In this paper, we propose a new approach to absurdity in the context of natural deduction for intuitionistic and classical logic. It combines the aspects of both the logical approach, which treats absurdity as a propositional constant, and the structural approach, which treats absurdity as a structural punctuation mark signalling the dead end of derivations. In particular, we will treat absurdity as an impossible command, that is, a speech act composed of an imperative force indicator, and (...) the false propositional constant, that is, a proposition that cannot be true by definition. In return, we obtain a framework that constitutes a middle ground between the logical and structural approaches. For example, it allows us to consider the ex falso quodlibet rule as a kind of structural rule, specifically, a semi‐structural rule, and at the same time also maintain that negation can be reduced to implication of absurdity, specifically, to its propositional content. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that on a structural view of absurdity within natural deduction frameworks for both classical and intuitionistic logic, absurdity cannot be identified with the empty set; that is, with something that contains nothing. Instead, absurdity should be seen as representing nothing; that is, as the empty space below the inference line, as Neil Tennant originally suggested. However, diverging from Tennant’s view that absurdity should be purely a structural notion, I consider an approach (...) that incorporates both structural and logical features. Specifically, this version of absurdity cannot be embedded into other propositions (just like absurdity in the structural approach) yet it is not merely a punctuation mark in the metalanguage but a proper part of the object language of the logic (just like absurdity in the logical approach). This will allow us to show that accepting the structural approach does not require adopting inferences with no conclusion, as was previously thought. Formally, I treat absurdity as a limit case of a signed proposition and, informally, it may be interpreted as a degenerate form of denial that lacks any propositional content. (shrink)

The price for morality as the meaning of existence is the entrance of another kind of absurdity, a moral absurdity. Clearly, there is something absurd about life on The Good Place. Moral worth, both on The Good Place and in our real‐life existence, comes in degrees. Deontological views, most famously associated with Immanuel Kant, hold that the morality of an action is determined based on whether or not it adheres to a moral rule. Care requires being flexible in (...) different situations so as to best foster caring relationships with others. A care ethics approach would give some support to Eleanor's claims in The Good Place, insofar as a caring home life is essential to the development of the child in a variety of ways. The power of caring relationships is perhaps nowhere more salient than in the show's final few episodes. (shrink)

A popular view on existential absurdity holds that if life is absurd, it must be inescapably so. In opposition to this view, I argue that the concept of existential absurdity allows for life to be contingently absurd. In Nausea (1938) and Being and Nothingness (1943), Jean-Paul Sartre puts forward two distinct conceptions of an absurd life, both of which entail an absurdity that is contingent rather than inescapable. Given the internal coherence of these accounts of existential (...) class='Hi'>absurdity, we have reasons to reject the view that existential absurdity is necessarily inescapable. A challenge arises, however, for radically contingent versions of absurdity: if life is absurd in a radically contingent way, it seems that no rational agent will live under absurd conditions for a significant portion of their life. This seems to run counter to the intuition that an absurdity can only be genuinely existential if it is a fundamental feature of human life. In response to this ‘problem of triviality’, I argue that there can be pro-absurdity reasons that outweigh the pro tanto reasons for escaping absurdity. Thus, it would not necessarily be irrational to continue to live under the yoke of absurdity. (shrink)

In various passages, Kant makes some version of the claim that it would be absurd for there to be appearances without something that appears (Absurdity Claim). This may be read — and indeed Kant would seem at times to present it as — an argument for the existence of non-sensible reality. I assess the relevant passages and argue that the Absurdity Claim is per se metaphysically sterile. While some passages where it appears are indicative of some commitment on (...) Kant’s part to the existence of non-sensible reality, this commitment is not argued for through the Absurdity Claim. It is rather already entailed in Kant’s choice of the word ‘appearance’ to refer to empirical objects. I thus attempt to bring to light the reasons that lead Kant to this choice, reasons which involve Kant’s views on affection and the origin of experience. (shrink)

Camus’ notions of absurdity and revolt remain relevant today, especially with respect to very recent developments in the growing role of electronic and digital mass media. Cormac McCarthy’s 2006 novel The Road , describing a father and child’s journey after the world as we know it has been destroyed, is used to highlight the nature of absurdity and revolt in their updated early 21 st century version.

This article evaluates the political implications of Thomas Hobbes’s extensive treatment of religion by taking up the motif of the Eucharist (and accompanying doctrine of transubstantiation) in Leviathan. Hobbes holds out transubstantiation as an exemplar of absurdity and an historical outgrowth of Christianity’s inauspicious meeting with pagan practices. At the same time, Leviathan contains allusions to eucharistic imagery in its narration of the generation of the “Mortal God,” the commonwealth, as the incorporation of a civil body. These conflicting sentiments (...) are illustrative of a wider tension running through Hobbes’s thought. Although Hobbes’s repudiation of superstition is well-known, it stands in stark contrast to Leviathan’s treatment of Christianity as an exemplar of “true” religion. The varied allusions to eucharistic doctrine illustrate how proper use might be made of a persistent “natural religiosity.” Both in its consonance with reason and its political logic, Christianity remains a politically constructive expression of “power invisible.”. (shrink)

Albert Camus, a prominent philosopher in existentialism, offered a groundbreaking perspective on human existence through his concept of the absurd. In his works, particularly The Myth of Sisyphus (1942), Camus defines the absurd as the conflict between humanity's intrinsic desire for meaning and the universe's indifference. This paper explores Camus’ rejection of hope, examining his belief that traditional notions of hope deny life's absurdity. Rather than succumbing to despair, Camus advocates for living authentically by embracing the absurd and creating (...) meaning through personal experiences. This paper also analyzes the relevance of Camus’ ideas in contemporary discussions on meaning and critiques of his rejection of hope. Ultimately, this exploration reveals that Camus’ philosophy offers a liberating perspective on navigating an inherently meaningless world. (shrink)

Camus’ central thesis in The Myth of Sisyphus is that suicide is not the proper response to, nor is it the solution of, the problem of absurdity. Yet many of his literary protagonists either commit suicide or are self-destructive in other ways. I argue that the protagonists that best live up to the characteristics of the absurd man that Camus outlines in the Myth uniformly either commit suicide or consent to their destruction by behaving in such a manner as (...) to invite death. It is my contention that this raises serious questions abuut the validity of Camus’ arguments that suicide is not the proper response to the recognition that life is absurd. (shrink)

This paper seeks to provide a renewed meaning to the idea of truth by enclosing it within Gandhi’s rhetorical use of the term religion. The religion that he seeks to present to us as Hinduism is absurd on all fronts, it is argued here. It is through such absurdity that he infuses notions of validity and obeyance on his own terms to take us to profuse criticisms of not only colonial but civilizational modernity as well. Further a newer meaning (...) is given to Hinduism in a rather unexpected manner even in the context of the Indian national movement. The point about political conservatism, the element of exoticism and God takes us to adventures around truth by a thinker-activist speaking as a colonial subject. (shrink)

G. E. Moore observed that to for me to assert, “I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did” would be “absurd”. Over half a century later, the explanation of the nature of this absurdity remains problematic. Such assertions are unlike semantically odd Liar-type assertions such as “What I’m now saying is not true” since my Moorean assertion might be true: you may consistently imagine a situation in which I went to the pictures last (...) Tuesday but fail to believe that I did. Moreover, if you contradict my assertion then your words, “If he went to the pictures last Tuesday then he believes he did” do not express a necessary truth1. Nonetheless it remains absurd of me to assert that p and I don’t believe that p. It seems no less absurd of me to silently judge that p and I don’t believe that p2. But why should it be absurd of me to assert something that might be true of me? Why should it be absurd of me to believe something that might be true of me? (shrink)

A popular view on existential absurdity holds that if life is absurd, it must be inescapably so. In opposition to this view, I argue that the concept of existential absurdity allows for life to be contingently absurd. In Nausea (1938) and Being and Nothingness (1943), Jean-Paul Sartre puts forward two distinct conceptions of an absurd life, both of which entail an absurdity that is contingent rather than inescapable. Given the internal coherence of these accounts of existential (...) class='Hi'>absurdity, we have reasons to reject the view that existential absurdity is necessarily inescapable. A challenge arises, however, for radically contingent versions of absurdity: if life is absurd in a radically contingent way, it seems that no rational agent will live under absurd conditions for a significant portion of their life. This seems to run counter to the intuition that an absurdity can only be genuinely existential if it is a fundamental feature of human life. In response to this ‘problem of triviality’, I argue that there can be pro-absurdity reasons that outweigh the pro tanto reasons for escaping absurdity. Thus, it would not necessarily be irrational to continue to live under the yoke of absurdity. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to account for the anti-Semitism harboured and expressed by Danny Balint, the main character in Henry Bean’s film, _The Believer_. I begin by considering two kinds of explanation that Danny himself offers: one focusing on rational argument, the other on non-rational, emotional grounds. I argue that neither of Danny’s expressed accounts, however, emerges as adequate to understanding his hatred of the Jews. Instead, I offer a more fundamental and inclusive account of Danny’s anti-Semitism, one (...) that focuses not just on the accounts he gives, but rather on constructing an account from a number of diverse, even contradictory, claims that he makes. I argue that the thread running through Danny’s anti-Semitic attitudes is the link that, for him, exists between the Jews, Judaism, and various forms of meaninglessness. (shrink)

Nikk Effingham and Huw Price argue that in certain cases of Newcomb problems involving time travel and foreknowledge, being given information about the future makes it rational to choose as an evidential decision theorist would choose. Although the cases they consider have some intuitive pull, and so appear to aid in answering the question of what it is rational to do, we argue that their respective positions are not compelling. Newcomb problems are structured such that whichever way one chooses, one (...) might be led by one’s preferred decision theory to miss out on some riches (riches which others obtain whilst employing their preferred decision theory). According to the novel aesthetic diagnosis we shall offer of the Newcomb dialectic, missing out in this way does not render one irrational but, rather, subject to being seen as absurd. This is a different kind of cost but not one that undermines one’s rationality. (shrink)

Will appeal to thoughtful readers who ponder the "big question" of the meaning of life. It explores the question both in a philosophical way and through using classical and contemporary Jewish texts. Both philosophy and Judaism run into ineliminable doubt. This shared circumstance can promote honest dialogue.

John Broome and Duncan Foley have argued that it is a ‘misperception’ that the ‘control of global warming is costly’ and that we can make ‘sacrifices unnecessary’. There are a number of assumptions that are essential for this idea to work. These assumptions can be challenged. Furthermore, my claim is not merely that the Broome/Foley argument is flawed, and therefore unlikely to be successful. I will argue that it is potentially harmful, leading to harms for the present generation and for (...) future generations. (shrink)

For many believers, encounters with evil trigger a deep desire to understand the divine reasons for permitting evil, that is, a desire for theodicy. Very often, however, attempts to find a theodicy fail—a phenomenon called the inscrutability of evil. Skeptical theists attribute this failure to our cognitive limitations as creatures. In this paper, I argue that the clash between the common desire for theodicy and the inscrutability of evil should be analyzed using the concept of absurdity, famously explored by (...) Albert Camus and some contemporary philosophers studying the meaning of life. I then propose that a loving God would not subject human beings to the experience of absurdity, so He would not create a world in which our cognitive limitations prevent us from finding a theodicy. This conclusion has important implications for the plausibility of the skeptical theist’s position. (shrink)

Some think normative properties like being good are basic: they cannot be explained in only non-normative terms. Moreover, some think these properties are instantiated—things are good. Others have argued the instantiation of basic normativity (with some plausible assumptions about grounding) implies pannormism, roughly the view that some atoms (and sub-atoms, and sub-sub…) and their behavior is also either good or bad. All the way down the levels of reality, normativity lurks. For example, if a seizure is bad, then the atomic (...) behavior (and sub-atomic behavior, and so on) explaining it is also bad. These same philosophers believe pannormism could be taken as a reductio against basic normativity and normative realism. I’ll argue that with plausible additional premises, the argument for pannormism implies all atomic (and sub-atomic, and so on) behavior (and every atom, sub-atom, and so on) is normative. I’ll then explore whether this stronger pannormism, along with the weaker one, should be thought of as a reductio. My conclusion is that it isn’t clear what is absurd about pannormism, partly because the intuitions supporting the alleged reductio are surprisingly similar to those supporting basic normativity. This means believers in basic normativity and normative realism shouldn’t be as worried about their view implying pannormism as some suggest they should, and in fact, it might be antipannormism that’s absurd. (shrink)

G. E. Moore famously observed that to say, “ I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did” would be “absurd”. Why should it be absurd of me to say something about myself that might be true of me? Moore suggested an answer to this, but as I will show, one that fails. Wittgenstein was greatly impressed by Moore’s discovery of a class of absurd but possibly true assertions because he saw that it illuminates “the (...) logic of assertion”. Wittgenstein suggests a promising relation of assertion to belief in terms of the idea that one “expresses belief” that is consistent with the spirit of Moore’s failed attempt to explain the absurdity. Wittgenstein also observes that “under unusual circumstances”, the sentence, “It’s raining but I don’t believe it” could be given “a clear sense”. Why does the absurdity disappear from speech in such cases? Wittgenstein further suggests that analogous absurdity may be found in terms of desire, rather than belief. In what follows I develop an account of Moorean absurdity that, with the exception of Wittgenstein’s last suggestion, is broadly consistent with both Moore’s approach and Wittgenstein’s. (shrink)

In A Confession, a memoir of his philosophical midlife crisis, Tolstoy recounts falling into despair after coming to believe that his life, and for that matter all human life, is meaningless and absurd. Although Tolstoy's account of the origin and phenomenology of his crisis is widely regarded as illuminating, his response to the crisis, namely, embracing a religious tradition that he had previously dismissed as “irrational,” “incomprehensible,” and “mingled with falsehood” seems unpromising, at best. Nevertheless, I argue, Tolstoy's account of (...) his response makes a valuable contribution to contemporary thought about the meaning and absurdity of life. I begin by drawing on classic discussions in the philosophical literature, and on Tolstoy's memoir, in order to characterize the problem of meaning and the problem of the absurd, and to clarify the relation between these problems. I then draw on Tolstoy's account of his response to his crisis in order to characterize a form of faith in our deepest values. I argue that such faith supplies one important part of the story concerning how we might respond to the problem of the absurd — a part that has been overlooked by more recent discussions of these issues. (shrink)

The subject of the study is the connection between the absurd and phenomenology.The texts of representatives of the absurdist trend in literature and philosophy (Camus, Kafka, Musil), as well as the works of academic philosophers of the phenomenological direction (Husserl, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Fink) are considered. The commonality of phenomenological interpretations of reality for some texts of the absurdist genre is proved. As a hypothesis, the existence of an epistemological dimension of meaning in the works of the absurd is put forward, (...) interpreted by the author as a reception of the views of phenomenologists, problematized in the inconsistent reduction of phenomena. The methodological basis was the general scientific methods of analysis and synthesis, as well as the critical analysis of the text. The scientific novelty lies in the attempt to present phenomenology as a precursor of absurdism, connected with it through the sphere of axiology. The main contribution of the author is the actualization of the epistemological layer of such a multifaceted phenomenon as the absurd, namely, the elaboration of the hypothesis that in many works of absurdists, the metamorphoses of the characters' consciousness are in fact an inconsistent reduction consisting in explicit metamorphoses of the Ego, as well as violating subject-object relations but not actually bracketing the idea of the world. Many literary contemporaries of Husserl devote their thoughts to the problems of phenomenology to one degree or another, which makes the connection between absurd literature and the key theses of early phenomenology logical. (shrink)

This paper interprets the influential colony management simulator ‘Dwarf Fortress’ existentially, in terms of finitude, absurdity, and narrative. It applies Aarseth/Möring’s proposed method of game interpretation, adopting their definition of ‘cybermedia’ as a generalized game ontology, then providing a specialized ontology of ‘Dwarf Fortress’ which describes its genre and salient gameplay features, incorporating Ian Bogost’s concept of ‘procedural rhetoric’. It then gives an existentialist interpretation of ‘Dwarf Fortress’ which centres on ‘finitude’, ‘absurdity’, and ‘narrative’, showing that ‘Dwarf Fortress’ (...) is a game about the existential tensions involved in being human. We live knowing our lives and civilizations are finite, that there are radical limits on what we can know and do. There is no meaning inherent in the world, or in history, so it is up to us to create our own, and one of our most powerful ways of doing this is narrative. (shrink)

"Dancing with Absurdity" explores the limitations of knowledge and argues that neither reasoning nor direct observation can be trusted. Not only are they unreliable sources, they do not even justify assigning probabilities to claims about what we can know. This position, called radical skepticism, has intrigued philosophers since before the birth of Christ, yet nobody has been able to refute it. Fred Leavitt uses two unique methods of presentation. First, he supports abstract arguments with summaries of real-life examples from (...) many and varied fields, which make the arguments much more convincing and compelling. He cites more than 200 studies from psychology, mathematics, chaos theory, quantum mechanics, evolutionary theory, history, the corporate world, politics, the military, and current news reporting. Second, Leavitt's writing is user-friendly, even when dealing with complex issues. Whether answering the telephone, turning on the TV, talking with friends, or munching on an apple, we expect things to happen predictably. These expectations, paired with radical skepticism, exemplify cognitive dissonance at the highest level. Although certain of nothing, other than that we can be certain of nothing, it's certain that readers will come to be intrigued by the problem. (shrink)

I argue that there is an interesting and underexplored sense in which some negative reactive attitudes such as anger are often absurd. I explore implications of this absurdity, especially for our understanding of forgiveness.

In The Myth of Sisyphus (1942), Albert Camus critiques mysticism for its attempt to escape the absurdity or meaninglessness of reality through a leap of faith (which Camus calls “philosophical suicide”). This critique does not so obviously apply to the atheistic mysticism endorsed by Brook Ziporyn in his Experiments in Mystical Atheism (2024). According to Ziporyn, the mystic atheist (e.g., Daoist) is not ignoring, but instead emulating, the ultimate purposelessness of reality that Camus would characterize as absurd. This raises (...) the question whether acknowledgement of absurdity would be better served by mystic atheism (what Ziporyn calls “Emulative Atheism”) rather than the atheism of philosophers such as Sartre and Camus, who champion human purposiveness, control and freedom (an approach Ziporyn calls “Compensatory Atheism”). In the following exploration of the similarities and differences between Camus and his Emulative Atheist counterpart, I endorse the view that Emulative Atheism better supports meaning in life than Compensatory Atheism, also clarifying how mystic atheism is not a form of philosophical suicide. But I also present a minor critique that Camus would likely make of Ziporyn’s presentation of mystical atheism, given Ziporyn’s pursuit of a highly abstract metaphysical picture of reality, which is at odds with the lucidity that we find in everyday life experience. In his own exploration of Daoism, David Cooper promotes a “sense of mystery,” involving an orientation toward the ineffable that emerges within ordinary experience. This appreciation of Daoism within the context of everyday life serves to enhance the meaningfulness of life that can be derived from Ziporyn’s mystical atheism. (shrink)

Camus unreservedly condemned and strictly criticized and rejected suicide and existential leap because suicide is a total surrender to absurdity and a total confession that life is too much on the individual. His interest in existentialism is to explain the meaninglessness of life through his explication of the absurd which is found in human existence; and which continues to torment man until the finality of his existence which is death. The knowledge that life is absurd is already a step (...) towards conquering the meaninglessness of life. For Camus therefore, since absurd has no meaning, man must hold himself apart from it and revolt against it. This is why he suggested philosophical suicide as a solution to reverse the absurdity of life. The question then is, since man’s belief in the absurdity of existence, then how and where should he direct his conduct, does suicide solve this problem? The consequences of Camus’ submissions are enormous; but be that as it may, this work attempts a study of the absurdity inherent in human existence with a view to answering the following questions: How far did Camus achieve the idea of absurdity of life? How realistic is Camus’ attempt to analyze life as meaningless apart from the meaning we give to it? Did Camus actually succeed in his attempt to show that life is absurd? Finally, what are the implications of Camus’ absurdity to philosophy and to life in general? This work will adopt expository and analytic methodological approaches. Here we shall with a detailed and deep reflective inquiry expose the place of absurdity in Camus’ philosophy in order to fully understand his understanding of life. (shrink)

This paper offers an account of propositional absurdity and investigates its connection to falsity. I propose that instances of absurdity just are cases of what I call maximal abnormality. In light of the works of Smith (2016) and Pietroski and Rey (1995) on normic conditionals which link normality to explanatory demands, I suggest that absurdity also has a close tie with explanations (more precisely, the lacking thereof). Interesting consequences follow under such an account – first, I argue (...) that we should see absurdity as ceteris paribus guide to falsehood – what is absurd is expected to be false, unless further evidence suggests otherwise; second (and relatedly), when further evidence indeed suggests otherwise, absurd propositions would not cease to be absurd. (shrink)

Language was central to Hobbes's understanding of human beings and their mental abilities, and criticism of other philosophers' uses of language became a favorite critical tool for him. This paper connects Hobbes's theories about language to his criticisms of others' language, examining Hobbes's theories of propositions and truth, and how they relate to his claims that various sorts of proposition are absurd. It considers whether Hobbes in fact means anything more by 'absurd' than 'false'. And it pays particular attention to (...) Hobbes's categorization of causes of absurdity and of types of incoherent proposition, arguing that Hobbes's approach is only loosely related to later discussions of category mistakes. (shrink)

Within Iranian culture awareness of death is encouraged and woven into everyday understanding of life and lived experiences. This death-conscious culture can be traced in religious belief system, works of literature old and new, and dominant discourse pushed through by the political establishment. This element of the culture can account for variations in manifestations of certain depressive symptoms, the different emphasis placed on them, and different ways of encountering them. Iranians commonly complain about a sense of meaninglessness and absurdity (...) in depression which can be accounted for by appeal to the death-conscious culture and the cultural conceptions of life. Similarly, this culture can account for manifestations of suicidal ideation and ‘passive suicide’ as a response to one’s religious duty to protect and preserve one’s life. It is also shown how a death-conscious culture has phenomenologically important effect on a common symptom of depression, namely loss of hope. (shrink)