In the mid twentieth century the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein famously asserted that games are indefinable; there are no common threads that link them all. "Nonsense," says the sensible Bernard Suits: "playing a game is a voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles." The short book Suits wrote demonstrating precisely that is as playful as it is insightful, as stimulating as it is delightful. Suits not only argues that games can be meaningfully defined; he also suggests that playing games is a central (...) part of the ideal of human existence, so games belong at the heart of any vision of Utopia. Originally published in 1978, The Grasshopper is now re-issued with a new introduction by Thomas Hurka and with additional material (much of it previously unpublished) by the author, in which he expands on the ideas put forward in The Grasshopper and answers some questions that have been raised by critics. (shrink)

By means of a critical examination of a number of theses as to the nature of game-playing, the following definition is advanced: To play a game is to engage in activity directed toward bringing about a specific state of affairs, using only means permitted by specific rules, where the means permitted by the rules are more limited in scope than they would be in the absence of the rules, and where the sole reason for accepting such limitation is to make (...) possible such activity. (shrink)

Epicurus's claim that "death is nothing to us" is defended. The usual concepts of harm, loss and suffering do not apply in the case of death. Immortality need not be bad. Epicurean prudence does not recommend suicide. Some issues in applied ethics are also discussed: the right to life, egoistic friendship, wills, and life insurance.

There are three main flaws in the claim that death can be a deprivation. (1) Death is not a deprivation on any reasonable understanding of what deprivation is. (2) The deprivation view does not show that death can be bad in any recognizable sense for the deceased. And (3) some deprivation accounts rely on a life-life (or, more accurately, actual-life vs. counterfactually longer life) comparison, yet such a comparison does not yield the conclusion that death can be bad for the (...) one who died. (shrink)

It has long been believed that if man had a special function appropriate to him, and that if we could discover what it was, then we would be in a perfect position to solve all of the basic problems of ethics. For if we were, for example, shovels, and knew ourselves to be shovels, then we would also know that to spend our lives in digging would best serve our fundamental interests, realize our highest aspirations, and be in every respect (...) the correct thing to do. Or so the theory goes; a theory which is shared, interestingly enough, by Aristotle and Sartre, even though they share little else, and even though one of them believes that man has a function and the other does not. (shrink)

How is it possible to respond emotionally to that which we believe is not the case? All of the many responses to this "paradox of fiction" make one or more of three important mistakes: (1) neglecting the context of believing, (2) assuming that belief is an all-or-nothing affair, and (3) assuming that if you believe that p then you cannot also reasonably believe that not-p. My thesis is that we react emotionally to stories because we do believe what stories tell (...) us – not fictionally-believe, not make-believe, but believe in the ordinary way in which we believe anything at all. (shrink)

Suits ended _The Grasshopper_ with a doubt about his main normative thesis; he worried that if people in his utopia knew they were only playing games, they’d find their lives not worth living. This abridgement of a previously unpublished sequel withdraws the doubt and gives a more robust defence of the value of playing games. The contrary view says a valuable activity must have an independently valuable goal, as game-playing doesn’t—you need to be curing real diseases or discovering otherwise unknown (...) truths. Suits now replies that to want there to be real disease or ignorance in the world is to want there to be real obstacles, so the activity of overcoming them can be possible. But that’s precisely to have the lusory attitude to the obstacles and so to be playing a game whether or not you realize you’re doing so. (shrink)

In his recent address to the Aristotelian Society, Aurel Kolnai suggests that games exhibit what he calls a “genuine paradoxy.” I do not believe that he has shown this to be the case, even on the most permissive interpretation of what it means to be a paradox. Kolnai has, however, called attention to an aspect of games which invites further investigation, and I should like to advance the following considerations not so much as a criticism of Kolnai as an attempt (...) to take the investigation along a path which Kolnai has indicated, but which he has not himself, in my opinion, followed. It is not that Kolnai does not say many interesting, indeed penetrating, things about games, for he does. That Kolnai's inquiry is an important contribution to the philosophy of games is not in question. What is questionable is whether paradox has very much to do with that contribution. (shrink)

One kind of attempt to defeat the Epicurean conclusion that "death is nothing to us" is the claim that death could be some kind of unexperienced harm. The possibility of such harm is thought to be made plausible by analogy to the possibility of unexperienced harm in life, and it has motivated the invention of many thought experiments which attempt to show that in life one can indeed be harmed without experiencing the harm or its effects in any way. But (...) such attempts fail to weaken the Epicurean conclusion because they fail to appreciate that something which is taken to be an unexperienceable misfortune could, with equal warrant, be claimed to be an unexperienceable good fortune. Indeed, a more accurate claim is that what is unexperienceable is neither good nor bad, but only nothing at all. At the conclusion of the essay I will propose a Principle of Nothing which expresses the Epicurean lesson to be learned from these investigations. (shrink)

A criticism of Searle's Chinese Room thought experiment.

Locke claimed that a government (with legislative, executive and judicial functions) is necessary to relieve people of the inconveniences of a state of nature. But those three functions can be provided by private arrangements in a state of nature.

Hobbes argues that it is reasonable to institute government. But there is a problem with a main proposition in that argument -- a proposition that, in varying forms, has found its way into some contemporary arguments in favor of government. "Without government there would be anarchy and chaos" might be the modern equivalent. I argue that, on the contrary, a "state of nature" need not be a state of war, that people in a state of nature can with reason enter (...) into and perform some kinds of agreements, and that, where some power is required in order to assure performance, such power need be neither absolute nor common over everyone. (shrink)

I am concerned primarily with Rawls’s idea of the contract device as a tool for generating principles of justice. In this paper I hope to make plausible the claim that the original position device presupposes a certain fundamental principle of justice. If I am right that rules are necessary, in the first instance, in order to avoid, as much as possible, “appeals to Heaven” (to use Locke's phrase), then have we not already hit upon a principle of justice? Certainly in (...) the case of individual actions we now have such a principle. Let me name this the Libertarian Principle: Do not initiate force or fraud. But Rawls insists that the primary subject of justice is not individuals but rather the basic structure of society. Yet it seems that in merely setting the stage for considerations about justice, we have inadvertently stumbled onto a principle of justice, and justice for individuals at that. (shrink)

The philosophy of Epicurus (c. 341-271 B. C. E.), has been a quietly pervasive influence for more than two millennia. At present, when many long revered ideologies are proven empty, Epicureanism is powerfully and refreshingly relevant, offering a straightforward way of dealing with the issues of life and death. The chapters in this book provide a kaleidoscope of contemporary opinions about Epicurus' teachings. They tell us also about the archeological discoveries that promise to augment the scant remains we have of (...) Epicurus's own writing. the breadth of this new work will be welcomed by those who value Epicurean philosophy as a scholarly and personal resource for contemporary life. "Epicurus: His Continuing Influence and Contemporary Relevance," is the title of a 2002 conference on Epicurus held at Rochester Institute of Technology, when many of the ideas here were first presented. (shrink)

In the mid twentieth century the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein famously asserted that games are indefinable; there are no common threads that link them all. “Nonsense,” said the sensible Bernard Suits: “playing a game is a voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles.” The short book Suits wrote demonstrating precisely that is as playful as it is insightful, as stimulating as it is delightful. Through the jocular voice of Aesop's Grasshopper, a “shiftless but thoughtful practitioner of applied entomology,” Suits not only argues (...) that games can be meaningfully defined; he also suggests that playing games is a central part of the ideal of human existence, and so games belong at the heart of any vision of Utopia. This new edition of _The Grasshopper_ includes illustrations from Frank Newfeld created for the book’s original publication, as well as an introduction by Thomas Hurka and a new appendix on the meaning of ‘play.’. (shrink)

In Book 3 of _De Rerum Natura_, Lucretius wonders whether it is possible that we could have a postmortem existence. But he can reject the idea of future (and past) lives for three kinds of reasons. (1) He has already presented arguments for the mortality of the soul. (2) The internal evidence -- our lack of memories of any prior life -- is against the possibility of past lives. (3) A third argument relies in part on internal evidence, but it (...) adds a new consideration. At 3.847-861 Lucretius takes a kind of pragmatic approach, concluding that any hypothesis of multiple existences ought to be, like death itself, nothing to us. In this essay I apply Lucretius's insight to several isssues: recombination of atoms, rebirth, Nietzschean recurrence, and cloning. (shrink)

Do our lives have meaning? Should we create more people? Is death bad? Should we commit suicide? Would it be better if we were immortal? Should we be optimistic or pessimistic? Life, Death, and Meaning brings together key readings, primarily by English-speaking philosophers, on such 'big questions.'.

The essays in this collection deal with Greek philosopher Lucretius's critique of religion, his critique of traditional attitudes about death, and his influences on later thinkers such as Isaac Newton and Alfred Tennyson. 144 pp.

Smith's view in The Theory of Moral Sentiments is that wealth provides us with "more means of happiness", but not happiness itself. The arguments in his The Wealth of Nations leaves unanswered two moral questions: What is it to lead a moral life? Is justice served, or best served, by the free enterprise system? The eleven essays in this volume give us a better understanding of the complexities and subtleties of Smith's thoughts about matters of morality and about his relations (...) with his friend David Hume, from whom he drew much of his moral theory. (shrink)

The ultimate goal for Epicurean philosophy was ataraxia, which is peace of mind, or tranquility –- a life that contains no serious problems. Ataraxia requires above all the removal of certain disturbing fears found in most people and in most cultures: fear of the gods, fear of the afterlife, and fear of death. For Epicurus, justice involves a contract (or agreement or understanding) of mutual non-interference –- a contract "not to harm or be harmed". The social result would seem to (...) be either a very limited government, or perhaps anarchy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Tibullus: Elegies II. With introduction and commentaryThomas A. SuitsPaul Murgatroyd, ed. Tibullus: Elegies II. With introduction and commentary. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. xx + 305 pp. Cloth, $65.00.This is the companion volume to Murgatroyd’s Tibullus I (Pietermaritzburg, 1980) and with it forms the first detailed commentary on the poet since Kirby Flower Smith’s 1913 edition. The editor has been better served by the Clarendon than the University of (...) Natal Press in that the quality of production is superior and the layout less huddled. Users will want to have access to Tibullus I, however, since Murgatroyd makes regular reference to it. In the main, the new volume follows the pattern of its predecessor; but since the latter received relatively little critical notice in English-language periodicals, it seems appropriate to describe principal features, especially where they represent a change from Murgatroyd’s previous practice.General matters received attention in the introduction to Tibullus I, and so the introduction here is brief, addressing the question of the completeness of this extraordinarily short libellus, its structure, and its main characters. The text is essentially Postgate’s 1915 OCT, without apparatus but rather with the handful of departures discussed in a critical appendix.The commentary itself is bulky—254 pages on only 430 verses, or an average of more than a page per distich. (By way of comparison, the commentary in Tibullus I averages just over half a page per distich.) Each elegy has an introductory essay; each of the five to nine sections into which Murgatroyd divides a poem receives its own introduction; and each distich is discussed separately in detail. All this is rather daunting, and few, other than reviewers, are likely to work through the whole, but there is something to engage readers wherever they decide to dip into it. As befits a commentary on a poet whose Alexandrianism is becoming ever more appreciated, Murgatroyd’s work exhibits both sensitivity [End Page 498] and sophistication. In what follows I touch on some of the book’s leitmotifs, in an attempt to convey its general character.There is naturally a vast store of material illustrative of both language and subject matter, selected from predecessors (the debt to Smith is considerable, though he is not followed in his predilection for copious parallels from modern vernacular literatures) and augmented by the editor, in part through diligent use of the TLL and OLD. Unlike Tibullus I, this volume provides English translations for the relatively few Greek quotations. My extensive samplings suggest a rare degree of accuracy in the citations.In his interpretations, Murgatroyd will often leave open a number of possibilities: e.g., “may refer to... or... or... may denote... or... could be... or... may mean... or... if...” is the wording in one short paragraph on 2.3.1–2. Again, he will lay before the reader a whole menu of possible senses, as he does for nubilus (on 2.5.75–76); it is salutary to be reminded of the wide range of possible connotations, even where one seems to deserve clear preference.A similar lack of dogmatism characterizes Murgatroyd’s many attempts to describe rhythmic and sound effects. Conscious of how subjective these can be, he always couches them guardedly, as (on 2.4.7–10), “the sudden preponderance of spondees and assonance involving long vowels seem to me to have an air of dejection and weariness.” Likewise, he is appropriately cautious in his frequent suggestions of possible etymological plays (here building on F. Cairns, Tibullus: A Hellenistic Poet at Rome [Cambridge 1979] 90–99); the general phenomenon, in any case, is clearly established, even if particular instances may be in doubt.Another recurrent type of note seeks to establish instances where Tibullus was the first to use a word in a new sense or to use a particular word combination (iunctura). Although the accidents of preservation make absolute claims in this area impossible, Murgatroyd makes an impressive case for Tibullus’ inventiveness. He is on more solid ground in his analyses of artistry in the word arrangement in individual lines and distichs. He has a very keen sense for this and demonstrates an impressive variety of... (shrink)

The author of a work of fiction creates truths about the characters in the fiction: some properties will be given to a character, and some properties will be denied to the character. But what of all other properties -- those neither asserted nor denied to the character? I argue that fictional characters are neither more nor less sets of properties than real persons, and fictional characters either possess or lack all properties neither more nor less than real persons.

In the mid twentieth century the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein famously asserted that games are indefinable; there are no common threads that link them all. “Nonsense,” said the sensible Bernard Suits: “playing a game is a voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles.” The short book Suits wrote demonstrating precisely that is as playful as it is insightful, as stimulating as it is delightful. Through the jocular voice of Aesop's Grasshopper, a “shiftless but thoughtful practitioner of applied entomology,” Suits not only argues (...) that games can be meaningfully defined; he also suggests that playing games is a central part of the ideal of human existence, and so games belong at the heart of any vision of Utopia. This new edition of _The Grasshopper_ includes illustrations from Frank Newfeld created for the book’s original publication, as well as an introduction by Thomas Hurka and a new appendix on the meaning of ‘play.’. (shrink)

What is life without passion? What would even a few years without emotion be like? This and some related issues figure prominently in "The Invasion of the Body Snatchers", and they raise in dramatic form some important philosophical concerns. Personal identity: The pod-people are "perfect duplicates" of the originals. What makes for personal identity? In the story, a person falls asleep and wakes up as a pod-person. Or is the original destroyed and replaced by a duplicate? Stoicism: Epictetus recommended an (...) emotional detachment from the world, which is accomplished only by accepting the world as it is, being satisfied with what actually happens and not railing against the gods for making the world be one way when you passionately wanted it to be otherwise. Give up those passions; they pave the road to frustration. Would it be better to be a pod-person? Momentous Decisions: Conversion to podhood is irreversible. How can one reasonably make such a momentious decision? John Stuart Mill said that some kinds of life are better than others. A proper judge of two kinds of life is a person who has experienced both. But then pod-people must be the proper judges. Progressive Beings: For the pod-people there can be only a cold Cartesian “I am”, and never an “I yearn for”. Pod-persons are not progressive beings precisely because they are passionless. (shrink)

In this sequel to Bernard Suits’ timeless classic philosophical work The Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia, published in its full and unabridged form for the first time, Suits continues to explore some of our most fundamental philosophical questions, including the value of sport and games, and their relationship to the good life. -/- In Return of the Grasshopper, Suits puts his theoretical cards on the table, exploring the in-depth implications of his definition of utopia, assessing the merits of a gamified (...) philosophy, and explaining how games can provide an existential balm against the fear of death. Perhaps most importantly, for the first time in print, Suits reveals his underlying worldview: that humanity is forever fated to endure a cyclical existence of privation, brought on by material scarcity, and boredom, resulting from material plenitude. An essential companion to The Grasshopper, this edition includes an introductory chapter that puts Suits’ life and work into context, helping the reader to understand why Suits has had such a profound influence on contemporary philosophy and how his ideas still provide powerful insight into the human condition. -/- This book is important reading for anybody with an interest in the philosophy of sport, leisure and play, political philosophy, ethics, existentialism or utopian studies. (shrink)

In recent philosophical debates a number of arguments have been used which have so much in common that it is useful to study them as having a similar structure. Many arguments -- Searle's Chinese Room, for example -- make use of thought experiments in which we are told a story or given a narrative context such that we feel we are in comfortable surroundings. A new notion is then introduced which clashes with our ordinary habits and associations. As a result, (...) we do not bother to investigate seriously the new notion any further. I call such an arrangement, which is perhaps a variation of the fallacy of presumption, a Steep Cliff argument. One remedy for the misdirection of a Steep Cliff argument is to tell a counterstory from the point of view of the rejected notion. (shrink)

There is an interesting parallel between Epicurus and C.S. Peirce that may be helpful to better understand Epicurus's notions of katastematic pleasure and ataraxia. Epicurus, like Peirce, is a fallabilist. Although there is no final guarantee of success, we can hope for a reliable method which tends to work for satisfaction. For Peirce, a condition of doubt is an irritation which ends in the satisfaction of belief. For Epicurus, a condition of pain is an irritation which ends in the satisfaction (...) of katastematic pleasure. For Peirce, meta-considerations about the stability of belief lead us to reflect on the methods by which belief might be attained and fixed. For Epicurus, meta-considerations about the stability of katastematic pleasure lead us to reflect on the methods by which satisfaction might be attained and made stable. For Peirce, the method of science is offered as the most reliable of the methods. For Epicurus, it is prudence, or "sober calculation which searches out the reasons for every choice and avoidance and drives out the opinions which are the source of the greatest turmoil for men's souls.". (shrink)