This paper addresses what we consider to be the most pressing challenge for the emerging science of consciousness: the measurement problem of consciousness. That is, by what methods can we determine the presence of and properties of consciousness? Most methods are currently developed through evaluation of the presence of consciousness in humans and here we argue that there are particular problems in application of these methods to nonhuman cases—what we call the indicator validity problem and the extrapolation problem. The (...) first is a problem with the application of indicators developed using the differences between conscious and unconscious processing in humans to the identification of other conscious vs. nonconscious organisms or systems. The second is a problem in extrapolating any indicators developed in humans or other organisms to artificial systems. However, while pressing ethical concerns add urgency to the attribution of consciousness and its attendant moral status to nonhuman animals and intelligent machines, we cannot wait for certainty and we advocate the use of a precautionary principle to avoid causing unintentional harm. We also intend that the considerations and limitations discussed in this paper can be used to further analyze and refine the methods of consciousness science with the hope that one day we may be able to solve the measurement problem of consciousness. (shrink)

Thick concepts, namely those concepts that describe and evaluate simultaneously, present a challenge to science. Since science does not have a monopoly on value judgments, what is responsible research involving such concepts? Using measurement of wellbeing as an example, we first present the options open to researchers wishing to study phenomena denoted by such concepts. We argue that while it is possible to treat these concepts as technical terms, or to make the relevant value judgment in-house, the responsible thing (...) to do, especially in the context of public policy, is to make this value judgment through a legitimate political process that includes all the stakeholders of this research. We then develop a participatory model of measurement based on the ideal of co-production. To show that this model is feasible and realistic, we illustrate it with a case study of co-production of a concept of thriving conducted by the authors in collaboration with a UK anti-poverty charity Turn2us. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to distinguish and analyze several difficulties confronting attempts to reconcile the fundamental quantum mechanical dynamics with Born''s rule. It is shown that many of the proposed accounts of measurement fail at least one of the problems. In particular, only collapse theories and hidden variables theories have a chance of succeeding, and, of the latter, the modal interpretations fail. Any real solution demands new physics.

This book traces how such a seemingly immutable idea as measurement proved so malleable when it collided with the subject matter of psychology. It locates philosophical and social influences reshaping the concept and, at the core of this reshaping, identifies a fundamental problem: the issue of whether psychological attributes really are quantitative. It argues that the idea of measurement now endorsed within psychology actually subverts attempts to establish a genuinely quantitative science and it urges a new direction. It (...) relates views on measurement by thinkers such as Holder, Russell, Campbell and Nagel to earlier views, like those of Euclid and Oresme. Within the history of psychology, it considers contributions by Fechner, Cattell, Thorndike, Stevens and Suppes, among others. It also contains a non-technical exposition of conjoint measurement theory and recent foundational work by leading measurement theorist R. Duncan Luce. (shrink)

At first sight, measurement might appear to be a natural candidate for a scientific practice that is value-free. This chapter reviews prominent arguments supporting the opposite view, i.e., that values play significant roles in measurement practices. Some of the arguments reviewed concern background assumptions underlying the pursuit of measurement and shaping its character. Other arguments focus on the various socially significant consequences of measurement practices (or aspects thereof), while still others focus on the content of the (...) concepts being measured and how scientists specify such contents. In discussing these arguments, the chapter aims to demonstrate the importance of greater engagement between the values-in-science literature and the historical-philosophical literature on measurement. (shrink)

The paper presents an argument for treating certain types of computer simulation as having the same epistemic status as experimental measurement. While this may seem a rather counterintuitive view it becomes less so when one looks carefully at the role that models play in experimental activity, particularly measurement. I begin by discussing how models function as “measuring instruments” and go on to examine the ways in which simulation can be said to constitute an experimental activity. By focussing on (...) the connections between models and their various functions, simulation and experiment one can begin to see similarities in the practices associated with each type of activity. Establishing the connections between simulation and particular types of modelling strategies and highlighting the ways in which those strategies are essential features of experimentation allows us to clarify the contexts in which we can legitimately call computer simulation a form of experimental measurement. (shrink)

This work develops an epistemology of measurement, that is, an account of the conditions under which measurement and standardization methods produce knowledge as well as the nature, scope, and limits of this knowledge. I focus on three questions: (i) how is it possible to tell whether an instrument measures the quantity it is intended to? (ii) what do claims to measurement accuracy amount to, and how might such claims be justified? (iii) when is disagreement among instruments a (...) sign of error, and when does it imply that instruments measure different quantities? Based on a series of case studies conducted in collaboration with the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), I argue for a model-based approach to the epistemology of physical measurement. To measure a physical quantity, I argue, is to estimate the value of a parameter in an idealized model of a physical process. Such estimation involves inference from the final state (‘indication’) of a process to the value range of a parameter (‘outcome’) in light of theoretical and statistical assumptions. Contrary to contemporary philosophical views, measurement outcomes cannot be obtained by mapping the structure of indications. Instead, measurement outcomes as well as claims to accuracy, error and quantity individuation can only be adjudicated relative to a choice of idealized modelling assumptions. (shrink)

The quantum measurement problem has resisted resolution for nearly a century, fragmenting into three seemingly independent challenges: the Born rule's probabilistic interpretation, the EPR paradox of simultaneous reality, and Bell inequality violations challenging local realism. This fragmentation has obscured a common structural origin. -/- This work demonstrates that all three problems arise from a single theoretical defect: the misapplication of commutative probability theory to non-commutative operational structures. Within the framework of Cognitional Mechanics (CM), grounded in two axioms—non-commutativity ([Ô_A, Ô_B] (...) ≠ 0) and finite operational resolution (Level of Detail)—these problems dissolve simultaneously through structural reconstruction. -/- The Born rule emerges as the unique projection measure compatible with resource conservation and tensor-product linearity under non-commutative constraints, repositioning probability as an epistemic consequence of finite resolution rather than ontological randomness. EPR correlations are resolved as constraint propagation across shared operational stacks, eliminating the apparent conflict between quantum completeness and local realism without invoking non-local signaling. Bell inequality violations follow from the logical impossibility of factorization: non-commutativity structurally excludes the simultaneous eigenstates required by the factorization condition, rendering the measure space for joint distributions undefined rather than merely violated. -/- The framework derives from Tier 1 axiomatic necessity within Cognitional Mechanics. Mathematical formalisms—Hilbert spaces, operator algebras, measure theory—serve as Tier 3 projection tools expressing this structure, not as foundational requirements for its validity. -/- This paper builds on Operational Quantum Mechanics I (DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.18649525), which resolved Schrödinger's cat through operational stack management, and forms a symmetrical counterpart to Universal Relativity (DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.18645324) within the CM framework. (shrink)

This is a book about the Hilbert space formulation of quantum mechanics and its measurement theory. It contains a synopsis of what became of the Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics since von Neumann's classic treatise with this title. Fundamental non-classical features of quantum mechanics-indeterminacy and incompatibility of observables, unavoidable measurement disturbance, entanglement, nonlocality-are explicated and analysed using the tools of operational quantum theory. The book is divided into four parts: 1. Mathematics provides a systematic exposition of the Hilbert (...) space and operator theoretic tools and relevant measure and integration theory leading to the Naimark and Stinespring dilation theorems; 2. Elements develops the basic concepts of quantum mechanics and measurement theory with a focus on the notion of approximate joint measurability; 3. Realisations offers in-depth studies of the fundamental observables of quantum mechanics and some of their measurement implementations; and 4. Foundations discusses a selection of foundational topics (quantum-classical contrast, Bell nonlocality, measurement limitations, measurement problem, operational axioms) from a measurement theoretic perspective. The book is addressed to physicists, mathematicians and philosophers of physics with an interest in the mathematical and conceptual foundations of quantum physics, specifically from the perspective of measurement theory. (shrink)

The decision-theoretic account of probability in the Everett or many-worlds interpretation, advanced by David Deutsch and David Wallace, is shown to be circular. Talk of probability in Everett presumes the existence of a preferred basis to identify measurement outcomes for the probabilities to range over. But the existence of a preferred basis can only be established by the process of decoherence, which is itself probabilistic.

This paper challenges “traditional measurement-accuracy realism”, according to which there are in nature quantities of which concrete systems have definite values. An accurate measurement outcome is one that is close to the value for the quantity measured. For a measurement of the temperature of some water to be accurate in this sense requires that there be this temperature. But there isn’t. Not because there are no quantities “out there in nature” but because the term ‘the temperature of (...) this water’ fails to refer owing to idealization and failure of specificity in picking out concrete cases. The problems can be seen as an artifact of vagueness, and so doing facilitates applying Eran Tal’s robustness account of measurement accuracy to suggest an attractive way of understanding vagueness in terms of the function of idealization, a way that sidesteps the problems of higher order vagueness and that shows how idealization provides a natural generalization of what it is to be vague. (shrink)

We employ a pragmatist model of inquiry to explain how measurement in physics can solve the problem of usefulness. In spite of the fact that a variety of resources, including theory, simulation, heuristics, rules of thumb, and practical considerations contribute to the context of a specific measurement inquiry, the measurement inquiry process partially decontextualizes its results, making them useful for other inquiries. This measurement inquiry process involves a process of transformation of data we call “entheorization,” which (...) happens in conjunction with the evaluation of uncertainty of measurement results. These uncertainty estimates then serve to define the sensitivity of the result to the aims of subsequent inquiries. On this approach, the epistemology of measurement requires treating measurement procedure, uncertainty estimation, and sensitivity to targets of inquiry as equally fundamental to understanding how measurement yields knowledge. To help understand how the abstract elements of our epistemological model of experimental inquiries are applicable to concrete episodes of measurement, we use the example of the W-boson mass measurement at the Large Hadron Collider to illustrate our arguments. (shrink)

Psychological measurement has received strong criticism throughout the history of psychological science. Nevertheless, measurements of attributes such as emotions or intelligence continue to be widely used in research and society. I address this puzzle by presenting a new causal perspective to psychological measurement. I start with assumptions that both critics and proponents of psychological measurement are likely to accept: a minimal causal condition and the observation that most psychological concepts are ill-defined or ambiguous. Based on this, I (...) argue that psychological measurement is fundamentally different from measurement in the physical sciences but can nevertheless be useful. (shrink)

The kinds of models discussed in this paper function as measuring instruments. We will concentrate on two necessary steps for measurement: (1) the search of a mathematical representation of the phenomenon; (2) this representation should cover an invariant relationship between the properties of the phenomenon to be measured and observable accociated attributes of a measuring instrument. Therefore, the measuring instrument should function as a nomological machine. However, invariant relationships are not necessarily ceteris paribus regularities, but could also occur when (...) the influence of the environment is negligible. Then we are able to achieve accurate measurements outside the laboratory. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that the difference between standard measurement and proxy measurement in paleoclimatology should not be understood in terms of ‘directness’. Measurements taken by climatologists to be paradigmatically non-proxy exhibit the kinds of indirectness that are thought to separate them proxy measurement. Rather, proxy measurements and standard measurements differ in how they account for confounding causal factors. Measurements are ‘proxy’ to the extent that the measurements require vicarious controls, while measurements are not proxy, but (...) rather ‘standard’, to the extent that the measurement apparatus provides sufficient physical control on its own. Guided by this account of proxy measurement, we then consider some of the challenges specific to historical proxy measurement and how it is that historical scientists address these challenges. Historical scientists rely on significant causal dependencies and naturally preserved signals to mitigate the influence of destructive processes over time. (shrink)

Human meaning, understood as the structure of what matters, what threatens, and what restores, emerges from viability regulation: the ongoing physiological process by which organisms maintain themselves within the bounds of continued functioning. This paper develops that claim into a precise epistemological argument with immediate consequences for psychological practice, cognitive modeling, and AI system design. Stress regulatory systems are characterized by hysteresis, the tendency to persist in dysregulated states long after the original stressor has been removed, and by a structural (...) measurement asymmetry: the internal variables that determine which regulatory regime a person currently occupies are latent, person-specific, and recoverable only partially from behavioral or linguistic observation. The epistemic consequence is that two people can be observationally equivalent from the outside over days or weeks, while inhabiting opposite internal states that require opposite actions for recovery and viability. Any intelligence operating exclusively on external signals, including large language models and AI-assisted wellness systems, will be systematically under-calibrated in exactly the contexts where calibration matters most: near stress thresholds, during post-stressor recovery, and in the early stages of burnout or trauma response. This paper offers a non-metaphysical account of why embodiment is cognitively relevant, identifies a specific and bounded failure mode for disembodied AI in psychological and clinical contexts, and reframes the common inferential error "you seem fine, therefore you are fine" as a measurement problem with concrete implications for clinical practice, occupational health, and AI system design. (shrink)

There is a received view on measurement scales. It includes both a classification of scales and a set of prescriptions regarding measurement inferences. This article casts doubt on the adequacy of this received view. To do this, I propose an epistemic characterization of the ordinal/interval distinction, that is, one in terms of researchers’ beliefs. This novel characterization reveals the ordinal/interval distinction as too coarse grained and thus the received view as too restrictive of a framework for measurement (...) research. (shrink)

Philosophers and metrologists have refuted the view that measurement’s epistemic privilege in scientific practice is explained by its theory-neutrality. Rather, they now explicitly appeal to the role that theories play in measurement. I formulate a challenge for this view: scientists sometimes ascribe epistemic privilege to measurements even if they lack a shared theory about their target quantity, which I illustrate through a case study from early geodesy. Drawing on that case, I argue that the epistemic privilege of (...) class='Hi'>measurement precedes shared background theory and is better explained by its pre-theoretic function in enabling a distinctive kind of inquiry. (shrink)

The Narrative Entropy formula Sₙ = ∫(If × Cb) dt has been formally published and registered (Bulut, 2026a). However, the operational procedures for assigning numerical values to Information Friction (If) and Causal Branching (Cb) — and for ensuring that independent raters produce consistent scores — have not previously been specified. This gap reduces Sₙ from a calculable metric to a qualitative label, undermining the reproducibility that is the Bulut Doctrine's core methodological commitment. This document closes that gap. It provides: (1) (...) operational definitions with discrete scoring anchors for If and Cb; (2) a standardised annotation procedure for applying scores to narrative text segments; (3) a statistical inter-rater reliability protocol based on Cohen's weighted kappa; and (4) worked examples demonstrating the full calculation pipeline from raw text to final Sₙ value. Upon adoption of this protocol, Sₙ becomes a fully operationalised metric satisfying the standards of empirical measurement. (shrink)

My thesis is that there are good reasons for a philosophical account of measurement to deal primarily with the properties or magnitudes of objects measured, rather than with the objects themselves. The account I present here embodies both a realism about measurement and a realism about the existence of the properties involved in measurement. It thus provides an alternative to most current treatments of measurement, many of which are operationalistic or conventionalistic, and nearly all of which (...) are nominalistic.1 This enables the present account to give better explanations of a number of features of measurement and other aspects of science than competing accounts of measurement can, and to be more readily integrated into a realist account of natural laws and causation. It also illustrates a general strategy for combining a familiar and powerful approach to representation with intensional entities like properties, which I think can be useful for dealing with a number of philosophical problems. (shrink)

Are widely used measurements in the human sciences (say happiness surveys or depression scales) quantitative or merely ordinal? If they are merely ordinal, could they be developed into quantitative measurements, just like in the progression from thermoscopes to thermometers? Taking inspiration from recent philosophy of measurement, some practitioners express optimism about future human science measurements. The so-called quantity objection stands out for having the only chance of settling the debate in favour of the pessimists. It claims that the problem (...) lies not with current, or likely future, measurement practices in the human sciences, but with human science attributes themselves—they just are not quantitative, but merely ordinal. Hence, they cannot not (thus will not) be measured quantitatively. The argument has a long and distinguished pedigree. This paper assesses old and recent versions of it, namely: the objection made originally to Fechner’s psychophysics by von Kries (among others) and Michell’s recent version of this objection. To do so, the paper first draws important distinctions between different versions of the argument that have been overlooked. Then, it argues that none of the versions of the quantity objection provide a good reason for the optimists to give up their optimism. In particular, Michell’s argument characterizes the measurand (that is, the attribute to be measured) in a way that optimists do not and need not accept. Yet the optimists’ defence articulated here brings with it serious burdens to discharge. The ball is in their court. (shrink)

The development of nineteenth-century geodetic measurement challenges the dominant coherentist account of measurement success. Coherentists argue that measurements of a quantity are epistemically successful if their numerical outcomes converge across varying contextual constraints. Aiming at numerical convergence, in turn, offers an operational aim for scientists to solve problems of coordination. Geodesists faced such a problem of coordination between two indicators of the earth’s ellipticity, which were both based on imperfect ellipsoid models. While not achieving numerical convergence, their measurements (...) produced novel data that grounded valuable theoretical hypotheses. Consequently, they ought to be regarded as epistemically successful. This insight warrants a dynamic revision of coherentism, allowing to judge the success of a metric based on both its coherence and fruitfulness. On that view, scientific measurement aims to coordinate theoretical definitions and produce novel data and theoretical insights. (shrink)

Putnam and Searle famously argue against computational theories of mind on the skeptical ground that there is no fact of the matter as to what mathematical function a physical system is computing: both conclude (albeit for somewhat different reasons) that virtually any physical object computes every computable function, implements every program or automaton. There has been considerable discussion of Putnam's and Searle's arguments, though as yet there is little consensus as to what, if anything, is wrong with these arguments. In (...) the present paper we show that an analogous line of reasoning can be raised against the numerical measurement (i.e., numerical representation) of physical magnitudes, and we argue that this result is a reductio ad absurdum of the challenge to computational skepticism. We then use this reductio to get clearer about both (i) what's wrong with Putnam's and Searle's arguments against computationalism, and (ii) what can be learned about both computational implementation and numerical measurement from the shortcomings of both sorts of skeptical argument. (shrink)

We review briefly the quantum potential approach to quantum theory, and show that it yields a completely consistent account of the measurement process, including especially what has been called the “collapse of the wave function.” This is done with the aid of a new concept of active information, which enables us to describe the evolution of a physical system as a unique actuality, in principle independent of any observer (so that we can, for example, provide a simple and coherent (...) answer to the Schrödinger cat paradox). Finally, we extend this approach to relativistic quantum field theories, and show that it leads to results that are consistent with all the known experimental implications of the theory of relativity, despite the nonlocality which this approach entails. (shrink)

The Representational Theory of Measurement is the best known account of the kind of representation measurement requires. However, RTM has been challenged from various angles, with critics claiming e.g. that RTM fails to account for actual measurement practice and that it is ambiguous about the nature of measurable attributes. In this paper I use the critical literature on RTM to formulate Representation Minimalism – a characterization of what measurement-relevant representation requires at the minimum. I argue that (...) Representation Minimalism avoids the main problems with RTM while acknowledging its usefulness as the formal foundation of representation in measurement. (shrink)

Contemporary scientific knowledge is largely structured around probabilistic models, measurement theory, and causal inference. However, this framework often fails to account for the asymptotic stabilization of meaning, the recursive formation of understanding, and the global coherence that underlies cognition in both biological and synthetic systems. This paper proposes a radical shift — from probabilistic computation to resonant epistemology, where knowledge emerges not through discrete measurement or statistical optimization, but through:  interference of phase trajectories,  asymptotic alignment,  (...) observer-centered coherence. Drawing on insights from quantum mechanics, process philosophy, and computational neuroscience, we argue that cognition is better understood as a dynamic interplay of phase relations rather than as an outcome of symbolic logic or numerical probability. We introduce the concept of improbabilistic intelligence, where truth is not determined, but stabilized within a field of potentials. This paradigm shift challenges traditional notions of causality, objectivity, and certainty, offering a new grammar of difference — one where knowledge forms through coherence dynamics, not through prediction. (shrink)

It is argued, in this paper, that the core operation underlying any measurement—the inverse modelling under uncertainty—is equivalent to quantitative abductive reasoning which consists in the selection of the best estimate of a measurand in a set of admissible solutions, using a priori information: on the measurand, on the measuring system coupled with an object under measurement, and on the influence of the environment including the user of the measurement results. There are two key premises of this (...) claim: a systematic interpretation of measurement in terms of inverse problems, proposed earlier by the author, and a logical link between inverse problems and abduction, identified by the Finnish philosopher of science Ilkka Niiniluoto. The title claim of this paper is illustrated with an expanded example of measuring optical spectrum by means of a low-resolution spectrometer. (shrink)

It remains controversial whether the human sciences can quantify the phenomena they study. The feasibility of quantification is usually assessed by identifying similarities and differences to quantitative measurement in physics. We argue that the case studies used to exemplify physical measurement are not sufficiently representative to underwrite such assessments. We substantiate this thesis by reconstructing how seismologists quantified “earthquake size.” Seismology demonstrates that quantification can succeed under conditions that, on the one hand, differ from canonical case studies and, (...) on the other, resemble those of the human sciences in relevant respects—seismologists study phenomena that are not amenable to significant experimental control and that cannot be isolated from complex background conditions. This allows us to refute an influential argument for the impossibility of human science quantification, which turns on the claim that experimental control is a necessary condition for quantification (Trendler, 2009). Finally, we draw constructive lessons for the human sciences from the method that seismologists Charles Richter and Beno Gutenberg used to quantify earthquake size. That method starts by introducing (approximate and circumscribed) “placeholder” scales, which can then be extended and revised to account for inevitable disturbing factors in the measurement process. We use this method to identify promising developments but also continued shortcomings in a noteworthy effort at quantification: the Lexile measure of reading comprehension. (shrink)

Within the context of psychological measurement, realist commitments pervade methodology. Further, there are instances where particular scientific practices and decisions are explicable most plausibly against a background assumption of epistemic realism. That psychometrics is a realist enterprise provides a possible toehold for Stephen Jay Gould’s objections to psychometrics in The Mismeasure of Man and Joel Michell’s charges that psychometrics is a “pathological science.” These objections do not withstand scrutiny. There are no fewer than three activities in ongoing psychometric research (...) which presuppose a commitment to a minimal epistemic realism. Those activities include selecting between different models for representing data, estimating ability in the context of item response theory, and the move to make the individual the fundamental unit of analysis in psychometrics thereby calling for a shift in what sorts of data are evidentially relevant. In none of these activities are the commitments and disregard for evidence that Gould and Michell find objectionable or “pathological.”. (shrink)

This paper addresses what we consider to be the most pressing challenge for the emerging science of consciousness: the measurement problem of consciousness. That is, by what methods can we determine the presence of and properties of consciousness? Most methods are currently developed through evaluation of the presence of consciousness in humans and here we argue that there are particular problems in application of these methods to nonhuman cases - what we call the indicator validity problem and the extrapolation (...) problem. The first is a problem with the application of indicators developed using the differences in conscious and unconscious processing in humans to the identification of other conscious vs. non-conscious organisms or systems. The second is a problem in extrapolating any indicators developed in humans or other organisms to artificial systems. However, while pressing ethical concerns add urgency in the attribution of consciousness and its attendant moral status to non-human animals and intelligent machines, we cannot wait for certainty and we advocate the use of a precautionary principle to avoid doing unintentional harm. We also intend that the considerations and limitations discussed in this paper can be used to further analyse and refine the methods of consciousness science with the hope that one day we may be able to solve the measurement problem of consciousness. (shrink)

According to the realist interpretation, measurement commits us not just to the logically independent existence of things in space and time, but also to the existence of quantitatively structured properties and relations, and to the existence of real numbers, understood as relations of ratio between specific levels of such attributes. Measurement is defined as the estimation of numerical relations (or ratios) between magnitudes of a quantitative attribute and a unit. The history of scientific measurement, from antiquity to (...) the present may be interpreted as revealing a progressive deepening in the understanding of this position. First, the concept of ratio was broadened to include ratios between incommensurable magnitudes; second, the concept of a quantitative attribute was broadened to include non-extensive quantities; third, quantitative structure and its relations to ratios and real numbers were elaborated; and finally, the issue of empirically distinguishing between quantitative and non-quantitative structures was addressed. This interpretation of measurement understands it in a way that is continuous with scientific investigation in general, i.e., as an attempt to discover independently existing facts. (shrink)

A brief review of the attempts to define “elements of reality” in the framework of quantum theory is presented. It is noted that most definitions of elements of reality have in common the feature to be a definite outcome of some measurement. Elements of reality are extended to pre- and post- selected systems and to measurements which fulfill certain criteria of weakness of the coupling. Some features of the newly introduced concepts are discussed.

According to a long-standing belief, introspection provides privileged access to the mind, while objective methods, which we denote as “extrospection”, suffer from basic epistemic deficits. Here we will argue that neither an introspective privilege exists nor does extrospection suffer from such deficits. We will focus on two entailments of an introspective privilege: first, such a privilege would require that introspective evidence prevails in cases of conflict with extrospective information. However, we will show that this is not the case: extrospective claims (...) can prevail in cases of conflict. These conflicts are resolved by an inference to the explanation that best accounts for the available evidence. This explanation may speak in favor of extrospection. Second, given an introspective privilege, the development of extrospective measurement techniques should be restricted by the accuracy of introspective reports. We will argue that this problem is part of a more general issue that comes up with the establishment of measurement in the natural sciences. We will identify three strategies that have proven successful in dealing with the problem in the natural sciences. It will turn out that all these strategies are available for extrospective measurement as well. Consequently, the insufficiencies of introspective reports do not impose a limit on the accuracy of extrospective measurement methods. We conclude that neither an introspective privilege nor basic extrospective deficits exist. This does not mean that extrospection will ever replace introspection. Rather, both approaches provide independent and indispensable forms of epistemic access to the mind. (shrink)

This volume introduces readers to the main philosophical issues of measurement in medicine, illustrating the connections between the natural and social sciences by integrating essays on causation, measuring instruments and issues of measurement and policy.

In this paper, I argue for a distinction between two scales of coordination in scientific inquiry, through which I reassess Georg Simon Ohm’s work on conductivity and resistance. Firstly, I propose to distinguish between measurement coordination, which refers to the specific problem of how to justify the attribution of values to a quantity by using a certain measurement procedure, and general coordination, which refers to the broader issue of justifying the representation of an empirical regularity by means of (...) abstract mathematical tools. Secondly, I argue that the development of Ohm’s measurement practice between the first and the second experimental phase of his work involved the change of the measurement coordination on which he relied to express his empirical results. By showing how Ohm relied on different calibration assumptions and practices across the two phases, I demonstrate that the concurrent change of both Ohm’s experimental apparatus and the variable that Ohm measured should be viewed based on the different form of measurement coordination. Finally, I argue that Ohm’s assumption that tension is equally distributed in the circuit is best understood as part of the general coordination between Ohm’s law and the empirical regularity that it expresses, rather than measurement coordination. (shrink)

Despite quantum theory’s remarkable success at predicting the statistical results of experiments, many philosophers worry that it nonetheless lacks some crucial connection between theory and experiment. Such worries constitute the Quantum Measurement Problems. One can broadly identify two kinds of worries: (1) pragmatic: it is unclear how to model our measurement processes in order to extract experimental predictions, and (2) realist: we lack a satisfying metaphysical account of measurement processes. While both issues deserve attention, the pragmatic worries (...) have worse consequences if left unanswered: If our pragmatic theory-to-experiment linkage is unsatisfactory, then quantum theory is at risk of losing both its evidential support and its physical salience. Avoiding these risks is at the core of what I will call the Pragmatic Measurement Problem. Fortunately, the pragmatic measurement problem is not too difficult to solve. For non-relativistic quantum theory, the story goes roughly as follows: One can model each of quantum theory’s key experimental successes on a case-by-case basis by using a measurement chain. In modeling this measurement chain, it is pragmatically necessary to switch from using a quantum model to a classical model at some point. That is, it is pragmatically necessary to invoke a Heisenberg cut at some point along the measurement chain. Past this case-by-case measurement framework, one can then strive for a wide-scoping measurement theory capable of modeling all (or nearly all) possible measurement processes. For non-relativistic quantum theory, this leads us to our usual projective measurement theory. As a bonus, proceeding this way also gives us an empirically meaningful characterization of the theory’s observables as (positive) self-adjoint operators. But how does this story have to change when we move into the context of quantum field theory (QFT)? It is well known that in QFT almost all localized projective measurements violate causality, allowing for faster-than-light signaling; These are Sorkin’s impossible measurements. Thus, the story of measurement in QFT cannot end as it did before with a projective measurement theory. But does this then mean that we need to radically rethink the way we model measurement processes in QFT? Are our current experimental practices somehow misguided? Fortunately not. I will argue that (once properly understood) our old approach to modeling quantum measurements is still applicable in QFT contexts. We ought to first use measurement chains to build up a case-by-case measurement framework for QFT. Modeling these measurement chains will require us to invoke what I will call a QFT-cut. That is, at some point along the measurement chain we must switch from using a QFT model to a non-QFT model. Past this case-by-case measurement framework, we can then strive for both a new wide-scoping measurement theory for QFT and an empirically meaningful characterization of its observables. It is at this point that significantly more theoretical work is needed. This paper ends by briefly reviewing the state of the art in the physics literature regarding the modeling of measurement processes involving quantum fields. (shrink)

The paper introduces what is deemed as the general epistemological problem of measurement: what characterizes measurement with respect to generic evaluation? It also analyzes the fundamental positions that have been maintained about this issue, thus presenting some sketches for a conceptual history of measurement. This characterization, in which three distinct standpoints are recognized, corresponding to a metaphysical, an anti-metaphysical, and relativistic period, allows us to introduce and briefly discuss some general issues on the current epistemological status of (...) measurement science. (shrink)

In this paper I assess the adequacy of no-conspiracy conditions employed in the usual derivations of the Bell inequality in the context of EPR correlations. First, I look at the EPR correlations from a purely phenomenological point of view and claim that common cause explanations of these cannot be ruled out. I argue that an appropriate common cause explanation requires that no-conspiracy conditions are re-interpreted as mere common cause-measurement independence conditions. In the right circumstances then, violations of measurement (...) independence need not entail any kind of conspiracy (nor backwards in time causation). To the contrary, if measurement operations in the EPR context are taken to be causally relevant in a specific way to the experiment outcomes, their explicit causal role provides the grounds for a common cause explanation of the corresponding correlations. (shrink)

In his Scientific Representation (2008), van Fraassen argues that measuring is a form of representation. In fact, every measurement pinpoints its target in accordance with specific operational rules within an already-constructed theoretical space, in which certain conceptual interconnections can be represented. Reichenbach’s 1920 account of coordination is particularly interesting in this connection. Even though recent reassessments of this account do not do full justice to some important elements lying behind it, they do have the merit of focusing on a (...) different aspect of his early work that traditional interpretations of relativized a priori principles have unfortunately neglected in favour of a more “structural” role for coordination. In Reichenbach’s early work, however, the idea of coordination was employed not only to indicate theory-specific fundamental principles such as the ones suggested in the literature on conventional principles in science, but also to refer to more “basic” assumptions. In Reichenbach, these principles are preconditions both of the individuation of physical magnitudes and of their measurement, and, as such, they are necessary to approach the world in the first instance. This paper aims to reassess Reichenbach’s approach to coordination and to the representation of physical quantities in light of recent literature on measurement and scientific representation. (shrink)

The way metrologists conceive of measurement has undergone a major shift in the last two decades. This shift can in great part be traced to a change in the statistical methods used to deal with the expression of measurement results, and, more particularly, with the calculation of measurement uncertainties. Indeed, as we show, the incapacity of the frequentist approach to the calculus of uncertainty to deal with systematic errors has prompted the replacement of the customary frequentist methods (...) by fully Bayesian procedures. The epistemological ramifications of the Bayesian approach merge with a deep empiricist mood tantamount to an “epistemic turn”: measurement results are analysed in terms of degrees of belief, and central concepts such as error and accuracy are called into question. We challenge the perspective entailed by this epistemic turn: we insist on the centrality of the concepts of error and accuracy by underlining the intentional character of measurement that is intimately linked to the process of correction of experimental data. We further circumvent the difficulties posed by the classical analysis of measurement by stressing the social rather than the epistemic dimension of measurement activities. (shrink)

Measurement outcomes are frequently used as evidence in favor of or against medical and surgical interventions, health policies, and system designs. Indeed, in the medical and health services research literature, outcomes are the currency of policy debate and decision making. Yet in the philosophy of science and philosophy of medicine, the measures used in evidence-based medicine (EBM) are rarely discussed. Rather, the focus here is almost exclusively on study design and hierarchies of evidence. This concentration on the methodology of (...) study design has meant that for practical purposes the measures used in randomized controlled trials, observational studies, audits, and so forth, appear as a “black box.” Yet as I argue in the first part of this article, an engagement with measurement can improve our understanding of EBM and the quality of our evidence. In the second part of the article, I develop such an engagement with one aspect of measurement, namely, the validity of patient-reported outcome measures. Here, I illustrate some of the complexity that is required to improve the validity of these measures and hence the validity of our study outcomes, that is, evidence. The concentration in philosophy of science on study design over measurement methodology perhaps reveals the interest that many philosophers of medicine have in causation, but there is more to the production of high-quality scientific evidence than securing the causal inference. (shrink)

This article examines the development of Mary Koss’s influential Sexual Experiences Survey and defends her then-controversial interpretive choice to endorse a broad-scope definition of rape. Koss’s choice was informed by an empirical recognition of how unjust power dynamics could confound measurement strategies. By adopting a feminist standpoint, Koss and her colleagues recognized how many measurement procedures implicitly disempowered respondents’ capacity to express inquiry-relevant data. Ultimately, the iterative development of a valid and reliable measurement system is compatible with, (...) and quite comparable to, the feminist project of identifying how gendered relations of power enable the persistence and concealment of sexual violence. (shrink)