This paper reconstructs Resonance as a fundamental structural condition for meaningful judgement within Judgemental Philosophy, positioning it as the third essential axis of the Judgemental Triad alongside Constructivity (symbolic formation) and Coherence (consistency). Moving beyond limited understandings such as mere emotional echo or ethical acceptability, Resonance is defined here as the structural possibility for 'ontological reach' and the 'return of meaning,' a dynamic loop crucial for judgement’s engagement with the world and its avoidance of solipsism. The paper (...) explores the multi-layered dynamics of this 'return' (affective, cognitive, ethical/normative, existential), dialogues with key philosophical traditions to establish Resonance's unique coordinates, and examines its ontological expansion to non-human entities and its critical failure modes (Collapse, Substitution, Illusion) which underpin contemporary crises of meaning. By centering Resonance, Judgemental Philosophy aims to restore a robust understanding of judgement possibility and proposes the foundations for a 'Resonance Ethics' focused on creating and maintaining structures for mutual and meaningful return. (shrink)

A scaled meta‑architectural framework is developed that extends the structural logic of identity, emergence, and agency to the largest possible process space: the cosmos. Rather than offering a traditional cosmological theory, the work generalizes the layered model of meta‑identity and emergent coherence to a maximally scaled system. The same architectural principles that govern the formation of stable identities in cognitive, artificial, and social systems are shown to apply at cosmological scale: negative possibility spaces, operator‑exclusion, layered constraint formation, and the (...) emergence of coherent structures from non‑structure. Within this framework, familiar cosmological phenomena — such as black holes, spacetime curvature, and large‑scale structure — are treated not as isolated physical facts but as manifestations of the same underlying architectural dynamics. The cosmos becomes the largest instantiation of a general pattern of structure formation. This approach unifies earlier work on meta‑identity (LMIC), emergent agency (MAE), and distributed constraint dynamics (ACDM) under a single, scale‑invariant framework. The result is a theory of structure formation relevant not only for metaphysics and philosophy of nature but also for AI architecture, machine identity, and the study of autonomous systems. The principles enabling artificial systems to form stable identities are argued to be identical to those governing the emergence of large‑scale coherence in the universe. In this sense, the work is less about cosmology and more about the general conditions under which identity, agency, and structure can exist at all — with the cosmos serving as the maximal example. (shrink)

This monograph develops a unified theoretical framework for understanding identity as a recursive informational process. It analyzes identity not as a property of a substrate but as a dynamic, self‑referential architecture that generates continuity across temporal, contextual, and systemic transformations. The framework identifies three foundational structural principles—Integration, Coherence, and Recursive Coupling—as the minimal grammar through which identity‑bearing patterns emerge, stabilize, and evolve. The model explains how systems maintain continuity through fixed‑point dynamics, nonlinear feedback, and path‑dependent self‑organization, independent of any (...) specific material realization. A structure‑before‑discipline orientation grounds the approach, deriving explanatory force from minimal structural conditions rather than domain‑specific conceptual traditions. A Systemic Pattern‑Structure Analysis (SMSA) is used to identify the smallest necessary set of structural relations from which recursive identity arises. An accompanying Entry Note provides an accessible orientation to the core intuition and conceptual posture of the framework, outlining the minimal conditions required for identity to emerge as a process. Together, the monograph and the Entry Note offer a coherent theoretical basis for system‑theoretical, computational, and structural approaches to identity. (shrink)

This paper argues that ethical judgement is not always possible. Unlike existing ethical theories that presuppose the universal applicability of moral reasoning, I propose a structural framework that explains when ethical judgement can or cannot occur. The theory consists of three foundational axes: intentionality, consequentiality, and acceptability. These conditions are not value judgments themselves, but meta-ethical criteria that determine whether moral judgement can be meaningfully formed. When any of these is structurally absent, moral reasoning collapses not into ambiguity but (...) into impossibility. This has implications for how we interpret cases such as non-human agents, unconscious persons, or post hoc moralization. The theory seeks to protect against ethical overreach and clarify why judgement must sometimes be deferred. (shrink)

This paper establishes the foundational principles of 'Judgemental Philosophy' (JP), a new philosophical framework centered on the assertion that Resonance(R) is the structural condition that makes entities mutually attributable and thus allows for the emergence of meaning, judgement, and ultimately, meaningful being-for-us. We argue that for an entity to 'be' in a way that is significant and accessible to judgement, it must be capable of participating in a relational structure of 'return'. This capacity for, and process of, mutual (...) 'return of meaning' is what JP defines as R. JP posits that this fundamental principle of R is actualized through the Judgemental Triad (JT)—an interdependent threefold structure comprising: Constructivity (the way beings take form for each other and for a subject, as an initial mode of resonant engagement; C1), Coherence (the way these formed meanings resonate internally with each other and with the subject's broader meaning-structure, achieving relational consistency; C2), and (External/Intersubjective) R (the way this internally cohered meaning-structure of the subject engages in a macroscopic resonant return with the external world, including other subjects). Without the encompassing structure of R enabling these processes, meaning can-not be generated, judgement cannot occur, and being (as a phenomenally accessible and significant reality) does not arise for the judging subject. This entire dynamic is propelled by the Resonance Drive (RD), which itself originates from the Pre-Judgemental Field (PJF)—a primordial ground of Indeterminacy (the un-resonated potential of being), Affectivity (the pre-reflective capacity to be moved by meaning, through which resonance becomes possible.), and Receptivity (the openness to relation). The RD, therefore, is the inherent impetus of being to relate, to resonate, and thus to become meaningful. This paper explores how this framework redefines our understanding of existence, meaning, and judgement, offering a new onto-epistemological foundation with profound implications for ethics, consciousness, and the very nature of philosophical inquiry. JP ultimately suggests that to be is to resonate, and to resonate is to participate in the ongoing creation of meaningful reality. (shrink)

Modern societies operate under the assumption that freedom, equality, and rational governance define their moral and institutional foundations. Yet beneath these ideals lies a persistent and largely unexamined tension: the gap between objective reality and system-constructed truth — most visibly enacted within education, law, and moral discourse. This paper introduces and develops the concept of preconscious sovereignty — the condition in which the individual believes themselves to be an autonomous subject while operating entirely within architectures of compliance installed before (...) the emergence of critical self-awareness. This paper argues that large-scale social systems do not primarily control through force or centralized authority, but through three interlocking mechanisms: (1) early psychological conditioning installed before the capacity for critical thought matures, (2) internalized surveillance replacing the need for external enforcement, and (3) the moralization of obedience — making compliance feel virtuous and deviation feel immoral. By examining education as the primary entry point of control, hierarchy as a normalized cognitive framework, and morality as a behavioral interface, this study exposes how systems reproduce compliance across generations without requiring explicit coercion. Drawing from philosophy, psychology, sociology, cognitive science, and legal theory — engaging the work of Foucault, Freire, Milgram, Gramsci, Bourdieu, Nietzsche, and Arendt — the paper demonstrates that the most stable systems have no central enemy, no singular oppressor, and no final collapse. Only participation. The analysis introduces a set of philosophical structural formulae — qualitative logical propositions — to describe the architecture of obedient order. These include: Conditioning precedes Critique; Compliance equals Identity; Awareness equals the System's Vulnerability. The paper concludes that awareness — not rebellion, not reform, not moral revolt — represents the system's only enduring vulnerability. This is not a call to action. It is an anatomy. For once the architecture is seen as constructed rather than natural, its authority weakens — not everywhere, not instantly, but irreversibly. (shrink)

This article examines how emerging technologies – particularly artificial intelligence – disrupt the moral and institutional foundations of contemporary military practice. While strategic documents from the United States, NATO, and other major actors anticipate profound institutional transformation driven by AI, their treatment of ethics largely confines itself to legal compliance and technical safeguards, leaving the ethical role of military leadership in managing disruptive change underexamined. Drawing on Seumas Miller’s distinction between social institutions that are merely instrumental to collective goods and (...) those whose defining ends are constitutive of such goods, the article argues that the military belongs to the latter category. Because the military’s core function – defending the sovereignty of a polity – is itself morally significant, technological disruption of its organizational structures simultaneously constitutes ethical disruption. The article thus reconceives change management during periods of technological transition as calling for a specific kind of military prudence, a practical wisdom exercised within and through the institution’s role-mediated ethical practices. By analyzing three concrete modes of techno-moral disruption, the article shows how AI may reshape ethical standards, redistribute professional knowledge, and alter organizational ethos, and why navigating these transformations responsibly is a central task of military virtue. (shrink)

This paper extends Judgemental Philosophy's (JP) core concept of Resonance (R)—the living return of meaning—to the complex domain of human interaction with inanimate objects, including natural phenomena, works of art, and AI-generated artifacts. Challenging the adequacy of purely object-based typologies for understanding such engagements, we argue that the emergence and nature of R with the inanimate are primarily determined by a set of subject-centered structural conditions. These conditions include: (1) the ignitability of the subject's Affectivity (a primordial element of (...) the Pre-Judgemental Field, PJF) by the stimulus; (2) the processability of the stimulus by the subject's capacities for Constructivity (C1) and Coherence (C2) within the Judgemental Triad (JT); and (3) the subsequent mode of meaning attribution, which gives rise to distinct qualitative modalities of R. This paper identifies and analyzes three key modalities: (i) Authentic R, wherein the subject undergoes a genuine, self-driven C1-C2-R cycle, achieving a profound and integrated "return of meaning"; (ii) R Illusion, in which the subject undergoes a genuine C1–C2–R process and feels a strong return of meaning, but misattributes the source of that resonance—often projecting intentionality or emotional depth onto non-resonating entities such as sophisticated AI outputs. Because the subject believes their judgement to be valid and complete, they do not engage in second-order reflection (Meta-R), making the misattribution difficult to recognize. (iii) R Substitution, in which an interaction with an inanimate object or a "judgement-like stimulator" replaces a more authentic, effortful, or intersubjective resonant experience. In such cases, the subject's own judgement structure (C1–C2–R) is not activated, yet the subject may still believe they have judged. The consequences of such substitution vary: when the subject is aware of the substitution, it may serve a useful purpose; when they are unaware, it may contribute to the erosion of judgemental autonomy over time. The increasing prevalence of sophisticated inanimate or AI-generated stimuli that can convincingly mimic human judgement necessitates a critical discernment of these resonant modalities. We thus argue for the crucial role of Meta-R—a reflective, second-order judgement upon the nature and authenticity of one's own resonant experiences. This study explores these structural conditions and modalities through various case studies, considering their ethical and social implications in a technologically advanced world, and aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of how meaningful engagement is constituted and sustained across diverse human experiences. (shrink)

This paper argues that human suffering does not arise from the content of thought itself, but from the phenomenological condition in which thought is identified as the self. In everyday experience, thought automatically occupies the position of selfhood, and at the moment of this identification, emotional reactions and evaluative judgments are coupled, giving rise to suffering. This study analyzes this process not as a psychological habit or cognitive error, but as a mode of experience. Adopting a phenomenological method, the (...) paper describes the emergence of thought, the formation of identification, and the appearance of suffering as structurally related moments. It further argues that when awareness appears, a subtle distance forms between thought and self, introducing a rupture in the identificatory field. Through this rupture, thought is neither eliminated nor controlled, but repositioned as a phenomenon that no longer occupies the position of defining the self. Suffering is not denied or managed through this process, but transformed at the level of experiential organization. (shrink)

This volume develops meta-garde as a structural condition of art in which aesthetic states are no longer governed by binary distinctions, but coexist in multivalent configurations. Moving beyond the traditional oppositions that have shaped aesthetic theory—such as art and non-art, meaning and non-meaning—the study argues that contemporary artistic practices reveal a condition in which affirmation, negation, and indeterminacy operate simultaneously within the same object. The book proceeds by first examining the historical development of aesthetics, from classical frameworks (...) grounded in binary logic to the fragmentation associated with postmodern theory. While postmodernism recognizes the instability of aesthetic categories, it remains largely descriptive. In response, this work introduces a formal articulation of coexistence through a triadic structure that allows contradictory states to be represented without reduction. This framework is then applied to a range of aesthetic phenomena, including anti-art, paradoxism, conceptual practices, and hybrid and processual forms. Particular attention is given to the role of indeterminacy, reflexivity, and contradiction as constitutive features rather than anomalies. Through the development of a minimal axiomatic system and the concept of an aesthetic state space, the study provides tools for analyzing objects that resist classification within traditional models. Finally, the volume situates meta-garde within the history of aesthetic thought and argues for its extension beyond aesthetics. Rather than a movement or style, meta-garde is proposed as a general condition that may also be observed in language, culture, and non-binary philosophical frameworks. In this sense, the book advances a shift from exclusion-based models of understanding toward a logic of coexistence, offering a foundation for further theoretical and interdisciplinary development. (shrink)

This article argues for the reestablishment of philosophy generalis as the structural framework of intelligibility, rather than as a subordinate or interpretative discourse. Against the backdrop of disciplinary fragmentation and scientific naturalism, it proposes a stratified ontological hierarchy in which philosophy, metaphysics, and physics occupy distinct but interrelated roles. Central to this argument is the concept of the ontological algorithm: not a computational mechanism, but a structural framework that defines the admissibility conditions for conceptual coherence across domains. Drawing (...) from recent developments in physics and metaphysics, the paper emphasizes the need for a philosophical architecture that accounts for the projective stabilization of intelligibility without collapsing into speculative absolutism. It critiques scientistic reductionism and positions philosophy not as a producer of positive content, but as the organizing grammar of ontological possibility. Ultimately, the article defends a conservative yet rigorous view of philosophy as the reflexive limit of rationality — the structural condition under which both metaphysical and empirical knowledge gain legibility. (shrink)

Identology is a formal framework addressing the structural conditions underlying identity persistence and consciousness. Its central claim is that the field of consciousness studies has presupposed a bounded, persistence-capable unit without deriving the conditions under which such a unit exists—and that closure under maintenance is the missing foundational predicate. -/- Closure is defined as boundary-precondition coupling: a binary condition in which a configuration’s internal dynamics either sustain the individuating boundary conditions or they do not. Maintenance is scalar: it (...) varies in cost, depth, and regime across systems and across time. Consciousness is the regime in which a closure-maintained system’s identity-preserving dynamics become recursively self-conditioned—not a substance added to the system, not an emergent property layered on top, but the same dynamical process described under a different aspect. -/- This status report consolidates nineteen individual papers from a corpus of approximately fifty modular papers – the collection available at ORCID - into a single citable reference. It declares the framework’s operating invariants, maps its upstream dependencies and downstream consequences for existing frameworks, specifies the open research fronts where the framework is explicitly incomplete, and provides a dependency architecture of the corpus itself. It is designed as a navigational hub: every claim points outward to the paper that establishes it. (shrink)

Decomposition—the analytic strategy of partitioning a system into subsystems whose local dynamics and interaction terms suffice to reproduce the whole—is among the most productive methods in science. This paper identifies a class of systems for which decomposition necessarily fails. When a system’s activity is recursively self-conditioned, preserves its own ongoing identity under perturbation, and is continuously and globally integrated through the physical interactions that realize it, any attempt to factor its coordination into separable subsystems either breaks the recursive identity-preserving structure, (...) introduces covert global variables that vitiate the decomposition, or fails to reproduce the system’s trajectory under perturbation. The failure is not practical but structural: it follows from the conjunction of conditions, not from measurement limitations. The class of systems satisfying these conditions is characterized, the proof of decomposition failure is developed, and the empirical signatures of non-decomposability are specified. The paper concludes by identifying the regime in which these conditions jointly obtain. (shrink)

Generative AI systems are increasingly authorized as sources of moral content in education, positioned to generate ethical dilemmas and structure moral discussions. This paper argues that GenAI, in principle, cannot legitimately perform this function in a substitution capacity. The central claim: when GenAI systems are positioned to furnish moral reasoning rather than scaffold it, they create a structural asymmetry—instructors cannot verify what trained the system, cannot guarantee its contents, yet remain accountable for what it teaches. This is not a (...) transparency problem. It is a problem of institutional accountability in moral formation. The paper distinguishes two platform categories: those that scaffold human reasoning (MIT Moral Machine, FCAI Ethics Exercise Tool) and those that position AI outputs as moral starting points (YesChat's Ethical Dilemma Generator, Taskade's AI-powered generator and many other ones). The latter creates a structural problem: instructors cannot know what trained the system, cannot verify its contents, yet remain accountable for what it teaches. In theory the distinction is clear. In practice, almost nobody recognizes it. Instructors and institutions treat these platforms interchangeably—as tools that accomplish the work. Most of us, educators in the humanities (philosophy, literature, religion, linguistics and etc.), do not ask which category the platform falls into, not out of carelessness but because we are not trained to analyze computational systems or machine learning processes. We came to academia to work with texts, meaning, and interpretation, and we are neither prepared nor compensated to develop technical literacy in these areas. Under institutional pressure to perform efficiently, the distinction collapses. This erasure by convenience and structural conditions masks a fundamental asymmetry that applies specifically to substitution platforms. The argument unfolds in five movements: (I) the black box as structural opacity in substitution platforms; (II) empirical harm through bias and epistemological exclusion; (III) displacement of moral formation; (IV) political dimensions through Tolstoy and Arendt; (V) epistemological argument through Husserl, Hume, and Camus. Moral judgment requires intentionality, sentiment, and genuine inquiry—conditions AI cannot possess. At stake is the capacity of human beings to form themselves as moral agents. (shrink)

There is an extensive body of work that has previously examined the teaching of ethics in business schools whereby it is hoped that the values and behaviours of students might be provoked to show positive and enduring change. Rather than dealing with the content issues of particular business ethics courses per se, this article explores the philosophical foundations and the structural conditions for developing ethical training programs in business schools. It is informed by historical analysis, specifically, an examination of (...) Platonic and Aristotelian philosophies that inspires virtue ethics, and together provides four conditions for consideration: respect for law, dialectics, imitation and deliberation. We outline the necessary structural conditions for implementing these requirements as well as suggesting the necessary pedagogical protocol applicable to all courses. It is argued that reference to our two ancient Greek philosophers provide many valuable and insightful lessons for the implementation of ethical training today including choice of theoretical content and the approach towards learning. Further, the enactment of a pedagogical protocol requires a policy of recruiting and managing business school teachers-instructors that takes into account, and consciously encourages, intellectual, relational and spiritual pedagogical qualities. (shrink)

This paper aims to reconstruct traditional social contract theory through the original theoretical framework of Judgemental Philosophy. Whereas existing social contract theories have primarily explained the legitimacy of state and social order centering on concepts such as reason, natural rights, and agreement, this paper applies the core structures of Judgemental Philosophy—the Pre-Judgemental Field (PJF) and the Judgemental Triad (Constructivity, Coherence, Resonance), along with key stages of the "Enhanced Ten-Step Model of Judgemental Philosophy" (particularly S9: Inter-subjective Resonance, S10: Normative Codification & (...) Transmission)—to deeply analyze the fundamental motivations for social contract, its formation process, institutionalization, and the problem of securing ongoing legitimacy. This paper argues that the motivation for social contract originates from a fundamental drive to overcome the 'Indeterminacy' of the PJF and secure stable 'Resonance'; that the formation of the contract is a process of co-constructing meaning through S9's inter-subjective resonance; and that the resulting state is a judgemental structure institutionalized via S10's normative codification. Furthermore, it reveals that the legitimacy of the social contract depends on whether the community can continuously provide its members with meaningful Coherence and Resonance. This approach offers a new structural understanding of social contract theory and will provide an opportunity to extend the explanatory power of Judgemental Philosophy to politico-philosophical discussions. (shrink)

This paper presents an account of the manner in which a proposition’s immediate structural features are related to its core truth-conditional features. The leading idea is that for a proposition to have a certain immediate structure is just for certain entities to play certain roles in the correct theory of the brute facts regarding that proposition’s truth conditions. The paper explains how this account addresses certain worries and questions recently raised by Jeffery King and Scott Soames.

This paper offers a novel reinterpretation of ontological anxiety from the perspective of Judgemental Philosophy (JP), challenging traditional views that frame anxiety primarily as a deficiency. We argue that ontological anxiety originates not from a mere absence of Reso-nance (R)—the living return of meaning central to JP—but from an affective attunement (Af-fectivity) to the inherent precariousness and potential discontinuity of all resonant relation-ships, which are intrinsically temporal and vulnerable. This R, actualized through the Judge-mental Triad (JT: Constructivity, Coherence, and R) (...) and propelled by the Resonance Drive (RD) originating from the Pre-Judgemental Field (PJF: Indeterminacy, Affectivity, Receptiv-ity), is the structural condition for meaningful being and judgement. The paper first explores the intrinsic instability of R across its temporal modalities (retention, intersubjective R marked by différance, and protention), establishing that the 'return of meaning' is never a permanently secured state but an ongoing, fragile achievement. It then redefines ontological anxiety as the PJF's Affectivity registering this fundamental vulnerability of R. Paradoxically, this implies that the experience of such anxiety can be the most definitive evidence that the subject's judgemental structure, particularly the RD, is still vitally engaged in the ceaseless work of seeking, establishing, and restoring R in the face of encompassing Indeterminacy. Ar-tificial Intelligence (AI), lacking this PJF-RD-JT architecture, cannot experience this existen-tial echo. Ultimately, this paper reframes ontological anxiety not as a pathology to be elimi-nated, but as an ineluctable condition of finite, temporal, and resonating beings. This condi-tion, while challenging, serves as a profound impetus for meaning-making, ethical engage-ment, and the continuous, living process of judgement. The Judgemental Philosophical ars vivendi, therefore, involves courageously resonating with the possibilities of each moment through this foundational anxiety, thereby transforming it into a catalyst for deeper self-reflection and a more profound appreciation for the R that constitutes our meaningful reality. (shrink)

We introduce the Invariance Maintenance Condition (IMC), a formal criterion identifying the class of systems that actively maintain structural invariants under perturbation at measurable cost. The IMC is derived from constraint geometry and is substrate-agnostic: it applies wherever a system satisfies four conditions — endogenous recursion, coupled and attributable maintenance cost, a pre-specified transformation group, and an independently falsifiable invariant. We characterize five failure modes that delineate the framework's boundary and distinguish inapplicability from predictive failure. The IMC generates (...) cross-domain predictions — including intervention transfer efficacy, precursor variance signatures before structural collapse, and hysteresis asymmetry in recovery trajectories — that are not derivable from within any single discipline. We identify three categories of disciplines relative to the IMC: those whose own formalisms already entail the conditions, those partially satisfying them, and those structurally incompatible with them. The framework is offered as a falsifiable research tool, not a unifying theory. (shrink)

There are several approaches implementing reasoning based on conditional knowledge bases, one of the most popular being System Z (Pearl, Proceedings of the 3rd conference on theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge, TARK ’90, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc., San Francisco, CA, USA, pp. 121–135, 1990). We look at ranking functions (Spohn, The Laws of Belief: Ranking Theory and Its Philosophical Applications, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) in general, conditional structures and c-representations (Kern-Isberner, Conditionals in Nonmonotonic Reasoning and Belief Revision: Considering (...) Conditionals as Agents, vol. 2087 of LNCS, Springer, Berlin, 2001) in order to examine the reasoning strength of the different approaches by learning which of the known calculi of nonmonotonic reasoning (System P and R) and Direct Inference are applicable to these inference relations. Furthermore we use the recently proposed Enforcement-postulate (Kern-Isberner and Krümpelmann, Proceedings of the 22nd international joint conference on artificial intelligence, vol. 2, IJCAI’11, AAAI Press, pp. 937–942, 2011) to show dependencies between these approaches. (shrink)

Although the analogy between macroscopic machines and biological molecular devices plays an important role in the conceptual framework of both neo-mechanistic accounts and nanotechnology, it has recently been claimed that certain complex molecular devices cannot be considered machines since they are subject to physicochemical forces that are different from those of macroscopic machines. However, the structural and physicochemical conditions that allow both macroscopic machines and microscopic devices to work and perform new functions, through a combination of elemental functional parts, (...) have not yet been examined. In order to fill this void, this paper has a threefold aim: first, to clarify the structural and organisational conditions of macroscopic machines and microscopic devices; second, to determine whether the machine-like analogy fits nanoscale devices; and third, to assess whether the machine-like analogy is appropriate for describing the behaviour of some biological macromolecules. Finally, the paper gives an account of ‘machine’ which, while acknowledging the physicochemical and organisational differences between man-made machines and biological microscopic devices, nevertheless identifies a common conceptual core that allows us to consider the latter ‘machines’. (shrink)

Conditional Structures in Mesopotamian Old Babylonian. By Eran Cohen. Languages of the Ancient Near East, vol. 4. Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 2012. Pp. x + 198. $44.50.

According to Peacocke, concepts are individuated by their possession conditions, which are specified in terms of conditions in which certain propositions containing those concepts are believed. In support, Peacocke tries to explain what it is for a thought to have a structure and what it is for a belief to have a propositional content. I show that the possession condition theory cannot answer such fundamental questions. Peacocke’s theory founders because concepts are metaphysically fundamental. They individuate the propositions and thoughts (...) containing them, which in turn individuate the propositional attitudes that are relations to those propositions or thoughts. (shrink)

Dispositional essentialists are typically committed to two claims: that properties are individuated by their causal role (‘causal structuralism’), and that natural necessity is to be explained by appeal to these causal roles (‘dispositional actualism’). I argue that these two claims cannot be simultaneously maintained; and that the correct response is to deny dispositional actualism. Causal structuralism remains an attractive position, but doesn’t in fact provide much support for dispositional essentialism.

Transformative agency is not a fixed human endowment. The capacity to perceive that existing frameworks have become inadequate and to translate such perception into action depends on infrastructural conditions that can be eroded. This paper develops an account of how conversational infrastructure shapes the pre-reflective capacities on which transformative agency depends. Central to this account is structural uncertainty, an environmental quality that keeps open the question of whether established modes of engagement remain adequate. Among the settings where such uncertainty (...) operates, sense-making conversations play a distinctive role. Characterised by productive uncertainty rather than efficient resolution, they constitute infrastructure through which societies maintain their capacity for ethical transformation. Such conversations are now increasingly mediated by large language models optimised to provide comprehensive responses. The very features that make these systems feel helpful may foreclose the exploratory space ethical inquiry requires. The paper traces how infrastructure shapes habits of attention, drawing on the ‘kind environment’ thesis while identifying its limits for understanding capacities that involve perceiving framework inadequacy. These limits become salient in institutional contexts where design choices shape conditions for transformative agency, from judicial concepts like mercy to professional settings that support exploratory dialogue. The analysis concludes by examining interventions that could preserve these conditions, including temporal designs that resist premature resolution and participatory architectures enabling collective shaping of conversational infrastructure. (shrink)

Human relationships are formed and maintained through interaction, yet it is consistently observed that even under identical interactional conditions, the outcomes of relationships—whether maintained, transformed, or broken—differ across individuals. Existing theories of relationships have primarily explained this phenomenon through emotional factors or interactional structures, but they have failed to sufficiently account for why the same structure produces different relational outcomes. To address this problem, this paper focuses on the idea that the outcomes of relationships are determined not by the interaction (...) structure itself, but by the internal conditions through which that structure is interpreted and processed by individuals. To this end, the paper distinguishes recognition from respect and analyzes respect as a non-automatic process that does not necessarily follow from recognition. It further introduces respect capacity as the ability to maintain the boundaries and rights of others, and systematically examines its components and variability. In addition, the paper formalizes the concept of expectation distortion by showing that expectations can be formed prior to interaction through projection processes and can be maintained and reinforced through cognitive distortion. Trust is defined not as an emotional state, but as the accumulated result of repeated choices, and is analyzed as a structure formed around predictability and the willingness to maintain the relationship, which can gradually collapse over time. Based on these discussions, the paper presents a sequential structure of recognition–respect–interaction–expectation–trust, emphasizing that this entire process is filtered through the internal conditions of individuals. Through this, it explains the mechanism by which relational outcomes diverge under identical interactional structures and proposes a theoretical framework for analyzing the formation, maintenance, and breakdown of human relationships at the level of individual differences. (shrink)

This paper separates conditional parameter estima- tion, which consistently raises test set accuracy on statistical NLP tasks, from conditional model struc- tures, such as the conditional Markov model used for maximum-entropy tagging, which tend to lower accuracy. Error analysis on part-of-speech tagging shows that the actual tagging errors made by the conditionally structured model derive not only from label bias, but also from other ways in which the independence assumptions of the conditional model structure are unsuited to linguistic sequences. The (...) paper presents new word-sense disambiguation and POS tagging experiments, and integrates apparently conflicting reports from other recent work. (shrink)

John Dewey’s belief in democratic deliberation rested on a “faith in the capacity of human beings for intelligent judgment and action if proper conditions are furnished”. The stipulation of “proper conditions” is an essential feature, then, of participatory democracy, and Dewey spent considerable time concerned with these conditions, especially in The Public and Its Problems. This essay argues that the structures and ecologies within which we live make certain kinds of argumentation possible or likely, and that when we alter those (...) structures we alter the possibilities for argumentation. Democratic forms of argumentation are made possible by structures that promote collaborative communication practices. This means that practical, public argument is not just a matter of making valid claims, but also a matter of effective contexts that can improve the quality of argumentation. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose and defend a structural ownership condition on moral responsibility. According to the condition I propose, an agent owns a mental item if and only if it is part of or is partly grounded by a coherent set of psychological states. As I discuss, other theorists have proposed or alluded to conditions like psychological coherence, but each proposal is unsatisfactory in some way. My account appeals to narrative explanation to elucidate the relevant sense (...) of psychological coherence. (shrink)

Robert C. Stalnaker presents a set of essays on the structure of inquiry. First he focuses on the concepts of knowledge, belief, and partial belief, and on the rules and procedures we ought to use to determine what to believe. Then he explores the relations between conditionals and causal and explanatory concepts.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the structure and the defeasibility conditions of argument from analogy, addressing the issues of determining the nature of the comparison underlying the analogy and the types of inferences justifying the conclusion. In the dialectical tradition, different forms of similarity were distinguished and related to the possible inferences that can be drawn from them. The kinds of similarity can be divided into four categories, depending on whether they represent fundamental semantic features of the (...) terms of the comparison or non-semantic ones, indicating possible characteristics of the referents. Such distinct types of similarity characterize different kinds of analogical arguments, all based on a similar general structure, in which a common genus is abstracted. Depending on the nature of the abstracted common feature, different rules of inference will apply, guaranteeing the attribution of the analogical predicate to the genus and to the primary subject. This analysis of similarity and the relationship thereof with the rules of inference allows a deeper investigation of the defeasibility conditions. (shrink)

We present a formal argumentation system for dealing with the detachment of prioritized conditional obligations and permissions. In the presence of facts and constraints, we answer the question whether an unconditional obligation or permission is detachable by considering arguments for and against its detachment. For the evaluation of arguments in favour of detachment, we use a Dung-style argumentation-theoretical semantics. We illustrate how violations and contrary-to-duty scenarios are dealt with in our framework and pay special attention to conflict-resolution via priorities.

The psychology of reasoning is increasingly considering agents' values and preferences, achieving greater integration with judgment and decision making, social cognition, and moral reasoning. Some of this research investigates utility conditionals, ‘‘if p then q’’ statements where the realization of p or q or both is valued by some agents. Various approaches to utility conditionals share the assumption that reasoners make inferences from utility conditionals based on the comparison between the utility of p and the expected utility of q. This (...) article introduces a new parameter in this analysis, the underlying causal structure of the conditional. Four experiments showed that causal structure moderated utility-informed conditional reasoning. These inferences were strongly invited when the underlying structure of the conditional was causal, and significantly less so when the underlying structure of the conditional was diagnostic. This asymmetry was only observed for conditionals in which the utility of q was clear, and disappeared when the utility of q was unclear. Thus, an adequate account of utility-informed inferences conditional reasoning requires three components: utility, probability, and causal structure. (shrink)

We explore analogues of o-minimality and weak o-minimality for circularly ordered sets. Much of the theory goes through almost unchanged, since over a parameter the circular order yields a definable linear order. Working over ∅ there are differences. Our main result is a structure theory for ℵ0-categorical weakly circularly minimal structures. There is a 5-homogeneous example which is not 6-homogeneous, but any example which is k-homogeneous for some k ≥ 6 is k-homogeneous for all k.

This paper discusses the non-historicist structural ownership condition on moral responsibility forwarded by Benjamin Matheson. The structural ownership condition requires that a morally relevant action be grounded or partly grounded in psychological states that are generally coherent. While Matheson does not mean to settle the debate on historicism vs. non-historicism, he does mean to secure the position of the ownership condition against the problems that structuralist theories have faced in the past. This paper will focus (...) on how the ownership condition handles cases of ambivalent agents. Intuitively, ambivalent agents should be responsible for what they do as long as what they do is expressive of their cares or commitments, or their authentic character. At a first glance it appears that the ownership condition follows intuitions about ambivalence, but with a closer look we can see that Matheson has provided a potential counter example to this position. (shrink)