Recent research has shown that the superlative quantifiers at least and at most do not have the same type of truth conditions as the comparative quantifiers more than and fewer than. We propose that superlative quantifiers are interpreted at the level of speech acts. We relate them to denegations of speech acts, as in I don’t promise to come, which we analyze as excluding the speech act of a promise to come. Calling such conversational acts that affect future (...) permissible speech acts “meta-speech acts,” we introduce the meta-speech act of a GRANT of a proposition as a denial to assert the negation of that proposition. Superlative quantifiers are analyzed as quantifiers over GRANTS. Thus, John petted at least three rabbits means that the minimal number n such that the speaker GRANTs the proposition that John petted n rabbits is n = 3. We formalize this interpretation in terms of commitment states and commitment spaces, and show how the truth conditions that are derived from it are partly entailed and partly conversationally implicated. We demonstrate how the theory accounts for a wide variety of distributional phenomena of superlative quantifiers, including the contexts in which they can be embedded. (shrink)

The superlative quantifiers, at least and at most, are commonly assumed to have the same truth-conditions as the comparative quantifiers more than and fewer than. However, as Geurts & Nouwen have demonstrated, this is wrong, and several theories have been proposed to account for them. In this paper we propose that superlative quantifiers are illocutionary operators; specifically, they modify meta-speech acts.Meta speech-acts are operators that do not express a speech act, but a willingness to make or refrain from (...) making a certain speech act. The classic example is speech act denegation, e.g. I don't promise to come, where the speaker is explicitly refraining from performing the speech act of promising What denegations do is to delimit the future development of conversation, that is, they delimit future admissible speech acts. Hence we call them meta-speech acts. They are not moves in a game, but rather commitments to behave in certain ways in the future. We formalize the notion of meta speech acts as commitment development spaces, which are rooted graphs: The root of the graph describes the commitment development up to the current point in conversation; the continuations from the root describe the admissible future directions.We define and formalize the meta-speech act GRANT, which indicates that the speaker, while not necessarily subscribing to a proposition, refrains from asserting its negation. We propose that superlative quantifiers are quantifiers over GRANTs. Thus, Mary petted at least three rabbits means that the minimal number n such that the speaker GRANTs that Mary petted n rabbits is n = 3. In other words, the speaker denies that Mary petted two, one, or no rabbits, but GRANTs that she petted more.We formalize this interpretation of superlative quantifiers in terms of commitment development spaces, and show how the truth conditions that are derived from it are partly entailed and partly conversationally implicated. We demonstrates how the theory accounts for a wide variety of phenomena regarding the interpretation of superlative quantifiers, their distribution, and the contexts in which they can be embedded. (shrink)

Philosophical Superlatives: Machines as Symbols. – In this paper, my chief aim is to present a close reading of parts of a central sequence of remarks from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (191 – 197, cf. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, I, 121 – 130). The apparent theme of this sequence is the idea of a ‘machine as a symbol of its mode of operation’. Obviously, this idea requires a good deal of clarification, and the present paper attempts to elucidate relevant (...) passages which, in their turn, are discussed in the hope of succeeding in spelling out some of the points Wittgenstein has in mind in appealing to the picture of a machine as a symbol of its mode of operation. What will serve as a kind of framework of these elucidations is the notion of a philosophical superlative appealed to by Wittgenstein in a number of remarks that can be seen as particularly characteristic of his later thought. In the course of developing the idea of a philosophical superlative six aspects, or types, of superlatives are distinguished, and the last of these is found to shade into the image of a machine as symbol in a way that allows us to draw on various superlatives in striving to clarify the train of thought underpinning the sequence PI 191 – 197 and related passages. (shrink)

Superlative adjectives accompanied by certain modal adjectives like possible (e.g. John bought the largest possible present) are ambiguous between a reading where possible is a regular noun modifier and a reading paraphrasable as ‘as Adj as possible’, called ‘modal superlative reading’. Three interesting restrictions have been observed in the literature. First, possible and some other adjectives ending in -able, but not potential and probable, support the latter reading. Second, when the modal adjective appears postnominally, only the modal (...) class='Hi'>superlative reading is available. Third, prenominal possible needs to be in a local configuration to -est in order for the modal superlative reading to arise. Using LF structures independently motivated for degree constructions, the present paper develops a compositional semantic analysis of the modal superlative reading, makes correct new predictions concerning this reading, and—by reconciling previous, opposed syntactic analyses—allows us to derive the three empirical restrictions above. The key innovations are: (i) the previously proposed constituent [possible ▲ellipsis] is interpreted as an amount relative clause, and (ii) this constituent is treated as overtly expressing the comparison class argument of -est. (shrink)

Superlative sentences with modal modifiers like possible give rise to the so-called 'modal superlative reading' . The present paper uses this reading to investigate an open issue in degree constructions: whereas two different lexical entries have been argued to exist for the comparative morpheme -er , it is not clear whether two entries are needed for the superlative morpheme -est. The paper argues that, with 3-place –est, otherwise unmotivated syntactic material would to have to be postulated and (...) that, even with this material, not all modal superlative examples would be assigned correct truth conditions. In contrast, 2-place -est can generate the modal superlative reading in all the cases, as shown in Romero . Modal superlative sentences, thus, provide evidence that 2-place –est is needed in the grammar. (shrink)

In this paper we propose a unified semantics for singular and plural superlative expressions that makes use of the ‘**’ (“double star”) distributivity operator (an operator whose role is to pluralize 2-place predicates). The analysis aims to solve two problems: (a) the distributivity problem (the fact that a superlative expression doesn’t distribute over the atomic parts of the plural individual it is predicated of); and (b) the cut-off problem (the fact that a plural superlative expression cannot simultaneously (...) be predicated of two distinct yet overlapping plural individuals). We argue that any solution to these problems that posits two distinct superlative morphemes, one corresponding to a superlative operator for singular individuals and one corresponding to a superlative operator for plural individuals, is challenged by the lack of cross-linguistic morphological evidence. We provide a unified analysis, and account for the differences between plural and singular superlative expressions by appealing to pragmatic principles. (shrink)

This article seeks to reconcile the ‘movement’ account of the interpretation of superlative and comparative degree quantifiers with a class of apparent counterexamples. Superlative and comparative degree quantifiers compare the extent to which a target term and alternatives to the target instantiate a gradable property. On the movement analysis, the target and the gradable property are determined by the scope of the degree quantifier in the syntactic structure. As a structural consequence, terms in the scope of the degree (...) quantifier are indifferent to the presence of the degree quantifier. This leads to incorrect empirical predictions in some contexts, apparently undermining the movement account. I provide an analysis of these contexts in which the unexpected interaction of degree quantifiers with other terms in their scope is a side effect of quantification over situations inherent in the degree quantifier itself. (shrink)

This collection of essays, drawn from the latest generation of Whitehead scholars, explores how, in the deconstruction of certain concepts, an unceasing invitation of possibility and change is released, both in relation to ongoing philosophical conversations, and as applied to lived experience. The essays make a significant intervention in the field of Whiteheadian scholarship by creating new intersections and paths that extend Whitehead's thought in novel, and often unexpected, directions. The philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead proposes a radical reconceptualization of (...) experience-one in which we, and all other things, are composed of mutually implicated series of events in an infinite universe of interaction, generating and regenerating experience. Far from indicating a new superlative of holistic integrity, Whitehead prefers the always incomplete movement of all realities, which is the source of vitality for every new generation. This volume applies Whitehead's philosophy to superlatives-those valued concepts that limit and define our categories amid the flux of experience. The first half of this book probes the superlatives that have historically defined philosophical method in the West. These essays trace the adventures of concepts like substance, novelty, system, and truth. Ossified oppositions that define these superlatives are fractured, indicating new directions for growth. The essays in the second half of the book reflect on the influx, fragility, and impossibility of superlatives like care, tragedy, love, and loss in human experience, generating new matters of philosophical discourse. Superlatives abound. But Whitehead cautions us to attend to their multiplicity. The mutual immanence of events constantly generates new constellations of importance, and so superlatives, because they are contingent upon unstable modes of togetherness, cannot be taken for granted. Any of these concepts may have a particular significance today, but as events coalesce into new constellations, those ideals will continue to take on new meaning. (shrink)

It has historically been assumed that comparative and superlative quantifiers can be semantically analysed in accordance with their core logical–mathematical properties. However, recent theoretical and experimental work has cast doubt on the validity of this assumption. Geurts & Nouwen have claimed that superlative quantifiers possess an additional modal component in their semantics that is absent from comparative quantifiers and that this accounts for the previously neglected differences in usage and interpretation between the two types of quantifier that they (...) identify. Their semantically modal hypothesis has received additional support from empirical investigations. In this article, we further corroborate that superlative quantifiers have additional modal interpretations. However, we propose an alternative analysis, whereby these quantifiers possess the semantics postulated by the classical model and the additional aspects of meaning arise as a consequence of psychological complexity and pragmatic implicature. We explain how this model is consistent with the existing empirical findings. Additionally, we present the findings of four novel experiments that support our model above the semantically modal account. (shrink)

Superlative modifiers (SMs) are known to demonstrate an ambiguity between an epistemic reading (EPI) conveying speaker ignorance and a concessive reading (CON) conveying speaker concession. Such EPI-CON ambiguity has often been taken, implicitly or explicitly, to be a lexical coincidence. While there may be some justification for such a position when a single language is considered, we argue for an intrinsic connection between the two readings based on cross-linguistic considerations. This paper focuses on English _at least_ and Mandarin _zhi-shao_ (...) as representative of superlative modifiers across a wide range of languages to propose a unified account of the two readings. The proposal builds on Biezma (2013) in relying on the role of focus and scalarity in developing a unified semantics for the two readings, but differs in capitalizing on the fact that cross-linguistically superlative modifiers use the same morphological formants as quantity superlatives. It also follows Biezma (2013) in taking pragmatic factors as crucial in deriving the variation between EPI and CON readings. Elaborating on her account, it offers a more nuanced picture of the ways in which EPI is sensitive to the question of informativity while CON relates to issues of evaluativity. The paper shows how the proposed semantics and pragmatics account for several well-known properties of superlative modifiers. It ends by noting several open issues in the literature on this topic that the current proposal sheds new light on. (shrink)

Adolescents, as active online searchers, have easy access to health information. Much health information they encounter online is of poor quality and even contains potentially harmful health information. The ability to identify the quality of health messages disseminated via online technologies is needed in terms of health attitudes and behaviors. This study aims to understand how different ways of editing health-related messages affect their credibility among adolescents and what impact this may have on the content or format of health information. (...) The sample consisted of 300 secondary school students. To examine the effects of manipulating editorial elements, we used seven short messages about the health-promoting effects of different fruits and vegetables. Participants were then asked to rate the message’s trustworthiness with a single question. We calculated second-order variable sensitivity as the derivative of the trustworthiness of a fake message from the trustworthiness of a true neutral message. We also controlled for participants’ scientific reasoning, cognitive reflection, and media literacy. Adolescents were able to distinguish overtly fake health messages from true health messages. True messages with and without editorial elements were perceived as equally trustworthy, except for news with clickbait headlines, which were less trustworthy than other true messages. The results were also the same when scientific reasoning, analytical reasoning, and media literacy were considered. Adolescents should be well trained to recognize online health messages with editorial elements characteristic of low-quality content. They should also be trained on how to evaluate these messages. (shrink)

This paper argues for a particular semantic decomposition of morphological definiteness. I propose that the meaning of ‘the’ comprises two distinct compositional operations. The first builds a set of witnesses that satisfy the restricting noun phrase. The second tests this set for uniqueness. The motivation for decomposing the denotation of the definite determiner in this way comes from split-scope intervention effects. The two components—the selection of witnesses on the one hand and the counting of witnesses on the other—may take effect (...) at different points in the composition of a constituent, and this has non-trivial semantic consequences when other operators inside the DP take action in between them. In particular, I analyze well-known examples of mutually recursive definite descriptions like ‘the rabbit in the hat’ as examples of definites whose referent-introducing and referent-testing components are interleaved rather than nested. I further demonstrate that this picture leads to a new theory of relative superlative descriptions like ‘the kid who climbed the highest tree’, which explains the previously mysterious role of the definite determiner in licensing such readings. (shrink)

Generalized Quantifier Theory defines superlative quantifiers at most n and at least n as truth-conditionally equivalent to comparative quantifiers fewer than n+1 and more than n $$-$$ - 1. It has been demonstrated, however, that this standard theory cannot account for various linguistic differences between these two types of quantifiers. In this paper I discuss how the distinction between assertibility and truth-conditions can be applied to explain this phenomenon. I draw a parallel between the assertibility of disjunctions and (...) class='Hi'>superlative quantifiers, and argue that those assertibility conditions are essentially modal. I use epistemic logic to formalize the assertibility conditions and revisit some of the linguistic puzzles related to superlative quantification. (shrink)

_First_ and _last_ have been variously described as ordinals, superlatives, or both. These descriptions are generally not accompanied by extensive argumentation, and those who label _first_ and _last_ as superlatives do not present and argue for a particular decomposition. Thus, _first_ and _last_’s status as ordinals vs. superlatives and their internal composition remain open issues. In this paper, I argue that _first_ and _last_ are superlatives, in particular the superlative forms of _before_ and _after_. To argue that _first_ and (...) _last_ are superlatives, I show that they pattern like superlatives and unlike ordinals (_second_, _third_, etc.) with respect to plurality, modifier choice, “modal superlatives” with _possible_, and the ordinal superlative construction. I next argue that the relations between _before_ and _first_ and between _after_ and _last_ show themselves overtly in many languages and in English paraphrases; furthermore, _first_ and _last_ semantically differ in ways that _before_ and _after_ have also been noted to differ. While I acknowledge one observation that _prima facie_ counterexemplifies these claims, I argue that it constitutes a genuine counterexample only if one formalizes my decomposition of _first_/_last_ using a standard Heimian (Heim in Notes on superlatives. Manuscript, MIT ( 1999 )) entry for _-est_. The counterexample, which concerns the “upstairs _de dicto_” reading of superlatives, ceases to be an issue if one treats _before_ and _after_ as simplex and formalizes my decomposition using a Containment Hypothesis-inspired semantics (Bobaljik in Universals in comparative morphology: Suppletion, superlatives, and the structure of words, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2012 ) for _-est_. (shrink)

This paper is about relative clauses whose “head” contains a superlative morpheme and whose main verb is intensional. The sentence in (1) has such a relative clause. We refer to these relative clauses as “intensional superlatives”.

Superlative – also Höchstleistungen, Rekorde, vermeintlich unüberbietbare Einzigartigkeiten – hat es immer gegeben, in der Menschheitsgeschichte ebenso wie in der Natur. Der Mensch allerdings hat sich dabei – mit Kontinuität, Gier und Rücksichtslosigkeit – das Primat der Alleinstellung erobert. Seit Beginn des dritten Jahrtausends wird die Ära, in der wir aktuell leben, Anthropozän genannt, um zum Ausdruck zu bringen, wie absolut die menschliche Präsenz, Herrschaft und Besitzergreifung auf unserem Planeten geworden ist.2 Die dafür verantwortlichen Ursachen sind, ebenso wie die (...) Auswirkungen, multifaktoriell: Die Industrielle Revolution und die mit ihr immer stärker und globaler sich entwickelnden Formen wirtschaftlicher Systeme, die auf konstante Gewinnmaximierung und grenzenloses Wachstum3 ausgerichtet sind, haben konzertiert zu einem Höchststand dessen geführt, mit welcher Massivität Menschen in die biologischen, geologischen und atmosphärischen Prozesse auf der Erde eingreifen. (shrink)

The Pātañjalayogaśāstra concludes with a description of the pinnacle of yoga practice: a state of samādhi called dharmamegha, cloud of dharma. Yet despite the structural importance of dharmamegha in the soteriology of Pātañjala yoga, the śāstra itself does not say much about this term. Where we do find dharmamegha discussed, however, is in Buddhist yogācāra, and more broadly in early Mahāyāna soteriology, where it represents the apex of attainment and the superlative statehood of a bodhisattva. Given the relative paucity (...) of Brahmanical mentions of dharmamegha in the early common era, Patañjali appears to adopt this key metaphor from a Mahāyāna context—and to revise its primary meaning from fullness to emptiness. This article traces the early elaborations of dharmamegha in Buddhist texts, and, drawing on conceptual metaphor theory, lays out four arguments that each, in part, accounts for the stark contrast in how classical yoga and yogācāra employ the superlative metaphor of dharmamegha. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine several criticisms that can be raised against Aquinas’s Fourth Way. Each criticism draws a line of reasoning from a historical source to a contemporary analogue. The aim is to trace these objections from Aquinas’s own philosophical perspective to a contemporary standpoint: showing how arguments and positions today bear on his 13th C. argument and vice versa. Section One begins by reconstructing the argument itself. Then I address a series of objections questioning some fundamental element of (...) Aquinas’ argument. Within each question/objection pair, we find a criticism aimed at a crucial aspect of the argument; thus giving us various possible ways to undermine it. The philosophical questions crucial to his argument make up Section Two and theological issues involved are the focus of Section Three. Aquinas’s argument goes through only if he can successfully address these series of objections and I argue that, ultimately, there are some questions he cannot adequately answer. Thus, the critique of the Fourth Way ends with a mixed bag of objections: some of the inadequate but some are successful in the long haul. (shrink)

The exhaustion particles of the Yi languages are sentence-end morphemes with a surprising wealth of possible interpretations. With gradeable states they convey the meaning of superlative, with accomplishments they function as completive particle, and in ungradeable states, activities or achievements they act as all particles, i.e. as universal non-distributive quantifiers, on the first argument. A unified account of the all -, completive - and superlative -meanings is proposed. It is argued that all three notions basically divide their respective (...) domain into three types: a singular domain type, a quantized domain type and a homogeneous domain type. For events there is also a fourth domain type, the bounded domain type, which does not have an analogy with objects and states. Object-denotations Event-denotations State-denotations Singular Individual OD Punctual ED Ungradeable SD Quantized Quantized OD Quantized ED State with quantized comparison class Bounded — Bounded ED — Homogeneous Homogeneous OD Homogeneous ED State with homogeneous comparison class The all -, the completive - and the superlative -meanings of the exhaustion particles have in common that they are incompatible with entities from the singular domain type, pragmatically implausible with entities from the homogeneous domain type, and compatible with entities from the quantized domain type. (shrink)

The verification of a sentence against a visual display in experimental conditions reveals a procedure that is driven solely by the properties of the linguistic input and not by the properties of the context (the set-up of the visual display) or extra-linguistic cognition (operations executed to obtain the truth value). This procedure, according to the Interface Transparency Thesis (ITT) (Lidz et al. in Nat Lang Semant 19(3):227–256, 2011), represents the meaning of an expression at the interface with the ‘conceptual-intentional’ system (...) (Chomsky in The minimalist program. MIT Press, Cambridge, 1995). My experiments provide support for the ITT by replicating in Polish and in Bulgarian the findings of Lidz et al. (Nat Lang Semant 19(3):227–256, 2011) for the English quantifier most. We also obtain new evidence that participants are prompted to switch between verification procedures by a change in the linguistic input (a different superlative quantifier entailed by most), but not by a change in the visual input. Thus, the motivation for the subconscious switch in procedures is not to maximize efficiency. Participants use the procedure associated with each quantifier, and in effect, the same display is verified differently depending on which information the visual system is instructed to use by the semantic representation of the sentence. (shrink)

Nicht nur in der Alltagssprache, sondern auch in der Sprache des Wissenschaftlers spielt die Verwendung von Superlativen eine wichtige Rolle. Für gewöhnlich geht man dabei vom jeweiligen Komparativ aus und führt hernach den dazugehörigen Superlativ ein. Für die Definition des Superlativs mit Hilfe des entsprechenden Komparativs kommen jedoch mehrere Möglichkeiten in Betracht, welche genau auseinandergehalten werden müssen; die Unterschiede, die sich dabei ergeben, sollen hier im einzelnen herausgearbeitet werden.

In the study of natural language quantification, much recent attention has been devoted to the investigation of verification procedures associated with the proportional quantifier most. The aim of these studies is to go beyond the traditional characterization of the semantics of most, which is confined to explicating its truth-functional and presuppositional content as well as its combinatorial properties, as these aspects underdetermine the correct analysis of most. The present paper contributes to this effort by presenting new experimental evidence in support (...) of a decompositional analysis of most according to which it is a superlative construction built from a gradable predicate many or much and the superlative operator -est. Our evidence comes in the form of verification profiles for sentences like Most of the dots are blue which, we argue, reflect the existence of a superlative reading of most. This notably contrasts with Lidz et al.’s results. To reconcile the two sets of data, we argue, it is necessary to take important differences in task demands into account, which impose limits on the conclusions that can be drawn from these studies. (shrink)

A central aim of Construction Grammar is to model links within the construct-i-con. This paper investigates three constructions that share one property: an atypical element in the object slot. The constructions are therefore not prototypically transitive. Structural priming (implemented with an automatic maze variant of self-paced reading) is used to test hypotheses on the relation among the Reaction Objoid (She smiled her thanks), the Cognate Objoid (She smiled a sweet smile or He told a sly tale), and the Superlative (...) Objoid (She smiled her sweetest) Construction, and between two variants of the latter (They worked (at) their hardest). Results support transitivity as gradient: intransitive COCs prime the ROC and the SOC, whereas COCs with transitives only prime the ROC. For variants of the SOC, we find evidence of asymmetric priming with the bare SOC priming the at-SOC. Within-construction priming effects in the SOC are of greater magnitude than those with the at-SOC and the latter are weaker than those of the COC and of a rather different nature than those from the ROC. This suggests that speakers, rather than creating a constructeme between the bare and the at-SOC, store distinct but closely related constructions on a cline of transitivity. (shrink)

Aristid. 47,48 has been variously corrected and interpreted by Dindorf, Keil and later editors. After careful reevaluation of the passage, it is proposed to print the text as transmitted by A (Laur. Plut. 60.3) but placing πῶς τί; in quotation marks: the expression – examined in detail in the paper – is attested in late Plato and is identifiable as a sort of colloquial superlative form. This ‘popular’ form of superlative, widely documented in Greek (cf. νῦν ἔναγχος, νῦν (...) ἄρτι, ἄρτι νυνί and the like), consists of juxtaposing two different but related-meaning words, which merge, so to speak, into a semantic unicum with enhanced meaning. (shrink)

This paper argues for the validity of inferences that take the form of: A is more X than B; therefore A and B are both X. After considering representative counterexamples, it is claimed that these inferences are valid if and only if the comparative terms in the inference are taken from no more than one comparative set, where a comparative set is understood to be comprised of a positive, comparative, and superlative, represented as {X, more X than, most X}. (...) In all instances where arguments appearing to be of this form are invalid, it is the case that the argument has fallaciously taken terms from more than one comparative set. The fallacy of appealing to more than one comparative set in an inference involving comparative terms is shown to be analogous to the fallacy of equivocation in argumentation. The paper concludes by suggesting a conflation of logical issues with grammatical issues is the core difficulty leading some to consider inferences in the form of A is more X than B; therefore A and B are X to be invalid. (shrink)

It has long been observed that the superlative construction, exemplified by John climbed the highest mountain, has two readings. On the absolute reading, the heights of the relevant mountains in a relevant context are compared; on the comparative reading, relevant climbers’ achievements of mountain climbing are compared (Szabolcsi, Comparative superlatives, MIT Working Papers in Linguistics, 1986). Two theories have been proposed regarding this ambiguity. One theory holds that it results from movement of the superlative morpheme -est (movement theory) (...) (Heim, Association with focus, Doctoral Dissertation, 1985, Notes on superlatives, 1999; Szabolcsi 1986).The other theory holds that the ambiguity is derived by assignment of different values to the context variable C, keeping a single LF structure where -est stays in situ (in-situ theory) (Farkas and Kiss, Nat Lang Linguist Theory 18:417–455, 2000; Sharvit and Stateva, Linguist Philos 25:453–504, 2002). As is pointed out by Heim (1999), a choice between these theories is hard to make based solely on English. Through an investigation of Japanese superlative constructions, this paper argues that, in Japanese at least, a movement theory is required. (shrink)

Widely showered with superlatives when it was first published in 1996, and now commonly regarded as a masterpiece, Richard Hays's The Moral Vision of the New Testament (1996) constructs a pacifist reading of the New Testament. To date, Hays's reading has provoked no systematic refutation from proponents of the doctrine of just war. This essay hopes to offer such a refutation. Its argument has three main planks. First, that Hays's reading of the New Testament stories about god-fearing soldiers, who persist (...) in their profession, is not compelling; second, that he fails to specify sufficiently the meaning of Jesus' teaching and conduct in terms of Jesus' own context (particularly the option of armed violence in the service of religiously inspired nationalism); and third, that Hays's normative moral concepts are often too crude, suffering from a failure to employ valid moral distinctions. The essay concludes by arguing that the doctrine of just war is better able than pacifism to make adequate sense of all the relevant New Testament data. (shrink)

Some philosophers have worried that AI threatens meaning in life by making humans redundant in the workplace or by relegating them to menial tasks. While these worries may be justified, there's no reason to think AI threatens meaning in human life generally. In this paper, however, I argue that AI can threaten what has been called superlative meaning, at least in some domains. I argue that philosophy is a source of superlative meaning for those who engage in it (...) as a vocation, and that if AI comes to be better than us at answering philosophical questions, philosophy can no longer be a source of such meaning for us. I consider attempts to rescue superlative meaning for philosophy, by finding a role for us, or by arguing that philosophy isn't the sort of thing that can be done for someone else, and find them wanting. I finish by asking how bad the death of superlative meaning would be. (shrink)

So-called downshifters seek more meaningful lives by decreasing the amount of time they devote to work, leaving more time for the valuable goods of friendship, family and personal development. But though these are indeed meaning-conferring activities, they do not have the right structure to count as superlatively meaningful. Only in work – of a certain kind – can superlative meaning be found. It is by active engagements in projects, which are activities of the right structure, dedicated to the achievement (...) of goods beyond ourselves, that we make our lives superlatively meaningful. (shrink)

Some lives are more meaningful than others. Some lives are more important than others. What is the relationship between meaning in life and importance? Because both can be described as relating to significance, the two are often conflated. But these are rather different concepts and the meaningful and the important can easily come apart. They do, however, interact in important ways. When importance also meets the conditions for meaningfulness, it amplifies it, and importance on a large scale is a key, (...) and perhaps the only, source of superlative meaningfulness. When contrasted with the quest for meaning, the desire for importance can seem shallow and egocentric. But the desire to make an important contribution reflects a legitimate existential concern. And, in their best form, both the desire for importance, and that for meaningfulness, similarly combine outward-looking and self-regarding aspects. (shrink)

Life and the living (on Aristotelian biohorror) -- Supernatural horror as the paradigm for life -- Aristotle's De anima and the problem of life -- The ontology of life -- The entelechy of the weird -- Superlative life -- Life with or without limits -- Life as time in Plotinus -- On the superlative -- Superlative life I: Pseudo-Dionysius -- Negative vs. affirmative theology -- Superlative negation -- Negation and preexistent life -- Excess, evil, and non-being (...) -- Superlative life II: Eriugena -- Negation in the periphyseon -- The quaestio de nihilo: on nothing -- The quaestio de nihilo: superlative nothing -- Dark intelligible abyss -- Apophasis -- The apophatic logic -- Negation in Frege and Ayer -- Negation vs. subtraction in Badiou -- Negation and contradiction in Priest -- The dialetheic vitalism of negative theology -- Ellipses: Suhraward and the luminous void -- Univocal creatures -- On spiritual creatures -- Life as form in Aristotle -- The concept of the creature -- Univocity I: Duns Scotus vs. Aquinas -- Univocity in Aquinas' Summa theologica -- Univocity in Duns Scotus' Opus oxoniense -- The common nature of the creature -- Univocity II: Duns Scotus vs. Henry of Ghent -- Univocity in Henry of Ghent -- Negative vs. privative indetermination -- Absolute indetermination -- Univocity III: Deleuze's scholasticism three variations -- Spinoza et le problème de l'expression -- Différence et répétition -- Cours de Vincennes -- Univocal creatures -- Ellipses: Dgen and uncreated univocity -- Dark pantheism -- Everything and nothing -- Life as spirit in Aquinas -- The concept of the divine nature -- Immanence I: Eriugena's periphyseon -- Natura and the unthought -- Universal life -- Four statements on pantheism -- Immanence II: Duns Scotus' reportatio Ia -- Univocal immanence -- Actual infinity -- The pathology of the triple primacy -- Immanence III: Nicholas of Cusa's De docta ignorantia -- The coincidence of opposites -- The folds of life -- Absolute vs. contracted pantheism -- Speculative pantheism (Deleuze's interlocutors) -- Pantheism and pure immanence -- The insubordination of immanence in Deleuze -- Scholia I: the isomorphism of univocity and immanence -- Scholia II: the vitalist logic of common notions -- Scholia III: the life of substance -- Dark pantheism -- Ellipses: Wang Yangming and idealist naturalism -- Logic and life (on Kantian teratology) -- The wandering line from Aristotle to Kant -- Critique of life -- Spectral life and speculative realism -- Ontotheology in Kant, atheology in Bataille -- The night land. (shrink)

Philosophers invoke the concept of a ‘person’ widely—not only as a basic building block for normative theories prescribing conduct, but to furnish a conceptual grounding for political and social philosophies about a just state. The concept is legion not just in philosophy, but across a wide swath of disciplines, including psychology, law, biomedicine, anthropology and others. The oldest known meaning of the word ‘person’ relates to performance before others in fiction or real life: the Latin persōna, referred to a mask (...) used by a player in a dramatic role, or the part or role played by a person in life. Today, broad agreement about personhood exists at a high level of abstraction, yet sharp divisions emerge as we move closer to the ground. Philosophers generally agree that to be a person differs from being a member of a species, and generally characterise ‘person’ in normative, rather than purely biological, terms. They generally converge in thinking that ‘person’ indicates a superlative moral worth, variously expressed as dignity, rights or deserving to be respected or treated as an end. However, little consensus exists when it comes to delineating necessary and sufficient conditions for personhood or determining whether particular beings (or things) count as persons. Are fetuses, cows, great apes, trees, soils, ecosystems or artificially intelligent social robots persons? People holding religious views may ask, ‘Is God(s) a person?’ Views diverge. As we cross borders not only of time, but culture, accounts of personhood splinter further. Compare the account of persons frequently espoused by people indigenous to sub-Saharan Africa with the one predominant in the West today. African personhood often underscores that persons exist only within their communal relationships. This idea finds expression in pithy sayings, such as, a person is a person through other persons, and I am because …. (shrink)

Abstract Proportional quantifiers have played a central role in the development of formal semantics because they set a benchmark for the expressive power needed to describe quantification in natural language (Barwise and Cooper Linguist Philos 4:159–219, 1981). The proportional quantifier most, in particular, supplied the initial motivation for adopting Generalized Quantifier Theory (GQT) because its meaning is definable as a relation between sets of individuals, which are taken to be semantic primitives in GQT. This paper proposes an alternative analysis of (...) most that does not treat it as a lexical item whose meaning is accessible without the help of compositional processes. Instead, proportional most is analyzed as the superlative of many (cf. Bresnan Linguist Inq 4(3):274–344, 1973). Two types of empirical evidence are presented in support of this view, both exploiting the fact that only a decompositional analysis of proportional quantifiers provides the means to generate different logical forms for seemingly equivalent statements of the form most A B and more than half of the A B. (shrink)