Magnanimity, especially as discussed by Aristotle, might seem to be one of the pagan virtues that would have been difficult to assimilate into a Christian ethical scheme. In fact, from the Fathers onwards, Christians welcomed _magnanimitas_ into their classifications of the virtues, basing their understanding of it, up until the thirteenth century, on Stoic sources. When they came, from the mid-1200s onwards, to read Aristotle’s discussion of magnanimity in his _Ethics_, the theologians—Aquinas above all—managed ingeniously to combine Aristotle’s (...) description with the version of magnanimity that was already at home in Christian thought. In the fourteenth century, Giraut Ott and John Buridan, in different ways, came closer to Aristotle’s discussion, without suggesting that magnanimity should be suspect as a virtue for Christians. The one medieval writer who does seem to have had a strong sense of magnanimity as an attractive, but distinctively pagan virtue, cultivated by the damned rather than those destined for heaven, was Dante. (shrink)

The Stoic treatment of magnanimity was formulated independently from Aristotle’s, though there are points of resemblance, considered at the end of this chapter. In early Stoic thought, magnanimity is presented as a subdivision of the cardinal virtue of courage, and is marked by an ability to rise above external circumstances, especially adversity. Stoic thinking on magnanimity is analysed here in terms of their theory of value, psychology, and worldview. The main later Stoic treatment of magnanimity comes (...) in Cicero’s _On Duties_, a highly influential work in medieval and early modern Europe. Magnanimity here appears as one of the four cardinal virtues, defined both in terms of the ability to rise above misfortune and the readiness to undertake great actions on behalf of others; the relationship between magnanimity and honour also emerges as a new theme in Cicero’s treatment. (shrink)

This chapter chronicles the approaches to magnanimity taken by three key Enlightenment theorists, David Hume, Adam Smith, and John Witherspoon. United in their concern to defend the modern relevance of magnanimity, these thinkers differed in how they approached two central questions: the standard by which magnanimity is measured, and the need to ensure that goodness and greatness coincide. Hume’s relative understanding of greatness of mind created problems which Smith sought to redress by introducing the concept of ‘absolute (...) perfection’ as the touchstone for judgements about magnanimity and moral judgements more broadly. Against the apparent tension between magnanimity and Christian values, John Witherspoon set out to recover the virtue on specifically Christian terms. Taking Smith’s solution one step further, he identified the standard of absolute perfection with God, with merit conceived as conformity with God’s will and the desire for worldly honour displaced by a desire for worthiness of God’s esteem. (shrink)

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit points the way to a new, post-modern form of normativity, and so self-consciousness. Its practical aspect is a magnanimous form of agency exercised by self-conscious individuals who thereby create a new kind of recognitive community structured by rationalizing recollection in the form of confession, forgiveness, and trust.

In recent years, a number of authors have called for a return to an ethic of honour as a means of imparting virtue to military personnel. Mark Osiel, for instance, argues that ‘martial honor can be...

This article argues that Hume's brief essay, "Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion," offers resources for three claims: (1) Delicate taste correlates with self-sufficiency and thus with a particularly Humean form of Magnanimity -- greatness of mind; (2) Delicate taste improves the capacity for profound friendships, characterized by mutual admiration and true compassion; and (3) magnanimity and compassion are thus not necessarily in tension with one another and may even proceed from and support harmony of character. These (...) claims, in turn, provide reasons to take seriously Hume's view that moral character depends, in part, on aesthetic character. (shrink)

In these brief remarks, I sketch Aquinas’s account of humility, courage, and magnanimity. The nature of humility for Aquinas emerges nicely from his account of pride, and it also illuminates Aquinas’s view of magnanimity. For Aquinas, pride is the worst of the vices, and it comes in four kinds. The opposite of all these kinds of pride in a person is his disposition to accept that the excellences he has are all gifts from a good God and are (...) all meant to be given back by being shared with others. Aquinas believes that all the virtues come together as a set. Consequently, a person who has humility also has courage. Aquinas takes the deepest kind of courage as a gift of the Holy Spirit. On his view, taken as a gift, courage manifests itself in a disposition to act on the settled conviction that one will be united to God in heaven when one dies. It is not easy to see how magnanimity could be a virtue if humility is. The solution is to see that for Aquinas the honor for the Christian virtue of magnanimity is not honor from human beings but honor from God. A person can have the virtue of humility and still strive for the greatest honors, as Aquinas sees it. The conclusion of Aquinas’s account of humility, courage, and magnanimity is this: it is morally obligatory to go for glory, because glory is a matter of being honored by God as faithful. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes’s concept of magnanimity, a descendant of Aristotle’s “greatness of soul,” plays a key role in Hobbes’s theory with respect to felicity and the virtue of justice. In his Critique du ‘De Mundo’, Hobbes implies that only genuinely magnanimous people can achieve the greatest felicity in their lives. A life of felicity is a life of pleasure, where the only pleasure that counts is the well grounded glory experienced by those who are magnanimous. Hobbes suggests that felicity involves (...) the successful pursuit of desires, a pursuit at which the magnanimous are particularly adept. Additionally, Hobbes implies that those who possess the virtue of justice must also possess magnanimity; it is the just person’s “Nobleness or Gallantnesse of courage, (rarely found).” Leo Strauss and Dorothea Krook suggest that this cannot be Hobbes’s “final word” on justice, because, they say, Hobbes considers magnanimity a type of pride, which he derogates and cannot consistently associate with virtue. I argue that magnanimity, associated with well-grounded glory, is not a type of pride; only vain glory is. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes contends that a wise sovereign would censor books and limit verbal discourse for the majority of citizens. But this article contends that it is consistent with Hobbes’s philosophy to claim that a wise sovereign would allow a small number of citizens – those individuals who engage in scientific discourse and who are magnanimous and just – to disagree freely amongst themselves, engaging in discourse on controversial topics. This article reflects on Hobbes’s contention that these individuals can tolerate one (...) another’s differences and engage in verbal disagreement without any risk to the commonwealth. By engaging in open discourse, these individuals can better create valuable technology and provide counsel to the sovereign that is necessary to maintain peace. (shrink)

abstract In this paper, I first develop a neo-Aristotelian account of the virtue of magnanimity. I then apply this virtue to ethical issues that arise in sport, and argue that the magnanimous athlete will rightly use sport to foster her own moral development. I also address how the magnanimous athlete responds to the moral challenges present in sport by focusing on the issue of performance-enhancing drugs, and conclude that athletic excellence as it is conventionally understood, without moral excellence, has (...) very little value. (shrink)

David Hume and Adam Smith are often regarded as founding fathers of modern social science and champions of self-interested material acquisitiveness. Against this view I argue that their moral and political philosophies are better understood as modern installments in the classical tradition of virtue ethics. By focusing on Hume and Smith's conception of self-love and particularly on their distinction of self-love from self-interest, I demonstrate their dedication to encouraging virtues beyond the instrumental virtues of the market. ;Hume and Smith regard (...) egoism as a natural and inescapable element of human nature, but they also believe that egoism is educable. Untrained egoism manifests itself in such basic forms of selfishness as vanity and ambition, but a properly educated and elevated egoism heightens our sensitivity to the well-being of others. Through a careful analysis of their dialectical rhetoric, I show how Hume and Smith educate the egoism of their readers in their moral works. By so doing I demonstrate that the Scots understood themselves not merely as advocates of the pursuit of wealth, but as moral educators aspiring to introduce their readers to a life beyond the furious pursuit of external goods. Their portraits of magnanimous statesmen and wise and virtuous sages serve as models of this higher life, a life distinguished by the pursuit of moral nobility through beneficent activity. By tracing the Aristotelian and Ciceronian origins of their understanding of the relationship of self-love to benevolence, I thus show that far from celebrating commercial self-interest and denigrating virtue, Hume and Smith draw on classical sources in their attempts to ennoble modern liberalism and encourage decency and respect for the dignity of others. And by focusing particularly on their conception of the proper magnanimity for modernity, that of the wise and virtuous man, I argue that Hume's and Smith's practical writings on history, politics and economics are best regarded as attempts to discharge the beneficent duties they describe in their moral philosophy, and thereby claim wisdom and virtue for themselves. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explore the notion of collective agency entailed by the theory of popular sovereignty. After examining criticisms of its classical formulation and critiquing Habermas’s interpretation, the article argues that modern conceptions of agency restrict our ability to recognise a form of collective action capable of sustaining the theory. Responsibility is often limited to individual attitudes, leading to alienation from our actions and weakening the collective dimension essential to sovereignty. To address this, the article draws (...) on Robert Brandom’s proposal of a postmodern, magnanimous form of agency, where the intelligibility of actions depends on shared responsibility, extending beyond individual purposes to socially and retrospectively determined governing intentions. This approach introduces a norm-instituting, law-authorising form of collective agency that preserves the radically democratic essence of classical sovereignty theory and defends against the criticisms directed at it. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that the medieval philosopher and theologian Thomas Aquinas can make a valuable contribution to philosophy of management. I describe how Aquinas can be read to helpfully articulate a model of servant leadership as combining leadership with service through the connection between the virtues of magnanimity and humility. I also describe how Aquinas expands the model of servant-leadership to include service to broader community not simply leadership in providing internal benefits or leading public benefit companies.

In this paper, I provide a characterisation of a neglected form of humility: magnanimous humility. Unlike most contemporary analyses of humility, magnanimous humility is not about limitations but instead presupposes that one possesses some entitlement in a context. I suggest that magnanimous intellectual humility (IH) consists in a disposition to appropriately refrain from exercising one's legitimate epistemic entitlements because one is appropriately motivated to pursue some epistemic good. I then shown that Magnanimous IH has an important role to play in (...) contexts of disagreement and oppression. It calls on knowing parties to refrain from pressing their epistemic entitlements to facilitate mutual understanding. And it is a virtue that oppressed persons have good reason to cultivate in order to develop meta-lucidity in themselves and others. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide a characterisation of a neglected form of humility: magnanimous humility. Unlike most contemporary analyses of humility, magnanimous humility is not about limitations but instead presupposes that one possesses some entitlement in a context. I suggest that magnanimous intellectual humility (IH) consists in a disposition to appropriately refrain from exercising one's legitimate epistemic entitlements because one is appropriately motivated to pursue some epistemic good. I then shown that Magnanimous IH has an important role to play in (...) contexts of disagreement and oppression. It calls on knowing parties to refrain from pressing their epistemic entitlements to facilitate mutual understanding. And it is a virtue that oppressed persons have good reason to cultivate in order to develop meta-lucidity in themselves and others. (shrink)

In modern English ‘magnanimity’ normally refers to generosity, especially in forgiving offences. ‘Pusillanimity’ normally refers to cowardice. The two traits do not seem to be genuine opposites. This is one way in which modern English usage may seem to mislead us about the Aristotelian virtue of _megalopsychia_. On closer inspection, however, the modern usage turns out not to be altogether misleading; for two central expressions of _megalopsychia_ are generosity and bravery. Once we see why they are central expressions, the (...) apparently unattractive features of the Aristotelian virtue are more intelligible and less unattractive. (shrink)

Certain traits of the magnanimous man of the Nicomachean Ethics seem incompatible with gratitude and humility. Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas are the first commentators of the Latin West who had access to the integral portrayal of magnanimity in the Nicomachean Ethics. Surprisingly, they welcomed the Aristotelian ideal of magnanimity without reservations. The paper summarizes Aristotle’s account of magnanimity, discusses briefly the transformation of this notion in Stoicism and early scholasticism, and analyzes Albert’s and Thomas’s interpretation (...) of Aristotle. Thomas is found to be a more faithful and ingenious interpreter than Albert. He addresses and solves a number of philosophical problems of Aristotle’s account that still puzzle contemporary interpreters. (shrink)

Enea Silvio Piccolomini’s texts about king Alfonso the Magnanimous reveal the remarkable admiration of a first rate humanist and important ecclesiastical figure towards the Hispanic monarch. As some of his extensive writings reflect, this literary connection grew as they got closer, while the personal trajectory of Piccolomini was very influential in the evolution of his consideration of this monarch.

This chapter reads Twilight of the Idols against Beyond Good and Evil to reveal a shift in tone from the vitriol of the earlier text to the good-natured, light-hearted chaffing of the later work, despite Twilight’s subtitle ‘How to Philosophize with a Hammer’ and despite the text’s closing injunction—borrowed from the pity-hobbled Zarathustra—to “become hard!” (Z3 ‘On Old and New Law Tables’ 29, KSA 4:268). Thus, while Nietzsche’s rhetorical arsenal is still in combat mode, his objective is no longer to (...) slash and burn but to jape and jibe. A glaring exception to this tonal shift is ‘The Problem of Socrates,’ an early Twilight chapter in which Socrates’ reputed ugliness precipitates a return to the arguably ugly animus of Beyond Good and Evil. The following chapter is divided into two halves: The first maps out Nietzsche’s path from the malice of Beyond Good and Evil to the magnanimity of Twilight, while the second examines the philological bad faith in Nietzsche’s elaborate rhetorical ruses aimed at proving to the reader that Socrates was a decadent. (shrink)

I defend a broadly Aristotelian account of the virtue of magnanimity against the objection that Aristotelian magnanimity is an expression of the vice of pride and so cannot be a virtue. I identify the essential features of magnanimity on Aristotle’s account and argue that Aquinas preserves these essential features while identifying additional necessary conditions of the virtue of magnanimity that illuminate the virtue and show it to be incompatible with pride. I also show where two other (...) attempts to defend Aquinas’s development of Aristotelian magnanimity against the pride objection fail. (shrink)

Magnanimity is a virtue that has led many lives. Foregrounded early on by Plato as a philosophical virtue par excellence, it became one of the crown jewels in Aristotle's account of human excellence and was accorded equally salient place by other ancient thinkers. It is one of the mostdistinctive elements of the ancient tradition to filter into the medieval Islamic and Christian worlds. It sparked important intellectual engagements and went on to carve deep tracks through several of the later (...) philosophies to inherit from this tradition. Under changing names and reworked forms, itwould continue to breathe in the thought of Descartes and Hume, Kant, and Nietzsche. Its many lives have been joined by important continuities, yet they have also been fragmented by discontinuities - discontinuities reflecting larger shifts in ethical perspectives and competing answers to questionsabout the nature of the good life, the moral nature of human beings, and their relationship to the social and natural world they inhabit. They have also been punctuated by moments of intense controversy in which the vision of human greatness has itself been called into doubt.The aim of this volume is to provide an insight into the complex trajectory of a virtue whose glitter has at times been as dazzling as it has been divisive. By exploring the many lives it has lived, we will be in a better position to evaluate whether this is a virtue we still want to make central toour own ethical lives, and why. (shrink)

This paper offers a composite portrait of the concept of magnanimity in nineteenth-century America, focusing on Ralph Waldo Emerson, Margaret Fuller, and Henry David Thoreau. A composite portrait, as a method in the history of philosophy, is designed to bring out characteristic features of a group's philosophizing in order to illuminate characteristic features that may still resonate in today's philosophy. Compared to more standard methods in the historiography of philosophy, the construction of a composite portrait de-privileges the views of (...) individual authors. These philosophers saw the virtue of magnanimity as a remedy for a number of modern ills. American philosophers suggest that the best sort of magnanimity is acquired by adopting the correct relation to the natural world, including new forms of inquiry, or by adopting a life of voluntary poverty. Magnanimous individuals are critics of capitalism and offer themselves as exemplars of a better, experimental life. (shrink)

European powers – mainly Spanish and Italian – took the figure of Alfonso the Magnanimous, King of Aragon (1416–1458), into great consideration as the example of the new modern prince. His image was highly valued in sixteenth and seventeenth-century historical texts like those of Jerónimo de Zurita (1512–1580), Giovanni Antonio Summonte (d.u.–1602) and Luigi Bonincontro (d.u.). Their concept of this sovereign and their admiration for his character are largely due to the success of his representative programme. Given his link to (...) the Neapolitan throne and his contact with Quattrocento Italy, the Magnanimous used an image discourse designed to represent him before his contemporaries and before posterity as a principe nuovo: Caesarean, virtuous and humanist. Among the component pieces of this programme, the works that his aulic humanists Lorenzo Valla (1407–1457), Bartolomeo Facio (1400–1457) and Antonio Beccadelli (1394–1471) dedicated to him stand out, with the latter's work being the one that raised up the sovereign as the exemplum of the new princeps. This paper focuses on how Beccadelli's work generated the concept of the Magnanimous in modern Spain and modern Italy, especially through the Alphonsi Regis dicta aut facta memoratu digna, which, since the second half of fifteenth century and before the work of Nicolas Machiavelli (1469–1527), mainly his The Prince and its inspiration Caesar Borgia (1475–1507), Beccadelli's work turned Alfonso the Magnanimous into a true exemplum principum for the modern era. (shrink)

Conspicuous consumption associated with status reinforcement behavior can be explained in terms of costly signaling, or strategic handicap theory, first articulated by Zahavi and later formalized by Grafen. A theory is introduced which suggests that the evolutionary raison d’être of status reinforcement behavior lies not only in its effects on lifetime reproductive success, but in its positive effects on the probability of survival through infrequent, unpredictable demographic bottlenecks. Under some circumstances, such “wasteful” displays may take the form of displays of (...) altruistic behavior and generosity on the part of high status individuals, in that is signals the ability to bear the short-term costs of being generous or “cooperative,” while at the same time reinforcing the long-term benefits of higher status. (shrink)

Aristotelianism is all the rage in contemporary virtue ethics. Yet given how anachronistic Aristotle’s account of the meta-virtue of _megalopsychia_ seems to be, there is a tendency to pass over it in silence. This chapter argues against such a move and maintain that Aristotle’s ideal can help illuminate a number of contemporary debates. In moral psychology, _megalopsychia_ helps mediate between realist and anti-realist conceptions of selfhood. In moral education, _megalopsychia_ casts light on the levels of moral development to which we (...) can aspire through the cultivation of character, as well as the necessary individualization of education in virtue. In moral philosophy, _megalopsychia_ helps crystallize debates about role moralities and the demands of _noblesse oblige_; the relationship between objective and subjective well-being; and to what extent contemplation and self-transcendence enter into well-being. This chapter provides a whistle-stop tour of those topics and explains the lessons Aristotle’s account of _megalopsychia_ can teach us about them. (shrink)

This article revisits the account of magnanimity offered by Thomas Aquinas, in his Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle and especially in his Summa Theologiae. Recent scholarship has viewed Aquinas' magnanimity as essentially Aristotle's, complemented by the addition of charity and humility to the classical moral horizon. By contrast, I read Aquinas as offering a subtle yet far-reaching critique of important aspects of Aristotelian magnanimity, a critique with roots in Aquinas' theology, yet also comprising a significant (...) philosophic reappraisal of Aristotle's account of human excellence. Against contentions that Aquinas' ethical revisionism is antithetical to civic common sense, the requirements of statesmanship, and the rational foundations of social science, I argue that Aquinas' theory is politically salutary and theoretically enlightening. Moreover, I suggest that recent dissident reflection on twentieth-century totalitarian experience underscores both the humanity and the nobility of a humility-informed magnanimity, such as that advocated by Thomas Aquinas. (shrink)

Supererogatory acts are considered by some to be part of medicine, whereas others accept supererogation to be a gratuitous virtue, to be extolled when present, but not to be demanded. The present paper sides with those contending that medicine is duty-bound to benefit patients and that supererogation/altruism must per definition remain outside and beyond any role-description of the profession. Medical ethics should be bound by rational ethics and steer away from separatist views which grant exclusive privileges but also create excessive (...) demands, way beyond what physicians perform or are willing and able to offer. (shrink)

This paper focuses on John Witherspoon (1723-1794) and the religious background of the American conception of religious liberty and church-state separation, as found in the First Amendment. Witherspoon was strongly influenced by debates and conflicts concerning liberty of conscience and the independence of the congregations in his native Scotland; and he brought to his work, as President of the (Presbyterian) College of New Jersey, a moderate Calvinism challenging the conception of “true virtue” found in Jonathan Edwards. Witherspoon was teacher to (...) James Madison who would substantially write the First Amendment. Religious freedom, focused on freedom of conscience, and ‘Christian magnanimity’ stand in considerable tension with the prior orthodoxy of predetermination and the historical tradition of Calvinistic theocracy. Understanding Witherspoon, we better understand the reformation background of the American Enlightenment and how his conception of the freedom of conscience contributed to American conceptions of freedom generally. (shrink)

Thomas Spragens attempts to rebuild liberal theory by arguing that realist, libertarian, egalitarian, and identity liberals all have valid insights, but develop them one‐sidedly. Re‐examining the work of sixteenth‐ and seventeenth‐century liberals leads, he contends, to a more balanced liberalism. Spragens's often‐impressive effort to reconstruct liberalism is undermined by insufficient appreciation of the role of the scale of the polity and by confusions about civic friendship. Appreciation of Hayekian insights about spontaneous order, and of the limits of citizen knowledge in (...) large polities, would help him solve the first problem. Distinguishing between friendship, friendliness, and social capital would help resolve the second. (shrink)

The treatment of magnanimity in Aristotle's three ethical works gives us an opportunity to compare his different discussions, and his different treatments of common-sense views and various ideals of magnanimity. Comparison of the three Ethics suggests that the Nichomaechean Ethics provides the latest and best treatment of this virtue.

The article explores the impact of Michael Oakeshott’s encounter with Aristotle’s virtue of megalopsychia or magnanimity upon his own philosophical pursuits. Although it is in no more than about a dozen pages of his published text that Oakeshott makes direct references to the virtue of magnanimity, it came to play an important part in the formation of his political and moral ideas, not only as a prefiguration of radical individuality, but also as a moral concept which served to (...) reformulate liberal historical discourse and to ennoble the tradition of liberal individualism, as well as to support, along with a set of related ideas, the development of Oakeshott’s own conception of moral conduct. In his work magnanimity is not treated as a virtue of unrivalled excellence that looks down on or threatens the formal and equalizing considerations of justice. In making a twofold move of elevating the tone of the liberal tradition of individuality, on the one hand, and of making the idea of aristocratic nobility more inclusive, on the other, Oakeshott questions the notorious identification of liberal individualism with bourgeois mediocrity, which allows him to reconcile magnanimity and justice within the framework of the nomocratic societas, while offering some significant guideposts towards a possible theory of liberal virtue. (shrink)

The article discusses satisfaction with self-presentation as the way of functioning (modus vivendi) of a magnanimous man in relation to Aristotelian ethics. Even though self-presentation is usually considered as a kind of biologically determined instinct, it may be argued that self-presentation is also an aspect of the actions of a magnanimous man. Naturalist social theories concerning moral...

This paper begins with a rather straightforward observation: Freud's last word on the theory of jokes and the comic is his 1927 essay on ‘Humour’. That is, when it comes to jokes and the comic, ‘humour’ has the last word, both textually and chronologically. What this also means, as this paper tries to show, is that the humour of last words is not far behind. Which is not to suggest that Freud's theory of humour is all fun and games. For, (...) if there is one thing that Freud's examples of humour in both Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious and ‘Humour’ make clear, it is that humorous last words must be taken seriously if we are to understand how they comfort and protect the ego in the face of death. (shrink)

I contend that Adam Smith and David Hume offer re-interpretations of Aristotle’s notion of greatness of soul, focusing on the kind of magnanimity Aristotle attributes to Socrates. Someone with Socratic magnanimity is worthy of honor, responds moderately to fortune, and is virtuous—just and benevolent. Recent theorists err in claiming that magnanimity is less important to Hume’s account of human excellence than benevolence. In fact, benevolence is a necessary ingredient for the best sort of greatness. Smith’s “Letter to (...) Strahan” attributes this greatness to Hume. It encourages us to admire Hume as an exemplar of human excellence, to seek Hume’s virtues for ourselves, and to approve of the “love of literary fame” which Hume calls his “ruling passion.”. (shrink)

Sophia Vasalou investigates the 'virtues of greatness' in the Islamic world. Examining the virtue of magnanimity in ancient philosophical ethics and the 'greatness of spirit' in the Arabic tradition, she traces the genealogy of these ideals, explores the influences that shaped them, and highlights the contemporary relevance of these ideals.

This essay examines the reception of the ancient virtue of greatness of soul (or magnanimity) in the Arabic tradition, touching on a range of figures but focusing especially on Miskawayh and even more concertedly on al‐Ghazālī. Influenced by a number of Greek ethical texts available in Arabic translation, both of these thinkers incorporate greatness of soul into their classifications of the virtues and the vices. Yet a closer scrutiny raises questions about this amicable inclusion, and suggests that this virtue (...) stands in an uneasy relationship to the larger ethical schemes of both thinkers. This is substantiated by a careful probing of these thinkers’ considered views on the value of honor and the ethics of self‐evaluation. Yet if the values embedded in the virtue of greatness of soul conflict with these thinkers’ ethical standpoints, there is then an interesting question to ask as to why this conflict should be obscured from view. (shrink)

Abstract: Does the evolving influence of humanity on the Earth’s environment call for new virtues? How might such virtues be seen as contributing to human flourishing? In this paper, I develop Aristotle’s discussion of magnificence and magnanimity to provide a framework within which to discuss such claims. I also defend the controversial view that even if genuinely new virtues may be involved, these may be virtues to which we should not aspire (now, or perhaps ever).

In "Toward an Augustinian Liberalism," Paul Weithman argues that modern liberal institutions should be concerned with the political vice of pride as a threat to the neutral, legitimate use of public power that liberalism demands. By directing our attention to pride, Weithman attempts to provide an incentive to and foundation for an Augustinian liberalism that can counteract this threat. While Weithman is right to point to the centrality of pride in understanding the modern liberal tradition, an investigation of the early (...) modern reflections on pride in politics reveals a deeper tension between Augustine and modern liberalism than Weithman's analysis acknowledges. This essay discusses this tension by focusing on Hobbes's account of pride and equality in the commonwealth, asking whether Hobbes can be understood as a thinker in the Augustinian political tradition. In order to provide a background on pride as a political vice, this essay contrasts Aristotelian magnanimity with Augustinian humility. Finally, Aquinas's attempt to reintroduce magnanimity into the Augustinian political tradition is considered as a more consistent development of Augustine's thought, thereby revealing more pointedly the tension between Augustine and modern liberalism. By way of conclusion, the possibility of deflating this tension is briefly addressed by considering Jean Bethke Elshtain's discussion of an Augustinian liberalism that does not rely upon a "secular" conception of human nature. (shrink)