Volume 24, Issue 12, December 2024, Page 62-64.

Frequently, we learn of the locations of things and events in our environment by means of hearing. Hearing, I argue, is a locational mode of perceiving with a robustly spatial phenomenology. I defend three proposals. First, audition furnishes one with information about the locations of things and happenings in one’s environment because auditory experience itself has spatial content—auditory experience involves awareness of space. Second, we hear the locations of things and events by or in hearing the (...) class='Hi'>locations of their sounds. Third, we auditorily experience sounds themselves as having relatively stable distal locations. I reject skepticism about spatial audition and auditory experience tracing to Strawson’s Individuals , and suggest that spatial auditory experience grounds a form of perceptual access to objects and events that is critical to negotiating one’s environment. (shrink)

This article aims to map the locations of identity prejudice that occurs in the context of a Community of Inquiry. My claim is that epistemic injustice, which usually originates from seemingly ‘minor’ cases of identity prejudice, can potentially leak into the actual practice of P4wC. Drawing from Fricker, the various forms of epistemic injustice are made explicit when epistemic practices are framed within concrete social circumstances where power, privilege and authority intersect, which is observable in school settings. In connection, (...) despite the pedagogical improvements P4wC offers, some forms of identity prejudice prevalent in traditional classrooms may persist, affecting children who are identified with negatively stereotyped social groups. It is, therefore, important to pay attention to the reality of epistemic injustice and the possible locations where it may potentially surface in the COI. Drawing from my P4wC experience, I show that identity prejudice stems from the intersections of the roles and positionalities of the participants in a philosophical dialogue. These intersections point towards the epistemic relationships of the P4wC teacher, the students, and the P4wC program itself. I conclude that identity prejudice arises circumstantially and/or substantively in P4wC scholarship and practice. (shrink)

This paper argues that qualia share their physical correlates' locations. The first premise comes from the theory of relativity: If something shares a time with a physical event in all reference frames, it shares that physical event’s location. The second premise is that qualia share times with their correlates in all reference frames. Having qualia and correlates share locations makes relations between them easier to explain, improving both physicalist and dualist theories.

The Russian re-invasion of 2022 has had a ripple effect on every aspect of Ukrainian society and culture. Fanfiction was no different, producing many highly politicized works, particularly in the RPF (Real Person Fiction) category. In this article, the author examines the locations in Ukrainian fanfics of modern political Ukrainian RPF and historical Ukrainian RPF about the Ukrainian Revolution (1917–1921) to determine their functions and correlation to Ukrainian identity. As a result, three primary functions were identified: canon building, relying (...) on references to places directly connected to the subject’s public life, as well as constructing hypothetical places in the private “gaps”; relatability, referencing specific details of daily life (particularly during the war) to establish a deeper connection with the reader; and finally, symbolic geography, referring to the especially significant places of war. The last function was the most influenced by the fanfiction author’s identity. (shrink)

This study evaluated the potential contribution of extrageniculate visual pathways to oculomotor orienting reflexes in hemianopic patients. It tested whether extrageniculate pathways mediate inhibition of return —a phenomenon characterized by slowed target detections at recently stimulated locations. Because hemianopic subjects cannot overtly respond to stimuli presented within their hemianopic field, we utilized a spatial cueing paradigm that capitalized on the fact that IOR operates in spatiotopic coordinates. Subjects moved their eyes so that a cue and a target presented at (...) the same spatial location were imaged successively onto blind and seeing portions of their retinas. One hemianopic patient showed a similar IOR effect from cues presented within both the seeing and the hemianopic fields. With a second hemianopic patient, only presentations of the cue to the subject's seeing field produced IOR. The explanation for this discrepancy is not evident. These observations highlight both the potential value and the pitfalls inherent in using “blindsight” as a window into human consciousness. (shrink)

Este trabajo surge como resultado de una investigación cuyos objetivos son identificar los tipos de espacios escénicos, suelos y localizaciones que utiliza la videodanza. Para ello hemos analizado 152 videodanzas escogidas de las selecciones oficiales de los festivales españoles específicos, desde su creación, hasta el año 2018. Para el análisis hemos creado un modelo ad hoc de nueve variables y 44 categorías. Del análisis podemos concluir que la videodanza utiliza preferentemente encuadres centrados en espacios abiertos y normalmente planos, que se (...) ubican en entornos urbanos, generalmente en interiores, con suelos específicos que aportan significado a la coreografía o a la narrativa de la videodanza. (shrink)

A longstanding issue in attempts to understand the Everett (Many-Worlds) approach to quantum mechanics is the origin of the Born rule: why is the probability given by the square of the amplitude? Following Vaidman, we note that observers are in a position of self-locating uncertainty during the period between the branches of the wave function splitting via decoherence and the observer registering the outcome of the measurement. In this period it is tempting to regard each branch as equiprobable, but we (...) argue that the temptation should be resisted. Applying lessons from this analysis, we demonstrate (using methods similar to those of Zurek's envariance-based derivation) that the Born rule is the uniquely rational way of apportioning credence in Everettian quantum mechanics. In doing so, we rely on a single key principle: changes purely to the environment do not affect the probabilities one ought to assign to measurement outcomes in a local subsystem. We arrive at a method for assigning probabilities in cases that involve both classical and quantum self-locating uncertainty. This method provides unique answers to quantum Sleeping Beauty problems, as well as a well-defined procedure for calculating probabilities in quantum cosmological multiverses with multiple similar observers. (shrink)

The notion of multiple location plays an important role in the characterization of endurantism. Several authors have recently offered cases intended to demonstrate the incoherence of multiple location. I argue that these cases do not succeed in making multiple location problematic. Along the way, several crucial issues about multiple location and its use by endurantists are clarified.

“Asian women” is an ambiguous category; it seems to indicate a racial as well as a cultural designation. The number of articles or books on being Asian or Asian-American is on the rise in other disciplines, but in comparison to the material on black or Hispanic identities, Asians are largely missing from the field of philosophy of race. Things Asian in philosophy are generally reserved for those who study Asian philosophy or comparative philosophy, but that focus usually excludes reflections on (...) Asian identities as such. This lack in the literature prompted me to start my own reflection with such questions as: Why do Asians not take an active interest in discourse on race? What does the category “Asian” designate? What contributes to their invisibility in general? Is this a stereotype? Are they simply “white-identified?” Are Asians responsible for their own invisibility, or is there some other factor? What is the relation between Asian philosophy and being Asian, if any? Is there any interesting connection between being Asian and feminism? As a Japanese woman philosopher who is also interested in feminism, these questions seemed natural. This paper is an attempt to clarify some of these issues in the light of my experience working in the profession of academic philosophy. (shrink)

According to the Self-Location Thesis, certain types of visual experiences have self-locating and so first-person, spatial contents. Such self-locating contents are typically specified in relational egocentric terms. So understood, visual experiences provide support for the claim that there is a kind of self-consciousness found in experiential states. This paper critically examines the Self-Location Thesis with respect to dynamic-reflexive visual experiences, which involve the movement of an object toward the location of the perceiving subject. The main aim of this paper is (...) to offer an alternative interpretation of these cases which resists attributing them self-locating content, arguing for a replacement of the de se component with a non-conceptual equivalent of the indexical ‘here’. In its final section, the paper also considers an extension of the h-replacement account to cases of visual kinesthesis. (shrink)

There is much philosophical controversy about what it is for a thing to occupy a place. Many metaphysicians accept a dualism of space and space-occupiers, and posit a fundamental location relation that holds between the two; but they disagree about the nature of that relation. Simultaneously, several analytic theologians have been developing occupation accounts of omnipresence — theories according to which God’s presence in space is not highly derivative or indirect, but is rather a species of whatever fundamental relation holds (...) between other things and space. The aim of the chapter is to defend the viability of occupation accounts; and to sharpen the tools of analytic theologians — so that the range of alternatives available to them becomes clearer — by careful examination of the two main rival metaphysical theories of location. (shrink)

Color subjectivists claim that, despite appearances to the contrary, the world external to the mind is colorless. However, in giving an account of color perception, subjectivists about the nature of perceived color must address the nature of perceived spatial location as well. The argument here will be that subjectivists’ problems with coordinating the metaphysics of perceived color and perceived location render color perception implausibly mysterious. Consequently, some version of color realism, the view that colors are (physical, dispositional, functional, sui generis, (...) or some other) properties of physical objects, is correct. (shrink)

A plea: If you're going to propose a Bayesian framework for updating self-locating degrees of belief, please read this piece first. I've tried to survey all the extant formalisms, group them by their general approach, then describe challenges faced by every formalism employing a given approach. Hopefully this survey will prevent further instances of authors' re-inventing updating rules already proposed elsewhere in the literature.

It has been argued that quantum mechanics provides the best case for thinking there is genuine metaphysical indeterminacy. In particular, it seems that the locations of quantum systems are indeterminate in a way that doesn’t depend on semantic or epistemic limitations. In this paper, I draw on concepts from the metaphysics of location to dispel this impression. Using quantum versions of exact and weak location introduced by Pashby (2016), I distinguish two accounts of quantum location: the spanner view and (...) the inexact location view. Each account requires the rejection of an intuitive locative principle, but I argue that neither gives rise to metaphysical indeterminacy. (shrink)

It is a common claim that one concept of time, tenseless theory, is in greater conflict with how the world seems to us than the competing theories of tense theory and presentism. This paper offers at least one counter-example to that claim. Here, it is argued that tenseless theory fares better than its competitors in capturing the phenomenology in particular cases of perception. These cases are where the visual phenomenology is of events occurring together which must be occurring at different (...) times. The commitments of matching such phenomenology in one’s ontology undermine tense theory and presentism and support tenseless theory. (shrink)

In this article, we aim to propose a solution to two quantum paradoxes—the Young’s double-slit paradox and the EPR paradox—as well as to a closely related philosophical paradox: the Black-Leslie paradox of the spheres. We first focus on constructing a model of quantum objects and providing a characterization thereof. To this end, we develop a model based on objects possessing a property of multi-location. Applying Occam’s razor, we adopt the conceptual framework of n-universes (Franceschi, 2001) to facilitate the construction of (...) simplified models. We then test the internal consistency of the model thus developed, both to verify that it is free from contradictions and to determine the properties that logically follow from the very definition of the constructed objects. We also discuss the geometric properties that emerge from the inherent nature of multi-located objects. Subsequently, we describe the interpretation provided by this model for the double-slit experiment, quantum entanglement and the EPR paradox, and the Black-Leslie paradox of the spheres. Finally, we offer a characterization of space as it emerges from this model. (shrink)

Recently, Cody Gilmore has deployed an ingenious case involving backwards time travel to highlight an apparent conflict between the theory that objects persist by perduring, and the thesis that wholly coincident objects are impossible. However, careful attention to the concepts of location and parthood that Gilmore’s cases involve shows that the perdurantist faces no genuine objection from these cases, and that the perdurantist has a number of plausible and dialectically appropriate ways to avoid the supposed conflict.

Perceptual experience is self‐locating. This claim aligns with our intuitions and is the dominant view in philosophy. To defend the claim, some philosophers have advanced perspectival accounts and others have advanced agentive accounts. Here, I explore tensions between the two accounts and propose a novel, integrative account: the top‐down view, which defends that visual experience is self‐locating in virtue of cognitive maps that modulate visual processing in a top‐down fashion. I assess recent neuroscientific evidence of spatial modulation in the visual (...) cortex and show how it turns existing notions of self‐location upside‐down, shifting the focus from bottom‐up to top‐down processes. (shrink)

Mental, mathematical, and moral facts are difficult to accommodate within an overall worldview due to the peculiar kinds of properties inherent to them. In this paper I argue that a significant class of social entities also presents us with an ontological puzzle that has thus far not been addressed satisfactorily. This puzzle relates to the location of certain social entities. Where, for instance, are organizations located? Where their members are, or where their designated offices are? Organizations depend on their members (...) for their existence, but the members of an organization can be where the organization is not. The designated office of an organization, however, need be little more than a mailbox. I argue that the problem can be solved by conceptualizing the relation between social entities and non-social entities as one of constitution, a relation of unity without identity. Constituted objects have properties that cannot be reduced to properties of the constituting objects. Thus, my attempt to solve the Location Problem results in an argument in favor of a kind of non-reductive materialism about the social. (shrink)

Self-locating beliefs are beliefs about one’s position or situation in the world, as opposed to beliefs about how the world is in itself. Section 1 of this entry introduces self-locating beliefs. Section 2 presents several distinct arguments that self-locating beliefs constitute a theoretically distinctive category. These arguments are driven by central examples from the literature; we categorize the examples by the arguments to which they contribute. (Some examples serve multiple strands of argument at once.) Section 3 examines positive proposals for (...) modeling self-locating belief, focusing on the two most prominent proposals, due to Lewis and Perry. Section 4 discusses another, quite distinct phenomenon that motivates some discussions of self-locating belief: immunity to error through misidentification. Section 5 takes up issues arising in the philosophy of language—in particular in theories of communication. Section 6 discusses issues arising in decision theory and formal epistemology. We close with a brief taxonomy of objections to the claim that self-locating beliefs constitute a distinctive category. -/- . (shrink)

The increasing concern about the environmental damage and sustainability of fossil fuels has led to a surge in electric vehicle adoption. However, the “range anxiety” barrier, which concerns that electric vehicles may not have enough range to reach their destinations, may deter potential buyers. This study aims to create a mathematical model that will help place the fewest possible charging stations needed to allow anyone to travel anywhere within the network, charging their vehicles as needed. The developed model will be (...) applied to the D400 and D550 highways in Turkey, aiming to identify the best regions for investment in energy infrastructure and support Turkey’s transition toward an electric-focused future. Addressing this concern is crucial for promoting wider acceptance of electric vehicles. (shrink)

In addition to being uncertain about what the world is like, one can also be uncertain about one’s own spatial or temporal location in the world. My aim is to pose a problem arising from the interaction between these two sorts of uncertainty, solve the problem, and draw two lessons from the solution.

It is natural to think that the relationship between ‘rain’ and the location of rain is different from the relationship between ‘dance’ and the location of dancing. Utterances of (1) are typically interpreted as, in some sense, being about a location in which it rains. (2) is, typically, not interpreted as being about a location in which the dancing takes place.

This article examines MichËle Roberts' novel In the Red Kitchen in the light of contemporary spatial theory: in particular, the geographer Doreen Massey's critique of space and time. It argues that Roberts' text is particularly susceptible to such readings because of its multilayered portrayal of space, examining women's enclosure within the home across three different time periods, and through five different voices, which are overlaid one upon another in order to create a sense of simultaneity. In so doing, the text (...) shows that while the nature of women's oppression may change over time, their fundamental association with the domestic space does not. The article explores three different recurring spaces in the text: the kitchen, the bedroom and the crypt, the last of which acts as the receptacle for the trauma experienced by the female subject within the other two. The Gothic trope of the crypt is associated with incestuous abuse at the hands of a father-figure whom the woman both fears and desires; and thus it also signifies the precarious security to be found within the home. ‘Homelessness’, however, becomes another traumatic concept within a text which, while problematizing the relationship between home and identity, the subject and the space that contains and confines her, can envisage no other way of sustaining a secure sense of subjectivity. In the final analysis, while the boundaries that separate space from time are rendered porous and permeable in this novel, the complete collapse of all spatial boundaries is not conceptualized as desirable. (shrink)

In the Jewish mystical tradition, some argue that God can’t literally be everywhere. He must be absent from places that lie beneath His dignity. Medieval Jewish philosophers, by contrast, argued that God is not located in space or time at all. Some biblical verses imply that God is always located everywhere. And yet, elsewhere, the Bible describes God as especially located in specific regions, at specific times. The rabbis talk about humans making space for God. To what extent can all (...) of these threads come together to form a coherent conception of God’s relationship with space? The striking conclusion of this chapter is that the ways in which God’s presence are limited are more religiously significant than the ways in which God’s presence is ubiquitous. (shrink)

In his book Powers (2003), George Molnar argues against Dispositional Monism by presenting a posteriori reasons to believe in the existence of actual categorical features. In this paper I argue that either Molnar’s project is misdirected, since the properties he concentrates on are most possibly irrelevant for the debate between Dispositional Monism and Property Dualism, or, granted that the properties he chooses are indeed relevant, his arguments cannot prove that they are categorical without begging the question against Dispositional Monism.

We perceive things in the external world as spatially located both with respect to each other and to ourselves, such that they are in principle accessible from where we seem to be. I hear the door bang behind me; I feel the pen on the desk over to my right; and I see you walking beneath the line of pictures, from left to right in front of me. By displaying these spatial relations between its objects and us, the perceivers, perception (...) places us in the perceived world: our world and the world we perceive are one. Clearly this is not achieved by our continually perceiving ourselves along with the things around us, and thus recovering our position with respect to them. Indeed I shall argue that there are serious difficulties with the suggestion that this might be the basic mechanism for perceptual self- location. Furthermore, I shall argue that our existence as an element of the objective order cannot be inferred from the raw given in sense perception. Hence it cannot even be on the right lines as an answer to the question 'What is it for perception to represent its objects as environmental to the subject?', that it should present these objects, along with the perceiving subject himself, or along with something from which his existence in the perceived world could be deduced, in the very same frame so to speak. Nevertheless it yields him an awareness of himself as there in the wings of that scene, genuinely located with respect to the action, yet somehow not normally quite getting onto the stage. And I shall argue here, that perceptual contents succeed in being self-locating in this way in.. (shrink)

Can material objects be weakly located at regions of spacetime and yet fail to be exactly located anywhere? In this paper, I discuss a case which, at least according to one interpretation, answers affirmatively: the case of blending gunky water and wine, in gunky space. Perhaps after such a blend, the water and wine aren't exactly located anywhere while being weakly located at the location of the blend and any region which overlaps it. I show that the case is interesting (...) and complicated, and has consequences for some ideas found in papers by Daniel Nolan and Josh Parsons. (shrink)

Discussions about determinables and determinates, on the one hand, and discussions about (formal) theories of location, on the other, have thus far proceeded without any visible interaction, in substantive mutual neglect. This paper aims to remedy this situation of neglect. It explicitly relates (theories of) determinables and (theories of) location. First, I argue that some well known principles of location turn out to be instances of principles relating determinables and determinates. Building on this I then argue that theories of location (...) present formidable counterexamples to those principles about determinables and determinates. One such counterexample in particular is used as an argument against disjunctivism. Finally, I relate the entire discussion to yet another crucial debate in metaphysics, that of metaphysical indeterminacy. (shrink)

Location ontologies axiomatize the relationship between physical bodies and the space that they occupy, and there is a rich literature on the philosophical underpinnings of these ontologies. Existi...