Sensitivity has sometimes been thought to be a highly epistemologically significant property, serving as a proxy for a kind of responsiveness to the facts that ensure that the truth of our beliefs isn’t just a lucky coincidence. But it's an imperfect proxy: there are various well-known cases in which sensitivity-based anti-luck conditions return the wrong verdicts. And as a result of these failures, contemporary theorists often dismiss such conditions out of hand. I show here, though, that a (...) class='Hi'>sensitivity-based understanding of epistemic luck can be developed that respects what was attractive about sensitivity-based approaches in the first place but that's immune to these failures. (shrink)

Modal knowledge accounts that are based on standards possible-worlds semantics face well-known problems when it comes to knowledge of necessities. Beliefs in necessities are trivially sensitive and safe and, therefore, trivially constitute knowledge according to these accounts. In this paper, I will first argue that existing solutions to this necessity problem, which accept standard possible-worlds semantics, are unsatisfactory. In order to solve the necessity problem, I will utilize an unorthodox account of counterfactuals, as proposed by Nolan, on which we also (...) consider impossible worlds. Nolan’s account for counterpossibles delivers the intuitively correct result for sensitivity i.e. S’s belief is sensitive in intuitive cases of knowledge of necessities and insensitive in intuitive cases of knowledge failure. However, we acquire the same plausible result for safety only if we reject his strangeness of impossibility condition and accept the modal closeness of impossible worlds. In this case, the necessity problem can be analogously solved for sensitivity and safety. For some, such non-moderate accounts might come at too high a cost. In this respect, sensitivity is better off than safety when it comes to knowing necessities. (shrink)

Value Sensitive Design (VSD) is a design methodology developed by Batya Friedman and Peter Kahn (2003) that brings in moral deliberations in an early stage of a design process. It assumes that neither technology itself is value neutral, nor shifts the value-ladennes to the sole usage of technology. This paper adds to emerging literature onVSD for autonomous weapons systems development and discusses extant literature on values in autonomous systems development in general and in autonomous weapons development in particular. I identify (...) opportunities, such as public debates, and threats, such as the classified nature of the design process, for VSD in autonomous weapons development. This paper contributes to academic debates about the non-neutrality of technology by pointing out that values have been and can be explicitly designed into autonomous systems. It is informative for policy makers and designers who are tasked with developing actual autonomous weapons or policies around such systems, as they learn about an established design methodology that is sensitive to societal concerns and industry needs and that can be applied to autonomous weapons systems. (shrink)

Sensitivity is a modal epistemic principle. Modal knowledge accounts are externalist in nature and claim that the knowledge yielding connection between a true belief and the truthmaker must be spelled out in modal terms. The sensitivity condition was introduced by Robert Nozick. He suggests that if S knows that p, then S’s belief that p tracks truth. Nozick argues that this truth-tracking relation can be captured by subjunctive conditionals. As a first approximation, he provides the following modal analysis (...) of knowledge: S knows that p iff (1) p is true; (2) S believes that p; (3) if p were false, S wouldn’t believe that p and (4) if p were true, S would believe that p. The dominant terminology in the literature, also adopted here, is to call condition (3) the sensitivity condition and condition (4) the adherence condition. The sensitivity condition is intuitively appealing since it states that a subject does not know that p if she would believe that p even if p were false. Nozick used the sensitivity condition to accomplish two major tasks. First, he provided a solution to the Gettier problem by arguing that in Gettier cases subjects do not know since the sensitivity condition is violated. Second, he presented a controversial solution to the skeptical problem according to which we have external world knowledge but do not know that the skeptical hypothesis is false. This solution is available because sensitivity is not closed under known entailment. Quickly, criticism of the sensitivity condition emerged. First, most epistemologists regarded the price of abandoning knowledge closure as a price too high to pay. Second, it was noted that sensitivity leads to the counterintuitive consequence of precluding us from inductive knowledge since induction typically yields insensitive beliefs. The most dominant reaction to these problems was to replace sensitivity by the modal principle of safety, nowadays the most popular modal principle. However, sensitivity is not only important as a starting point of modal epistemology. Because of its intuitive attractiveness, many authors aimed at refining the original sensitivity account in order to avoid well-known problems. This has led to a second wave of sensitivity accounts. As of today, various sensitivity-based theories are on the market, including accounts that avoid closure failure, probabilistic interpretations of sensitivity and adherence, and contextualist approaches. There is thus a vivid and ongoing debate about the sensitivity principle in epistemology. (shrink)

The study aimed to identify the strategic sensitivity and its impact on enhancing the creative behavior of Palestinian NGOs in Gaza Strip, and the study used the descriptive analytical approach and the questionnaire as a main tool for collecting data from employees of associations working in Gaza Strip governorates, and the cluster sample method was used and the sample size reached (343) individuals (298) questionnaires were retrieved, and the following results were reached: The relative weight of strategic sensitivity (...) was 79.22 (%), and the relative weight of creative behavior was 78.99 (%), a statistically significant relationship between all strategic sensitivity and creative behavior, and the presence of a sensitivity effect The strategy’s strategy on creative behavior, there are statistically significant differences in the scale dimensions attributable to the gender variable and the differences were in favor of females, there are no statistically significant differences between the averages of strategic sensitivity due to the age variable, and the educational qualification, and there were no statistically significant differences in creative behavior according to The gender variable, age, educational qualification, specialization, and the study presented a set of recommendations, the most important of which are: the need for civil organizations in Gaza Strip to seek funding from external countries in order to provide self-income for associations to face crises and give them independence Mechanism in order to keep them to carry out their role in society, the need to follow up the strategic plan of civil organizations using e-mails as they pave the way to reach excellence and creativity in the field of work. (shrink)

Sosa, Pritchard, and Vogel have all argued that there are cases in which one knows something inductively but does not believe it sensitively, and that sensitivity therefore cannot be necessary for knowledge. I defend sensitivity by showing that inductive knowledge is sensitive.

The orthodox view about sensitivity and induction has it that beliefs formed via induction are insensitive. Since inductive knowledge is highly plausible, this problem is usually regarded as a reductio argument against sensitivity accounts of knowledge. Some adherents of sensitivity defend sensitivity against this objection, for example by considering backtracking interpretations of counterfactuals. All these extant views about sensitivity and induction have to be revised, since the problem of sensitivity and induction is a different (...) one. Regardless of whether we allow backtracking interpretations of counterfactuals, some instances of induction yield insensitive beliefs whereas others yield sensitive ones. These results are too heterogenous for providing a plausible sensitivity-account of inductive knowledge. Induction remains a serious problem for sensitivity accounts of knowledge. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend the heterogeneity problem for sensitivity accounts of knowledge against an objection that has been recently proposed by Wallbridge in Philosophia. I argue in, 479–496, 2015) that sensitivity accounts of knowledge face a heterogeneity problem when it comes to higher-level knowledge about the truth of one’s own beliefs. Beliefs in weaker higher-level propositions are insensitive, but beliefs in stronger higher-level propositions are sensitive. The resulting picture that we can know the stronger propositions without being (...) in a position to know the weaker propositions is too heterogeneous to be plausible. Wallbridge objects that there is no heterogeneity problem because beliefs in the weaker higher-level propositions are also sensitive. I argue against Wallbridge that the heterogeneity problem is not solved but only displaced. Only some beliefs in the weaker higher-level propositions are sensitive. I conclude that the heterogeneity problem is one of a family of instability problems that sensitivity accounts of knowledge face and that Wallbridge’s account raises a further problem of this kind. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Melchior pursues a novel argumentative strategy against the sensitivity condition. His claim is that sensitivity suffers from a ‘heterogeneity problem:’ although some higher-order beliefs are knowable, other, very similar, higher-order beliefs are insensitive and so not knowable. Similarly, the conclusions of some bootstrapping arguments are insensitive, but others are not. In reply, I show that sensitivity does not treat different higher-order beliefs differently in the way that Melchior states and that while genuine bootstrapping (...) arguments have insensitive conclusions, the cases that Melchior describes as sensitive ‘bootstrapping’ arguments don’t deserve the name, since they are a perfectly good way of getting to know their conclusions. In sum, sensitivity doesn’t have a heterogeneity problem. (shrink)

Recent attempts to resolve the Paradox of the Gatecrasher rest on a now familiar distinction between individual and bare statistical evidence. This paper investigates two such approaches, the causal approach to individual evidence and a recently influential (and award-winning) modal account that explicates individual evidence in terms of Nozick's notion of sensitivity. This paper offers counterexamples to both approaches, explicates a problem concerning necessary truths for the sensitivity account, and argues that either view is implausibly committed to the (...) impossibility of no-fault wrongful convictions. The paper finally concludes that the distinction between individual and bare statistical evidence cannot be maintained in terms of causation or sensitivity. We have to look elsewhere for a solution of the Paradox of the Gatecrasher. (shrink)

In this paper, we put forth an analysis of sensitivity which aims to discern individual from merely statistical evidence. We argue that sensitivity is not to be understood as a factive concept, but as a purely epistemic one. Our resulting analysis of epistemic sensitivity gives rise to an account of legal proof on which a defendant is only found liable based on epistemically sensitive evidence.

Value Sensitive Design (VSD) is an established method for integrating values into technical design. It has been applied to different technologies and, more recently, to artificial intelligence (AI). We argue that AI poses a number of challenges specific to VSD that require a somewhat modified VSD approach. Machine learning (ML), in particular, poses two challenges. First, humans may not understand how an AI system learns certain things. This requires paying attention to values such as transparency, explicability, and accountability. Second, ML (...) may lead to AI systems adapting in ways that ‘disembody’ the values embedded in them. To address this, we propose a threefold modified VSD approach: 1) integrating a known set of VSD principles (AI4SG) as design norms from which more specific design requirements can be derived; 2) distinguishing between values that are promoted and respected by the design to ensure outcomes that not only do no harm but also contribute to good; and 3) extending the VSD process to encompass the whole life cycle of an AI technology in order to monitor unintended value consequences and redesign as needed. We illustrate our VSD for AI approach with an example use case of a SARS-CoV-2 contact tracing app. (shrink)

Healthcare is becoming increasingly automated with the development and deployment of care robots. There are many benefits to care robots but they also pose many challenging ethical issues. This paper takes care robots for the elderly as the subject of analysis, building on previous literature in the domain of the ethics and design of care robots. Using the value sensitive design approach to technology design, this paper extends its application to care robots by integrating the values of care, values that (...) are specific to AI, and higher-scale values such as the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. The ethical issues specific to care robots for the elderly are discussed at length alongside examples of specific design requirements that work to ameliorate these ethical concerns. (shrink)

Background: Moral distress, moral sensitivity, and moral courage among healthcare professionals have been explored considerably in recent years. However, there is a paucity of studies exploring these topics among baccalaureate nursing students. Aim/objective: The purpose of this study was to explore the relationship between and among moral distress, moral sensitivity, and moral courage of undergraduate baccalaureate nursing students. Research design: The research employed a descriptive-correlational design to explore the relationships between and among moral distress, moral sensitivity, and (...) moral courage of undergraduate nursing students. Participants and research context: A total of 293 baccalaureate Filipino nursing students who have been exposed to various clinical areas participated in the study. Ethical considerations: Institutional review board approval was sought prior to the conduct of the study. Self-determination was assured and anonymity and confidentiality were guaranteed to all participants. Findings: Results indicate that a majority of the nursing students in the clinical areas encounter morally distressing situations that compromise quality patient care. However, despite the fact that they want to do what is in the best interest of their patients, their perception of being the inexperienced among the healthcare team drives the majority of them to ignore morally distressing situations to avoid conflict and confrontation. Another interesting finding is that 79.20% of the respondents hardly consider quitting the nursing profession even if they frequently encounter morally distressing situations. Analysis also shows associations between moral distress intensity and frequency ( r = 0.13, p < 0.05) and moral distress intensity and moral sensitivity ( r = 0.25, p < 0.05). The dimensions of moral courage are also related to both moral distress and moral sensitivity. Conclusion: Results of the study imply that moral distress is a reality among all healthcare professionals including nursing students and requires more consideration by nurse educators. (shrink)

It has been argued that an advantage of the safety account over the sensitivity account is that the safety account preserves epistemic closure, while the sensitivity account implies epistemic closure failure. However, the argument fails to take the method-relativity of the modal conditions on knowledge, viz., sensitivity and safety, into account. In this paper, I argue that the sensitivity account and the safety account are on a par with respect to epistemic closure once the method-relativity of (...) the modal conditions is taken into account. Therefore, epistemic closure is no longer an arbiter in the debate. (shrink)

A number of prominent epistemologists claim that the principle of sensitivity “play[s] a starring role in the solution to some important epistemological problems”. I argue that traditional sensitivity accounts fail to explain even the most basic data that are usually considered to constitute their primary motivation. To establish this result I develop Gettier and lottery cases involving necessary truths. Since beliefs in necessary truths are sensitive by default, the resulting cases give rise to a serious explanatory problem for (...) the defenders of sensitivity accounts. It is furthermore argued that attempts to modally strengthen traditional sensitivity accounts to avoid the problem must appeal to a notion of safety—the primary competitor of sensitivity in the literature. The paper concludes that the explanatory virtues of sensitivity accounts are largely illusory. In the framework of modal epistemology, it is safety rather than sensitivity that does the heavy explanatory lifting with respect to Gettier cases, lottery examples, and other pertinent cases. (shrink)

Background: Moral sensitivity is the foremost prerequisite to ethical performance; a review of literature shows that nurses are sometimes not sensitive enough for a variety of reasons. Moral distress is a frequent phenomenon in nursing, which may result in paradoxes in care, dealing with patients and rendering high-quality care. This may, in turn, hinder the meeting of care objectives, thus affecting social healthcare standards. Research objective: The present research was conducted to determine the relationship between moral sensitivity and (...) moral distress of nurses in intensive care units. Research design: This study is a descriptive-correlation research. Lutzen’s moral sensitivity questionnaire and Corley Moral Distress Questionnaire were used to gather data. Participants and research context: A total of 153 qualified nurses working in the hospitals affiliated to Shahid Beheshti University of Medical Sciences were selected for this study. Subjects were selected by census method. Ethical considerations: After explaining the objectives of the study, all the participants completed and signed the written consent form. To conduct the study, permission was obtained from the selected hospitals. Findings: Nurses’ average moral sensitivity grade was 68.6 ± 7.8, which shows a moderate level of moral sensitivity. On the other hand, nurses also experienced a moderate level of moral distress (44.8 ± 16.6). Moreover, there was no meaningful statistical relationship between moral sensitivity and moral distress (p = 0.26). Discussion: Although the nurses’ moral sensitivity and moral distress were expected to be high in the intensive care units, it was moderate. This finding is consistent with the results of some studies and contradicts with others. Conclusion: As moral sensitivity is a crucial factor in care, it is suggested that necessary training be provided to develop moral sensitivity in nurses in education and practical environments. Furthermore, removing factors that contribute to moral distress may help decrease it in nurses. (shrink)

Vogel, Sosa, and Huemer have all argued that sensitivity is incompatible with knowing that you do not believe falsely, therefore the sensitivity condition must be false. I show that this objection misses its mark because it fails to take account of the basis of belief. Moreover, if the objection is modified to account for the basis of belief then it collapses into the more familiar objection that sensitivity is incompatible with closure.

Artificial placenta technologies (also termed ‘artificial wombs’) for use in place of conventional neonatal intensive care are increasingly closer to first-in-human use. There is growing ethical interest in partial ectogestation (the use of an artificial placenta to continue gestation of an underdeveloped human entity extra uterum), however, there has been little reflection on the ethical issues in the design of the technology. While some have noted the importance of such reflection, and others have noted that a ‘value sensitive design’ approach (...) should be preferred, they have not elaborated on what this means. In this article, we consider what a value sensitive design approach to artificial placenta design might encompass. We believe that applying this framework to the topic at hand raises theoretical and substantive ethical questions that merit further elucidation. Highlighting that there is a careful need to separate preferences from values and that our intervention should be considered only a starting point, we explore some of the values that could be used to make ethical design choices about the artificial placenta: efficacy, compassion and accessibility. (shrink)

Ethical sensitivity was introduced to caring science to describe the first component of decision making in professional practice; that is, recognizing and interpreting the ethical dimension of a care situation. It has since been conceptualized in various ways by scholars of professional disciplines. While all have agreed that ethical sensitivity is vital to practice, there has been no consensus regarding its definition, its characteristics, the conditions needed for it to occur, or the outcomes to professionals and society. The (...) purpose of this article is to explore the meaning of the concept of ethical sensitivity based on a review of the professional literature of selected disciplines. Qualitative content analysis of the many descriptors found within the literature was conducted to enhance understanding of the concept and identify its essential characteristics. Ethical sensitivity is considered to be an emerging concept with potential utility in research and practice. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn a recent paper, Michael Pardo argues that the epistemic property that is legally relevant is the one called Safety, rather than Sensitivity. In the process, he argues against our Sensitivity-related account of statistical evidence. Here we revisit these issues, partly in order to respond to Pardo, and partly in order to make general claims about legal epistemology. We clarify our account, we show how it adequately deals with counterexamples and other worries, we raise suspicions about Safety's value (...) here, and we revisit our general skepticism about the role that epistemological considerations should play in determining legal policy. (shrink)

The sensitivity principle in epistemology has faced numerous, considerable, and relentless challenges since it emerged in Nozick’s Philosophical Explanations (Nozick, Philosophical Explanations 1981). In this paper, I develop a version of sensitivity, based on Dretske’s notion of conclusive reasons (Dretske, Australasian Journal of Philosophy49, 1971), that responds to the complaint that sensitivity is either incompatible with or makes an unprincipled mess of inductive knowledge. There are three key moves in formulating reasons-based Dretskean sensitivity (RDS). First, (...) class='Hi'>sensitivity is conceived in terms of reasons rather than beliefs tracking truth. Second, focus shifts from whether S would have those reasons in the relevant counterfactual worlds to whether those reasons would be the case. Third, closer attention is paid to the structure of reasons, such that S can know that p on the basis of a reason R because R tracks p, can know that R on the basis of experience because experience tracks R, even if experience does not track p. While critics of Nozick are correct to point out that, typically, S would have their actual world observational basis for belief—their experience—if their true induction-based belief were false, this does not preclude inductive knowledge according to RDS. (shrink)

This study reports the results of a study of Swedish psychiatrists’ responses to moral statements related to decision making in the psychiatric context. Use was made of the Moral Sensitivity Questionnaire, a modified instrument previously constructed from a theory of moral sensitivity. This Likert-type scale contains 30 items constructed from the following categories: interpersonal orientation, structuring moral meaning, benevolence, modifying autonomy, experiencing moral conflict, and trust in medical knowledge and principles of care. The purpose was to identify possible (...) differences in responses rather than to evaluate right or wrong responses. The analysis is based on 754 completed questionnaires. The results of the study showed some significant differences in the item and category levels; for example, male psychiatrists experienced more conflicts than female psychiatrists and agreed to a greater extent that medical knowledge was most important in deciding what was best for the patient. The results also showed that more female than male psychiatrists thought that the relationship with the patient was most important in psychiatric practice. (shrink)

In this paper I propose a partition semantics for sentences containing objective predicates that takes into account the phenomenon of occasion-sensitivity associated with so-called Travis cases. The key idea is that the set of worlds in which a sentence is true has a more complex structure as a result of different ways in which it is made true. Different ways may have different capacities to support the attainment of a contextually salient domain goal. I suggest that goal-conduciveness decides whether (...) some utterance of a sentence is accepted as true on a particular occasion at a given world. The utterance will not be accepted as true at a world which belongs to a truth-maker which is less conducive to a contextually salient goal than other truth-makers. Finally, the proposed occasion-sensitive semantics is applied to some cases of disagreement and cancellability. (shrink)

Background Moral sensitivity and academic integrity discernment hold paramount importance for healthcare professionals. Owing to distinct undergraduate educational backgrounds, nurses and physicians may exhibit divergent moral perspectives, academic integrity cognisance, and moral sensitivity within clinical environments. A limited number of studies have investigated the disparities and congruencies pertaining to moral sensitivity and academic ethical awareness among nursing and medical students. Objective The study compares moral sensitivity and academic ethical awareness of undergraduate nursing and medical students with (...) and without clinical exposure. Research design A self-administered cross-sectional survey conducted from January to February 2022 was used to collect data from a medical school in Hong Kong. Participants and research context A total of 545 respondents, including 137 nursing students and 408 medical students, completed the questionnaire. Ethical consideration Ethics approval of the study was obtained. Written consent was waived to maintain anonymity because completing the questionnaire was considered implied consent. Findings Both groups of undergraduates demonstrated a high level of bioethics knowledge. In terms of academic integrity, medical students were found to have a less concerned attitude towards punctuality, attendance, and skipping classes. Regarding moral sensitivity, senior medical students with clinical experience put less emphasis on decision-making involving patient participation, while senior nursing students were more hesitant in withholding treatment for incompetent patients who refused treatment. Both nursing and medical students showed decreased moral sensitivity in the ‘conflicts’ domain with increased clinical exposure. Conclusion Study findings contribute to the discussion comparing the ethical attitudes of nursing and medical students. More effort should be made in nursing and medical education to promote practices in line with high academic integrity and to develop the ability to be morally sensitive in professional settings. (shrink)

The sensitivity principle is a compelling idea in epistemology and is typically characterized as a necessary condition for knowledge. This collection of thirteen new essays constitutes a state-of-the-art discussion of this important principle. Some of the essays build on and strengthen sensitivity-based accounts of knowledge and offer novel defences of those accounts. Others present original objections to sensitivity-based accounts and offer comprehensive analysis and discussion of sensitivity's virtues and problems. The resulting collection will stimulate new debate (...) about the sensitivity principle and will be of great interest and value to scholars and advanced students of epistemology. (shrink)

The epidemic of noncommunicable diseases is currently responsible for 74% of the global death toll. Since modifiable individual behaviors partly determine risk factor exposure, it may seem reasonable to suggest that individuals can take some responsibility for their health by adopting healthier lifestyles. In this paper, I consider whether certain types of responsibility-sensitive healthcare policies, namely policies that treat certain groups of people differentially because they are considered responsible for their health-related choices and subsequent condition, constitute cases of direct and/or (...) harmful discrimination. Specifically, I reflect on the potentially discriminatory nature of backward-looking responsibility-sensitive healthcare policies (RSHPs) and their specification built around the idea of golden opportunities (GOs). To provide a plausible response to this puzzle, I initially examine these policies’ compatibility with Benjamin Eidelson’s and Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s definitions of non-moralized direct discrimination. Then, I discuss whether these policies impose unjustified harm on imprudent individuals by harmfully discriminating against them. (shrink)

Kolodny and MacFarlane have made a pioneering contribution to our understanding of how the interpretation of deontic modals can be sensitive to evidence and information. But integrating the discussion of information-sensitivity into the standard Kratzerian framework for modals suggests ways of capturing the relevant data without treating deontic modals as “informational modals” in their sense. I show that though one such way of capturing the data within the standard semantics fails, an alternative does not. Nevertheless I argue that we (...) have good reasons to adopt an information-sensitive semantics of the general type Kolodny and MacFarlane describe. Contrary to the standard semantics, relative deontic value between possibilities sometimes depends on which possibilities are live. I develop an ordering semantics for deontic modals that captures this point and addresses various complications introduced by integrating the discussion of information-sensitivity into the standard semantic framework. By attending to these complexities, we can also illuminate various roles that information and evidence play in logical arguments, discourse, and deliberation. (shrink)

Background: Ethical behaviour in nursing practice is integral to establishing a harmonious nurse-patient relationship and improving the quality of care. A multitude of factors shapes such behaviour. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the interplay between these factors. Research objectives: This study aimed to explore the mechanisms underlying the influence of moral sensitivity on nurses’ ethical behaviour and clarify the mediating role of moral courage. Research design: This cross-sectional quantitative study was conducted between July and August 2023. Participants and (...) Research Context: The sample comprised 465 clinical nurses from three tertiary hospitals in Zhengzhou City, Henan Province, China. Data were collected using the Chinese version of the Moral Sensitivity Questionnaire-Revised Version, Nurses’ Moral Courage Scale, and Ethical Behaviour Scale for Nurses. Data analysis was performed with SPSS 26.0 and AMOS 24.0, using descriptive statistics, Pearson correlation analysis, structural equation modelling, and bootstrapping methods. Ethical considerations: This study was approved by the Ethical Review Committee of Life Sciences of Zhengzhou University, China. Results: The participants were predominantly female (95.1%), with a mean age of 31.9 years. Moral courage and moral sensitivity were positively correlated with ethical behaviour. Moral sensitivity was positively associated with moral courage. Moral courage partially mediates the relationship between moral sensitivity and ethical behaviour. The indirect effect of nurses’ moral sensitivity on ethical behaviour was quantified through moral courage (indirect effect = 0.290). Conclusion: Moral courage intermediates nurses’ moral sensitivity and ethical behaviour. This conclusion provides nursing administrators with the insight that improving clinical nurses’ moral sensitivity and courage can contribute to ensuring appropriate ethical behaviour. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose and defend a pair of necessary conditions on evidence-based knowledge which bear resemblance to the troubled sensitivity principles defended in the philosophical literature. We can think of the traditional principles as simple but inaccurate approximations of the new proposals. Insofar as the old principles are intuitive and used in scientific and philosophical contexts, but are plausibly false, there’s a real need to develop precise and correct formulations. These new renditions turned out to be more (...) cautious, so they won’t be able to do everything the old principled promised they could. For example, they respect closure for knowledge. But these sober formulations, or something like them, might be the best that we can do with respect to sensitivity. And there’s value in understanding the limits to these types of principles. (shrink)

Nurses find themselves in a unique position - between patient and physicians, and in close proximity to the patient. Moral sensitivity can help nurses to cope with the daily turmoil of demands and opinions while delivering care in concordance with the value system of the patient. This article aims to reconsider the concept of moral sensitivity by discussing the function of emotions in morality. We turn to the ideas of historic and contemporary authors on the function of emotions (...) in morality to expand our understanding of moral sensitivity. Ancient philosophers and contemporary psychologists uphold different strategies on the orientation of morality being (a) personal growth or (b) community living, and the primordial function of (c) reason and (d) emotions in the creation of judgements about good and bad. The theoretical discussion on the function of emotions in morality shows that by focusing on reason alone, one leaves out an essential part of morality. The concept of moral sensitivity should (1) include an initial judgment of good and bad based on emotions, (2) hold the ability to reflect on the initial judgement and the associated emotions, (3) include the ability to understand other stakeholders' perspectives based on the ideal-types and (4) include a personal decision on the right course of action. (shrink)

In two large samples, we found a positive relationship between disgust sensitivity and political conservatism. This relationship held when controlling for a number of demographic variables as well as the “Big Five” personality traits. Disgust sensitivity was also associated with more conservative voting in the 2008 U.S. presidential election. In Study 2, we replicated the disgust sensitivity–conservatism relationship in an international sample of respondents from 121 different countries. Across both samples, contamination disgust, which reflects a heightened concern (...) with interpersonally transmitted disease and pathogens, was most strongly associated with conservatism. (shrink)

It is natural to assume that knowledge, like belief, creates a hyperintensional context, that is, that knowledge ascriptions do not allow for substitution of necessarily equivalent prejacents salva veritate. There exist a variety of different proposals for modelling the phenomenon. In the last years, the topic-sensitive approach to the hyperintensionality of knowledge has gained considerable traction. It promises to provide a natural account of why knowledge fails to be closed under necessary equivalence in terms of differences in subject matter. Here, (...) we argue that the topic-sensitive approach, as recently put forward by Franz Berto, Peter Hawke, Aybüke Özgün, and others, faces formidable problems. The root of these problems lies in the approach’s prediction that a mere grasp of subject matter may help to provide insights into necessary implications that it would seem to require more substantive epistemic work to gain. (shrink)

This chapter lays out a view of freedom according to which the following two claims are true: first, acting freely is, at least partly, a matter of being sensitive to reasons; second, acting freely is exclusively a function of having a certain kind of actual causal history. It is notoriously difficult to reconcile claims of this type. For being sensitive to reasons appears to be a modal property of agents, one that agents possess by virtue of their capacity to react (...) to reasons in _other_ possible worlds, and this seems to clash with the idea that acting freely is just a function of _actual_ causal histories. The chapter argues that the reconciliation can be achieved by focusing on the absences of certain reasons, and the role that those absences play in the actual causal history of the agent’s behavior. (shrink)

Background: Rising levels of burnout and decreasing job satisfaction can inhibit healthcare professionals from providing high-quality care due to a corresponding decrease in their ethical sensitivity. Aim: This study aimed to determine the relationship between the level of ethical sensitivity in emergency service nurses and their levels of burnout and job satisfaction. Research design: This research employed a descriptive and cross-sectional design. Participants and research context: This study was conducted with a sample of 236 nurses, all of whom (...) worked in emergency service between 24 July 2015 and 28 April 2016. Data were collected using the Moral Sensitivity Questionnaire, Maslach Burnout Inventory, and Minnesota Job Satisfaction Scale. Ethical considerations: This study was approved by the Institutional Ethics Review Board of Ondokuz Mayıs University. Findings: There was a weak and negative correlation (r = –0.158, p = 0.015) between Moral Sensitivity Questionnaire and Maslach Burnout Inventory scores. There was also a weak and negative correlation (r = –0.335, p < 0.001) between the Maslach Burnout Inventory and Minnesota Job Satisfaction Scale scores. Discussion and conclusion: Decreased job satisfaction and increased burnout levels among emergency service nurses might result in them indulging in improper practices, frequently facing ethical problems, and a decrease in the overall quality of service in hospitals. In order for emergency service nurses to recognize ethical problems and make the most accurate decisions, a high level of ethical sensitivity is critical. In this respect, it is suggested that continuing education after graduation and training programs should be organized. (shrink)

It is proposed here that there is a sensitive period in the first two to three years of life during which humans acquire a basic knowledge of what foods are safe to eat. In support of this, it is shown that willingness to eat a wide variety of foods is greatest between the ages of one and two years, and then declines to low levels by age four. These data also show that children who are introduced to solids unusually late (...) have a narrower diet breadth throughout childhood, perhaps because the duration of the sensitive period has been shortened. By reducing the costs associated with learning, a sensitive period for food learning should be adaptive for any omnivore (including early humans) that remains in the same environment throughout its life. (shrink)

Some contextually sensitive expressions are such that their context independent conventional meanings need to be in some way supplemented in context for the expressions to secure semantic values in those contexts. As we’ll see, it is not clear that there is a paradigm here, but ‘he’ used demonstratively is a clear example of such an expression. Call expressions of this sort supplementives in order to highlight the fact that their context independent meanings need to be supplemented in context for them (...) to have semantic values relative to the context. Many philosophers and linguists think that there is a lot of contextual sensitivity in natural language that goes well beyond the pure indexicals and supplementives like ‘he’. Constructions/expressions that are good candidates for being contextually sensitive include: quantifiers, gradable adjectives including “predicates of personal taste”, modals, conditionals, possessives and relational expressions taking implicit arguments. It would appear that in none of these cases does the expression/construction in question have a context independent meaning that when placed in context suffices to secure a semantic value for the expression/construction in the context. In each case, some sort of supplementation is required to do this. Hence, all these expressions are supplementives in my sense. For a given supplementive, the question arises as to what the mechanism is for supplementing its conventional meanings in context so as to secure a semantic value for it in context. That is, what form does the supplementation take? The question also arises as to whether different supplementives require different kinds of supplementation. Let us call an account of what, in addition to its conventional meaning, secures a semantic value for a supplementive in context a metasemantics for that supplementive. So we can put our two questions thus: what is the proper metasemantics for a given supplementive; and do all supplementives have the same metasemantics? In the present work, I sketch the metasemantics I formulated for demonstratives in earlier work. Next, I briefly consider a number of other supplementives that I think the metasemantics I propose plausibly applies to and explain why I think that. Finally, I consider the prospects for extending the account to all supplementives. In so doing, I take up arguments due to Michael Glanzberg to the effect that supplementives are governed by two different metasemantics and attempt to respond to them. (shrink)

We report the results of an investigation of nurses’ and physicians’ sensitivity to ethical dimensions of clinical practice. The sample consisted of 113 physicians working in general medical settings, 665 psychiatrists, 150 nurses working in general medical settings, and 145 nurses working in psychiatry. The instrument used was the Moral Sensitivity Questionnaire (MSQ), a self-reporting Likert-type questionnaire consisting of 30 assumptions related to moral sensitivity in health care practice. Each of these assumptions was categorized into a theoretical (...) dimension of moral sensitivity: relational orientation, structuring moral meaning, expressing benevolence, modifying autonomy, experiencing moral conflict, and following the rules. Significant differences in responses were found between health care professionals from general medical settings and those working in psychiatry. The former agreed to a greater extent with the assumptions in the categories ‘meaning’ and ‘autonomy’ and to a lesser degree with the categories ‘benevolence’ and ‘conflict’. Moreover, those from the psychiatric sector agreed to a greater extent to the use of coercion if necessary. Significant differences were also found for some of the MSQ categories, between physicians and nurses, and between males and females. (shrink)

The sensitivity principle in epistemology has faced numerous, considerable, and relentless challenges since it emerged in Nozick’s Philosophical Explanations (1981). In this paper, I develop a version of sensitivity, based on Dretske’s notion of conclusive reasons (1971), that responds to the complaint that sensitivity is either incompatible with or makes an unprincipled mess of higher-level knowledge. There are three key moves in formulating reasons-based Dretskean sensitivity (RDS). First, sensitivity is conceived in terms of reasons, rather (...) than beliefs, that track the truth. Second, focus shifts from whether S would have those reasons in the relevant counterfactual worlds to whether those reasons would be the case. Third, closer attention is paid to the structure of reasons. Critics of Nozick point out that, typically, even when S knows that they do not have a false belief that p, if S were to have a false belief that p, S would nonetheless believe that they do not have a false belief that p, violating Nozickean sensitivity. I explain how this fact does not preclude higher-level knowledge according to RDS, even if the false belief that p were based on their actual method. (shrink)

There is the sort of context-sensitivity that is hard-wired into particular lexical items, Kaplan-style; and then there is the sort of context-sensitivity that can enter into a sentence in virtue of the way that index parameters are ‘initialized’ by context. Call the former sort of context-sensitivity _indexical_, and the latter _parametric_. Philosophical thinking about context-sensitivity is dominated by a focus on the indexical variety. Indeed, ‘context-sensitive’ is often defined in ways that would make all context-sensitivity (...) indexical. Yet parametric context-sensitivity is arguably the more pervasive phenomenon. Drawing together some themes in recent work by Dilip Ninan, Brian Rabern, and Paolo Santorio, this chapter offers a study of parametric context-sensitivity. Attention to it is important for thinking straight about the relation between compositionality and content, about monsters, and about what it takes to motivate the context parameter of Kaplan’s two-dimensional semantics. (shrink)

Background and aim Ethical sensitivity of nurses often plays an important role in their occupational commitment and moral decision-making. In some working conditions, nurses are affected by ethical distress and fail to pursue correct ethical actions despite having knowledge and a tendency for moral practice. Therefore, the present study aimed to investigate the correlation between sensitivity and ethical distress in the nurses of patients with spinal cord injuries. Materials and methods This descriptive-analytical study was performed on 160 of (...) the nurses of patients with spinal cord injuries. The participants were selected through the purposive sampling method out of the nurses in Khatamolanbia and Sasan hospitals, Tehran, Iran. Data collection tools included the Moral Sensitivity Questionnaire by Han and Corley’s Moral Distress Scale. Data were analyzed by the independent t-test and Pearson correlation coefficient using the SPSS software version 19. Results The mean values of ethical sensitivity was 80.48 ± 14.45 and ethical distress among the subjects was 62.39 ± 3.54. Moreover, a significant negative correlation was observed between moral sensitivityand moral distress (P<0.05, r = −0.37). Conclusion According to the results of this study, increased ethical sensitivity is associated with diminished moral distress among the nurses of patients with spinal cord injuries. On the other hand, moral sensitivity is of considerable importance in nurses, especially in taking care of patients with special conditions. Consequently, it is recommended to provide some conditions for maintaining and enhancing ethical sensitivity in nurses taking care of patients with spinal cord injuries. (shrink)

Background In order to achieve the goals of the healthcare system, nursing managers are required to comply with ethical principles in decision-making. In complex and challenging healthcare settings, it is shown that the managers’ mere awareness of ethics does not suffice and managers need to be sensitive toward making ethical decisions. Aim To explore nursing managers and their sensitivity toward ethical decision-making by analyzing their related experiences. Method The current study has been conducted in Iran in 2017 through a (...) qualitative content analysis approach. Nineteen nurse managers were selected purposefully from different hospitals in Tehran. Data were collected using semi-structured, in-depth, face-to-face interviews, and after transcription, they were analyzed according to the Graneheim and Lundman method. Ethical considerations The research was approved by the ethics committee of Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran. Participants were informed about the purpose of the study and submitted written informed consents regarding their participation. The principle of autonomy, confidentiality, and anonymity was taken into account in data collection. Results Fifteen subcategories, three categories (assertiveness, commitment, and insight), and one theme of excellent decision-making were the results of data analysis. Discussion Findings showed that nursing managers’ sensitivity to ethical decision-making allows them to make the best decision by insight, commitment, and assertiveness. Making a morally excellent decision ensures that ethical principles are followed in the healthcare system. Conclusion Considering that most managers are committed to making ethical decisions, it is required to develop the scope of their insights even further using a professional management and ethical principles training program. Also, by addressing some of the ethical barriers at personal and organizational levels, the assertiveness in managers can be improved, which in turn can facilitate their ethical decision-making. (shrink)

Charles Travis presents a series of essays in which he has developed his distinctive view of the relation of thought to language. The key idea is "occasion-sensitivity": what it is for words to express a given concept is for them to be apt for contributing to any of many different conditions of correctness (notably truth conditions). Since words mean what they do by expressing a given concept, it follows that meaning does not determine truth conditions. This view ties thoughts (...) less tightly to the linguistic forms which express them than traditional views of the matter, and in two directions: a given linguistic form, meaning fixed, may express an indefinite variety of thoughts; one thought can be expressed in an indefinite number of syntactically and semantically distinct ways. Travis highlights the importance of this view for linguistic theory, and shows how it gives new form to a variety of traditional philosophical problems. (shrink)

This article is a survey of the literature on context sensitivity in the philosophy of language.

The paper argues against Sosa’s claim that sensitivity cannot be differentially supported over safety as the right requirement for knowledge. Its main contention is that, although all sensitive beliefs that should be counted as knowledge are also safe, some insensitive true beliefs that shouldn’t be counted as knowledge are nevertheless safe.

Jennifer Lackey challenges the sufficiency version of the knowledge-action principle, viz., that knowledge that p is sufficient to rationally act on p, by proposing a set of alleged counterexamples. Her aim is not only to attack the knowledge-action principle, but also to undermine an argument for subject-sensitive invariantism. Lackey holds that her examples are counterexamples to the sufficiency version of the knowledge-action principle because (a) S knows the proposition in question, but (b) it is not rational for S to act (...) on it. In this paper, first, I argue against (a) on intuitive and on theoretical grounds. Second, I point out that (b), even if combined with (a), is not sufficient to make for counterexamples to the knowledge-action principle of the relevant kind. Third, I offer two alternative explanations of the intuition Lackey relies on. If either one of them is right, (b) may not be satisfied in her examples. (shrink)

It is widely thought that if knowledge requires sensitivity, knowledge is not closed because sensitivity is not closed. This paper argues that there is no valid argument from sensitivity failure to non-closure of knowledge. Sensitivity does not imply non-closure of knowledge. Closure considerations cannot be used to adjudicate between safety and sensitivity accounts of knowledge.

Magnitude-sensitivity refers to the result that performance in decision-making, across domains and organisms, is affected by the total value of the possible alternatives. This simple result offers a window into fundamental issues in decision-making and has led to a reconsideration of ecological decision-making, prominent computational models of decision-making, and optimal decision-making. Moreover, magnitude-sensitivity has inspired the design of new robotic systems that exploit natural solutions and apply optimal decision-making policies. In this article, we review the key theoretical and (...) empirical results about magnitude-sensitivity and highlight the importance that this phenomenon has for the understanding of decision-making. Furthermore, we discuss open questions and ideas for future research. (shrink)