The following text discusses an issueof legal interpretation status in continentalsystem of law. Exploring a metaphor of theinterpretation as a translation, it emphasizesits creative aspect, which has been deniedoften in modern times. Reminding the Romanorigins of contemporary continental legalsystems, it uses historical arguments to accentthe intrinsically inventive character of legalinterpretation.

This chapter elaborates how we can recognize theories of international status as they are manifested in discourse. To this second end, the chapter develops a metalinguistic framework—“Grammar of Status Competition”—for identifying the logic of status competition as it manifests in language. The chapter thereby leverages the processual-relational logic outlined in the previous chapter to develop a lens for identifying status and its effects without assuming (and reifying) the rules of an international social hierarchy or trying to (...) infer motivations. Specifically, it outlines how three types of representations invoke and thus constitute competitive status hierarchies: (1) superlatives and relative comparisons, (2) positional identity constructions, and (3) sports metaphors. When uttered, each grammatical unit on its own (no matter how momentary) invokes the logic of status competition and specifies a distinct theory of status, which can be used to legitimize and delegitimize particular courses of action. (shrink)

This chapter explores how international organizations can exert influence when lacking material carrots or sticks. Investigating Norway’s response to the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) ranking, the chapter argues that international rankings operate as “status Esperanto” that allow “foreign” theories of status to bypass the obstacles that usually hinder international agreement about the rules of international status competitions. However, tracing 19 years of the education policy highlights a more critical “reactivity,” hitherto overlooked by prior research. (...) The process of competing in the PISA rankings led several domestic groups to question the rules of the game and develop rival theories of educational status that spread to mainstream politics. This emergent resistance to the competition has undermined the potential for PISA to legitimate future policy reforms and highlights the importance of treating status competition as a discursively mediated process that is always susceptible to contestation from below. (shrink)

If we were required to sacrifice our own interests whenever doing so was best overall, or prohibited from doing so unless it was optimal, then we would be mere sites for the realisation of value. Our interests, not ourselves, would wholly determine what we ought to do. We are not mere sites for the realisation of value — instead we, ourselves, matter unconditionally. So we have options to act suboptimally. These options have limits, grounded in the very same considerations. Though (...) not merely such sites, you and I are also sites for the realisation of value, and our interests (and ourselves) must therefore sometimes determine what others ought to do, in particular requiring them to bear reasonable costs for our sake. Likewise, just as my moral status grounds a requirement that others show me appropriate respect, so must I do to myself. (shrink)

Shelly Kagan has recently defended the view that it is morally worse for a human being to suffer some harm than it is for a lower animal (such as a dog or a cow) to suffer a harm that is equally severe (ceteris paribus). In this paper, I argue that this view receives rather less support from our intuitions than one might at first suppose. According to Kagan, moreover, an individual’s moral status depends partly upon her ‘modal capacities.’ In (...) this paper, I argue that the most natural strategy for justifying Kagan’s theory faces some important challenges. More generally, I argue that philosophers who wish to defend the view that human beings have a higher moral status than that of the lower animals face a dilemma. Either their theory of moral status will imply (unacceptably) that some severely cognitively impaired human beings have a significantly lower moral status than that of typical human beings, or these philosophers will be forced to ground moral status in a set of properties so far removed from a subject’s actual capacities that it will become difficult to see why these kinds of properties should have such moral importance. (shrink)

Distrust in scientific experts can be surprisingly stubborn, persisting despite evidence supporting the experts’ views, demonstrations of their competence, or displays of good will. This stubborn distrust is often viewed as a manifestation of irrationality. By contrast, this article proposes a logic of “status distrust”: low-status individuals are objectively vulnerable to collective decision-making, and can justifiably distrust high-status scientific experts if they are not confident that the experts do not have their best interests at heart. In phenomena (...) of status distrust, social status is thus an indicator of distrust, and this has wider implications for the literatures on trust in science and on expert communication. (shrink)

This paper offers several criticisms of the account of rightholding laid out in S. Matthew Liao’s recent paper “The Basis of Human Moral Status.” I argue that Liao’s account both does too much and too little: it grants rightholder status to those who may not deserve it, and it does not provide grounds for offering such status to those who arguably do deserve it. Given these troubling aspects of his approach, I encourage Liao to abandon his “physical (...) basis of moral agency” account of moral status and instead adopt a position closer to a traditional “speciesist” view. (shrink)

Moral status refers to a value recognized as belonging or ascribed to a particular entity according to which its protection is a moral and often legal obligation. Considered more broadly, the grounds for moral status always refer to the interests of the entity in question. For example, there may be overall interest in protecting the entity or such an entity may have interests of its own that ought to be protected.

Moral status is a vexing topic. Linked for so long to the unending debates about ensoulment and the morality of abortion, it has recently resurfaced in the embryonic stem cell controversy. In this new context, it should benefit from new insights originating in recent scientific advances. We believe that the recently observed capability of somatic cells to return to a pluripotential state (a capability we propose to name 'reversed potency') in a controlled manner requires us to modify the traditional (...) concept of moral status and to consider it as referring not only to intrinsic properties (like 'to possess reason' or 'to be a person'), but also to extrinsic or relational ones. (shrink)

Mary Anne Warren investigates a theoretical question that is at the centre of practical and professional ethics: what are the criteria for having moral status? That is: what does it take to be an entity towards which people have moral considerations? Warren argues that no single property will do as a sole criterion, and puts forward seven basic principles which establish moral status. She then applies these principles to three controversial moral issues: voluntary euthanasia, abortion, and the (...) class='Hi'>status of non-human animals. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: What is Moral Status? The Moral Agency Theory The Genetic Humanity Theory The Sentience Theory The Organic Life Theory Two Relationship‐based Theories Combining these Criteria Principles of Moral Status Human Zygotes, Embryos, and Fetuses Are All Animals Equal? Machines and Artificial Life‐forms Conclusion.

Socioeconomic status (SES) is a complex and multidimensional construct, encompassing both independent objective characteristics (e.g., income or education) and subjective people’s ratings of their placement in the socioeconomic spectrum. Within the growing literature on subjective SES belongingness and psychological well-being, subjective indices of SES have tended to center on the use of pictorial rank-related social ladders where individuals place themselves relative to others by simultaneously considering their income, educational level, and occupation. This approach, albeit consistent with the idea of (...) these social ladders as summative or cognitive SES markers, might potentially constrain individuals’ conceptions of their SES. This research ( N = 368; M age = 39.67, SD = 13.40) is intended to expand prior investigations on SES and psychological well-being by revisiting the role of subjective SES. In particular, it (a) proposes an innovative adaptation of the traditional MacArthur Scale of subjective SES to income, education, and occupation, thus resulting in three separate social ladders; and (b) tests the empirical contribution of such three social ladders to psychological well-being. Overall, our findings showed that the novel education and occupation ladders (excluding the income ladder) are predictive of a significant part of the variance levels of psychological well-being that is not due to canonical objective metrics of SES (i.e., income, education, and occupation), or to the conventional MacArthur Scale of subjective SES. Although preliminary, these results underscore the need to further reconsider (subjective) SES-related conceptualization and measurement strategies to gather a more comprehensive understanding of the SES-psychological well-being link. (shrink)

Gopal Sreenivasan’s “hybrid theory” states that a moral duty is directed toward an individual because her interests justify the assignment of control over the duty. An alternative “plain theory” states that the individual’s interests justify the duty itself. I argue that a strong moral status constraint explains Sreenivasan’s instrumentalization objection to a Razian plain theory but that his own model violates this constraint. I suggest how both approaches can be reformulated to satisfy the constraint, and I argue that a (...) reformulated plain theory can also avoid an insufficiency objection. The hybrid approach consequently has no clear advantage over the plain approach. (shrink)

In this article, we discuss Beauchamp and Childress’s treatment of the issue of moral status. In particular, we introduce the five different perspectives on moral status that Beauchamp and Childress consider in Principles of Biomedical Ethics and explain their alternative to those perspectives, raise some critical questions about their approach, and offer a different way to think about one of the five theories of moral status that is more in line with what we believe some of its (...) leading advocates affirm. (shrink)

Whether, how and when do leaders engage in ethical leadership as a response to status threat? We propose that leaders facing status threat are likely to develop ethical leadership behaviors toward subordinates. Drawing on power dependence theory, we theorize that experiencing status threat augments leaders’ dependence on subordinates who can provide them with status-relevant resources. Dependence on subordinates further motivates leaders to absorb the resource constraints through displaying ethical leadership. However, if leaders are able to obtain (...) alternative resources to cope with status threat, their dependence on subordinates is weakened. We conducted two studies to test the predictions. Using a moderation-of-process design, Study 1 found that when participants experienced status threat, they displayed more ethical leadership behaviors, but particularly so when their reward structure was team- rather than individual-based. Study 2 was a field study using a sample of 104 teams from two Chinese firms listed in the “Top 500 private enterprises in China.” We found that leaders who experienced more status threat were perceived to be more ethical by their subordinates, which was mediated by leaders’ perceptions of dependence on subordinates. The mediated effect was stronger for leaders who were less skilled in networking. Implications for theory on the contextual factors of ethical leadership, dependence, and status threat are discussed. (shrink)

Brain organoid research raises ethical challenges not seen in other forms of stem cell research. Given that brain organoids recapitulate the development of the human brain, it is plausible that brain organoids could one day attain consciousness and perhaps even higher cognitive abilities. Brain organoid research therefore raises difficult questions about these organoids’ moral status—questions that currently fall outside the scope of existing regulations and guidelines. This chapter offers a novel moral framework for brain organoid research. It outlines the (...) conditions under which brain organoids might attain moral status and explain what this means for the ethics of experimenting with these entities. (shrink)

Many economists and philosophers assume that status quo bias is necessarily irrational. I argue that, in some cases, status quo bias is fully rational. I discuss the rationality of status quo bias on both subjective and objective theories of the rationality of preferences. I argue that subjective theories cannot plausibly condemn this bias as irrational. I then discuss one kind of objective theory, which holds that a conservative bias toward existing things of value is rational. This account (...) can fruitfully explain some compelling aspects of common sense morality, and it may justify status quo bias. (shrink)

Status in Law and Morality argues that status is a moral, and not just a legal or social, idea. Status picks out the role one occupies within an asymmetrical social relation in which one of the parties suffers from vulnerabilities or dependencies. The point of status is to protect the weaker party—the employee or the tenant. It does so through social recognition of their role and through a set of prophylactic legal rights and duties. This notion (...) of status (role-status) differs in important respects from status as the ranking of social esteem (rank-status). Role-status aims to shield the self-esteem of the weaker party and to project the value of equality into the social relation. This book aims to revive this progressive character of status, which was prominent in moral philosophy during the Enlightenment. Contrary to Maine’s thesis, law has not progressed from status to contract. Rather, it started gradually to side with the weaker instead of the stronger party to these status relations. Rather than leaving status behind, this book argues that we need more and better protected legal statuses. (shrink)

The current economic and societal production system gives money a magnified importance, overlooking other essential flows necessary for human survival and existence. It focuses on monetary indicators like profits, dividends, and GDPs to evaluate organizational production, while often disregarding outputs that harm the biosphere. Money is treated as the constitutive being (ousia) and attributed undemonstrated explanatory properties. Intangible flow theory helps eliminate this metaphysical status of money by recognizing that monetary flows are just one of many necessary flows for (...) human survival and existence. Organizations deliver product-flows that require input-flows from and send output-flows back to the encompassing biosphere, whether they explicitly engage in environmentally friendly activities or not. Therefore, every organization is an ecological entity because it has a relationship with the biosphere, which participates in the manner through which humans integrate into their surrounding environment and relate to other living beings. Eliminating the metaphysical status of money integrates every organization in the biosphere, making organizations accountable for environmental harm caused by their activities. This can be achieved by deconstructing the metaphysical status of money in business models. (shrink)

This paper critically examines the principle of equal consideration of interests (ECOI) in the discourse of animal ethics. I claim that within a consequentialist moral order, an entity's moral status comes from working backward from consequences, not solely on intrinsic capacities. Hence, I propose that to judge moral status, one must take into account not only (a) an entity's intrinsic capacity for sentience but also (b) how reliably that entity will reduce suffering overall. Given these two criteria, I (...) explore whether human beings deserve a higher moral status than nonhuman animals. While there is evidence that homo sapiens have evolved a unique instinctual urge to reduce suffering called ‘compassion,’ humans are not always compassionate. For this reason, I conclude that as a species, human beings do deserve a much higher moral status than other animals; however, the moral status of any individual human being falls upon a much wider spectrum above and below other animals. This framework has the advantage of justifying common moral intuitions about human moral superiority while still obligating humans to exercise compassion. I conclude by discussing the implications of this on the moral status of non-paradigm humans, and its possible import for AI ethics and alignment. (shrink)

It seems obvious that phenomenally conscious experience is something of great value, and that this value maps onto a range of important ethical issues. For example, claims about the value of life for those in a permanent vegetative state, debates about treatment and study of disorders of consciousness, controversies about end-of-life care for those with advanced dementia, and arguments about the moral status of embryos, fetuses, and non-human animals arguably turn on the moral significance of various facts about consciousness. (...) However, though work has been done on the moral significance of elements of consciousness, such as pain and pleasure, little explicit attention has been devoted to the ethical significance of consciousness. In this book Joshua Shepherd presents a systematic account of the value present within conscious experience. This account emphasizes not only the nature of consciousness, but the importance of items within experience such as affect, valence, and the complex overall shape of particular valuable experiences. Shepherd also relates this account to difficult cases involving non-humans and those with disorders of consciousness, arguing that the value of consciousness influences and partially explains the degree of moral status a being possesses, without fully determining it. The upshot is a deeper understanding of both the moral importance of phenomenal consciousness and its relations to moral status. This book will be of great interest to philosophers and students of ethics, bioethics, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of mind and cognitive science. (shrink)

Debates surrounding the nature of mental disorder have tended to divide into an objectivist camp that takes psychiatric classification to be a value-free scientific matter, and a normativist camp that takes it to be irreducibly values-based. Here we present an overlooked distinction between _status_ and _constitution_. Questions of the form “What is x?” are ambiguous between status questions (“What gives something the status of an x?”), and constitution questions (“Given that something has the status of an x, (...) what is it made of?”). We elucidate this distinction in detail, and argue that normativism is uniquely well-placed to answer status questions while objectivism provides answers, where they are available, to constitution questions. (shrink)

Some people contend that fetuses have moral status but less than that of paradigm persons. Many people hold views implying that sentient animals have moral status but less than that of persons. These positions suggest that moral status admits of degrees. Does it? To address this question, we must first clarify what it means to speak of degrees of moral status. The paper begins by clarifying the more basic concept of moral status and presenting two (...) models of degrees of moral status. It then sketches several significant considerations in favor of, and several against, the assertion of degrees of moral status. The paper concludes by drawing lessons from the discussion. (shrink)

Which beings have moral status? This chapter argues that moral status requires some capacity for hedonic feelings of pleasure or displeasure. David Chalmers rejects this view on the grounds that it denies moral status to Vulcans, which are defined as conscious creatures with no capacity for hedonic feelings. On his more inclusive view, all conscious beings have moral status. Both views agree that only conscious beings have moral status, but they disagree about how to explain (...) this. This chapter argues that we cannot explain why consciousness is necessary for moral status without denying that it is sufficient for moral status. Hence, we cannot exclude unconscious zombies without excluding conscious Vulcans too. (shrink)

This chapter first considers the idea of an entity’s moral status as what it is permissible or impermissible to do to it and examines how its status so understood relates to whether it is sentient, conscious, capable of agency, a subject, or rational. The chapter then considers ways in which the moral status of embryos that will definitely develop into persons differs from the status of those persons. It considers implications of this for the Non-Identity Problem (...) and the so-called No-Difference View about it. (shrink)

Consciousness-based approaches to non-human moral status maintain that consciousness is necessary for (some degree or level of) moral status. While these approaches are intuitive to many, in this paper I argue that the judgment that consciousness is necessary for moral status is not secure enough to guide policy regarding non-humans, that policies responsive to the moral status of non-humans should take seriously the possibility that psychological features independent of consciousness are sufficient for moral status. Further, (...) I illustrate some practical consequences of calling consciousness-based views into question. (shrink)

What is the moral status of animals? What’s the moral status of fetuses? What’s the moral status of the permanently comatose? While questions like these are sometimes asked (also about ‘moral standing’), I have written a few paragraphs where I argue that the term “moral status” shouldn’t be used.

Conflicts of interest in health and medicine have been the source of considerable public and professional debate. Much of this debate has focused on financial, rather than non-financial COI, which is a significant lacuna because non-financial COI can be just as influential as financial COI. In an effort to explore the nature and effects of non-financial, as well as financial COI, we conducted semi-structured interviews with eleven Australian medical professionals regarding their experiences of, and attitudes towards, COI. We found that (...) this group of medical professionals saw non-financial interests—most notably the pursuit of status and respect and the avoidance of stigma—as potentially conflicting with other important interests. (shrink)

Which beings have moral status? I argue that moral status requires some capacity for hedonic feelings of pleasure or displeasure. David Chalmers rejects this view on the grounds that it denies moral status to Vulcans, which are defined as conscious creatures with no capacity for hedonic feelings. On his more inclusive view, all conscious beings have moral status. We agree that only conscious beings have moral status, but we disagree about how to explain this. I (...) argue that we cannot explain why consciousness is necessary for moral status without denying that it is sufficient for moral status. Hence, we cannot exclude unconscious zombies without excluding conscious Vulcans too. (shrink)

It matters a great deal whether animals have moral status. If animals have moral status, it may be wrong for us to use them as we currently do – hunting, farming, eating, and experimenting on them. The argument from marginal cases provides us with a reason to think that some animals have moral status that is equal to that of “marginal” humans.

Status in an organization is considered a significant antecedent to an employee's work-related behaviors. However, the relationship between knowledge workers' informal status and "taking charge" has been ignored in previous human resource management (HRM) research. Based on the self-consistency theory, this study examines the mechanisms underlying the influence of knowledge workers’ informal status on taking charge. Data were collected from 337 dyads of employees and their immediate supervisors in 24 enterprises and companies. Based on moderated mediation analysis, (...) results indicated that knowledge workers’ informal status is positively related to taking charge and organization-based self-esteem (OBSE). OBSE fully mediated the relationship between knowledge workers’ informal status and taking charge, while person-job fit (P-J fit) and person-supervisor fit (P-S fit) each moderated the relationship between knowledge workers’ informal status and OBSE, in addition to the indirect effect of knowledge workers’ informal status on taking charge. Specifically, the indirect effect was strongest when P-J fit or P-S fit was high. The theoretical and managerial implications of the findings, limitations of the study, and future research directions are discussed. (shrink)

This essay considers the ways in which the various contexts – abortion, prenatal diagnosis, fetal research, and the use of fetuses in transplantation – shape the American debate on the moral standing of the fetus. This discussion gives rise to several philosophical debates on the status of the preimplantation embryo, particularly the debate over when the preimplantation embryo becomes individuated. How that question is resolved has critical ethical and policy implications.

Most work on collective action assumes that group members are undifferentiated by status, or standing, in the group. Yet such undifferentiated groups are rare, if they exist at all. Here we extend an existing sociological research program to address how extant status hierarchies help organize collective actions by coordinating how much and when group members should contribute to group efforts. We outline three theoretically derived predictions of how status hierarchies organize patterns of behavior to produce larger public (...) goods. We review existing evidence relevant to two of the three hypotheses and present results from a preliminary experimental test of the third. Findings are consistent with the model. The tendency of these dynamics to lead status-differentiated groups to produce larger public goods may help explain the ubiquity of hierarchy in groups, despite the often negative effects of status inequalities for many group members. (shrink)

This essay critically examines the idea that “identity” or “difference” might be proper objects of principles of respect. The author suggests that this idea makes sense only at the cost of the egalitarianism to which its adherents usually subscribe. The essay also shows that liberal interpretations of respect can evade this problem and reaches this conclusion on the basis of an analysis of the concept of respect and its connections with notions of status.

Many people believe that all human life is of equal value. Most of them also believe that all human beings have a moral status superior to that of nonhuman animals. But how are these beliefs to be defended? The mere difference of species cannot in itself determine moral status. The most obvious candidate for regarding human beings as having a higher moral status than animals is the superior cognitive capacity of humans. People with profound mental retardation pose (...) a problem for this set of beliefs, because their cognitive capacities are not superior to those of many animals. I argue that we should drop the belief in the equal value of human life, replacing it with a graduated view that applies to animals as well as to humans. (shrink)

This chapter examines the different types of moral status and the relation of moral status to the permissibility and impermissibility of doing harm to some entities to prevent harm to, or promote the good of, other entities. In this regard, it compares uncloned persons with clones and embryos, and also shows the bearing of these issues on the Non-Identity Problem and on treatment of future generations.

It seems that if a thinker in an argument arrives at an empirical conclusion, then some of the belief‐formation or reasoning principles she employs must be a priori if the reasoning is to be knowledgeable. Stewart Shapiro accepts this claim, and investigates the way in which the basic principles of logic must have an a priori status if the process of empirical confirmation of propositions reasoning that involves such principles of logic is to make sense.

Consciousness has an important role in ethics: when a being consciously experiences the frustration or satisfaction of its interests, those interests deserve higher moral priority than those of a behaviourally similar but non-conscious being. I consider the relationship between this ethical role and an a posteriori (or ‘type-B’) materialist solution to the mind-body problem. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that, if type-B materialism is correct, then the reference of the concept Phenomenal Consciousness is radically indeterminate between a neuronal-level (...) property that is distinctive to mammals and a high-level functional property that is much more widely shared. This would leave many non-mammalian animals (such as birds, fish, insects and octopuses) with indeterminate moral status. There are ways to manage this radical moral indeterminacy, but all of these ways lead to profoundly troubling consequences. (shrink)

The decision to trust encompasses evaluation of multiple information cues that are used by evaluators to make inference about the trustee’s qualities and capabilities. The information about the social status of the trustee firm is one of such cues available to evaluators. Yet the relationship between perceived social status of the trustee and the evaluator’s trust remains underexplored. In two experimental studies, we find a non-linear relationship between a firm’s status and the evaluator’s trust, and test theorized (...) mechanisms that can explain this relationship. The paper reveals that firms having low, middle, and high status are not only trusted differently, but are trusted for different reasons: qualities, such as perceived benevolence and integrity, mediate higher trust for middle-status firms, while trust for high-status firms is mediated by ability and integrity. The findings thus suggest that in the assessment of an organization’s trustworthiness, the relative importance of a particular virtue, such as ability, benevolence, or integrity, varies depending on the status position of that organization. (shrink)

The authors of the articles in this special section discuss an array of psychological perspectives on emotion. The articles provide only a limited consideration of status and power processes, however, which play a larger role in sociological theories of emotion than in psychological ones. Here, I examine the ways in which the theories account for status and power and suggest opportunities for greater inclusion of these key facets of social structure.

ABSTRACT One of the most important as well as most awesome achievements of modern biotechnology is the possibility of cloning human embryonic stem cells, if not human beings themselves. The possible revolutionary role of such stem cells in curative, preventive and enhancement medicine has been voiced and chorused around the globe. However, the question of the moral status of embryonic stem cells has not been clearly and unequivocally answered. Taking inspiration from the African adage that ‘the hand that reaches (...) beneath the incubating hen is not guiltless’, I attempt answering this question, from the background of traditional African moral sensibility and sensitivity. I reach the following conclusions. Stem cells in themselves do not have human status and therefore lack moral worth/value. Embryos do have human status and a morally significant line cannot be drawn between human embryos and other human beings. What is morally at stake in stem cell research is therefore the question of the source of derivation or generation of the cells, not of the cells as such. (shrink)

Starting from a distinction between intrinsic and final value, I explore the implications of the supervenience of final value on extrinsic properties regarding moral status. I make a case for ‘extrinsic moral status’ based on ‘extrinsic final value’. I show that the assumption of ‘moral individualism’, that moral status supervenes merely on intrinsic properties, is misguided, and results from a conflation of intrinsic with final value. I argue that at least one extrinsic property, namely vulnerability, can be (...) the basis of both final value and moral status, and that dependence on such extrinsic properties is compatible with the requirement of agent-neutrality. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider the view that paternalism is wrong when it demeans or diminishes the paternalizee's moral status. I argue that we should reject the Moral Status Argument because it is both too narrow and too broad. It is too narrow because it cannot account for the wrongness of some of the most objectionable paternalistic interventions, namely, strong paternalistic interventions. It is too broad because it is unable to distinguish between wrongful paternalistic acts that are plausibly (...) considered more wrong than other wrongful paternalistic acts. (shrink)

Although the production and recognition of social actions have been central concerns for conversation analysis from the outset, it has recently been argued that CA is yet to develop a systematic analysis of ‘action formation’. As a partial remedy to this situation, John Heritage introduces ‘epistemic status’, which he claims is an unavoidable component of the production and recognition of social action. His proposal addresses the question how is social action produced and recognized? by reference to another question how (...) is relative knowledge recognized? Despite the importance placed on the latter question, it is not clear how it is to be answered in particular cases. We argue that the introduction of epistemic status builds on a reformulation of the action formation problem that unnecessarily de-emphasizes the importance of the sequential environment. Our re-analyses of key sequences cast doubts on the empirical grounding of the epistemic program, and question whether the fundamental role of epistemic status has been convincingly demonstrated. (shrink)

This paper investigates whether moral status talk gets us anywhere in our search for answers to questions in the ethics of marginal cases. I consider the usefulness of moral status talk first on the assumption that an individual's possession of moral status is not a further fact about that individual, and then on the assumption that it is. Finally, I offer an expressivistic interpretation of moral status talk. In each case, I argue that such talk conveys (...) nothing that cannot be conveyed more clearly in other words. My conclusion is that we should stop using moral status and its cognates. (shrink)

The chief themes of this discussion are as follows. First, we need a theory of the grounds of moral status that could guide practical considerations regarding how to treat the wide range of potentially conscious entities with which we are acquainted – injured humans, cerebral organoids, chimeras, artificially intelligent machines, and non-human animals. I offer an account of phenomenal value that focuses on the structure and sophistication of phenomenally conscious states at a time and over time in the mental (...) lives of conscious subjects. Second, we need to map a theory of moral status onto practical considerations. I prefer the precautionary framework proposed by many, and fruitfully precisified recently by Birch. I have suggested that in addition to further discussion surrounding the evidential bar for attributing consciousness to different types of entities, more discussion is needed regarding how value and moral status may vary across different entity-types, and regarding the sources of value in an entity’s mental life. (shrink)

This article provides a systematic analysis of the proposal to use Covid‐19 vaccination status as a criterion for admission of patients with Covid‐19 to intensive care units (ICUs) under conditions of resource scarcity. The general consensus is that it is inappropriate to use vaccination status as a criterion because doing so would be unjust; many health systems, including the UK National Health Service, are based on the principle of equality of access to care. However, the analysis reveals that (...) there are several unique features of Covid vaccination status in the context of a pandemic that make this issue disanalogous to cases (such as lung cancer caused by smoking) discussed previously. First, there is equality in access to care at the point of vaccination; the unvaccinated refuse the offer of preventive care when they decline vaccination, weakening their claim to ongoing care if they become ill (this is qualitatively different from ‘poor lifestyle choices’ such as smoking). Second, the decision of one person to refuse vaccination substantially increases the risk that they will become seriously ill and need ICU care; the person who chooses not to get vaccinated thus potentially increases the pressure on intensive care bed provision, as well as increasing the risk that he or she will infect others who in turn might end up needing ICU care. Third, justice cuts both ways, and giving unvaccinated patients equal priority may itself be unjust when other patients have reduced their risk of ending up on the ICU by getting vaccinated. (shrink)

The article presents the results of a study investigating the links between emotion regulation and identity. The aim of this study was to explore the relationship between the two variables. On the basis of neo-eriksonian theories, an attempt to specify the role of emotion regulation in the process of identity formation was made. The study involved 849 people (544 women, 304 men) aged 14-25. The participants attended six types of schools: lower secondary school, basic vocational school, technical upper secondary school, (...) general upper secondary school, post-secondary school, and university. The research was conducted with the use of two questionnaires: Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS) and Dimensions of Identity Development Scale (DIDS). The analysis of the results points to a partial confirmation of the assumed hypotheses about the differences between people with different identity statuses in respect of the six investigated dimensions of emotion regulation. Also, the hypotheses about the links between the dimensions of emotion regulation and dimensions of identity in the subgroups with different identity statuses were partially confirmed. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the relations between moral status (or standing) and what the author calls _moral significance_. Something has moral significance just in case it morally counts for its own sake, or is something that must be taken into consideration in itself when moral judgments about what ought or ought not to be done are made. The chapter argues that the moral status of something is dependent on what is morally significant about it. Nothing can have moral (...) class='Hi'>status if there is not anything morally significant about it. On the other hand, something can be morally significant, even though it does not have moral status. The notion of moral significance is then the more fundamental notion and the notion of moral status could be dispensed with. In fact, it would simplify and clarify matters if it were dispensed with. (shrink)