Can the phenomenal character of perceptual experience be altered by the states of one's cognitive system, for example, one's thoughts or beliefs? If one thinks that this can happen then one thinks that there can be cognitive penetration of perceptual experience; otherwise, one thinks that perceptual experience is cognitively impenetrable. I claim that there is one alleged case of cognitive penetration that cannot be explained away by the standard strategies one can typically use to explain away alleged cases. The case (...) is one in which it seems subjects' beliefs about the typical colour of objects affects their colour experience. I propose a two-step mechanism of indirect cognitive penetration that explains how cognitive penetration may occur. I show that there is independent evidence that each step in this process can occur. I suspect that people who are opposed to the idea that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable will be less opposed to the idea when they come to consider this indirect mechanism and that those who are generally sympathetic to the idea of cognitive penetrability will welcome the elucidation of this plausible mechanism. (shrink)

Physics tells us what is objectively there. It has no place for the colours of things. So colours are not objectively there. Hence, if there is such a thing at all, colour is mind-dependent. This argument forms the background to disputes over whether common sense makes a mistake about colours. It is assumed that..

This essay* takes two notions of autonomy and two notions of explanation and argues that colours occur in explanations that fall under all of them. The claim that colours can be used to explain anything at all may seem to some people an outrage. But their pessimism is unjustified and the orthodox dispositional view which may seem to support it, I shall argue, itself has difficulties. In broad terms, Section 2 shows that there exist good straight scientific laws of (...) class='Hi'>colour, constituting what one might call a phenomenal science. Section 3 offers a larger view of what we are doing when we attribute colours to things, a view which makes it a case of holistic explanation, similar in many ways to psychological explanation. Section 2 emphasizes the model of scientific explanation, and Section 3 the holistic model found in rational explanation; but it will emerge that colour explanation in different ways fits both models, as it also does the two principal notions of autonomy that the first section identifies. (shrink)

The origin of colour categories and their relationship to colour perception have been the prime example for testing the influence of language on perception and thought and more generally for investigating the biological, ecological and cultural determination of human cognition. These themes are central to a broad range of disciplines, including vision research, neuroscience, cognitive psychology, developmental science, cultural anthropology, linguistics, computer science, and philosophy. Unfortunately, though, it has been tacitly taken for granted that the conceptual assumptions and (...) methodological practices from the dawn of empirical research on colour categorisation are the gold standard for current colour category research. Here, we show that these assumptions and practices are obsolete and flawed and have led to four fundamental and widespread misconceptions about colour categorisation: 1.) that colour perception is inherently categorical; 2.) that English Basic Colour Terms correspond to universal categories that are the end point of a fixed evolutionary sequence; 3.) that the prototypes of English basic colour terms are perceptually salient and qualify as focal colours; and 4.) that colour category research essentially revolves around the universalism-realism debate. State-of-the-art research on colour categorisation provides new, more sophisticated approaches and allows for rectifying those four statements. At the same time, some of the questions underlying those statements are not convincingly answered yet and constitute major challenges to future research. The critical considerations on colour categorisation may be transferred to research on other kinds of perceptual categorisation to inspire new, more general research questions. (shrink)

In this major reinterpretation, Howard Caygill argues that all of Benjamin's work is characterized by its focus on a concept of experience derived from Kant but applied by Benjamin to objects as diverse as urban experience, visual art, literature and philosophy. The book analyzes the development of Benjamin's concept of experience in his early writings showing that it emerges from an engagement with visual experience, and in particular the experience of colour. By representing Benjamin as primarily a thinker of (...) the visual field, Caygill is able to bring forward previously neglected texts on inscription and the visual field and to cast many of his more familiar texts, for instance the Work of Art in an Age of Mechanical Reproduction in a new light. (shrink)

The view that the mind-dependence of colour is implicit in our ordinary thinking has a distinguished history. With its origins in Berkeley, the view has proved especially popular amongst so-called ‘Oxford’ philosophers, proponents including Cook Wilson (1904: 773-4), Pritchard (1909: 86-7), Ryle (1949: 209), Kneale (1950: 123) and McDowell (1985: 112). Gareth Evans’s discussion of secondary qualities in “Things Without the Mind” is representative of this tradition. It is his version of the view that I consider in this paper.

Multisensory stimulation has been shown to alter the sense of body-ownership. Given that perceived similarity between one’s own body and those of others is crucial for social cognition, we investigated whether multisensory stimulation can lead participants to experience ownership over a hand of different skin colour. Results from two studies using introspective, behavioural and physiological methods show that, following synchronous visuotactile stimulation, participants can experience body-ownership over hands that seem to belong to a different racial group. Interestingly, a baseline (...) measure of implicit racial bias did not predict whether participants would experience the RHI, but the overall strength of experienced body-ownership seemed to predict the participants’ post-illusion implicit racial bias with those who experienced a stronger RHI showing a lower bias. These findings suggest that multisensory experiences can override strict ingroup/outgroup distinctions based on skin colour and point to a key role for sensory processing in social cognition. (shrink)

Whether or not one endorses realism about colour, it is very tempting to regard realism about determinable colours such as green and yellow as standing or falling together with realism about determinate colours such as unique green or green31. Indeed some of the most prominent representatives of both sides of the colour realism debate explicitly endorse the idea that these two kinds of realism are so linked. Against such theorists, the present paper argues that one can be a (...) realist about the determinable colours of objects, and thus hold that most of the colour ascriptions made by competent speakers are literally true, while denying that there are any positive facts of the matter as to the determinate colours of objects. The result is a realistic colour realism that can certify most of our everyday colour ascriptions as literally correct, while acknowledging the data regarding individual variation. (shrink)

In this paper evidence will be provided that Wittgenstein’s intuition about the logic of colour relations is to be taken near-literally. Starting from the Aristotelian oppositions between propositions as represented in the logical square of oppositions on the one hand and oppositions between primary and secondary colors as represented in an octahedron on the other, it will be shown algebraically how definitions for the former carry over to the realm of colour categories and describe very precisely the relations (...) obtaining between the known primary and secondary colours. Linguistic evidence for the reality of the resulting isomorphism will be provided. For example, the vertices that resist natural single-item lexicalization in logic (such as the O-corner, for which there is no natural lexicalization *nall (=not all)) are not naturally lexicalized in the realm of colour terms either. From the perspective of the architecture of cognition, the isomorphism suggests that the foundations of logical oppositions and negation may well be much more deeply rooted in the physiological structure of human cognition than is standardly assumed. (shrink)

The widely accepted understanding in contemporary discourse is that race and ethnicity fundamentally arose as social constructs devoid of inherent biological or scientific significance.1 Despite this consensus, discussions abound, including in this journal,2 regarding the extent and manner in which racial and ethnic categorisations should influence the landscape of medical research, practice and policy. In an ideal paradigm, medicine should exude an unwavering commitment to impartiality, extending care and treatment to every individual, unfettered by considerations of their racial or ethnic (...) background—an approach that can be described as ‘colour blind.’ Yet, a cursory examination of medicine’s historical trajectory and the enduring realities of human prejudices unravels a precarious tension. This tension resides at the intersection of two seemingly conflicting imperatives: one, the ethical mandate for medicine to operate as a colour-blind entity, and the other, the ethical duty to candidly acknowledge, confront and rectify the historical and contemporary shortcomings woven into the fabric of our healthcare systems. Navigating this precarious balance demands a nuanced and introspective approach, one that aspires to forge a path towards a more equitable healthcare landscape while remaining steadfastly committed to the principles of honesty, accountability and the pursuit of a just and inclusive future. Scientific journals are confronted with the intricate dilemma of addressing racist scientific records.3 The question at hand pertains to whether content tainted by racism, …. (shrink)

This book comprises material on colour which was written by Wittgenstein in the last eighteen months of his life. It is one of the few documents which shows him concentratedly at work on a single philosophical issue. The principal theme is the features of different colours, of different kinds of colour and of luminosity—a theme which Wittgenstein treats in such a way as to destroy the traditional idea that colour is a simple and logically uniform kind of (...) thing. This edition consists of Wittgenstein's basic German text, together with an English translation. (shrink)

The purpose of this review-essay is twofold: 1). It looks at three recent publications on Goethe's theory of colour in relation to the philosophy of polarity. 2). It puts forward a method for more precisely determining the exact day of Goethe's so-called "prism aperçu" - i.e. the precise date when Goethe looked through the prism in Weimar and had his revolutionary insight into the foundations of colour. The date of this insight is still an unresolved problem in Goethe (...) research. (shrink)

John Cottingham; XIII*—Descartes on Colour, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 90, Issue 1, 1 June 1990, Pages 231–246, https://doi.org/10.1093/ari.

Following G. E. M. Anscombe, most commentators on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico‐philosophicus have held that §6.3751 rules out colour propositions as elementary propositions. However, a careful reading of some passages from The Big Typescript, MS 105 and MS 103, on the logical structure of colour and the logical analysis of colour statements, shows that the elementary propositions of the Tractatus include colour propositions. It follows that Anscombe’s interpretation of §6.3751 is mistaken.

The task of giving some sort of interpretation of Wittgenstein's Remarks on Colour is an extraordinarily difficult one. The book is exceptionally fragmentary. Many of the remarks seem to raise questions that are then left completely unanswered, or to invite us to imagine various circumstances that are then left without any further comment. Although nearly all the remarks are related in one way or another to the problem of colour, the range of topics that Wittgenstein touches on is (...) extremely wide, and covers areas that are not normally mentioned in contemporary philosophical discussions of colour. For example, apart from the familiar ‘Why can't there be a transparent white?’ and ‘Why can't there be a reddish-green?’, he asks ‘Can a transparent piece of glass have the same colour as an opaque piece of paper?’, ‘Is white always the lightest colour?’, ‘Do I see blond hair in the black and white photograph of a blond youth?’, ‘Does it make sense to point to a colour in the iris of a Rembrandt eye and ask for the walls of my room to be painted the same colour?’, ‘Do the colour-blind have the same concept of colour-blindness as the normally sighted?’, ‘Can normal vision be described?’, and so on. (shrink)

known as timbral sonicism, accepts that a musical work's orchestral colour is a factor in its identity, but denies that the use of the specified instruments is required for an authentic rendition of the work provided that sounds as of those instruments are achieved. This position has been defended by Julian Dodd. In arguing against his view, I appeal to empirical work showing that composers, musicians, and listeners typically hear through music to the actions that go into its production. (...) In this respect, musical listening reflects the standard account of ‘ecological hearing’; we appreciate sounds as providing information about their sources rather than for their intrinsic qualities. On this basis, I suggest that musical instruments are not merely means to the production of the sounds of performances. Their use is mandated if such performances are to be properly formed. More specifically, when composers are able to make the instrumentation of their compositions central to the identity of those compositions, accurate performances must involve the appropriate use of the specified instruments. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

This article addresses two questions related to colour categorization, to wit, the question what a colour category is, and the question how we identify colour categories. We reject both the relativist and universalist answers to these questions. Instead, we suggest that colour categories can be identified with the help of the criterion of psychological saliency, which can be operationalized by means of consistency and consensus measures. We further argue that colour categories can be defined as (...) well-structured entities that optimally partition colour space. We provide some empirical support for this claim by presenting experimental results, which indicate that internal structure is a better predictor of colour categories than perceptual saliency. (shrink)

In spatial sequence synaesthesia ordinal stimuli are perceived as arranged in peripersonal space. Using fMRI, we examined the neural bases of SSS and colour synaesthesia for spoken words in a late-blind synaesthete, JF. He reported days of the week and months of the year as both coloured and spatially ordered in peripersonal space; parts of the days and festivities of the year were spatially ordered but uncoloured. Words that denote time-units and triggered no concurrents were used in a control (...) condition. Both conditions inducing SSS activated the occipito-parietal, infero-frontal and insular cortex. The colour area hOC4v was engaged when the synaesthetic experience included colour. These results confirm the continued recruitment of visual colour cortex in this late-blind synaesthetes. Synaesthesia also involved activation in inferior frontal cortex, which may be related to spatial memory and detection, and in the insula, which might contribute to audiovisual integration related to the processing of inducers and concurrents. (shrink)

This article evaluates the gains but also the losses of the set-theoretical ontology Badiou develops in Being and Event, in order to stress the importance of the shift to a concern with appearance and difference in Logics of Worlds. It is argued that this shift suggests a possible rapprochement between Badiou’s philosophy of the event on the one hand and postcolonial critical race theory on the other. This is explored through an evental reading of the so-called Morant Bay Revolt that (...) took place in Jamaica in 1865. The article closes by exploring some of the overlaps between Badiou’s development of an “objective phenomenology” in Logics of Worlds, and Frantz Fanon’s elaboration of a phenomenology of race in Black Skin, White Masks. (shrink)

Theories of Colour from Democritus to Descartes investigates issues of the ontological status and perception of colours, such as: What is the nature of colours? Do they exist independently of the subjects who perceive them? And if so, how are they generated and how do they differ from one another? These are some of the questions raised by philosophers, but what has been lacking is an account of the various theories about colours through different periods of the history of (...) philosophy. Exploring philosophical debates on the nature and perception of colours from a historical perspective, this book presents how different theories from Antiquity through the Middle Ages to the early modern era explain the nature of colours, their generation and the way they are perceived. Twelve eminent historians of philosophy analyse the theories of colours prevailing at critical points in the history of Western philosophy, from its beginnings with Democritus to Descartes and the early modern period. This book will appeal to students and scholars working on the history of philosophy (ancient, medieval, Arabic and Latin, and early modern) as well as those interested in contemporary philosophy: philosophy of the mind, philosophy of perception, phenomenology, metaphysics and neurosciences. A broader audience may also include researchers in psychology, cultural history and the history of art. (shrink)

First published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Cognition can influence action. Your belief that it is raining outside, for example, may cause you to reach for the umbrella. Perception can also influence cognition. Seeing that no raindrops are falling, for example, may cause you to think that you don’t need to reach for an umbrella. The question that has fascinated philosophers and cognitive scientists for the past few decades, however, is whether cognition can influence perception. Can, for example, your desire for a rainy day cause you to (...) see, hear, or feel raindrops when you walk outside? More generally, can our cognitive states influence the way we see the external world? In this paper, I discuss three experiments on memory colour effects. In these experiments, subjects systematically made different colour matches or adjustments for object-patches representing objects that have prototypical colours and neutral object-patches. I argue that these differences are not merely differences in judgments but are best explained in terms of phenomenology. However, I show that these differences in phenomenology can be explained without reference to cognitive states such as colour concepts or beliefs. (shrink)

Scientists are often bemused by the efforts of philosophers essaying a theory of colour: colour science sports a huge array of facts and theories, and it is unclear to its practitioners what philosophy can or is trying to contribute. Equally, philosophers tend to be puzzled about how they can fit colour science into their investigations without compromising their own disciplinary identity: philosophy is supposed to be an _a priori_ investigation; philosophers do not work in psychophysics labs – (...) not in their professional capacity, anyway. (shrink)

The book is a first detailed discussion of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Remarks on Colour.

There have been a number of criticisms, based on visual processes, of the Australian view that colour is an objective property of the world. These criticisms have led to subjective theories about colour. These visual processes (metamers, retinex theory, opponent processes, simultaneous contrast, colour constancy, subjective colours) have been examined and it is suggested that they do not carry their supposed critical weight against an objective theory. In particular, it is argued that metamers don’t occur in nature (...) and primate colour vision evolved without metamers. Thus normal colour vision occurs without the problem of metamers. This argument, in conjunction with evidence against the critical roles of opponent processes and retinex theory in colour vision, is taken to suggest that colour can be given a photon energy/wavelengthrealism explanation. This proposal allows an account of the many microstructural bases of colour generation put forward by Nassau (1983). It is argued that neither disjunctive realism or reflectance realism are adequate objective explanations of colour. (shrink)

The circularity problem states that the representationalist about phenomenal consciousness gives a circular explanation if she adopts the classic view about secondary qualities, such as colours, that characterises them as dispositions to produce experiences with a specific phenomenal character. Since colour primitivism faces severe difficulties, it seems that colour physicalism is the only viable option for the representationalist. I will argue that the representationalist is not committed to colour physicalism because she can adopt an anti-realist theory of (...) colour. My diagnosis is that the alleged commitment to colour physicalism rests upon the acceptance of colour realism which is due to the approval of externalist versions of representationalism, such as tracking representationalism. I will argue that the representationalist can deal with the circularity problem by adopting figurative projectivism, which holds that colours are contingently non-instantiated properties that only figure in the representational contents of colour experiences. (shrink)

Two principal questions lie at the heart of the philosophy of colour perception. First: how do colour experiences represent the world? Second: do colour representations veridically represent the world? This collection of papers closely examines the various ways in which colour experience may represent the world, and the possibilities regarding the veridicality of these representations. As it turns out, close attention to the above two questions illuminates novel ways of approaching the metaphysics of colour and (...) colour experience. Paper one distinguishes different ways in which colour experience can be veridical or erroneous, and uses these distinctions to motivate realist error theories: a new class of theory regarding the perception of colour. Realist error theories say that colour experience is erroneous regarding the location and/or metaphysics of colour, but is generally veridical regarding the instantiation of colour. I argue that realist error theories provide a new approach to certain tensions between our motivated metaphysics for colour and how experience represents the colours. Paper two falls into two parts. In the first part, I argue that extant subject-dependent theories of colour fail to delineate veridical colour experiences from erroneous colour experiences. In part two, I develop novel subject-dependent theories which successfully delineate veridical colour experiences from erroneous colour experiences. I advocate for mono-minimalism: a view which says that colours are subject-dependent properties which range over at least one standard perceiver in at least one standard condition. Paper three focuses on the distinction between steady and unsteady colours. Extant proposals involve positing that steady colours are subject-independent and unsteady colours are subject-dependent. I argue that the subject-dependent theorist can explain the metaphysical difference between steady and unsteady colours in wholly subject-dependent terms. We can say that steady and unsteady colours are both subject-dependent properties, but steady colours range over a broader range of perceptual conditions compared to unsteady colours. I argue that this bifurcation in the scope of the colours is consistent with the mono-minimalist theory of colour proposed in paper two. (shrink)

Thread 6 discusses instances of artistic activism in which the often grey concrete of the ‘urban fabric’ is overflown with its carnivalesque counter-textures: the Orange Alternative of the Polish 1980s; rainbow symbolism; the ‘knit graffiti’ of contemporary ‘craftivists’; and an antifascist clown patrol in Tampere, Finland. A staple in the performativity literature, the particular theatricality of political protest is located in more ephemeral qualities of surface texture and the abundance of colour specifically—deemed empty or excessive like theatricality itself; adding (...) to urban texture rather than fading into its fabric. Zooming out to a more evolutionary time frame of more-than-human performativity (in accordance with the often organistic metaphors of artistic activism), the discussion helps imagine a more permissive politics of textural porosity and thus also of diversity—predicated not on antagonistic tropes of transgressive opposition, but on saturating the world, perhaps with the merest hues of textures to be. (shrink)

This article examines contemporary representations of sakura (cherry blossom) in cosmetics marketing. Since the Heian period, sakura has been loved and regarded as having tangible and metaphorical significance in Japan. Imagery of sakura is rich in ambiguity and has a complex history as evident in its use in the militaristic promotion of heroism, especially related to the Second World War. However, in recent decades, sakura imagery has proliferated across a range of popular culture both inside and out of Japan. In (...) this article we focus on the circulation and meanings of sakura imagery accessible and appropriated in Australia with specific attention to cosmetics. Sakura offers not only aesthetic pleasure but also potentially some health benefits. Our discussion draws on data from surveys and interviews with participants in Australia about their perspectives of sakura aesthetics related to colour symbolism. This is accompanied by close analysis of colour symbolism in recent perfume, skincare and cosmetic marketing, branding and packaging which use sakura imagery. We argue that, using the complex symbolism associated with the wide colour spectrum, sakura imagery has now been refashioned as a versatile promotional tool in the global market, as exemplified by the brand engagement of sakura-themed cosmetics. (shrink)

In notes to Hegel's Rechtsphilosophie lectures, written around the time of Haiti's 1825 ‘ransom’—the 150 million francs demanded by France to indemnify former slave and plantation owners—we find an uncanny remark. Hegel appears to report on a different ransom, a compensated abolition of slavery in North America that never happened, anticipating an application of the Fifth Amendment's takings clause that US legal scholarship routinely fails to mention. In view of Alan Brudner's enlistment of Hegel as the philosopher ‘uniquely’ able to (...) understand the Fifth Amendment's requirement for compensation for expropriations—a ‘constitutional essential for liberalism’—this paper explores the meaning of these passages in the historical context of the legal abolitions of Hegel's time: feudalism and slavery. The slaveholder indemnities were clearly the unjust ‘dividends’ of the colour line, but their legal foundations and developments in US thought of the nineteenth century also usefully illustrate takings law's foreclosure of political and social transformation through the securitization of value. Reading these histories and Hegel's comments alongside the critical interventions of the black radical tradition, I suggest that Hegel's curious remarks on compensated takings suggest not only a critical divergence from Brudner's understanding of ‘dialogic community’, but a crucial limitation in his field of analysis which pivoted on the denigration of black sovereignty. This paper thus suggests an understanding of US takings law through the shifting understandings of the term ‘ransom’—which for abolitionists such as Frederick Douglass signified not a resolution of slavery, but rather the threat of its perpetuation—and Douglass's elaboration of the pathology of the colour line. (shrink)

Arguments for and against the existence of demonstrative concepts of shades and shapes turn on the assumption that demonstrative concepts must be recognitional capacities. The standard argument for this assumption is based on the widely held view that concepts are those constituents of propositional attitudes that account for an attitude's inferential potential. Only if demonstrative concepts of shades are recognitional capacities, the standard argument goes, can they account for the inferential potential of demonstrative judgements about shades. Shades are conceived as (...) colour universals. Shade a is different from shade b iff it is possible to distinguish a from b visually. In this paper I will argue that the standard argument is based on a mistaken view of inference. We can correctly draw inferences from a demonstrative judgement about something x , even if we are not able to recognise or re-identify the previously demonstrated x during our reasoning. We are prima facie entitled to rely on our preservative memory as retaining our initial demonstrative apprehension of x . The fact that preservative memory entitles us to assume sameness of referent over time is linguistically manifest in the use of anaphoric pronouns: if we can no longer recognise and demonstrate our original demonstratum, we can use anaphoric expressions to pick it up, thereby ensuring sameness of reference. ('That is a nice bird. Now it has vanished. So there is a nice bird that has just vanished.') Since preservation of the initial episode of apprehending x grounds our reasoning from demonstrative judgements, there is no longer a reason to require demonstrative concepts to be recognitional capacities. The standard argument does not get off the ground. 1. (shrink)

Photographs and optical images, whatever their contents, are imprints of the electromagnetic waves in the (human) visible range of wavelengths, we refer to as light. Furthermore, they are designed to portray different parts of the visible light in terms of different colours, in analogy with the human eyes, however imperfectly. The world outside our eyes and cameras, however, is permeated by electromagnetic waves with much wider spectrum of wavelengths than those in the visible range. Importantly also, colour is a (...) construct of our eye‐brains: the Universe itself has no colour, independently of us. I ask how does the knowledge of these facts change the way we perceive the colour in optical images and photographs, whatever their relationship to the world in a representational sense may be? By employing three images, with very different origins and vistas ‐ one a direct photograph, the other two synthetically constructed images using real cosmological observations ‐ I demonstrate the extent to which colour in such images can hide the underlying phenomena of which they claim to visually speak, both due to its nature as a coarse-grained visual index, and by being restricted to the visible range. The aim is not to belittle the important role that our (restricted) vision together with our perception of colour have played in the evolution of our species, and still play in the way we relate to the world informationally, aesthetically and emotionally. But rather to show that recognizing the limitations of our vision and complementing it with the knowledge of the phenomena underlying optical images and photographs can allow us to perceive them anew and provide additional tools (both conceptual and visual) to imagine and envision such images outside the bounds of the visible range and colour. (shrink)

L. T. Hobhouse (1864–1929) is most familiar today as a leading theorist of British new liberalism. This article recovers and examines his overlooked commentary on the concept and rhetoric of race, which constituted part of his better-known project of advancing an authoritative account of liberal doctrine. His writings during and after the South African War, I argue, represent a prominent effort to cast liberalism as compatible with both imperial rule and what he called ‘the idea of racial equality’. A properly (...) liberal empire, he asserted, would dissolve the colour line. This article traces the arguments Hobhouse advanced to make this claim, and explores his motivations for doing so. I contend that Hobhouse drew on the idiom of race as a form of exclusionary rhetoric, to delegitimise rival accounts of liberal empire and to cast his own as properly cosmopolitan. This recovery, I suggest, offers payoffs for our understanding of both Hobhouse's political thought and, more broadly, the uses of ‘race’ in twentieth-century liberalism. (shrink)