Category mistakes are sentences such as 'Green ideas sleep furiously' or 'Saturday is in bed'. They strike us as highly infelicitous but it is hard to explain precisely why this is so. Ofra Magidor explores four approaches to category mistakes in philosophy of language and linguistics, and develops and defends an original, presuppositional account.

Rocco Gangle addresses the methodological questions raised by a commitment to immanence in terms of how diagrams may be used both as tools and as objects of philosophical investigation. Gangle integrates insights from Spinoza, Pierce and Deleuze in conjunction with the formal operations of category theory.

This paper establishes that category theory is not a foundational layer of any operational system but a representational artifact: the minimal morphism-based formal language encoding the operational obstruction structure [ℐ/∼] derived from Operatiology. The Unbounded Index Obstruction criterion classifies core categorical notions individually. Arbitrary categories, functors, and natural transformations require certification over non-finitely-exhaustible index families. Limits and colimits belong to the power-set type of [ℐ/∼], the categorical analogue of the Power Set axiom in ZFC. Adjunctions belong to the unrestricted (...) type, parallel to the Axiom of Replacement. The Yoneda lemma occupies the extremal position within the power-set type: the entire relational complexity of Nat(h_A, F) collapses to a single evaluation, constituting maximum compression efficiency within the morphism-based language. The minimal categorical structures retaining executive correlates in C⁽³⁾_Πd are finite acyclic free categories and the single-object category BM₃(ℂ). A fidelity ordering among categorical, set-theoretic, and type-theoretic foundations is established as a structural taxonomy. Category theory and ZFC are dual [ℐ/∼] compression languages differing only in compression axis: membership versus morphism. Their foundational rivalry is a competition internal to the projective layer. The classification criterion (operational necessity, grounded in Axiom 2) and the classification function (Unbounded Index Obstruction) are both derived from the executive layer; no external foundation is structurally required or presupposed. -/- Published on May 31, 2026 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.20470946. (shrink)

I review some recent work on applications of category theory to questions concerning theoretical structure and theoretical equivalence of classical field theories, including Newtonian gravitation, general relativity, and Yang–Mills theories. In particular, the chapter explains how the Baez–Bartel–Dolan framework for classifying forgetful functors provides a precise way of saying when one formulation of a physical theory posits more or less structure than another, and also when two theories posit equivalent amounts of structure.

I defend a one category ontology: an ontology that denies that we need more than one fundamental category to support the ontological structure of the world. Categorical fundamentality is understood in terms of the metaphysically prior, as that in which everything else in the world consists. One category ontologies are deeply appealing, because their ontological simplicity gives them an unmatched elegance and spareness. I’m a fan of a one category ontology that collapses the distinction between particular (...) and property, replacing it with a single fundamental category of intrinsic characters or qualities. We may describe the qualities as qualitative charactersor as modes, perhaps on the model of Aristotelian qualitative (nonsubstantial) kinds, and I will use the term “properties” interchangeably with “qualities”. The qualities are repeatable and reasonably sparse, although, as I discuss in section 2.6, there are empirical reasons that may suggest, depending on one’s preferred fundamental physical theory, that they include irreducibly intensive qualities. There are no uninstantiated qualities. I also assume that the fundamental qualitative natures are intrinsic, although physics may ultimately suggest that some of them are extrinsic. On my view, matter, concrete objects, abstract objects, and perhaps even spacetime are constructed from mereological fusions of qualities, so the world is simply a vast mixture of qualities, including polyadic properties (i.e., relations). This means that everything there is, including concrete objects like persons or stars, is a quality, a qualitative fusion, or a portion of the extended qualitative fusion that is the worldwhole. I call my view mereological bundle theory. (shrink)

This volume explores the many different meanings of the notion of the axiomatic method, offering an insightful historical and philosophical discussion about how these notions changed over the millennia. The author, a well-known philosopher and historian of mathematics, first examines Euclid, who is considered the father of the axiomatic method, before moving onto Hilbert and Lawvere. He then presents a deep textual analysis of each writer and describes how their ideas are different and even how their ideas progressed over time. (...) Next, the book explores category theory and details how it has revolutionized the notion of the axiomatic method. It considers the question of identity/equality in mathematics as well as examines the received theories of mathematical structuralism. In the end, Rodin presents a hypothetical New Axiomatic Method, which establishes closer relationships between mathematics and physics. Lawvere's axiomatization of topos theory and Voevodsky's axiomatization of higher homotopy theory exemplify a new way of axiomatic theory building, which goes beyond the classical Hilbert-style Axiomatic Method. The new notion of Axiomatic Method that emerges in categorical logic opens new possibilities for using this method in physics and other natural sciences. This volume offers readers a coherent look at the past, present and anticipated future of the Axiomatic Method. (shrink)

Can category theory be a foundation of mathematics? While category theory is taken to organize the body of mathematical knowledge and practice, its status as a foundational theory has been disputed. I argue that category theory can serve as a foundation of mathematics especially in an explanatory sense. The explanatory sense of foundation is both historically situated and philosophically motivated; I examine its historical uses by some of the pioneering figures as well as its theoretical ramifications across (...) several philosophical topics. Then what makes category theory explanatory in the relevant sense? I argue that the explanatory nature of category theory can be understood as its capacity to offer abstract explanation. To support this, the case studies on mathematical explanation through Galois theory and category theory will be considered, which will be tied in with more traditional accounts of category theory’s foundational status. Thus, I argue that category theory’s foundational status can be supported through the lens of mathematical explanation, which demonstrates a successful interplay between the two traditions in philosophy of mathematics, i.e. the foundation-oriented tradition and the practice-oriented tradition. (shrink)

This is the first volume on category theory for a broad philosophical readership. It is designed to show the interest and significance of category theory for a range of philosophical interests: mathematics, proof theory, computation, cognition, scientific modelling, physics, ontology, the structure of the world.

Category mistakes are sentences such as ‘Colourless green ideas sleep furiously’ or ‘The theory of relativity is eating breakfast’. Such sentences are highly anomalous, and this has led a large number of linguists and philosophers to conclude that they are meaningless (call this ‘the meaninglessness view’). In this paper I argue that the meaninglessness view is incorrect and category mistakes are meaningful. I provide four arguments against the meaninglessness view: in Sect. 2, an argument concerning compositionality with respect (...) to category mistakes; in Sect. 3 an argument concerning synonymy facts of category mistakes; in Sect. 4 concerning embeddings of category mistakes in propositional attitude ascriptions; and in Sect. 5 concerning the uses of category mistakes in metaphors. Having presented these arguments, in Sect. 6 I briefly discuss some of the positive motivations for accepting the meaninglessness view and argue that they are unconvincing. I conclude that the meaninglessness view ought to be rejected. (shrink)

This paper argues that consciousness theory has been repeatedly stalled by a structural failure: the collapse of neighboring categories into the overloaded term “consciousness.” Drawing on Ryle’s category discipline, Nagel’s protection of subjectivity, Dennett’s anti-mystification, and Block’s internal decompression, the paper shows how the field has preserved difficulty without preserving distinction. -/- Scrutinized awareness is introduced as a threshold concept that distinguishes mere awareness from awareness exposed to participational consequence—the condition in which what is undergone becomes non-detachable from a (...) participant’s continuing history. This threshold resists the common collapses that equate consciousness with intelligence, reportability, suffering, moral status, or artificial performance. -/- The paper then develops the concept of recompression, the predictable process by which a clarifying distinction becomes flattened into a slogan, proxy, or institutional stopping rule. Using the Hard Problem as a case study, it argues that the field has often treated the recognition of difficulty as a sufficient marker of seriousness, thereby halting the decompositional work required to map the surrounding conceptual terrain. -/- The central claim is methodological: a theory of consciousness must not only introduce distinctions but also explain how those distinctions will be pressured, misused, and collapsed once they circulate. A compression-resistant concept is not one that cannot be misunderstood, but one that can diagnose its own misuse. -/- The paper concludes that the future of consciousness studies depends not only on solving the Hard Problem, but on resisting the institutional life of difficulty itself. Scrutinized awareness is offered not as a final theory but as a discipline of distinction capable of reopening inquiry where inherited formulations have produced conceptual arrest. (shrink)

Arguing first that the best way to understand what a continuant is is as something that primarily has its properties at a time rather than atemporally, the paper then defends the idea that there are occurrent continuants. These are things that were, are, or will be happening—like the ongoing process of someone reading or my writing this paper, for instance. A recently popular philosophical view of process is as something that is referred to with mass nouns and not count nouns. (...) This has mistakenly encouraged the view that the only way to think of process is as the stuff of events, and has obscured the possibility of thinking of processes as individual continuants. (shrink)

Journal of Mathematical Logic, Volume 22, Issue 02, August 2022. We introduce bounded category forcing axioms for well-behaved classes [math]. These are strong forms of bounded forcing axioms which completely decide the theory of some initial segment of the universe [math] modulo forcing in [math], for some cardinal [math] naturally associated to [math]. These axioms naturally extend projective absoluteness for arbitrary set-forcing — in this situation [math] — to classes [math] with [math]. Unlike projective absoluteness, these higher bounded (...) class='Hi'>category forcing axioms do not follow from large cardinal axioms but can be forced under mild large cardinal assumptions on [math]. We also show the existence of many classes [math] with [math] giving rise to pairwise incompatible theories for [math]. (shrink)

This paper considers the role that category theory can play in philosophy. Category theory is a source of problems, methods and inspiration when it comes to considering both some new and some longstanding philosophical issues. Among the former, the paper draws attention to the ontological interaction between categories and sets, as well as the quantificational criterion of being—to mention just two. Among the latter, it highlights the problem of cognitive access to mathematical objects, and that of the way (...) in which such objects exist. In the context of the development and the ontology of mathematics, I argue in favour of the thesis that category theory is the most “platonic” theory in mathematics. I also point out that category theory impacts significantly upon many standard philosophical positions, providing many counter-examples to popular, often repeated, yet unjustified philosophical claims. The influence of category theory on the foundations and ontology of mathematics is also briefly explored here. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Preliminaries 1 The Highly Problematic Status of the Category of Substance 2 A New Approach: Prime State of Affairs (“Pristate”) as the Only Ontological Category at the Fundamental Level 3 Concluding Remarks.

I argue for a kind of sub-category generalism about conspiracy theories. I identify four features that negatively contribute to the evaluation of any conspiracy theory that has them. I argue that particularism about conspiracy theories is in conflict even with this moderate position. I explain the implications of sub-category generalism for questions about the epistemic environment in which epistemic agents operate. I argue that even if there are pragmatic reasons for being vigilant about the possibility of malign conspiracies, (...) this does not support rejecting the claim that it is a prima facie epistemically wrong to believe a conspiracy with any of the four features I identify. I discuss how the favoured sub-category generalism may help to refine discussion about the relationship between the psychology of those who believe conspiracy theories and subjects who have delusions. There are grounds for thinking that believers in conspiracy theories display irrationality at least as bad as those suffering from delusions. This is not to pathologise believers in conspiracy theories but recognise the continuities between those who have delusions and believers who are not the subject of clinical attention. (shrink)

Although a considerable degree of precision has been introduced both into the formulation and the discussion of ontological theories by the use of formal methods there is still a remarkable indefiniteness about foundational issues. In particular it is not clear what an ontological category is and why we regard something as an ontological category. This is amazing given that the notion of ontological category is in fact the most basic of the whole of ontology: it is what (...) this discipline is about. (shrink)

Foundational ontologies, central constructs in ontological investigations and engineering alike, are based on ontological categories. Firstly proposed by Aristotle as the very ur- elements from which the whole of reality can be derived, they are not easy to identify, let alone partition and/or hierarchize; in particular, the question of their number poses serious challenges. The late medieval philosopher Dietrich of Freiberg wrote around 1286 a tutorial that can help us today with this exceedingly difficult task. In this paper, I discuss (...) ontological categories and their importance for foundational ontologies from both the contemporary perspective and the original Aristotelian viewpoint, I provide the translation from the Latin into English of Dietrich's De origine II with an introductory elaboration, and I extract a foundational ontology–that is in fact a single-category one–from this text rooted in Dietrich's specification of types of subjecthood and his conception of intentionality as causal operation. (shrink)

Radical Ontic Structural Realism (ROSR) claims that structure exists independently of objects that may instantiate it. Critics of ROSR contend that this claim is conceptually incoherent, insofar as, (i) it entails there can be relations without relata, and (ii) there is a conceptual dependence between relations and relata. In this essay I suggest that (ii) is motivated by a set-theoretic formulation of structure, and that adopting a category-theoretic formulation may provide ROSR with more support. In particular, I consider how (...) a category-theoretic formulation of structure can be developed that denies (ii), and can be made to do work in the context of formulating theories in physics. Keywords: structural realism, category theory, general relativity.. (shrink)

The concept of an ontological category is central to metaphysics. Metaphysicians argue about which category of existence an object should be assigned to, whether one category can be reduced to another one, or whether there might be different equally adequate systems of categorization. Answers to these questions presuppose a clear understanding of what precisely an ontological category is, and Jan Westerhoff now provides the first in-depth analysis. After examining a variety of attempted definitions, he proceeds to (...) argue for a new understanding of ontological categories, according to which they are systematizations of our knowledge of the world rather than essential characteristics of the world itself. Metaphysicians will find his work highly stimulating. (shrink)

Gilbert Ryle never pursued research under Edmund Husserl. However, Ryle was indeed Husserl’s student in a broader sense, as much of his own work was deeply influenced by his studies of Husserl’s pre-World War I writings. While Ryle is the thinker whose name typically comes to mind in connection with the concern over category mistakes I argue that (1) Husserl deserves to be known for precisely this concern as well, and (2) the similarity between them is no accident. Developing (...) this reading of Ryle’s Husserlian pedigree forces a broader reevaluation of each of their roles in twentieth-century thought. (shrink)

The aim of this article is methodological, specifically to apply cognitive linguistics to the legal concept of mediators' impartiality, viewed in relation to the prototypical impartiality of judges. Specifically, the notions of semantic frame, schema, and prototype are employed. It addresses a fundamental theoretical issue: how the impartiality of a mediator constitutes an alternative to judicial impartiality. The research identifies the semantic frames of _TRIAL_ and _MEDIATION_ as distinct cognitive structures that organise the professional understanding of impartiality. The paper argues (...) that judicial impartiality constitutes the prototype of the category, while the mediator’s impartiality is a non-prototypical, peripheral variation. The study’s primary objective is to demonstrate the feasibility and usefulness of applying linguistic tools - traditionally unused in legal science - to reveal the structure of legal categories. The originality of this work lies in reconstructing the semantic frame of _MEDIATION_ using ethical codes for mediators, and in contrasting it with the _TRIAL_ frame. The research is conducted within the scope of the Polish legal language, with conceptual implications that may extend to the EU and international contexts. The paper provides a novel cognitive-linguistic perspective on the categorisation of impartiality, which may serve as a basis for further empirical research and practicalreflectionon the normative conditions of mediator impartiality. (shrink)

This paper challenges the traditional metaphysical assumption that properties can be located in spacetime and examines the ontological implications of categorizing spacetime itself. By introducing a two-category ontology, we argue that attempts to locate properties in spacetime represent a category mistake, as this notion fails to address the fundamental categorization of spacetime. We propose that the notion of instantiation should be conceptually separated from spatiotemporal location, thereby allowing for properties that are Platonic yet immanent. Furthermore, we reevaluate the (...) debate between Platonism and Aristotelianism, advocating that Platonic properties can possess a form of immanence previously thought to be exclusive to Aristotelian frameworks. This reformation not only underscores the need for categorizing spacetime but also reshapes our understanding of the instantiation and immanence of properties within ontological dependence frameworks. (shrink)

Wille’s formal concept analysis, Hardegree’s treatment of natural kinds, and Birkhoff’s mathematical theory of polarities provide essentially equivalent tools for the analysis of a static system functioning at a single level. We now show how a number of categorical notions allow these tools to be extended to cover the analysis of complex systems involving multiple hierarchical levels indexed by a semilattice, including the case where a chain represents a time series governing the evolution of a single system. A semilattice is (...) a poset category with finite products or coproducts. Our analysis then rests on functors from a semilattice to the category of complete lattice homomorphisms, or from a semilattice to a category of polarities and bonding relations. (shrink)

In this paper, we develop a mathematical model of awareness based on the idea of plurality. Instead of positing a singular principle, telos, or essence as noumenon, we model it as plurality accessible through multiple forms of awareness (“n-awareness”). In contrast to many other approaches, our model is committed to pluralist thinking. The noumenon is plural, and reality is neither reducible nor irreducible. Nothing dies out in meaning making. We begin by mathematizing the concept of awareness by appealing to the (...) mathematical formalism of higher category theory. The beauty of higher category theory lies in its universality. Pluralism is categorical. In particular, we model awareness using the theories of derived categories and (infinity, 1)-topoi which will give rise to our meta-language. We then posit a “grammar” (“n-declension”) which could express n-awareness, accompanied by a new temporal ontology (“n-time”). Our framework allows us to revisit old problems in the philosophy of time: how is change possible and what do we mean by simultaneity and coincidence? Another question which could be re-conceptualized in our model is one of soteriology related to this pluralism: what is a self in this context? A new model of “personal identity over time” is thus introduced. (shrink)

The modem psychological theories (since the middle of the XX-th century) concerning the internal freedom of a personality are analysed in this paper: a humanistic theory of Maslow A. and Fromm E., a phenomenological theory of Rogers C., a dispositional theory of Allport G., a psychosocial theory by Erikson E., an individual theory of Adler A. etc. The category of freedom is described as a freedom of choice, decision making and movement. The psychological criteria of internal freedom of a (...) personality and the influence of a child's experience on it are described. Key words: internal freedom, determine, self-actualization, modem psychological theories. (shrink)

This is the only chapter that is more a supplement to Kant’s text than an exposition. It is a category-by-category elucidation of how transcendental _synthesis speciosa_ introduces objective unity of apperception into the manifold of pure formal space and time. It is, in effect, a chance to see the categories in action in a way Kant himself never quite managed, at least not in this detail, and certainly not in respect to the pure formal manifold of space and (...) time that he held to be presupposed not only by experiential cognition but also by pure mathematics. It is needed to solve Kant’s _heterogeneity problem_: how can purely sensible space and time combine with purely intellectual categories to yield cognitive experience without committing the subreption Kant termed “transcendental amphiboly” (sensibilizing the intellectual à la Locke or intellectualizing the sensible à la Leibniz)? (shrink)

The subject of comparison of Husserl’s category of “now” with the category of “now” functioning in recentivism constitutes the notion of “living reality” in the sense of embroiling “now” into the activity of the stream of consciousness. In Husserl’s conception, this „living reality” falls apart into retention and protention. Hence, we deal with the passage of subsequent “nows”, taking nunc stans, which creates all other time- and logic-delayed objects for granted. This lack of an ontological foundation of the (...) category of “now” in Husserl’s conception removes recentivism. In recentivism, though, the category of “now” constitutes punctum saliens (that is fluidity) on the one hand, and characterises being as newly formed each time, that is an event which in its new “now” is continually taking on the new otherness on the other hand. It is enough for an event to “be”, but “the way” it is is no longer dependent on the event, but a phenomenon which phenomenology would like to ignore. At best, it would like to eliminate it as insignificant. (shrink)

In the present chapter, we shall deal with the general logical–epistemological foundations of the quantum theory, where the stress is on categorisation. This aspect and the physical–ontological ones previously discussed need finally to agree. I first give a general account of category theory. Then, we shall see its applications to QM and especially to quantum information. Then a logical and epistemological assessment of the theory follows.

An attempt is made to find out the philosophic contents of the notion of « situation» in the context of identity of the objective formations of spirit special attention is paid to its place in the dialectic process of formation of the idea of real determination and to the inner triadity of the category in particular. It is confirmed that the category of situation is an attributive moment of the main structural components of the philosophic knowledge. Key words: (...) ideal, situation, conflict, action. (shrink)

Cognitive Science, Volume 46, Issue 2, February 2022.

Religious-secular distinctions have been crucial to the way in which modern governments have rationalised their governance and marked out their sovereignty – as crucial as the territorial boundaries that they have drawn around nations. The authors of this volume provide a multi-dimensional picture of how the category of religion has served the ends of modern government. They draw on perspectives from history, anthropology, moral philosophy, theology and religious studies, as well as empirical analysis of India, Japan, Mexico, the United (...) States, Israel-Palestine, France and the United Kingdom. (shrink)

The author of the article tries to reveal ideological analogies between the modern conception of the category of life and the principles of the theory of events in Józef Bańka’s theory of recentivism. Ultimately, the author of this article wishes to prove that if we accept the non-casual conceptions of events, which do not require the cause and effect relationship, the idea of life can be explained theoretically. The substantiation of this theory is the goal pursued by the author (...) of this article. (shrink)

The miscellaneous methodological fundamentals of legal consciousness of social life are tendered, the mediodological-legal signs of idealized definition of a category of "legal status" are determined. Key words: legal status, legal consciousness, eligibility of legal consciousness.

This chapter argues for — or calls attention to — the existence of another class or category of particulars. The characterization of category is perhaps best, that is, most persuasively, approached by referring to a certain subclass of the already acknowledged category of events. Particular members of this sub-class include, for example, particular smiles, blushes, grimaces, sneezes, gestures. Each such event is a unique individual particular, with its own spatio-temporal position, a particular instance of its appropriate sortal.

An introduction to category theory as a rigorous, flexible, and coherent modeling language that can be used across the sciences. Category theory was invented in the 1940s to unify and synthesize different areas in mathematics, and it has proven remarkably successful in enabling powerful communication between disparate fields and subfields within mathematics. This book shows that category theory can be useful outside of mathematics as a rigorous, flexible, and coherent modeling language throughout the sciences. Information is inherently (...) dynamic; the same ideas can be organized and reorganized in countless ways, and the ability to translate between such organizational structures is becoming increasingly important in the sciences. Category theory offers a unifying framework for information modeling that can facilitate the translation of knowledge between disciplines. Written in an engaging and straightforward style, and assuming little background in mathematics, the book is rigorous but accessible to non-mathematicians. Using databases as an entry to category theory, it begins with sets and functions, then introduces the reader to notions that are fundamental in mathematics: monoids, groups, orders, and graphs—categories in disguise. After explaining the “big three” concepts of category theory—categories, functors, and natural transformations—the book covers other topics, including limits, colimits, functor categories, sheaves, monads, and operads. The book explains category theory by examples and exercises rather than focusing on theorems and proofs. It includes more than 300 exercises, with solutions. Category Theory for the Sciences is intended to create a bridge between the vast array of mathematical concepts used by mathematicians and the models and frameworks of such scientific disciplines as computation, neuroscience, and physics. (shrink)

The inductive category formation framework, an influential set of theories of learning in psychology and artificial intelligence, is deeply flawed. In this framework a set of necessary and sufficient features is taken to define a category. Such definitions are not functionally justified, are not used by people, and are not inducible by a learning system. Inductive theories depend on having access to all and only relevant features, which is not only impossible but begs a key question in learning. (...) The crucial roles of other cognitive processes (such as explanation and credit assignment) are ignored or oversimplified. Learning necessarily involves pragmatic considerations that can only be handled by complex cognitive processes.We provide an alternative framework for learning according to which category definitions must be based on category function. The learning system invokes other cognitive processes to accomplish difficult tasks, makes inferences, analyses and decides among potential features, and specifies how and when categories are to be generated and modified. We also examine the methodological underpinnings of the two approaches and compare their motivations. (shrink)

Category-specific impairments of object recognition and naming are among the most intriguing disorders in neuropsychology, affecting the retrieval of knowledge about either living or nonliving things. They can give us insight into the nature of our representations of objects: Have we evolved different neural systems for recognizing different categories of object? What kinds of knowledge are important for recognizing particular objects? How does visual similarity within a category influence object recognition and representation? What is the nature of our (...) semantic knowledge about different objects? We review the evidence on category-specific impairments, arguing that deficits even for one class of object cannot be accounted for in terms of a single information processing disorder across all patients; problems arise at contrasting loci in different patients. The same apparent pattern of impairment can be produced by damage to different loci. According to a new processing framework for object recognition and naming, the hierarchical interactive theory, we have a hierarchy of highly interactive stored representations. HIT explains the variety of patients in terms of lesions at different levels of processing and different forms of stored knowledge used both for particular tasks and for particular categories of object. Key Words: category-specific deficits; functional imaging; hierarchical models; interactive activation models; neuropsychology; object recognition; perceptual and functional knowledge. (shrink)

This study of the interpretations of Aristotle's "Categories" in the thirteenth century provides an introduction to some main themes of medieval philosophical ...

SummaryThe term ‘category mistake’ began to turn up regularly in public discourse in the 1990s as a general term to describe a confusion between different fields of thought with serious practical consequences. But it began its career in philosophy, introduced by Gilbert Ryle in The Concept of Mind in 1949 to attack Cartesian dualism and assert a monistic solution to the so-called mind-body problem. This paper traces the stages by which it came into general usage, arguing that while by (...) the later 1960s it had generally been rejected by philosophers, it was saved from disappearance by its migration into fields such as psychology and theology. From there, it moved into critical theory and then into international relations. Its entry into these latter areas first made plain its potential in political argument. Eventually, multiple meanings of the term came to coexist with one another, with the practical and rhetorical usage supplementing rather than replacing its original philosophical sense. (shrink)

Category mistakes are sentences such as ”The number two is blue’ or ”Green ideas sleep furiously’. Such sentences are highly infelicitous and thus a prominent view claims that they are meaningless. Category mistakes are also highly prevalent in figurative language. That is to say, it is very common for sentences which are used figuratively to be such that, if taken literally, they would constitute category mistakes. In this paper I argue that the view that category mistakes (...) are meaningless is inconsistent with many central and otherwise plausible theories of figurative language. Thus if the meaninglessness view is correct, the theories in question must each be rejected, and conversely, if any of the theories in question is correct, the meaninglessness view must be wrong. The debates concerning the semantics of figurative language and concerning the semantic status of category mistakes are closely connected. (shrink)