have been contrasted with modern discussions of causality concerned with agents or events sufficient to produce effects. As Richard Taylor claimed in the 1967 Encyclopedia of Philosophy, of the four causes considered by Aristotle, all but the notion of efficient cause is now archaic. What we will consider here is a notion even less familiar than Aristotelian material, formal, and final causes—what we will call 'demonstrational causality'. Demonstrational causality refers (...) to the dependence of the conclusion on the premises of a demonstration. Here, if ever, we have a case of explanational priority, since among other things what is required of the premises is that they be better known or more manifest than the conclusion. But, oddly enough, Aristotle and his medieval commentators describe demonstrational causality in the same terms as efficient causality. Aristotle speaks of the conclusion as an "effect" of the premises; his commentators speak of the "sufficiency" of first principles or axioms in producing the conclusion. (shrink)

The most successful science on the Aristotelian model was geometry in the style of Euclid. As advocated in the Posterior Analytics, Euclid’s Elements laid out geometry as a structure of theorems deduced from definitions and axioms that were evident to reason. However, geometry deals with the category of quantity, whereas Aristotelian definitions are paradigmatically in the category of substance. This chapter argues that definitions in the category of quantity have fulfilled well the Aristotelian ideal of stating the essence of ‘what (...) a thing is’, in such a way as to support a superstructure of demonstrations about that thing. Euclid’s definition of circle is a prime example: it is philosophically satisfying and from the first theorem of the Elements proved itself very productive of theorems. As this chapter demonstrates, the definition of ratio was more difficult. Euclid stands at the end of a long search for a definition of ratio, one of the most central notions of mathematics, that is both philosophically satisfying and mathematically productive. The search was not wholly successful. (shrink)

The relationship between emotional arousal and long-term memory is addressed in two experiments in which subjects viewed either a relatively emotionally neutral short story or a closely matched but more emotionally arousing story and were tested for retention of the story 2 weeks later. Experiment 1 provides essential replication of the results of Heuer and Reisberg and illustrates the common interpretive problem posed by the use of different stimuli in the neutral versus emotional stories. In Experiment 2, identical slides were (...) used in both the neutral and arousal stores. Two different stories were created by varying the narration that accompanied each slide. In both experiments, subjects who viewed the arousal story both experienced a greater emotional reaction to the story than did the subjects who viewed the neutral story, and subsequently exhibited enhanced memory for the story. Subjects in Experiment 2 who viewed the arousal story also recalled more slides than did the subjects who viewed the neutral story. This effect was greatest for story phase 2, the phase in which the emotional slide narration occurred. Because this enhanced retention of the story slides cannot be explained by any differences in the slides themselves, the results provide new evidence to support the contention that emotional arousal influences long-term memory in normal human subjects. (shrink)

I defend an interpretation of Aristotle’s _Posterior Analytics _Book I which distinguishes between two projects in different passages of that work: to explain what a given science is and to explain what properly scientific knowledge is. I present Aristotle’s theory in answer to ii, with special attention to his definition of scientific knowledge in 71b9-12 and showing how this is developed on chapters 1.2-9 and 1.13 into a solid Theory of Scientific Demonstration. The main point of this theory is (...) that demonstrations need to capture relevant explanations. Some formal requirements of the demonstration are unfoldings of the main project, 1.e., to capture and present properly relevant causal-explanatory relations. (shrink)

I argue against the standard interpretation of Aristotle’s account of ‘natural predication’ in Posterior Analytics 1.19 and 1.22 according to which only substances can serve as subjects in such predications. I argue that this interpretation cannot accommodate a number of demonstrations Aristotle sanctions. I propose a new interpretation that can accommodate them.

The subject matter of psychology is humans and their experiences and actions. This subject matter differs from the subject matter of physical science by being more highly contextualized, uncertain, and morally saturated. As a consequence, psychological theory must concern itself with context and moral significance and with the formulation of principles rather than causal laws. The development of psychological theory can be assisted by programs of inquiry that emphasize conceptual clarification and moral consideration, in addition to empirical demonstration. Programs (...) of inquiry in psychology also should place a high value on reasoned criticism derivative from a wider array of scholarly methods and traditions. In all of this, psychology should be guided first and foremost by the nature of its subject matter. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

In this article, I outline a teaching demonstration that lasts approximately twenty-two minutes, which a candidate can employ when interviewing for a position in ethics. Since job openings in ethics, and especially applied ethics, are becoming increasingly common, I think that this outline will be helpful to many candidates deliberating about the topic and structure of their future teaching demonstrations. This demonstration is also especially well-suited to a search at a teaching institution, whether a community college, state college, (...) or state university, where faculty and administration place more emphasis on success in pedagogy than success in research and publication. In the conclusion, I offer some suggestions for ways to adapt this outline for a longer teaching demo. (shrink)