In this article, I explore a Wittgensteinian approach to blasphemy. While philosophy of religion tends to have very little to say about blasphemy, we can note two key, typically unchallenged, assumptions about it. First, there is the Assertion from Anywhere Assumption: whether one can successfully blaspheme is entirely independent of one’s religious views, commitments, or way of life. Second, there is the Act of Communication Assumption: blasphemy is essentially an act of assertion. I contend that a Wittgensteinian (...) approach rejects both assumptions and, thus, reorients our conception of blasphemy. Take two characteristically Wittgensteinian claims. First, religious statements/beliefs have a different ‘grammar’ than empirical propositions. Second (and relatedly), holding religious beliefs necessarily connects with how one lives. Wittgensteinian blasphemy rejects the Assertion from Anywhere Assumption: to blaspheme, one must be in or have been in the religious framework one blasphemes. Being entirely outside of that context divests one’s blasphemy from its proper content. Second, Wittgensteinian blasphemy rejects the Act of Communication Assumption: if religious belief is centrally a form of life, then blasphemy must be lived out as well. Wittgensteinian blasphemy is less about the utterances one makes and more about how one’s life intersects (or fails to intersect) with religiosity. (shrink)

Blasphemy law (BL) has become a central issue for the international community in various parts of the world in the last three decades. In almost every case involving the BL, especially in Muslim countries, such as Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia, they are always responded with violence or threats of attack that cause many victims, loss of homes, damage to places of worship, evictions, stigma of being heretical, severe punishments, or extra-judicial killings. When international human rights law (IHLR) and declaration (...) of the right to peace are adopted by the international community, at the same time, the number of violence related to the application of BL continues to increase. This paper aims to examine the ambiguity of the concept of the BL in Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia, and how its lead to the weak of enforcement that creates social injustice and inequality. Then, referring to Galtung’s theory of structural violence and other experts of peace studies, this paper argues that blasphemy law should be included as a form of structural violence. Therefore its challenges these States to reform their BL in which its provisions accommodate the state’s neutrality and content high legal standards. Thus, through guarantee the fully enjoyment of human rights for everyone may support the States to achieve sustainable peace. (shrink)

‘Sacred’ may be defined in various ways, depending on one’s worldview. In a pluralistic society, a single perspective from which to decide what is sacred seems absent. Yet certain elements are taken to be sacred such that they transcend individual worldviews. Their inviolability entails blasphemy laws, where ‘blasphemy’ extends beyond what is traditionally considered religious, since ‘religion’ itself is not clearly demarcated either. The interests of the sacred may be protected by blasphemy laws, but the downside of (...) such laws is that the freedom of expression is compromised. A balanced view is necessary to accommodate these conflicting interests. (shrink)

This study analyzes how judges argue for the legally salient properties of a criminal event through the lens of visual jurisprudence. It focuses on how viral video footage provides pertinent justifications for courts to interpret the legal notion of speech crime. The analysis centers around an Indonesian blasphemy case of Basuki_ ‘_Ahok’ Tjahaya Purnama, in which a viral video showing him, as the governor of Jakarta, misusing a Quranic verse during a public consultation. Amid the surge of Islamic populism, (...) Ahok, a Christian of Chinese descent who was running for re-election, was then convicted of blasphemy on the basis of the content of the viral video. Building the argument on Susan Haack’s foundherentism, we contend that the exposure of the viral video has been able to shape a distinct epistemology of evidence, bringing legal scripts into imaginal politics. In this framework, while religious blasphemy has been traditionally tied up with verbal utterance, the case illustrates, as a matter of evidentiary structure, how the elements of virality and visual imagery have been able to induce legal decision-makers’ perceptual experience of resentment. Epistemologically, the legally salient properties of an event generated from virality and visuality may obscure the boundaries between lay persons’ habit of perception and legal professional practices. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for a secular conception of blasphemy as a grave moral wrong. I argue for this conception on the basis of a neo-Aristotelian conception of virtue ethics. Specifically, I argue that there is a virtue of intellectual fidelity to matters of great importance: morally permissible ends. In order to structure our lives around such ends, which is essential to living a characteristic human life, we must consistently bear in mind what we know to be true (...) about our ends and not succumb to a temptation to belittle our ends when we struggle in our attempts to realize them. Conversely, a disposition to believe falsehoods about morally permissible ends is a vice, and acts that express that character trait are blasphemous and wrong. Likewise, I argue that it is wrong to belittle or promote falsehoods about the morally permissible ends of others, for we must recognize that in pursuing morally permissible ends of various sorts, people are realizing their humanity in worthwhile ways. (shrink)

What does philosophy have to say about the argument that blasphemous art ought not to be publicly displayed? We examine four concepts of blasphemy: blasphemy as offence, attack on religion, attack on the sacred, attack on the blasphemer himself. We argue all four are needed to grasp this complex concept. We also argue for blasphemy as primarily a moral, not a religious concept. We then criticise four arguments for the public display of blasphemous art: it may be (...) beautiful, provocative, devoutly intended, and is autonomous of religious concerns. Finally, we discuss the notions of blasphemy and blasphemous art as public offences. We conclude that the display of blasphemous art is a public, and not merely a private moral offence, and that there are respectable philosophical arguments for this conclusion. (shrink)

This article examines the controversial issue of blasphemy in literature from the viewpoint of reception inside and outside the academia. The thesis of the article is that blasphemy in literature, though inherently related to religion and language, has a plurality of connotations and interpretations (dissidence, intertextuality, critique of colonialism, discursive strategy, alterity/Otherness, ethnicity, subversive text). Consequently, blasphemy in literature is an incentive for fruitful discussions regarding tolerance, freedom of expression, and the re-situation of the (post)modern self in (...) today’s world, dominated by an uncanny admixture of secular and religious values. (shrink)

Should defaming the name of God be of concern even for those who do not have faith in Him? With Gregory Reichberg and Farzad Mahootian.

Should defaming the name of God be of concern even for those who do not have faith in Him? With Gregory Reichberg and Farzad Mahootian.

In this article, Severson explores the insights of Emmanuel Levinas regarding theodicy and the problem of evil. Levinas considers philosophical and practical justifications of suffering to be blasphemous, violating the sanctity of the suffering of the other person, even when well-meant. Severson introduces distinctions between “pain” and “suffering” to extrapolate and explain Levinas’s striking rejection of theodicy.

Use of divine names is strictly regulated in the three Abrahamic faiths: Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Unlike most ordinary names, “God,” “Jesus,” and “Allah,” have a particular moral significance for the faithful. Misuse of the names constitutes a form of blasphemy—a sin. Tomes have been written about the origin of holy names in these traditions and the role that they play in devotional practices. I have no such grand theological ambitions here. Instead, in this short essay I will raise (...) a few more narrow questions about the sin of blasphemy from the standpoint of contemporary philosophy of language. Until we have good reason to think otherwise, we should assume that the best semantic theory for ordinary proper names like “Obama” and “Aristotle” extends to names for God. In particular, I think we have reason to assume some causal theory of reference is true of divine names, since some version of it seems true of most every other name. From this assumption I will argue (i) that there are some puzzles for the sin of blasphemy as it is traditionally conceived, and (ii) that we can make progress toward answering the puzzles by acknowledging that divine names are vulnerable to a special kind of reference drift. (shrink)

The article investigates the development of discourses related to freedom of religion and discrimination against religious minority in current Indonesia by identifying the discourse constructions of Ahmadiyya in various texts and talks produced and disseminated by government institution and the Indonesian Council of Ulama (the MUI). This study aims to reveal these institutions’ views and perspectives on Ahmadiyya issue using various discourse strategies. The data analysed are some legal proclamations issued and personal views delivered by the officials of these two (...) institutions. The CDA theoretical framework employed is to examine the positive-self and negative-other presentations. The finding reveals that the issue of Ahmadiyya is addressed through discourses related to Indonesian national interest and discourses related to religious matters. in these discourses, the two institutions and their officials present themselves positively and portray the Ahmadiyya sect negatively. The sect followers are negatively presented as the troublemaker, blasphemer, and the destroyer of religious harmony and social order. (shrink)

Religious tensions in America, as well as abroad, are nothing new. Yet, in this current epoch various cultures around the world are involved in internal clashes between religious and secular groups that pull at the attention of the public more often than not. Though a myriad of issues confront anyone interested in investigating these tensions, one must first wonder what, exactly, blasphemy means to both sides of the debate. In the course of doing so, one interesting question arises: What (...) does it mean to consider speech against a secular group’s belief in a given object, text, or even another belief as blasphemous? The point of this paper is to inquire into the semantic status of blasphemy. First, I will outline various possible definitions of blasphemy and take into consideration what such definitions mean to those on the opposite side of the fence . Second, I will explore how extending such a definition to both parties would change the semantic landscape of the current cultural debates. Last, I will propose a modest solution to how one should view issues surrounding blasphemous speech and the freedom of expression. (shrink)

On Certainty remains one the mostprovocative and challenging parts ofWittgenstein's intellectual legacy.Philosophers generally read this text as anassault on the traditional sceptic/anti-scepticdebate. But some commentators identifypolitical – specifically `conservative' –sentiments at work here. Others embraceWittgenstein's (alleged) `pluralism', whilethose less enthused think the latter collapsesinto relativism. Although this mixed receptionis, I will argue, partly due to Wittgenstein'sown troubled engagement with the central themesof On Certainty, the real difficultyand value of this text lies in itsintertwining questions of epistemology,religious belief and ethical-politicaljudgement.

Perhaps no show has ever engaged in philosophy as much as South Park. Although it has made many philosophical arguments, this chapter will focus on the arguments South Park makes regarding censorship and freedom of speech, especially the ones made in the banned episodes “Cartoon Wars” (Part I and II), “200” and “201.” Does catering to terrorism create more? Should we respond to terrorism by doing more of what the terrorist want to forbid? When it comes to mockery, is everything (...) fair game? How much should we be willing to sacrifice for freedom of speech? And how far should freedom of speech go? After a historical summary of South Park’s controversies, and by engaging with the works of many past philosophers (e.g., John Stuart Mill and Karl Popper) and contemporary ones (e.g., Geroge Letsas, Aaron James, and Brian Leiter), this chapter will answer these questions and more. (shrink)

Some Saturday Night Live (SNL) religion sketches are relatively harmless. Sears pulled their advertising from NBC's online posting of the sketch and Jim Baker argued that it was the “most blasphemous skit in SNL history.” Actor Pat Boone, who starred in the film, objected to the SNL parody, equating it to an attack on God and suggesting that the writers had earned themselves a place in hell. SNL was birthed into existence in conflict with religion. That conflict came to a (...) head on October 3, 1992 when Sinead O'Connor – after singing an acapella version of Bob Marley's “War” – held up a picture of Pope John Paul II, sang the word “evil,” tore the picture to shreds, and shouted “Fight the real enemy!”. The Republic is essentially one long argument that it's better to be like O'Connor because being virtuous comes with its own internal reward that far outweighs the reward of public recognition. (shrink)

This dialogue is concerned with the problems raised by the Rushdie affair for Western intellectuals, whose thought on social issues derives either from the Christian or the Western liberal tradition. This has brought to a head the many difficulties which beset a Western European country as it develops into a multicultural one. Since the concern of the dialogue is with a crisis in the thinking of Western intellectuals about free speech, censorship, tolerance, etc., the four participants are university teachers of (...) philosophy in a British university. They are: Ambrose Taylor, a self‐styled defender of ‘British’ and ‘Christian’ values, Archie Runciman, a progressive Christian or religious eclectic, Freddie Stuart Hill, a committed Mill type liberal and Jenny Spring, whose liberalism is tempered by the belief that the state should take a positive role in promoting certain values. The author should not be identified with any of the speakers. (shrink)

This paper will strive to address the novel manifestations and roles that sacrilege playsin the postsecular world, and especially how it figuresin the symbolic battles waged in Serbia afterOctober 5, 2000 over which current has the indisputable right to form its postsocialist collectiveidentity – ethnic, ethical, ideological, religious.The focus will be on concrete incidents in Serbianpublic space involving accusations of blasphemy and the ensuing debates, which have arguablyhelpedestablish and maintain the symbolic boundaries in a society. The sample includes caseswhich (...) are mentioned in news portals available online and this corpus of empirical material consistingof media content will be contextualized and subjected to discourse analysis. Of special interestwill be the ways in which both accusations of blasphemy and defenses against these accusationscan serve to draw lines around respective collective identities in symbolic divisions usuallyclosely corresponding with geopolitical ones. The sociocultural problems that will hopefully befurther illuminated are the modalities of the secular status of the state, freedom of religion andfreedom of speech, collective identities (most pertinently ethnic nationalism, especially when combinedwith Eastern Orthodoxy in a postsocialist country), geopolitical influences, and postsecularhybrids (especially establishing which are permissible in a community, and which are perceived asimpure mixing and as such sacrilegious). (shrink)

Since the publication of South Park and Philosophy in 2007, Parker and Stone have made some additional forays into religious satire, poking fun at staunch supporters of the Catholic Church and “militant agnostics” among others. This chapter deals with the episodes 200 and 201 in which the “Cartoon Wars” controversy resurfaced, inspiring real‐life death threats aimed at Parker and Stone. Additionally, The Book of Mormon opened on Broadway. This musical comedy extends the obsession with Mormonism in several South Park episodes, (...) featuring a playful, biting, yet loving portrayal of its adherents. South Park is a show born in blasphemy. In “All About Mormons,” Gary, the little Mormon kid, voices the lesson that Parker and Stone frequently teach in their messed‐up way. This same loving yet mocking attitude is displayed in spades in The Book of Mormon, illustrating even more clearly their love of Mormons while ridiculing their religion. (shrink)

This article analyses the short performances of Drag Sethlas at the yearly Gran Canaria Drag Queen Contest in Spain (2017–20) from the perspective of religious studies and gender studies, following on from an earlier article in which this case was explored in light of the severe blasphemy accusations (by local and national bishops and lay organisations) against the 2017 show. These short performances consist of remarkable representations of Roman Catholic texts, saints, symbols and rituals acted out as prize-winning drag-queen (...) shows that were aired on national television. At the same time, these acts are situated, by reference to famous earlier controversial acts by the pop artists Madonna, Lady Gaga and Ariana Grande, in a genealogy of provocations and blasphemy accusations that are currently made in North American and Western European countries. In exploring the forms of ritualisation (cf. Bell 1989) in the provocation that this type of popular artistic performance with strong religious connotations evokes, I show the presence of a double theatricality in Sethlas’s first and most controversial performance: on the one hand a ‘holy drama’ centred around a religious pattern of penance, repentance and redemption, and on the other hand a specific drag theatricality, with its parodies, mockery and daring erotic scenes. It is precisely the connection between both forms of theatricality, especially the representation of the Virgin Mary and Jesus, who play a large and special role in both forms of theatricality, that contributes most to the provocativeness of this scene. (shrink)

The approach of the European Court of Human Rights to cases of religiously offensive expression is inconsistent and unsatisfactory. A critical analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence on blasphemy, religious insult and religious hatred identifies three problems with its approach in this field. These are: the embellishment and over-emphasis of freedom of religion, the use of the margin of appreciation and the devaluing of some forms of offensive speech. Nevertheless, it is possible to defend a more coherent approach to the (...) limitation of freedom of expression under the European Convention of Human Rights, designed to protect religious liberty in a narrower category of cases. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Abstract Introduction Tolerance and Blasphemy Muslim Identity and Internal Reasons Liberal Pluralism References.

On countering slander, religious hate speech, and blasphemy from Islamic perspectives to build religious harmony in Indonesia.

Knowledge of sins of speech derives from knowledge of God and from knowledge of created nature as teleological, rational, social and communicative. Speech is directed to God and neighbours; it is causal and irrevocable; good speech demonstrates integrity, good intent, justice and moderation. Sinful speech arises from wicked intention and damages both speaker and hearer. Blasphemy opposes vocal confession of God with disparagement of his excellence. Defamation opposes justice by speaking against the neighbour’s good reputation. In the Christian community, (...) the speech of regenerate creatures is under repair, as thanksgiving to God and edification of neighbours are established by the moving power of the Holy Spirit. (shrink)

The Danish Muhammad cartoons enflamed much of the Muslim world. What does respect for another religion require? Must non‐believers follow all of its dictates? Which? Why? Heresy by fellow believers depends on the content of the beliefs. Is it the manner or matter of disagreement and/or disregard that makes for the disrespect in blasphemy? Some of the history of blasphemy law in England and the United States is considered.

Issues in Chapter 11 include conscientious objection to military conscription. Britain recognised as a ground freedom of _conscience_, the U.S.A. only of _religion_. The force of appeal to conscience is provided by the original meaning of the term as a belief about what would put one in the _wrong_. We hesitate unnecessarily to force people to act like that. Freedom of _speech_ is strongly protected by the U.S. constitution, which counteracts stagnation and authoritarianism. But Indian legislation prefers to limit religious (...) hate speech, to protect religious freedom. A compromise is included to avoid witch hunts for blasphemy. Indian civil law also protects freedom of religion by allowing different personal laws for different religions, on polygamy for example, but has also had to address the danger of protecting religious practices unfair to some members. There is no one balance of freedoms right for all, and all balances require effective implementation. (shrink)