This is an expanded and revised discussion of the argument briefly put forward in my 'A New Problem for the A-Theory of Time', where it is claimed that it is impossible to experience real temporal passage and that no such phenomenon exists. In the first half of the paper the premises of the argument are discussed in more detail than before. In the second half responses are given to several possible objections, none of which were addressed in the earlier paper. (...) There is also some discussion of some related epistemic arguments against the passage of time given by Huw Price and David Braddon-Mitchell along with objections raised against them recently by Tim Maudlin and Peter Forrest respectively. (shrink)

This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations. We use evaluative terms and concepts every day. We call actions right and wrong, teachers wise and ignorant, and pictures elegant and grotesque. Philosophers place evaluative concepts into two camps. Thin concepts, such as goodness and badness, and rightness and wrongness (...) have evaluative content, but they supposedly have no or hardly any nonevaluative, descriptive content: they supposedly give little or no specific idea about the character of the person or thing described. In contrast, thick concepts such as kindness, elegance and wisdom supposedly give a more specific idea of people or things. Yet, given typical linguistic conventions, thick concepts also convey evaluation. Kind people are often viewed positively whilst ignorance has negative connotations. The distinction between thin and thick concepts is frequently drawn in philosophy and is central to everyday life. However, very few articles or books discuss the distinction. In this full-length study, Simon Kirchin discusses thin and thick concepts, highlighting key assumptions, questions and arguments, many of which have gone unnoticed. Kirchin focuses in on the debate between 'separationists' (those who think that thick concepts can be separated into component parts of evaluative, often very 'thin', content and nonevaluative content) and 'nonseparationists' (who deny this). Thick Evaluation argues for a version of nonseparationism, and in doing so argues both that many concepts are evaluative and also that evaluation is not exhausted by thin positive and negative stances. (shrink)

This essay juxtaposes the position in metaethics defended, expressivism with quasirealistic trimmings, with the ancient problem of relativism. It argues that, perhaps surprisingly, there is less of a problem of normative truth on this approach than on others. Because ethics is not in the business of representing aspects of the world, there is no way to argue for a plurality of moral truths, simply from the existence of a plurality of moral opinions. The essay also argues that other approaches, which (...) superficially seem better adapted to defending robust and substantive conceptions of moral truth, in fact face more danger from the threat of relativism. This is particularly so in the case of 'secondary quality' or 'response-dependent' approaches, but also in the case of certain kinds of constructivism. (shrink)

In this paper I am not so much concerned with movements of the mind, as movements of the will. But my question bears a similarity to that of the tortoise. I want to ask whether the will is under the control of fact and reason, combined. I shall try to show that there is always something else, something that is not under the control of fact and reason, which has to be given as a brute extra, if deliberation is ever (...) to end by determining the will. This is, of course, a Humean conclusion, and the only novelty comes in the way I wish to argue for it. I believe that many philosophers think, erroneously, that Hume relies on a naive and outdated conception of facts, or on an even more naive and outdated conception of reason, in order to put passion on their throne. My tortoise defends Hume: what we do with our premises is not itself construed as acceptance of a premise. As it stands the project is only described metaphorically. Presumably everything, including movement of the will, is under the control of facts in some sense, for even if they are only facts about our physiology or chemistry, still, they make us move. I am interested only in cognitive control, or control by the apprehension of fact and reason. (shrink)

The author argues that Plato’s “proof” that happiness follows justice has a fatal flaw – because the philosopher king in Plato’s Republic is itself a counter example.

"... the great Catholic philosopher Yves Simon explains with admirable clarity just in what the Aristotelian conception of virtue consists." -Crisis.

_On Being With Others_ is an outstanding exploration of this key philosophical question. Simon Glendinning shows how traditional positions in the philosophy of mind can do little to rebuff the accusation that in fact we have little claim to have knowledge of minds other than our own. _On Being With Others_ sets out to refute this charge and disentangle many of the confusions in contemporary philosophy of mind and language that have led to such scepticism. Simon Glendinning explores (...) why early attempts by J.L. Austin and Martin Heidegger to refute scepticism about other minds failed and argues that we must turn to Wittgenstein in order to build a solid theory of other minds. Drawing on the celebrated debate between John Searle and Jacques Derrida, Simon Glendinning establishes fascinating and important links between controversies in the philosophy of mind, language and epistemology. (shrink)

Suppose it is a law that all Fs are G. Does the law hold in all possible worlds? According to Necessitarianism, it holds in at least all those worlds containing F-ness. I argue that the Necessitarian must also take the law to hold in all those possible worlds which do not contain F-ness. Accepting the principle that a law can only hold in a world if it has some ontological grounding in that world, I argue that Necessitarianism is committed to (...) the claim that any law holding in the actual world is grounded in every possible world, and that any law holding in any possible world is grounded in the actual world. In other words, Necessitarianism takes all possible laws to be actual. (shrink)

Philosophers have traditionally used thought-experiments in their endeavours to find a satisfactory account of the self and personal identity. Yet there are considerations from empirical psychology as well as related ones from philosophy itself that appear to completely undermine the method of thought-experiment. This paper focuses on both sets of considerations and attempts a defence of the method.

In this paper I argue that, in at least two cases - his discussions of the temporal precedence o f polytheism over monotheism and of the origins of civil society - we see Hume consigning to historical development certain aspects of reason which, as a comparison with Locke will show, have sometimes been held to be uniform. In the first of these cases Hume has recourse to claims about the general historical development of human thought. In the second case, the (...) origin of the civil institution of justice and government is not linked directly to external circumstances and the principles of human nature, as it is in contractarian theories, but makes a detour through the historical acquisition of certain concepts. Because Hume's position does not conform in any simple sense to Dugald Stewart's 'incontrovertible logical maxim' that the capacities of the human mind have been the same in all ages, Stewart's account of the method of conjectural history is, in any simple sense, inadequate as a description of Hume's practice. (shrink)

In the paper “Math Anxiety,” Aden Evens explores the manner by means of which concepts are implicated in the problematic Idea according to the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. The example that Evens draws from Difference and Repetition in order to demonstrate this relation is a mathematics problem, the elements of which are the differentials of the differential calculus. What I would like to offer in the present paper is an historical account of the mathematical problematic that Deleuze deploys in his (...) philosophy, and an introduction to the role that this problematic plays in the develop- ment of his philosophy of difference. One of the points of departure that I will take from the Evens paper is the theme of “power series.”2 This will involve a detailed elaboration of the mechanism by means of which power series operate in the differential calculus deployed by Deleuze in Difference and Repetition. Deleuze actually constructs an alternative history of mathematics that establishes an historical conti- nuity between the differential point of view of the infinitesimal calculus and modern theories of the differential calculus. It is in relation to the differential point of view of the infinitesimal calculus that Deleuze determines a differential logic which he deploys, in the form of a logic of different/ciation, in the development of his proj- ect of constructing a philosophy of difference. (shrink)

Article responds to the criticism of speciesism that it is somehow less immoral than other -isms by showing that this is a mistake resting on an inadequate taxonomy of the various -isms. Criticizes argument by Bonnie Steinbock that preference to your own species is not immoral by comparison with racism of comparable level.

Some years ago, without realizing what it might mean, I accepted a dinner invitation from a Jewish colleague for dinner on Friday night. I should say that my colleague had never appeared particularly orthodox, and he would have known that I am an atheist. However, in the course of the meal, some kind of observance was put in train, and it turned out I was expected to play along—put on a hat, or some such. I demurred, saying that I felt (...) uncomfortable doing something that might be the expression of some belief that I do not hold, or of joining a “fellowship” with which I felt no special community, and with which I would not have any particular fellow-feeling beyond whatever I feel for human beings in general. I was assured that what it would signify, if I went through with the observance, was not that I shared the world views or beliefs of my host, or wished myself to identify uniquely with some particular small subset of humanity, but only that I respected his beliefs, or perhaps his stance. I replied that in that case, equally, I could not in conscience do what was required. (shrink)

Der Text geht von einem Widerspruch zwischen Souveränität und Relationalität des suizidalen Subjekts aus, der die Debatte um assistierten Suizid strukturiert. Dem Problem der Souveränität kann spätestens seitdem das BVerfG die Feststellung eines freien, autonomen und konsistenten Willens zur einzigen erlaubten Bedingung für Suizidassistenz gemacht hat, nicht mit dem Verweis auf die relationale Verfasstheit von Autonomie ausgewichen werden. Simon Duncker argumentiert dafür, dass Grundbegriffe der Psychoanalyse Spezifika aufweisen, die sie dafür prädestinieren, den Widerspruch eines abhängigen Souveräns nicht zu lösen, (...) aber mit ihm umgehen zu können. Dazu zählt erstens ein widersprüchlicher Begriff von psychoanalytischer Aufklärung, die einerseits Selbsttransparenz herzustellen versucht, andererseits aber auch ihr verdunkelndes Moment betont. Zweitens ermöglicht der Begriff des Unbewussten, die Abhängigkeit eines relativ freien Sterbewillens von internalisierten gesellschaftlichen anderen in eine Reflexion des Ichs hineinzuholen. Und drittens konzipiert der Begriff der Übertragung das psychoanalytische Gespräch als eine Wahrheitspraxis, durch die suizidale Subjekte diese Reflexion in der Beziehung zur Analytikerin vollziehen können, die die anderen ihrer Abhängigkeitsverhältnisse repräsentiert. So könnte Psychoanalyse eine besondere Rolle bei Verfahren spielen, die der Sorge um den freien Willen von Menschen dienen, die Suizidassistenz in Anspruch nehmen möchten. Dafür dürfte sich Psychoanalyse jedoch nicht als Psychologie, sondern müsste sich als ethische Praxis verstehen. (shrink)

Two German philosophers working during the Weimar Republic in Germany, between the two World Wars, produced seminal texts that continue to resonate almost 100 years later. Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Heidegger, a Jewish thinker and a philosopher who at one time was studying to become a Roman Catholic Priest, each in their own, particular way include in their writings powerful philosophies of art that, if approached phenomenologically and ethically, provide keys to understanding their radically divergent trajectories, both biographically and for (...) their philosophical heritage. Simon provides a close reading of some of their essential texts—The Star of Redemption for Rosenzweig and Being and Time and The Origin of the Work of Art for Heidegger—in order to draw attention to how their philosophies of art can be understood to provide significant ethical directives. (shrink)

This article presents the interpretive disagreements that Simon Critchley raises with Slavoj Žižek regarding Critchley's work. Reflecting on the political problems of violence, authoritarianism, and anarchism, the author critiques much of the Slovak thinker's writing.

Major adherents of the Christian, Muslim and Jewish faiths, who claim common religious roots, have worked quietly for years on an interfaith declaration which would identify shared ethical values to be applied in the conduct of international business. After a final meeting in Amman, Jordan, in 1993 the Declaration was officially promulgated at St James's Palace in London in 1994, and the author of this introduction was acknowledged as a major figure in its composition. Besides being Director of the British‐North (...) American Research Association, Simon Webley has researched and written extensively on codes of conduct in business. Copies of the Interfaith Declaration, which is reproduced here with permission, are obtainable from The Interfaith Foundation, P.O. Box 4385, London SW1W 9XS. (shrink)

Cognitive scientists have long noted that automated behavior is the rule, while consciousness acts of self-regulation are the exception to the rule. On the face of it automated actions appear to be immune to moral appraisal because they are not subject to conscious control. Conventional wisdom suggests that sleepwalking exculpates, while the mere fact that a person is performing a well-versed task unthinkingly does not. However, our apparent lack of conscious control while we are undergoing automaticity challenges the idea that (...) there is a relevant moral difference between these two forms of unconscious behavior. In both cases the agent lacks access to information that might help them guide their actions so as to avoid harms. In response it is argued that the crucial distinction between the automatic agent and the agent undergoing an automatism, such as somnambulism or petit mal epilepsy, lies in the fact that the former can preprogram the activation and interruption of automatic behavior. Given that, it is argued that there is elbowroom for attributing responsibility to automated agents based on the quality of their will. (shrink)

Welchen Stellenwert hat die Kenntnis einer Grammatik für das Verhältnis des Menschen zur Welt und zu sich selbst? Und wofür braucht es Grammatik überhaupt, wenn grammatische Mehrdeutigkeit ohnehin meist unbemerkt bleibt und selten ein Verständnisproblem darstellt? Auf diese Fragen gibt Simon Kasper empirisch und theoretisch fundiert eine umfassende Antwort. Anhand einer historischen Korpusstudie an Paralleltexten dokumentiert er den erfolgreichen menschlichen Umgang mit Mehrdeutigkeit und liefert in der Folge einen anthropologischen Entwurf zum Verstehen, der sowohl der leiblichen Existenz des Menschen (...) (Embodiment) als auch der Grammatizität seiner Sprache Rechnung trägt. Dabei bezieht er nicht nur Grundannahmen der Kognitiven Linguistik und der Philosophischen Anthropologie ein, sondern führt auch quantitative (Frequenz) und qualitative (Bedeutsamkeit) Ansätze der Sprachtheorie zusammen. (shrink)

The Newcomb problem is analysed here as a type of common cause problem. In relation to such problems, if you take the dominated option your expected outcome will be good and if you take the dominant option your expected outcome will be not so good. As is explained, however, these arenot conventional conditional expected outcomes but `conditional evidence expected outcomes' and while in the deliberation process, the evidence on which they are based is only hypothetical evidence.Conventional conditional expected outcomes are (...) more sensitive to your current epistemic state in that they are based purely on actual evidence which is available to you during the deliberation process. So although they are conditional on a certain act being performed, they are not based on evidence that you would have only if that act is performed. Moreover, for any given epistemic state during the deliberation process, your conventional conditional expected outcome for the dominant option will be better than that for the dominated option. The principle of dominance is thus in perfect harmony with the conventional conditional expected outcomes. In relation to the Newcomb problem then, the evidence unequivocally supports two-boxing as the rational option. Yet what is advanced here is not simply a two-boxing strategy. To see why, two stages to the problem need to be recognised. The first stage is that which occurs before the information used by the predictor in making his predictions has been gained. The second stage is after this point. Provided that you are still in the first stage, you have an opportunity to influence whether or not the predictor places the $1m in the opaque box. To maximise the probability that it is, you need to commit yourself to one-boxing. (shrink)

In this paper I consider the 'disappearing we' account of Wittgenstein's attitude to other ways of thought or other 'conceptual schemes'. I argue that there is no evidence that Wittgenstein expected the 'we' to disappear, in the manner of Davidson, and that his affinities with relativistic trains of thought in fact go much deeper.

Welche Argumente sollen eine "Eigenstandigkeit" sozialer Phanomene begrunden? Simon Lohse widmet sich dieser Frage aus wissenschaftsphilosophischer Perspektive. Unter kritischen Gesichtspunkten diskutiert er die wichtigsten ontologischen Argumente, die innerhalb der Sozialwissenschaften gegen die Position des Methodologischen Individualismus vorgebracht werden, zum Beispiel emergentistische Argumente und Argumente, die von einer Verwobenheit von individuellen Akteuren und Umwelt ausgehen. Das Buch soll zu einem besseren Verstandnis eines Kernproblems der Sozialwissenschaften innerhalb der Wissenschaftsphilosophie beitragen und auch einen klarenden Beitrag zur theoretischen Diskussion in den Sozialwissenschaften (...) selbst leisten. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 30.2 (2006) 410-423 MuseSearchJournalsThis JournalContents[Access article in PDF]Reading Our Way To Democracy? Literature and Public EthicsSimon Stow The College of William and Mary"I believe," wrote Franz Kafka, "that we should only read those books that bite and sting us. If a book we are reading does not rouse us with a blow to the head, then why read it?" 1 Almost all of us who read (...) books for a living and/or pleasure have undoubtedly experienced that most delightfully troubling of phenomena: a novel that forces us to think differently about the world and the way that we live. In recent years, literature's capacity to generate in its readers "a rigorous scrutiny of everything they believe in and live by" 2 —what Stanley Fish calls its "dialectical" potential—has drawn the attention of a number of liberal-democratic theorists, most notably Martha Nussbaum and Richard Rorty. By "liberal-democratic" is meant here, of course, that system of government with popular rule, regular elections, a commitment to individual rights and the rule of law; one that draws on a tradition of political thought that includes the work of John Locke, John Stuart Mill and John Rawls. Although their exact formulations of the claim differ in important ways, Nussbaum and Rorty are united in the belief that reading can enhance the practice of liberal-democracy by expanding the moral imaginations of a citizenry. Such an expansion will, they believe, promote the values of tolerance, respect for other viewpoints, and a recognition of the contingency of one's own perspective, in short, the values of civil society. Whilst there is undoubtedly something intuitively appealing about their claim, there is much that is philosophically and politically problematic about their respective formulations of it. Both seem to rest for example upon an implausible theory of the impact of literature upon its readers, and an illiberal tendency to treat reader-citizens as means and not as ends. Attempting to capture what is of value [End Page 410] whilst jettisoning what is problematic, I will briefly set out their claims; identify the difficulties within them; and offer an account of how their project might be operationalized in a way that is both more philosophically plausible and more politically consistent with liberalism. My aim will not be to offer another detailed account of the connection between literature and democracy—not least because I believe that the current accounts are overly deterministic—but rather to suggest some ways in which we might nevertheless build upon the current work to capture the potential benefits of reading for liberal-democratic societies.Although Martha Nussbaum and Richard Rorty hold quite different views about the proper role of literature in philosophy—Nussbaum believes that literature is merely a valuable addition to philosophical Reason traditionally conceived, whereas for the postfoundational Rorty, the literariness goes all the way down—both suggest that reading will promote two values that they regard as essential to liberal-democratic practice. Following Rorty we might label these values contingency and solidarity. 3 Contingency arises from the recognition that even one's most deeply held beliefs are always only a perspective. It is connected to civility in that it serves, Nussbaum and Rorty believe, to undermine the vehemence of individual claims. Although this claim about the partiality of individual perspectives sounds dangerously postmodern for thinker such as Nussbaum—Rorty, who calls his political philosophy "postmodernist bourgeois liberalism," 4 has no such qualms—there are limits to this insight in her thought. Nussbaum is simply concerned to show that an excessive and over-confident reliance on philosophical Reason is likely to generate an incomplete understanding of a given situation. For this reason, she suggests, "storytelling and literary imagining are not opposed to... but can provide essential ingredients in a rational argument." 5 She argues, for example, that Hard Times by Charles Dickens will alert its readers—in particular "the person brought up solely on economic texts" who "has not been encouraged to think of workers (or indeed anybody else) as fully human... (shrink)

Thomas More’s humor was influenced by his studies of Greek Old and New Comedy and Lucian’s Dialogues. He was fascinated by the multiple ways human follies could be exposed to provoke laughter. Although aware of the “anti-laughter” tradition of the Early Church Fathers, he asserted that the intellectual, moral, and spiritual superiority of “the man who laughed” justified using humor to provoke “critical laughter” as an effective rhetorical strategy to ridicule the comic incongruities and corruption of “the inferior man who (...) was laughed at.” In his religious polemics: Responsio ad Lutherum, Supplication of Souls, Dialogue Concerning Heresies, and Confutation of Tyndale’s Answer, More enjoyed using invectives, lampoons, and scholastic parody to denigrate Lutherans and their heretical doctrines. He considered laughter an appropriate response to heresy, and his vituperative humor provided a rhetorical punishment of derision as an alternative to the horrifying physical punishment of execution proscribed for heretics. More’s humor was intended to discourage his readers from accepting Lutheran doctrines, but it also invited them to share his joyful superior affirmation of faith in the tenets of the Catholic Church that will lead them to “the eternal merriment of heaven.”. (shrink)

This paper sets out to raise questions about the metaphor of the spaceof reasons. It argues that a proper appreciation of Wittgensteinundermines the metaphysical or dualistic way of taking the metaphor thatis supposed to prevent the naturalization of reason.

This best-selling dictionary is written by one of the most famous philosophers of our time, and it is widely recognized as the best dictionary of its kind. Comprehensive and authoritative, it covers every aspect of philosophy from Aristotle to Zen. With clear and concise definitions, it provides lively and accessible coverage of not only Western philosophical traditions, but also themes from Chinese, Indian, Islamic, and Jewish philosophy. Entries include over 500 biographies of famous and influential philosophers, in-depth analysis of philosophical (...) terms and concepts, and a chronology of philosophical events stretching from 10,000 BC to the present day. The first edition of this dictionary became a market-leader and a standard work of reference, selling over 100,000 copies. Now the author, Professor Simon Blackburn, has revised it to include web links which provide up-to-date and valuable extra information via the Dictionary of Philosophy companion website. Fully cross-referenced and containing over 3,000 alphabetical entries, it is the ideal introduction to philosophy for anyone with an interest in the subject, and it is an indispensable work of reference for students and teachers. (shrink)

The 'death of man', the 'end of history' and even philosophy are strong and troubling currents running through contemporary debates. Yet since Nietzsche's heralding of the 'death of god', philosophy has been unable to explain the question of finitude. _Very Little...Almost Nothing_ goes to the heart of this problem through an exploration of Blanchot's theory of literature, Stanley Cavell's interpretations of romanticism and the importance of death in the work of Samuel Beckett. Simon Critchley links these themes to the (...) philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas to present a powerful new picture of how we must approach the importance of death in philosophy. A compelling reading of the convergence of literature and philosophy, _Very Little...Almost Nothing_ opens up new ways of understanding finitude, modernity and the nature of the imagination. (shrink)

The attempt to pursue philosophy in the name of phenomenology is one of the most significant and important developments in twentieth century thought. In this bold and innovative book, Simon Glendinning introduces some of its major figures, and demonstrates that its ongoing strength and coherence is to be explained less by what Maurice Merleau-Ponty called the 'unity' of its 'manner of thinking' and more by what he called its 'unfinished nature'. Beginning with a discussion of the nature of phenomenology, (...) Glendinning explores the changing landscape of phenomenology in key texts by Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas and Derrida. Focusing on the different ways in which each philosopher has responded to and transformed the legacy of phenomenology, Glendinning shows that the richness of this legacy lies not in the formation of a distinctive movement or school but in a remarkable capacity to make fertile philosophical breakthroughs. Important topics such as the nature of phenomenological arguments, the critique of realism and idealism, ontology, existentialism, perception, ethics and the other are also closely examined. Through a re-evaluation of the development of phenomenology Glendinning traces the ruptures and dislocations of philosophy that, in an age dominated by science, strive constantly to renew our understanding of ourselves and our place in the world. Clearly and engagingly written, In the Name of Phenomenology is essential reading for students of phenomenology and contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

This is the second volume of a three-volume historical and literary commentary of the eight books of Thucydides, the great fifth-century BC historian of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta. Books iv-v.24 cover the years 425-421 BC and contain the Pylos-Spakteria narrative, the Delion Campaign, and Brasidas' operations in the north of Greece. This volume ends with the Peace of Nikias and the alliance between Athens and Sparta. A new feature of this volume is the full thematic introduction which (...) discusses such topics as Thucydides and Herodotus, Thucydide's presentation of Brasidas, Thucydides and kinship, speech - direct and indirect - in iv-v.24, Thucydides and epigraphy (including personal names), iv-v.24 as a work of art: innovative or merely incomplete? Thucydides intended his work to be `an everlasting possession' and the continuing importance of his work is undisputed. Simon Hornblower's commentary, by translating every passage of Greek commented on for the first time, allows readers with little or no Greek to appreciate the detail of Thucydides' thought and subject-matter. A full index at the end of the volume. (shrink)

This book presents a philosophical and theological analysis of the concept of integrity. Using case studies, it offers a view of integrity which is focused in: identity (individual and corporate); responsibility (for critical reflection on identity and related ideas and feelings associated with worth, mutual and plural accountability, and shared responsibility for creating and creation); ongoing learning (individual and corporate). Simon Robinson brings together Aristotelian and existentialist perspectives, agapeic theology, and wider leadership and governance theory, and in doing so (...) connects ecclesiology, Christian Ethics, pastoral theology, church leadership and governance. Robinson focuses on praxis, reflection on how the Christian church engages its members and the world, and how it can learn and develop peacebuilding. Critical to this the development of genuine dialogue, individual and shared narrative building, and the corporate framework of virtues and virtue development, which connects individual and corporate agency. (shrink)

Association of American University Presses Book Jacket Award, 1996 "Beginning with a description of a poster for a punk band and ending with a critique of the movie JFK, this work marshals an impressive array of cultural information in attempting to provide an overall history of the genre. Simon closely examines images and films, relating them to the continuing struggle over the authoring and interpretation of the story of Kennedy's death." --Library Journal The assassination of John F. Kennedy provoked (...) intense public debates and focused the world's attention on the recorded details of the event in still and moving images. Intense scrutiny of the testimony and images became a national obsession. Dangerous Knowledge argues that the very currents that powered the debates also prompted a crisis in interpretation that profoundly affected American culture. From 1963 to the present day, amateur sleuths have proposed compelling theories of who was responsible for Kennedy's death and why. In the process they entered into an ongoing struggle centered in questions of authority: Who has access to evidence and the power to interpret history? What is the relation of photographs and films to the writing of history? To show how this struggle literally changed history and figured in the avant-garde's artistic production, Art Simon considers a wide range of cultural work shaped by the assassination. Simon reveals the influence of the assassination theorists on commercial films such as JFK and Parallax View and shows how the images that blanketed the media resurfaced in Andy Warhol's silk screens, work and underground film of Bruce Conner, and other 1960s artists where they become vehicles for challenging the truth value of photographs or the public's endless fascination with celebrities. "This history of the representation of the JFK assassination makes a terrific contribution to film studies and indeed to cultural studies generally. Moving with wit and erudition across political history, avant-garde film, serigraphy, journalism, and mass-market film, Simon transcends the banalities of the high culture/low culture binary to produce a study of exemplary range and insight." --David E. James, School of Cinema-Television, University of Southern California. (shrink)

Like no other philosopher of this century, the late Yves R. Simon grappled with philosophical issues that still carry weight today. This collection of his essays explores an impressive range of genuinely foundational topics of philosophical inquiry. These essays discuss, among other topics, the relationship between faith and reason, the nature of sensation, and the various meanings of work. SimonOs significant contribution to philosophy through these varied essays is unquestionable, and this is the first such collection of his works. (...) Philosopher at Work will be indispensable for philosophers of all backgrounds. (shrink)

This complete treatise of political philosophy demonstrates Yves R. Simon's belief that, even in the best conceivable circumstances, government is needed to determine direction toward the common good and to provide the means for united action.