[Significantly updated in Chapter 6 of Awareness and the Substructure of Knowledge] In order for a reason to justify an action or attitude it must be one that is possessed by an agent. Knowledge-centric views of possession ground our possession of reasons, at least partially, either in our knowledge of them or in our being in a position to know them. On virtually all accounts, knowing P is some kind of non-accidental true belief that P. This entails that (...) knowing P is a kind of non-accidental true representation that P. I outline a novel theory of the epistemic requirement on possession in terms of this more general state of non-accidental true representation. It is just as well placed to explain the motivations behind knowledge-centric views of possession, and it is also better placed to explain the extent of the reasons we possess in certain cases of deductive belief-updates and cases involving environmental luck. I conclude with three reflections. First, I indicate how my arguments generate a dilemma for Errol Lord’s view that possessing reasons is just a matter of being in a position to manifest one’s knowledge how to use them. Second, I explain how my view can simultaneously manage cases of environmental luck without falling prey to lottery cases. Finally, I sketch the direction for a further range of counterexamples to knowledge-centric theories of possession. (shrink)

The traditional aim of Western social democracy has been to create a society that is a ‘common possession’ of its members (in T.H. Marshall's words). Social democratic politics has therefore been both society-making and membership-making, orienting people to a shared society as an object of attachment and loyalty, and nurturing membership-based conceptions of democracy and the welfare state. This aspiration to create a society that is the common possession of its members has underpinned many social justice movements. However, (...) some commentators argue that this model cannot address the most pressing issues of today's world, and that we need to find a way to theorize politics that does not rest on ideas that individuals are ‘members’ of ‘societies’, or on ideas that politics should aim to orient people to a shared society as an object of loyalty and a basis for solidarity. In this article, I explore whether the ideal of society as a common possession of its members can be redeemed in the face of these critiques, and in particular whether it can be pluralized in a way that respects the experiences and aspirations of racialized minorities and Indigenous peoples. (shrink)

The rationalist lover accepts that whom she ought to love is whom she has most reason to love. She also accepts that the qualities of a person are reasons to love them. This seems to suggest that if the rationalist lover encounters someone with better qualities than her beloved, then she is rationally required to trade up. In this paper, I argue that this need not be the case and the rationalist lover can have just about as normal if not (...) a better romantic life than anyone could hope for. This is because we often do possess most reason to love our beloveds. To see why this is so, we have to think more carefully about (i) how we come to possess reasons for love and (ii) the higher-order reasons that govern whether we should seek or refrain from possessing said reasons. Reflection on these issues leads to what I call the Possession-Commitment Account of Love’s Reasons. I use this account to address additional worries for love rationalism and highlight how being rational about love can potentially get us out of romantic messes. I conclude that if being a rationalist about love is plausible after all, then we have reason to hope that being rational about other areas of our practical lives is plausible as well. (shrink)

A basic problem of daily life is determining who owns what. One way that people may solve this problem is by relying on a ‘first possession’ heuristic, according to which the first person who possesses an object is its owner, even if others subsequently possess the object. We investigated preschoolers’ use of this heuristic in five experiments. In Experiments 1 and 2, 3- and 4-year-olds inferred that an object was owned by the character who possessed it first, even though (...) another character subsequently possessed it. Two-year-olds also showed this bias, but only when the object was placed between the characters when children were asked about ownership. Experiment 3 ruled out the possibility that children’s bias to select the first possessor results from a tendency to select the character first associated with the object. Experiment 4 showed that 3- and 4-year-olds have difficulty disregarding the first possession heuristic, even when provided with evidence that the character who first possessed an object is not its owner. But Experiment 5 found that children can disregard the heuristic in at least some situations. These five experiments suggest that the first possession heuristic guides children’s ownership inferences. The findings provide the first evidence that preschoolers can infer who owns what, when not explicitly told, and when not reasoning about objects with which they are personally acquainted. (shrink)

This paper investigates the structural reason why humanity continues to accelerate artificial intelligence development, despite widespread awareness of its existential risks. Applying Judgemental Philosophy, we argue that the problem is not one of knowledge or intent, but of judgemental displacement—a condition in which the Judgemental Triad (Constructivity, Coherence, Resonance) is externally dislocated and structurally unpossessed. Al becomes a field of judgement without return, where no subject can coherently own or halt the trajectory. We conclude that progress, when stripped of resonance, (...) becomes self-perpetuating—and unjudgeable. (shrink)

To investigate possible cognitive factors influencing the cross-cultural incidence of spirit possession concepts and to develop a more refined understanding of the precise contours of 'intuitive mind-body dualism', two studies were conducted that explored adults' intuitions about the relationship between minds and bodies. Specifically, the studies explored how participants reason about the effects of a hypothetical mind-migration across a range of behaviours. Both studies used hypothetical mind-transfer scenarios in which the mind of one person is transferred into the body (...) of another person. Participants were asked to reason about the new post-transfer person's behaviours and aptitudes. In Study 1, participants were provided with a scale on which they indicated their answers; in Study 2, participants responded to open-ended questions. In both studies, the majority of participants reasoned that while the post-transfer person's performance on physical tasks would be similar to the host performance on mental tasks would be similar to the person whose mind has been transferred. Further, participants tended to assume a complete displacement of minds, such that the post-transfer person's performance on mental task items was reasoned to be identical to incoming person's performance normally. The relevance of these findings for explaining the variable incidence and spread of different possession concepts is discussed. (shrink)

This paper explores an understudied and poorly understood phenomenon of morphological syncretism in which a morpheme otherwise used to mark the head of a possessive NP appears on words naming property concept (PC) states (states named by adjectives in languages with that lexical category; Dixon, Where have all the adjectives gone? And other essays in Semantics and Syntax, 1982) in predicative and attributive contexts. This phenomenon is found across a variety of unrelated languages. We examine its manifestation in Ulwa, an (...) endangered Misumalpan language of Nicaragua, where diachronic evidence clearly shows that a single affix is involved. We propose an explanation for the syncretism based on an explicit syntactic and semantic analysis of the relevant constructions. On the proposed explanation, the syncretism arises out of a combination of semantic and morphosyntactic facts of Ulwa grammar. Specifically, we propose that the Ulwa pattern exemplifies a possessive strategy of predication. Intuitively, this strategy is a manifestation in grammar of the idiomatic equivalence between the property of being F and the property of having F-ness. (shrink)

This paper investigates the historiographical utility of psychoanalysis, focussing in particular on retrospective explanations of demonic possession and exorcism. It is argued that while 'full-blown' psychoanalytic explanations-those that impose Oedipus complexes, anal eroticism or other sophisticated theoretical structures on the historical actors-may be vulnerable to the charge of anachronism, a weaker form of retrospective psychoanalysis can be defended as a legitimate historical lens. The paper concludes, however, by urging historians to look at psychoanalysis as well as trying to look (...) through it. Full-blown psychoanalysis is a bad historical lens but it may, in some cases, be an excellent explanatory template: a thorough understanding of how psychoanalytic therapy functions in the modern world is, for example, a good theoretical preparation for historians seeking to understand the sixteenth-century's demonological universe. (shrink)

This chapter discusses possessive and exceptive expressions that can be seen as determiners. Possessive determiners constitute a major form of possessive expressions in English and Swedish, whereas they do not occur in, for example, Italian or French, which instead predominantly use a postnominal (prepositional) form. The quantifiers denoted by such expressions are examined: their properties and the mechanisms by which they become the interpretations of simple or complex possessive and exceptive determiners. The extent to which the grammatical number of the (...) noun following a possessive determiner influences interpretation is considered. Even if the universal reading of possessives is often the default, sometimes existential and other readings are used as well. After mentioning certain compound noun-like possessive constructions, the concept of narrowing is examined. A much discussed characteristic of possessives, the freedom in how the ‘possessor’ relation is fixed, is also analysed. The monotonicity behavior, including smoothness of possessives, is also addressed. (shrink)

En este ensayo, examino dos problemas que cualquier teoría del saber cómo y en particular una teoría del saber como grupal debe tratar: el problema de la posesión, que es la necesidad de explicar como un grupo puede estar en un estado de saber como hacer algo, y el problema de la atribución, que es la necesidad de dar cuenta de las condiciones en las que es admisible atribuir saber como a un grupo. Argumento que (a pesar de ciertas apariencias (...) iniciales) estos problemas son independientes, lo que es especialmente importante en el contexto de teorías del saber cómo donde este no puede en general reducirse a actitudes proposicionales. (shrink)

A rational agent is someone who knows what she is doing and why; and we hold her responsible for her actions. However, in our everyday lives we often act automatically and even involuntarily. The aim of this paper is to motivate a reconsideration of agency such that we can conceive of basic forms of the unconscious, the involuntary and the unreflective as being part of human responsive agency. The paper dwells on the structure of self-experience in habits to reveal how (...) temporal displacements, disintegration and self-alienation are part of human self-experience. The central claim is that the responsive structure of habits form a possibility for re-appropriation of our own actions. This will allow us to acknowledge that a large part of our actions and decisions are less rational and deliberate than we might have hoped, while avoiding the unfortunate conclusion that such behaviour is impersonal and simply a complex form of reflex. (shrink)

The paper contrasts Kant's conception of original common possession of the earth with Hugo Grotius's superficially similar notion. The aim is not only to elucidate how much Kant departs from his natural law predecessors—given that Grotius's needs-based framework very much lines in with contemporary theorists’ tendency to reduce issues of global concern to questions of how to divide the world up, it also seeks to advocate Kant's global thinking as an alternative for current debates. Crucially, it is Kant's radical (...) shift in perspective—from an Archimedean ’view from nowhere‘, to a first-personal standpoint through which agents reflexively recognise their systematic interdependence in a world of limited space—that provides him with the more thorough and ultimately convincing global standpoint. This standpoint does not come with ready-made solutions to shared global problems, but provides a promising perspective from which to theorise them. (shrink)

This paper answers critical responses to the author’s “A Theory of Concepts and Concept Possession.” The paper begins with a discussion of candidate counterexamples to the proposed analysis of concept possession -- including, e.g., a discussion of its relationship to Frank Jackson’s Mary example. Second, questions concerning the author’s general methodological approach are considered. For instance, it is shown that -- contrary to the critics’ suggestions -- an analysis of concept possession cannot invoke belief alone, but must (...) also invoke intuition. Finally, a defense is given for the realist framework within which the theory of concepts, and of their possession conditions, is formulated. (shrink)

It is widely believed that Twin-Earth-style thought experiments show that the contents of a person's thoughts fail to supervene on her intrinsic properties. Several recent philosophers have made the further claim that Twin-Earth-style thought experiments produce metaphysically necessary conditions for the possession of certain concepts. I argue that the latter view is false, and produce counterexamples to several proposed conditions. My thesis is of particular interest because it undermines some attempts to show that externalism is incompatible with privileged access.

Paulus Knorr von Rosenroth wrote a lengthy report on three cases of demonic possession in Graz in 1599–1600, just as tension between Catholics and Lutherans brought the threat of civil war. The appearance of a peasant girl who claimed to be possessed by evil spirits became important for Catholic clergy, who hoped to demonstrate that only believers in the true faith were given the divine power to expel demons. Two more cases of demonic possession were observed in the (...) city, one of which involved a member of court society, and even Archduke Ferdinand and his family attended the exorcisms. Knorr von Rosenroth was one of those who conducted the exorcisms, but his report was denied episcopal approval and the manuscript disappeared in the diocesan archive for four hundred years. (shrink)

An important question for evidentialism is: what does it take to have evidence? Feldman (2004) and McGrath (2018) argue that evidence possession requires more than psychological access—it must also satisfy an epistemic condition, such as being justified. In this paper, I argue that the epistemic condition either results in a problematic regress or denies internalism unless one distinguishes between two senses of evidence possession. Developing this distinction helps to clarify the structure and nature of our evidence. In particular, (...) it shows that one’s evidence, at a fundamental level, is self-supporting and consists of one’s mental states rather than their propositional contents. (shrink)

Two major factors have to be considered to account for Neugebauer’s “Weltanschauung”, in particular his apparent or real rejection of philosophical or political judgments. On the one hand, Neugebauer, as a mathematician and a historian, had to cope, with the double character of mathematics as a science in its continuity and universality, independent of time, and of mathematics as a characteristic and fundamental product of each individual culture. On the other hand emphasis has to be put on Neugebauer being torn (...) between organizational work (institution building, reviewing, editing) and historical research. One has to consider the vicissitudes of Neugebauer’s long and eventful life, which was highlighted by a series of highs and lows and marked by many contradictory, often frustrating and sobering political experiences, mainly connected to repeated emigration. (shrink)

Does it make sense to think of eternal life not as an unending continuation of life subsequent to death but as fully actualized in one’s present mortal and finite life? After outlining conceptual and moral reasons for being troubled by the notion of an endless life, this article draws upon the thought of major Christian theologians and philosophers of religion to expound the idea of eternal life as a possession exclusively of the life one is presently living. Supplementing the (...) claims of religious thinkers with notions of four-dimensionalism and eternalism from theoretical physics and the philosophy of time, and considering important objections to the conception of eternal life in question, I argue for both the conception’s intelligibility and its ethical and spiritual profundity. (shrink)

John Campbell; IX*—Possession of Concepts, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 85, Issue 1, 1 June 1985, Pages 149–170, https://doi.org/10.1093/aris.

Boyer's minimalist model of human ownership psychology overlooks important cues that children provide in their development leading them from pre-conceptual to conceptual (symbolic) expressions of the basic feeling experience of control over things, qua ownership in the most basic psychological sense. Appeal for innate core knowledge and evolutionary logic blows out the light of this rich and unique ontogenetic progression.

In Mali, during the 1980s Islamization of Bèlèdugu, the local dismantling of secret societies has been followed by an increase of spirit possession cults (jinèton). Their expansion was made possible by their therapeutic success and by their ability to use their initiatory worship apparatus to convert novice “possessees” to a form of relationship with the jinn that was experienced and understood according to the “possession trance” and “executive possession” models. This text describes and analyses how afflicted villagers (...) acquired the singular ability to experience the relinquishing of their own agency and the concomitant take-over of their body by this kind of invisible agent. It argues that these learning processes rely on the prior existence of a type of declarative and procedural religious knowledge regarding other ritualised forms of possession practised in the region. Moreover, it claims that these learning processes consist in the double triggering of an intuitive mind-body dualism and of neurocognitive modules connected to the Theory of Mind. (shrink)

According to the traditional conception of epistemic responsibilist virtue, virtuous traits are evaluatively and conceptually primary. Virtuous acts are derived from, or proceed from, virtue. If an agent performs an act based on good epistemic motives but does not possess the virtue, it is merely an act that a virtuous agent would perform, but is not itself virtuous. In contrast, according to the view I propose and call Act First Responsibilism (AFR), virtuous acts are evaluatively and conceptually primary. Acts based (...) on good motives are virtuous regardless of whether they issue from a virtuous trait. The possession of a virtuous trait is defined derivatively in terms of the performance of virtuous acts. With the new dispositional model of virtues I propose, AFR provides the metaphysical foundation for taking virtuous acts as evaluatively and conceptually primary. I argue that AFR is not normatively slight, meets the demands of an exemplarist virtue theory, and fares better than the traditional view in explaining, predicting, understanding, and evaluating an agent, as well as considering someone worthy of imitation. (shrink)

Aristotle argued that you need some wealth to live well. The Stoics argued that you could live well with or without wealth. But the Cynics argued that wealth is a hinderance. For the Cynics, a good life consists in self-sufficiency, or being able to rule and help yourself. You accomplish this by living simply and naturally, and by subjecting yourself to rigorous philosophical exercises. Cynics confronted people to get them to abandon extraneous possessions and positions of power to live better. (...) And while the Cynics were experts in living in this way, their ascetic lifestyles made their message curious to some audiences. This paper reflects on Cynic ascetic practices and the ways others perceived them. (shrink)

Epistemicism about reason possession holds that one possesses a fact as a normative reason just in case one has appropriate epistemic access to that fact. This paper argues that (i) the purely epistemic view of reason possession is untenable, as it fails to account for the role of reasoning abilities in possessing normative reasons; (ii) possessing a normative reason requires both the general and specific ability to respond to that reason; (iii) these abilities consist of four particular components—the (...) deliberative ability, the enkratic ability, the instrumental ability, and the executive ability; and (iv) they should be analyzed in terms of dispositions to respond correctly to one’s normative reasons when one tries to do so. By way of defense and further elaboration, I respond to a series of objections to this new ability-based account of reason possession. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend a reasons-first view of epistemic justification, according to which the justification of our beliefs arises entirely in virtue of the epistemic reasons we possess. I remove three obstacles for this view, which result from its presupposition that epistemic reasons have to be possessed by the subject: the problem that reasons-first accounts of justification are necessarily circular; the problem that they cannot give special epistemic significance to perceptual experience; the problem that they have to say that (...) implicit biases provide epistemic. The first problem will be overcome by introducing presentational attitudes that are not in need of justification as basic ways of possessing epistemic reasons. The latter two problems will be solved by introducing epistemic rational capacities of two different kinds, which are exercised in mental states that are ways of possessing epistemic reasons, and by distinguishing these from mental states that are not exercises of epistemic rational capacities. (shrink)

The paper contrasts Kant's conception of original common possession of the earth with Hugo Grotius's superficially similar notion. The aim is not only to elucidate how much Kant departs from his natural law predecessors—given that Grotius's needs-based framework very much lines in with contemporary theorists’ tendency to reduce issues of global concern to questions of how to divide the world up, it also seeks to advocate Kant's global thinking as an alternative for current debates. Crucially, it is Kant's radical (...) shift in perspective—from an Archimedean ’view from nowhere‘, to a first-personal standpoint through which agents reflexively recognise their systematic interdependence in a world of limited space—that provides him with the more thorough and ultimately convincing global standpoint. This standpoint does not come with ready-made solutions to shared global problems, but provides a promising perspective from which to theorise them. (shrink)

Influential holistic analyses of patient perspectives assume that the concepts that patients associate with medical terms are formed by their total social and cultural contexts. Holistic analyses presuppose conceptual role semantics in the sense that they imply that a medical term must have the same role for a nurse and a patient in order for them to associate the same concept with the term. In recent philosophy of mind, social externalism has emerged as a non‐holistic alternative to conceptual role theories. (...) According to social externalism, a nurse and a patient express the same concept by a term if they both have a minimal or better understanding of the term. Three arguments in favour of social externalism are presented in connection with nurse–patient interaction. The first concerns successful communication, the second focuses on belief reports made by patients and the third centres on the need for including medical terms in medical discourse. Finally, the practical implications of the arguments are clarified. The most important of these is that, in cases of misunderstanding, a nurse should not conform to a patient's idiosyncratic understanding, but instead correct the mistaken applications of the term in question. (shrink)

In the Phaedo, to explain why the philosopher lives in the unusually ascetic way he does, Socrates explains what someone realizes when philosophy takes possession of his soul and how he changes his behavior on the basis of this information. This paper considers the conception of belief the character uses in this explanation and whether it is the same as the conception Michael Frede thinks the historical Socrates is likely to have held and that the Stoics much later incorporated (...) into their doctrine of practice. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 107 Heft: 1 Seiten: 160-178.

The Evil God (EG) challenge alleges that because arguments used to support belief in a Good God (GG) can be mirrored by the EG hypothesis, then belief in the former is no more reasonable than belief in the latter. Thus, there is an epistemic symmetry between both hypotheses. This paper argues that one of the EG’s secondary traits, specifically his maximal possessiveness, would render it very likely, if not certain, that the EG would _not_ create anything at all. By contrast, (...) the GG would very likely create. Consequently, the existence of anything non-divine would generate a significant asymmetry between the hypotheses—one that favors the GG hypothesis. Moreover, strategies to overcome this argument fail, and as such, the EG challenge is severely undermined. (shrink)

Participants in Northern Brazilian Tambor de Mina dance and spirit possession rituals demonstrate three principal discourses concerning memory and states of consciousness during possession. Most dancers claim, as "unconscious" mediums, to remember essentially nothing of their trance experiences. Many, however, speak of "faked" or incomplete forms of possession. In fact, my research eventually revealed that some experienced mediums and religious leaders regard, if secretly, "conscious" possession to be a more—not less—advanced form of mediumship. I consider some (...) potential implications of the apparent growth, particularly due to the influence of European origin Kardecist and other spiritist movements, of conscious mediumship in this Afro-Brazilian tradition. (shrink)

It is fundamental assumption in nursing theory that it is important for nurses to understand how patients experience states of ill health. This assumption is often related to aims of empathic understanding, but normative principles of social interpretation can have an important action‐guiding role whenever nurses seek to understand patients’ subjective horizons on the basis of active or passive expressions of meaning. The aim of this article is to present a philosophical theory of concept possession and to argue that (...) it can shed light on how nurses should seek to understand patients’ subjective perspectives on the meaning of illness. The two basic ideas in the theory are that patients’ beliefs and thoughts about their experiences involve concepts and that concepts can be communicated on the basis of shared implicit conceptions of what they mean. These conditions of understanding have a striking application: nurse‐patient communication is limited by many contextual factors, but it is often possible for nurses to detect shared implicit conceptions of the meaning of concepts of disease and illness. Furthermore, by acting as sympathetic linguistic experts and creating an atmosphere for dialogue, nurses can make patients feel comfortable about deferring to medical explanations of meaning that can constitute a communicative platform. The last part of the article uses a number of cases studies to show how these implications can be implemented as conceptual tools for securing meaningful communication about illness experiences in patient dialogue. (shrink)

Įmonių restruktūrizavimas yra priemonė, skirta mokumo problemų turinčioms įmonėms išsaugoti. Vienas svarbiausių restruktūrizavimo proceso ypatumų yra tai, kad įmonės veiklai šio proceso metu toliau vadovauja įmonės valdymo organai, tačiau tam tikrais atvejais procesui administruoti gali būti skiriamas ir nemokumo administratorius. Šiame straipsnyje nagrinėjama, koks yra savo turtu disponuojančio skolininko principo turinys, analizuojama, kodėl jis yra taikomas restruktūrizavimo procese ir ar jo taikymas leidžia pasiekti restruktūrizavimo proceso tikslus. Apžvelgiama, koks yra šio principo turinys Europos Sąjungos ir Lietuvos nemokumo teisėje ir kokios (...) yra nemokumo administratoriaus funkcijos jį paskyrus restruktūrizavimo procese. Taip pat analizuojama, kokias funkcijas restruktūrizavimo procese turėtų atlikti nemokumo administratorius ir kaip jo atliekamos funkcijos yra suderinamos su įmonės valdymo organų kompetencija. (shrink)

The common law has long maintained that, where a defendant has tortiously interfered with a chattel that was in the claimant’s possession at the time of the wrong, the claimant is, in general, to be presumed to be the ‘absolute and complete owner’ of the chattel. It is argued in this article that the rule lacks a satisfactory justificatory basis: the justification that has been endorsed by the courts is fatally flawed, and the main alternative justifications that have been (...) advanced in the academic literature are also unsatisfactory. If an adequate foundation cannot be found, the rule should be abolished and, if it were to be abolished, there are, it is suggested, good reasons to introduce a similar, but importantly different, rule of presumption. (shrink)