I review some theoretical ideas in cosmology different from the standard “Big Bang”: the quasi-steady state model, the plasma cosmology model, non-cosmological redshifts, alternatives to non-baryonic dark matter and/or dark energy, and others. Cosmologists do not usually work within the framework of alternative cosmologies because they feel that these are not at present as competitive as the standard model. Certainly, they are not so developed, and they are not so developed because cosmologists do not work (...) on them. It is a vicious circle. The fact that most cosmologists do not pay them any attention and only dedicate their research time to the standard model is to a great extent due to a sociological phenomenon . We might well wonder whether cosmology, our knowledge of the Universe as a whole, is a science like other fields of physics or a predominant ideology. (shrink)

Non-standard models were introduced by Skolem, first for set theory, then for Peano arithmetic. In the former, Skolem found support for an anti-realist view of absolutely uncountable sets. But in the latter he saw evidence for the impossibility of capturing the intended interpretation by purely deductive methods. In the history of mathematics the concept of a nonstandard model is new. An analysis of some major innovations–the discovery of irrationals, the use of negative and complex numbers, the modern concept (...) of function, and non-Euclidean geometry–reveals them as essentially different from the introduction of non-standard models. Yet, non-Euclidean geometry, which is discussed at some length, is relevant to the present concern; for it raises the issue of intended interpretation. The standard model of natural numbers is the best candidate for an intended interpretation that cannot be captured by a deductive system. Next, I suggest, is the concept of a wellordered set, and then, perhaps, the concept of a constructible set. One may have doubts about a realistic conception of the standard natural numbers, but such doubts cannot gain support from non-standard models. Attempts to utilize non-standard models for an anti-realist position in mathematics, which appeal to meaning-as-use, or to arguments of the kind proposed by Putnam, fail through irrelevance, or lead to incoherence. Robinson’s skepticism, on the other hand, is a coherent position, though one that gives up on providing a detailed philosophical account. The last section enumerates various uses of non-standard models. (shrink)

This new edition of work that has evolved over the past seven years completes the derivation of the form of The Standard Model from quantum theory and the extension of the Theory of Relativity to superluminal transformations. The much derided form of The Standard Model is established from a consideration of Lorentz and superluminal relativistic space-time transformations. So much so that other approaches to elementary particle theory pale in comparison. In previous work color SU(3) was derived (...) from space-time considerations. This book shows that the SU(2) U(1) Weak Interaction sector follows directly from the extension of Lorentz transformations to superluminal (faster-than-light) transformations. In fact, ElectroWeak symmetry is shown to have an SU(2) U(1) U(1) symmetry that naturally includes WIMPs (Weakly Interacting Massive Particles), a candidate for Dark Matter. Thus the form of the Standard Model is dictated by space-time considerations fulfilling a dream of Einstein. Using a new matrix formulation of Logic - Operator Logic - we show that Dirac-like equations can be constructed. This edition also derives broken SU(4) four fermion generations as well as a non-Higgsian (Dimensional Mass Generation) derivation of fermion and ElectroWeak gauge boson masses from GL(4). The program of the book is completed by reprinting the book Quantum Theory of the Third Kind, which describes Two-Tier quantum field theory. This theory yields finite results (No Feynman diagram calculations diverge!) in The Standard Model and Quantum Gravity calculations to all orders in perturbation theory. Lastly, the book also contains a description of Operator Logic, Probabilistic Operator Logic, Quantum Operator Logic (for q-number statements). A comprehensive derivation of the form of The Standard Model from geometric considerations. (shrink)

It is well known that the self-energy of the gauge bosons is quadratically divergent in the Standard Model when a simple cutoff is imposed. We demonstrate phenomenologically that the quadratic divergences in fact unify. The unification occurs at a surprisingly low scale, \(\Lambda _\mathrm {u}\approx 4\times 10^7\) GeV. Suppose now that there is a spontaneously broken rotational symmetry between the space-time coordinates and gauge theoretical phases. The symmetry-breaking pattern is such that the gauge bosons arise as the massless (...) Goldstone bosons, whereas the dilatonic mode acts as the massive (Higgs) boson, whose vacuum expectation value determines the gauge couplings. In this case, the quadratic divergences or the tadpoles of the gauge boson self-energy should indeed unify because these divergences need to be cancelled by a universal dilatonic contribution, assuming dynamical symmetry breaking. If there is dynamical symmetry breaking, we are in principle able to calculate the value of the gauge couplings as well as the scale hierarchy \(\Lambda _\mathrm {cut}/\Lambda _\mathrm {u}\) . We perform this calculation by adopting a naive quartic symmetry-breaking potential which unfortunately violates local gauge invariance. Using tadpole-cancellation and dilatonic self-energy conditions, the value of \(\Lambda _\mathrm {cut}\) is then found to be approximately \(4\times 10^{18}\) GeV in the Feynman gauge and \(5\times 10^{15}\) GeV in the Landau gauge. The cancellation of an anomaly in the dilaton self-energy requires that the number of fermionic generations equals three. The symmetry-breaking needs to be driven by some other mass-generating mechanism such as electroweak symmetry breaking. Our estimation for \(\Lambda _\mathrm {u}\) is of the correct order if \(\Lambda _\mathrm {cut}\approx 5\times 10^{15}\) GeV. (shrink)

This work establishes that the gauge dynamics of the Standard Model arise as structural necessities of the algebra M₃(ℂ) under Axioms 1–4 of the Cognitional Mechanics (CM) framework. Rather than assuming gauge groups, couplings, or renormalisation behaviour, the paper derives them from the minimal non‑commutative algebra capable of supporting internal distinction. The spectral space of the Dirac operator D_F is shown to possess a smooth structure without invoking Morse genericity, using only the isolated eigenvalue property and the geometry (...) of the pure‑state space P(A_F) ≅ CP² ⊔ {pt}. The dynamical weight κ is obtained non‑circularly as the unique eigenfunction of the dilation operator D = λ d/dλ, giving κ = c₀ λ² with λ² ≡ ξ² at Tier‑1. -/- A five‑functor chain F₄ ∘ H ∘ G ∘ F₂ ∘ F₁ maps the algebraic structure of M₃(ℂ) to the full gauge/sheaf structure of the Standard Model, with naturality verified at each stage. The Faddeev–Popov operator is proven elliptic independently of D_F, enabling BRST quantisation on the induced spectral manifold. The one‑loop β‑function coefficient b₀ = 11/3 is derived independently in three layers—algebraic (C_A = 3), geometric (scale invariance of a₄), and BRST (ghost pairing)—with n_f = 0 following from the Tier‑1 dissolution of particle ontology. -/- The Standard Model gauge sector is identified as the colimit of a sheaf over spectral patches, and three structural predictions follow without free parameters, including α_s/α_em = 13/7 from the cyclotomic structure Φ₃(3) and Φ₆(3). All results arise internally from the CM axioms, with no Tier‑2 assumptions. This establishes that the Standard Model is not an externally assembled structure but a forced projection of M₃(ℂ) under axiomatic closure. -/- Published on April 28, 2026 doi: 10.5281/zenodo.19833881. (shrink)

Experiments in particle physics have hitherto failed to produce any significant evidence for the many explicit models of physics beyond the Standard Model (BSM) that had been proposed over the past decades. As a result, physicists have increasingly turned to model-independent strategies as tools in searching for a wide range of possible BSM effects. In this paper, we describe the Standard Model Effective Field Theory (SM-EFT) and analyse it in the context of the philosophical discussions (...) about models, theories, and (bottom-up) effective field theories. We find that while the SM-EFT is a quantum field theory, assisting experimentalists in searching for deviations from the SM, in its general form it lacks some of the characteristic features of models. Those features only come into play if put in by hand or prompted by empirical evidence for deviations. Employing different philosophical approaches to models, we argue that the case study suggests not to take a view on models that is overly permissive because it blurs the lines between the different stages of the SM-EFT research strategies and glosses over particle physicists' motivations for undertaking this bottom-up approach in the first place. Looking at EFTs from the perspective of modelling does not require taking a stance on some specific brand of realism or taking sides in the debate between reduction and emergence into which EFTs have recently been embedded. (shrink)

In his doctor's thesis [1], Henkin has shown that if a formal logic is consistent, and sufficiently complex, then it must admit a non-standard model. In particular, he showed that there must be a model in which that portion of the model which is supposed to represent the positive integers of the formal logic is not in fact isomorphic to the positive integers; indeed it is not even well ordered by what is supposed to be the (...) relation of ≦.For the purposes of the present paper, we do not need a precise definition of what is meant by a standard model of a formal logic. The non-standard models which we shall discuss will be flagrantly non-standard, as for instance a model of the sort whose existence is proved by Henkin. It will suffice if we and our readers are in agreement that a model of a formal logic is not a standard model if either: The relation in the model which represents the equality relation in the formal logic is not the equality relation for objects of the model. That portion of the model which is supposed to represent the positive integers of the formal logic is not well ordered by the relation ≦. That portion of the model which is supposed to represent the ordinal numbers of the formal logic is not well ordered by the relation ≦. (shrink)

There are two opposing traditions in contemporary quantum field theory (QFT). Mainstream Lagrangian QFT led to and supports the standard model of particle interactions. Algebraic QFT seeks to provide a rigorous consistent mathematical foundation for field theory, but cannot accommodate the local gauge interactions of the standard model. Interested philosophers face a choice. They can accept algebraic QFT on the grounds of mathematical consistency and general accord with the semantic conception of theory interpretation. This suggests a (...) rejection of particle ontology. Or they can accept the standard model on the grounds of its established success. This alternative, which I defend, suggests revising philosophical accounts of scientific theory and finding some way of accommodating particles. (shrink)

The principal result of this paper answers a long-standing question in the model theory of arithmetic [R. Kossak, J. Schmerl, The Structure of Models of Peano Arithmetic, Oxford University Press, 2006, Question 7] by showing that there exists an uncountable arithmetically closed family of subsets of the set ω of natural numbers such that the expansion of the standard model of Peano arithmetic has no conservative elementary extension, i.e., for any elementary extension of , there is a (...) subset of ω* that is parametrically definable in but whose intersection with ω is not a member of . We also establish other results that highlight the role of countability in the model theory of arithmetic. Inspired by a recent question of Gitman and Hamkins, we furthermore show that the aforementioned family can be arranged to further satisfy the curious property that forcing with the quotient Boolean algebra collapses 1 when viewed as a notion of forcing. (shrink)

This thesis provides an introduction to the physics of the Standard Model and beyond, and to the methods used to analyse Large Hadron Collider (LHC) data. The 'hierarchy problem', astrophysical data and experiments on neutrinos indicate that new physics can be expected at the now accessible TeV scale. This work investigates extensions of the Standard Model with gravitons and gravitinos (in the context of supergravity). The production of these particles in association with jets is studied as (...) one of the most promising avenues for researching new physics at the LHC. Advanced simulation techniques and tools, such as algorithms allowing the computation of Feynman graphs and helicity amplitudes are first developed and then employed. (shrink)

This thesis studies collider phenomenology of physics beyond the Standard Model at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC). It also explores in detail advanced topics related to Higgs boson and supersymmetry - one of the most exciting and well-motivated streams in particle physics. In particular, it finds a very large enhancement of multiple Higgs boson production in vector-boson scattering when Higgs couplings to gauge bosons differ from those predicted by the Standard Model. The thesis demonstrates that due (...) to the loss of unitarity, the very large enhancement for triple Higgs boson production takes place. This is a truly novel finding. The thesis also studies the effects of supersymmetric partners of top and bottom quarks on the Higgs production and decay at the LHC, pointing for the first time to non-universal alterations for two main production processes of the Higgs boson at the LHC-vector boson fusion and gluon-gluon fusion. Continuing the exploration of Higgs boson and supersymmetry at the LHC, the thesis extends existing experimental analysis and shows that for a single decay channel the mass of the top quark superpartner below 175 GeV can be completely excluded, which in turn excludes electroweak baryogenesis in the Minimal Supersymmetric Model. This is a major new finding for the HEP community. This thesis is very clearly written and the introduction and conclusions are accessible to a wide spectrum of readers. (shrink)

This article seeks to describe in general terms what has become the standard way of conceptualizing moral injury in the clinical psychological and psychiatric literature, which is the key source for applications of the concept in other domains. What we call “the standard model” draws on certain assumptions about beliefs, mental states, and emotions as well as an implicit theory of causation about how various forms of harm arise from certain experiences or “events” that violate persons’ moral (...) beliefs and systems. Our analysis makes these assumptions more explicit and subjects them to critical scrutiny. In so doing, we survey the current literature and identify basic features of how moral injuries are defined, how they are thought to occur, and the forms of treatment or repair that appear to be indicated. We caution that it matters how moral experience is characterized and argue that an alternative understanding of what is the moral in moral injury is important for overcoming critical challenges to the standard model. Moreover, recently evolving approaches to moral repair could be more consistent with an alternative model. Our concluding suggestion is that a more robust account of the nature of moral experience and its relations to self-identity and social experience more generally could advance understanding of the etiology of moral injury and promote rehabilitation. (shrink)

This paper establishes two related structural results within the Cognitional Mechanics (CM) framework. Part I proves that the spectral coupling constant ξ² = (μα)² is a complete statistic for the observational content of M₃(ℂ). The state space S is defined generatively as the union of O-orbits of the one-parameter family H_λ = diag(λ, λ, −2λ), where O is the operation algebra derived from axioms A1–A4. Normality of all elements of S holds by construction, eliminating Jordan structure entirely. The residual degree (...) of freedom is λ ∈ ℝ⁺, uniquely recoverable from any state s via λ(s) = √(Tr(s²)/6). The map f(s) = Tr(s²)·(αμ₀)² satisfies f ∝ λ² and induces a bijection S/∼_f ≅ Im(f) of dimension exactly 1: all observational distinctions within M₃(ℂ) collapse to a single scalar. Part II classifies the 19 Standard Model parameters as eigenvalue-type (12), orbit-invariant (4), and basis-mixing (3) projections of Spec(D), and bounds the independent degrees of freedom to at most 11. The connecting corollary establishes that every Standard Model projection map πᵢ is a rational function of ξ² alone, so that the Standard Model parameter structure is a representation layer of the invariant algebra, not an independent ontological structure. Anomaly cancellation and asymptotic freedom are shown to be algebraic necessities of M₃(ℂ) at n = 3. A falsifiable prediction is derived: the ratio αₛ/α_em at the Planck scale equals Φ₃/Φ₆ = 13/7 ≈ 1.857, deviating from the Standard Model perturbative result by approximately 0.24. No free parameters are introduced at any stage. All logical gaps are closed within the CM axiom system. -/- Published on April 26, 2026 doi: 10.5281/zenodo.19784769 . (shrink)

The standard model of the quantum theory of measurement is based on an interaction Hamiltonian in which the observable to be measured is multiplied by some observable of a probe system. This simple Ansatz has proved extremely fruitful in the development of the foundations of quantum mechanics. While the ensuing type of models has often been argued to be rather artificial, recent advances in quantum optics have demonstrated their principal and practical feasibility. A brief historical review of the (...) standard model together with an outline of its virtues and limitations are presented as an illustration of the mutual inspiration that has always taken place between foundational and experimental research in quantum physics. (shrink)

The Standard Model of elementary particle physics is one of the best theories that we currently have and thereby invites realist engagement. Adopting a realist stance towards it involves careful consideration of the nature of the symmetries that it incorporates. Here I begin with such a consideration and argue that it leads us to a form of structural realism that, following Cassirer might be called ‘Parmenidean’. I conclude with some thoughts on how this meshes with ‘local’ forms of (...) realism. (shrink)

We study those models of ZFCwhich are embeddable, as the class of all standard sets, in a model of internal set theory >ISTor models of some other nonstandard set theories.

In the classification of particles in the last chapter, one abundant particle, photon—the particle of light—was conspicuously missing. Photon is neither a hadron nor a lepton; it belongs to a third class of particles called gauge bosons, the byproducts of gauge theories. According to quantum field theory, fundamental particles exert forces on one another by exchanging gauge bosons. The process of repulsion of two electrons, for example, is described as the exchange of photons between the two electrons.

The aim of this paper is to show that it’s not a good idea to have a theory of truth that is consistent but ω-inconsistent. In order to bring out this point, it is useful to consider a particular case: Yablo’s Paradox. In theories of truth without standard models, the introduction of the truth-predicate to a first order theory does not maintain the standard ontology. Firstly, I exhibit some conceptual problems that follow from so introducing it. Secondly, I (...) show that in second order theories with standard semantics the same procedure yields a theory that doesn’t have models. So, while having an ω- inconsistent theory is a bad thing, having an unsatisfiable theory of truth is actually worse. This casts doubts on whether the predicate in question is, after all, a truthpredicate for that language. Finally, I present some alternatives to prove an inconsistency adding plausible principles to certain theories of truth. (shrink)

In this work we discuss issues of ontological commitment towards one of the most important examples of contemporary fundamental science: the standard model of particle physics. We present a new form of selective structural realism, which uses as its basis the distinction between what have been called framework and interaction theories. This allows us to advance the ongoing debate about the ontological status of (quasi-)particles and quantum fields, by emphasising the distinction between quantum field theory serving as a (...) framework, and the standard model itself, which we argue is an interaction theory embedded within this framework. Following a discussion of what ontological commitments corresponds to each of these two classes, we argue that some of the previous proposals in the literature might have been misguided by the blending of quantum field theory and the standard model into an undifferentiated unity, and defend a moderate form of object realism with respect to particle-like entities. (shrink)

A theory of truth is usually demanded to be consistent, but -consistency is less frequently requested. Recently, Yatabe has argued in favour of -inconsistent first-order theories of truth, minimising their odd consequences. In view of this fact, in this paper, we present five arguments against -inconsistent theories of truth. In order to bring out this point, we will focus on two very well-known -inconsistent theories of truth: the classical theory of symmetric truth FS and the non-classical theory of naïve truth (...) based on ᴌukasiewicz infinitely valued logic: PAᴌT. (shrink)

General Relativity and the Standard Model often are touted as the most rigorously and extensively confirmed scientific hypotheses of all time. Nonetheless, these theories appear to have consequences that are inconsistent with evidence about phenomena for which, respectively, quantum effects and gravity matter. This paper suggests an explanation for why the theories are not disconfirmed by such evidence. The key to this explanation is an approach to scientific hypotheses that allows their actual content to differ from their apparent (...) content. This approach does not appeal to ceteris-paribus qualifiers or counterfactuals or similarity relations. And it helps to explain why some highly idealized hypotheses are not treated in the way that a thoroughly refuted theory is treated but instead as hypotheses with limited domains of applicability. (shrink)

If we set ourselves from the point of view of a radical Constructivism, an effective semantic anchorage for an observer system such as the one, for example, represented by the non-trivial machine as imagined by H. von Foerster, can come to be identified only to the extent that the evolving system itself proves able to change the Semantics. This, however, will result in our being able to realize an expression of ourselves as autonomous beings, as subjects, in particular, capable of (...) focusing on the same epistemological conditions relating to our autonomy. A creative autonomy that expresses itself above all in the observer's ability to govern the change taking place. Only the cognitive agent operating in these conditions will actually come to undergo the new embodiment. Here is the passage on one's shoulders to which T. Skolem refers, namely that continuous passage from the first to the second observer that marks the very course of natural evolution. (shrink)

Sequential Time Theory (STT) provides a metrological foundation for physics, defining time through operational procedures rather than as a geometric coordinate. STT CR (Metrological Completion of Relativity) established a formal framework: Physics = (STT-Core -> Bridge -> L1) -> Θ_sys Physical Systems, where L1 is the formal language of dynamics, L2 (STT-Core) is the operational definition of time, and Θ_sys is the mapping rule to specific physical systems. This paper applies this framework to audit the Standard Model (Θ_SM), (...) focusing on the Higgs mechanism. -/- We propose that mass is not a primitive quantity but is defined through the time unit process: m = h * (c^2 * ΔQ_unit)^-1. From Bridge axiom B4 (local calibration consistency), we derive that mass must be determined by a spatially uniform Lorentz-scalar quantity. From metrological constraints on ΔQ_unit -- positivity (C1), finiteness (C2), and statistical reproducibility (C3) -- together with an explicit minimality assumption (Θ_minimal), we derive the form of the Higgs potential V(φ) = -μ^2 |φ|^2 + λ |φ|^4, where the derivation is conditional on the stated assumptions. -/- We show that, for UV-complete fundamental descriptions, renormalizability is a metrological necessity: otherwise the operational distribution of clock-ticks becomes resolution-dependent in a way that cannot be removed by finitely many calibrations (violating C3 and B4). Effective-field descriptions can still satisfy C3 within a finite resolution window. -/- Finally, we present a testable prediction distinguishing STT from standard quantum mechanics: intrinsic clock fluctuations scale as σ_Q ∝ m^-2, predicting the ratio σ_Q(e) : σ_Q(μ) ≈ m_μ : m_e ≈ 207 for electrons versus muons. (shrink)

I make an attempt at the description of the delicate role of the standard model of arithmetic for the syntax of formal systems. I try to assess whether the possible instability in the notion of finiteness deriving from the nonstandard interpretability of arithmetic affects the very notions of syntactic metatheory and of formal system. I maintain that the crucial point of the whole question lies in the evaluation of the phenomenon of formalization. The ideas of Skolem, Zermelo, Beth (...) and Carnap (among others) on the problem are discussed. ‘A tries to explain to B the meaning of negation. Finally A gives up, saying: “You don’t understand what I mean, and I am not going to explain any longer,” to which B replies: “Yes, I see what you mean, and I am glad you are willing to continue your explanations”’. G. Mannoury, reported by E. W. Beth (Beth, 1963, 489). (shrink)

© 2016, The Author.A search for neutral Higgs bosons of the minimal supersymmetric standard model and for a heavneutral Z′ boson is performed using a data sample corresponding to an integrated luminosity of 3.2 fb- 1 from proton–proton collisions at s=13 TeV recorded by the ATLAS detector at the LHC. The heavy resonance is assumed to decay to a τ+τ- pair with at least one τ lepton decaying to final states with hadrons and a neutrino. The search is (...) performed in the mass range of 0.2–1.2 TeV for the MSSM neutral Higgs bosons and 0.5–2.5 TeV for the heavy neutral Z′ boson. The data are in good agreement with the background predicted by the Standard Model. The results are interpreted in MSSM and Z′ benchmark scenarios. The most stringent constraints on the MSSM mA–tan β space exclude at 95 % confidence level tan β> 7.6 for mA= 200 GeV in the mhmod+ MSSM scenario. For the Sequential Standard Model, a ZSSM′ mass up to 1.90 TeV is excluded at 95 % CL and masses up to 1.82–2.17 TeV are excluded for a ZSFM′ of the strong flavour model. (shrink)

In the context of life sciences, we are constantly confronted with information that possesses precise semantic values and appears essentially immersed in a specific evolutionary trend. In such a framework, Nature appears, in Monod’s words, as a tinkerer characterized by the presence of precise principles of self-organization. However, while Monod was obliged to incorporate his brilliant intuitions into the framework of first-order cybernetics and a theory of information with an exclusively syntactic character such as that defined by Shannon, research advances (...) in recent decades have led not only to the definition of a second-order cybernetics but also to an exploration of the boundaries of semantic information. As H. Atlan states, on a biological level "the function self-organizes together with its meaning". Hence the need to refer to a conceptual theory of complexity and to a theory of self-organization characterized in an intentional sense. There is also a need to introduce, at the genetic level, a distinction between coder and ruler as well as the opportunity to define a real software space for natural evolution. The recourse to non-standard model theory, the opening to a new general semantics, and the innovative definition of the relationship between coder and ruler can be considered, today, among the most powerful theoretical tools at our disposal in order to correctly define the contours of that new conceptual revolution increasingly referred to as metabiology. This book focuses on identifying and investigating the role played by these particular theoretical tools in the development of this new scientific paradigm. Nature "speaks" by means of mathematical forms: we can observe these forms, but they are, at the same time, inside us as they populate our organs of cognition. In this context, the volume highlights how metabiology appears primarily to refer to the growth itself of our instruments of participatory knowledge of the world. (shrink)

So far this has been a lonely and unrewarding quest. New experiments occasionally come along which point to a breakdown of the Standard Model, but up to now they have invariably been proved wrong by more careful analysis or subsequent experiments with better data. A case in point is the energetic jet data from the CDF experiment at FermiLab which suggested possible substructure of the quark. (See my AV column "Inside the Quark" in the September-1996 issue of Analog.) (...) The CDF group found an unexpected excess of "jets" (clumps of energetic particles moving in the same direction) with energies above 200 GeV in their data. They found that they could not explain this excess of high energy jets using the Standard Model, as interpreted by standard theoretical procedures, and they pointed out that the data might represent new physics, possibly an indication that the quark is a composite object made of even more fundamental particles. (shrink)

This paper investigates the question of how we manage to single out the natural number structure as the intended interpretation of our arithmetical language. Horsten submits that the reference of our arithmetical vocabulary is determined by our knowledge of some principles of arithmetic on the one hand, and by our computational abilities on the other. We argue against such a view and we submit an alternative answer. We single out the structure of natural numbers through our intuition of the absolute (...) notion of finiteness. (shrink)

The way, in which quantum information can unify quantum mechanics (and therefore the standard model) and general relativity, is investigated. Quantum information is defined as the generalization of the concept of information as to the choice among infinite sets of alternatives. Relevantly, the axiom of choice is necessary in general. The unit of quantum information, a qubit is interpreted as a relevant elementary choice among an infinite set of alternatives generalizing that of a bit. The invariance to the (...) axiom of choice shared by quantum mechanics is introduced: It constitutes quantum information as the relation of any state unorderable in principle (e.g. any coherent quantum state before measurement) and the same state already well-ordered (e.g. the well-ordered statistical ensemble of the measurement of the quantum system at issue). This allows of equating the classical and quantum time correspondingly as the well-ordering of any physical quantity or quantities and their coherent superposition. That equating is interpretable as the isomorphism of Minkowski space and Hilbert space. Quantum information is the structure interpretable in both ways and thus underlying their unification. Its deformation is representable correspondingly as gravitation in the deformed pseudo-Riemannian space of general relativity and the entanglement of two or more quantum systems. The standard model studies a single quantum system and thus privileges a single reference frame turning out to be inertial for the generalized symmetry [U(1)]X[SU(2)]X[SU(3)] “gauging” the standard model. As the standard model refers to a single quantum system, it is necessarily linear and thus the corresponding privileged reference frame is necessary inertial. The Higgs mechanism U(1) → [U(1)]X[SU(2)] confirmed enough already experimentally describes exactly the choice of the initial position of a privileged reference frame as the corresponding breaking of the symmetry. The standard model defines ‘mass at rest’ linearly and absolutely, but general relativity non-linearly and relatively. The “Big Bang” hypothesis is additional interpreting that position as that of the “Big Bang”. It serves also in order to reconcile the linear standard model in the singularity of the “Big Bang” with the observed nonlinearity of the further expansion of the universe described very well by general relativity. Quantum information links the standard model and general relativity in another way by mediation of entanglement. The linearity and absoluteness of the former and the nonlinearity and relativeness of the latter can be considered as the relation of a whole and the same whole divided into parts entangled in general. (shrink)

This chapter characterizes ideal social ontology by developing _the standard model of ideal social ontology_. The standard model is exemplified by the works of Margaret Gilbert, John Searle, and Raimo Tuomela. This model thus synthesizes central assumptions from the three works that shaped the research field of ideal social ontology and shows their explicit and implicit assumptions about social reality. This standard model has a crucial implication: it has shaped what social ontologists understand (...) the social phenomena to be analyzed to be—direct, transparent, and deontic social phenomena built on consensus. Consequently, this model offers only a partial view of the social world while claiming it is general, and it is too limited to serve as the foundation of the social sciences. (shrink)

Although the Standard Model of particle physics is usually formulated in terms of fields, it can be equivalently formulated in terms of particles and strings. In this picture particles and open strings are always coupled. This offers an intuitive and graphical explanation for the otherwise mysterious gauge symmetry. In addition, the particle–string formulation avoids introducing redundant path integral configurations that are present in the field formulation. For its explanatory power and economy, the particle–string ontology may be preferred over (...) the field ontology for the Standard Model. (shrink)

In response to Stephen Davis’s criticism of our previous essay, we revisit and defend our arguments that the Resurrection hypothesis is logically incompatible with the Standard Model of particle physics—and thus is maximally implausible—and that it cannot explain the sensory experiences of the Risen Jesus attributed to various witnesses in the New Testament—and thus has low explanatory power. We also review Davis’s reply, noting that he evades our arguments, misstates their conclusions, and distracts the reader with irrelevancies regarding, (...) e.g., what natural laws are, what a miracle is, and how “naturalism” and “supernaturalism” differ as worldviews. Contrary to what Davis claims (even in his abstract), we do not argue that “if the Standard Model of particle physics is true, then the resurrection of Jesus did not occur and physical things can only causally interact with other physical things.” Davis distorts our claims and criticizes straw men of his own creation. (shrink)

Our paper studies the anatomy of the discovery of the Higgs boson at the Large Hadron Collider and its influence on the broader model landscape of particle physics. We investigate the phases of this discovery, which led to a crucial reconfiguration of the model landscape of elementary particle physics and eventually to a confirmation of the standard model. A keyword search of preprints covering the electroweak symmetry breaking sector of particle physics, along with an examination of (...) physicists own understanding of the discovery as documented in semiannual conferences, has allowed us an empirical investigation of its model dynamics. From our analyses we draw two main philosophical lessons concerning the nature of scientific reasoning in a complex experimental and theoretical environment. For one, from a confirmation standpoint, some SM alternatives could be considered even more confirmed by the Higgs discovery than the SM. Nevertheless, the SM largely remains the commonly accepted account of EWSB. We present criteria for comparing degrees of confirmation and expose some limits of a purely logical approach to understanding the Higgs discovery as a victory for the SM. Second, we understand the persistence of SM alternatives in the face of disfavourable evidence by borrowing the Lakatosian concept of a research programme, where the core idea behind a group of models survives, while other aspects adapt to incoming data. In order to apply this framework to the model landscape of EWSB, we must introduce a new category of research programme, the model-group, and we test its viability using the example of composite Higgs models. (shrink)

Much debate about scientific realism concerns the issue of whether it is compatible with theory change over time. Certain forms of ‘selective realism’ have been suggested with this in mind. Here I consider a closely related challenge for realism: that of articulating how a theory should be interpreted at any given time. In a crucial respect the challenges posed by diachronic and synchronic interpretation are the same; in both cases, realists face an apparent dilemma. The thinner their interpretations, the easier (...) realism is to defend, but at the cost of more substantial commitment. The more substantial their interpretations, the more difficult they are to defend. I consider this worry in the context of the Standard Model of particle physics. Examining some selective realist attempts at interpretation, I argue that realism is, in fact, compatible with different commitments on the spectrum of thinner to more substantial, thus mitigating the dilemma. (shrink)

With the ascent of modern epidemiology in the Twentieth Century came a new standard model of prediction in public health and clinical medicine. In this article, we describe the structure of the model. The standard model uses epidemiological measures-most commonly, risk measures-to predict outcomes (prognosis) and effect sizes (treatment) in a patient population that can then be transformed into probabilities for individual patients. In the first step, a risk measure in a study population is generalized (...) or extrapolated to a target population. In the second step, the risk measure is particularized or transformed to yield probabilistic information relevant to a patient from the target population. Hence, we call the approach the Risk Generalization-Particularization (Risk GP) Model. There are serious problems at both stages, especially with the extent to which the required assumptions will hold and the extent to which we have evidence for the assumptions. Given that there are other models of prediction that use different assumptions, we should not inflexibly commit ourselves to one standard model. Instead, model pluralism should be standard in medical prediction. (shrink)

The Cognitive Science of Nationalistic Behavior, presented in this paper, integrates the political sciences of nationalities as invented communities with an evolutionary cognitive analysis of social forms as products of the human mind. The framework is modeled after the Cognitive Science of Religion, where decades of cross-disciplinary work has generated standards, predictions, and data about the role of individual cognitive tendencies in shaping societies. We study the nationalistic calendar as a cultural attractor and draw on cue-based behavioral motivation and differential (...) autobiographical memory systems to explain its appeal to the human mind. Calendrical elements are analyzed in the context of essentialist thought patterns and action representation systems. We conclude with the implications of calendrical thinking on the control of elites who aim to forge and reinforce national identities. This paper lays the groundwork for applying a similar approach to the study of other nationalistic elements. (shrink)

What does it mean to say that a scientific theory is unified? Prominent attempts by John Watkins, Philip Kitcher, and Margaret Morrison to answer this question face serious difficulties, and many analysts of science remain pessimistic about the possibility of ever rendering precise or explaining what theoretical unity consists in. This paper gives grounds for optimism, offering a novel account of the concept of unification. This account is tested against a detailed study of the standard model in contemporary (...) high-energy physics, a theory for which a high degree of unity has repeatedly been claimed. (shrink)

The dominant view in the cognitive science of religion (the ‘Standard Model’) is that religious belief and behaviour are not adaptive traits but rather incidental byproducts of the cognitive architecture of mind. Because evidence for the Standard Model is inconclusive, the case for it depends crucially on its alleged methodological superiority to selectionist alternatives. However, we show that the Standard Model has both methodological and evidential disadvantages when compared with selectionist alternatives. We also consider (...) a pluralistic approach, which holds that religion or various aspects of religion originated as byproducts of evolved cognitive structures but were subsequently co-opted for adaptive purposes. We argue that when properly formulated, the pluralistic approach also has certain advantages over the Standard Model. (shrink)

In response to Bhupinder Singh Anand''s article CAN WE REALLY FALSIFY TRUTH BY DICTAT? in THE REASONER II, 1, January 2008,that denies the existence of nonstandard models of Peano Arithmetic, we prove from Compactness the existence of such models.

The scheme of concepts we employ in daily life to explain intentional behaviour form a belief-desire model, in which motivating states are sorted into two suitably broad categories. The BD model embeds a philosophy of action, i.e. a set of assumptions about the ontology of motivation with subsequent restrictions on psychologising and norms of practical reason. A comprehensive critique of those assumptions and implications is offered in this work, and various criticisms of the model are met. The (...) model’s predictive and explanatory value exploits realistic notions of beliefs and desires as inner states underlying behavioural patterns. It is argued that the popular explication that beliefs and desires differ in their “direction of fit” is insufficient and inescapably normative. Essential to the model is the causal role given to desires. ‘Desire’ is therefore focussed. A dispositional and functional characterisation of desires is compatible with an eliminative view of dispositions. These views taken together do not exclude regarding desires as causes. Desires have propositional content. Content is a feature of desire’s dispositionality, and thereby causally relevant. This functional characterisation of content allows for non-linguistic content. The phenomenal conception of desire is criticised and diagnosed. A theme defended in various ways throughout the work is that desires mostly are unknown to agents and that the agent is in a less privileged position when it comes to analysis of his own motivational states, than e.g. people close to him. There are formal and empirical reasons to be pessimistic about agents’ abilities to make reliable predictions about their own intentional behaviour. The BD model’s concept of ‘intention’ is discussed and compared with non-reductive views of intentions. Criticisms of the common view that David Hume defends a BD model are presented, but it is argued that the BD interpretation of Hume is plausible, although this reading requires important qualifications in order to preserve internal consistency. The BD model leaves room for focussing attention, making foregrounded practical judgements, higher order desiring and other activities affecting one’s decision process. However, these various forms of deliberation in many cases are overrated. Three suggested norms of internal structural rationality are criticised in favour of simple Humean instrumentalism about practical reason. That position implies that criticism of other people’s ultimate ends is not a matter of internal rationality, but an inevitably social practice; it is dependent upon our concern for others, our view of their social roles and our own intrinsic desires. (shrink)

A theoretical development is carried to establish fundamental results about rank-initial embeddings and automorphisms of countable non-standard models of set theory, with a keen eye for their sets of fixed points. These results are then combined into a “geometric technique” used to prove several results about countable non-standard models of set theory. In particular, back-and-forth constructions are carried out to establish various generalizations and refinements of Friedman’s theorem on the existence of rank-initial embeddings between countable non-standard models (...) of the fragment \ + \-Separation of \; and Gaifman’s technique of iterated ultrapowers is employed to show that any countable model of \ can be elementarily rank-end-extended to models with well-behaved automorphisms whose sets of fixed points equal the original model. These theoretical developments are then utilized to prove various results relating self-embeddings, automorphisms, their sets of fixed points, strong rank-cuts, and set theories of different strengths. Two examples: The notion of “strong rank-cut” is characterized in terms of the theory \, and in terms of fixed-point sets of self-embeddings. (shrink)

This note discusses some problems concerning intended, standard, and nonstandard models of mathematical theories. We pay attention to the role of extremal axioms in attempts at a unique characterization of the intended models. We recall also Jan Woleński’s views on these issues.

The main foundations of the standard \CDM model of cosmology are that: the redshifts of the galaxies are due to the expansion of the Universe plus peculiar motions; the cosmic microwave background radiation and its anisotropies derive from the high energy primordial Universe when matter and radiation became decoupled; the abundance pattern of the light elements is explained in terms of primordial nucleosynthesis; and the formation and evolution of galaxies can be explained only in terms of gravitation within (...) a inflation + dark matter + dark energy scenario. Numerous tests have been carried out on these ideas and, although the standard model works pretty well in fitting many observations, there are also many data that present apparent caveats to be understood with it. In this paper, I offer a review of these tests and problems, as well as some examples of alternative models. (shrink)