The dominant view in the philosophical literature contends that internalized oppression, especially that experienced in virtue of one's womanhood, reduces one's sense of agency. Here, I extend these arguments and suggest a more nuanced account. In particular, I argue that internalized oppression can cause a person to conceive of herself as a deviant agent as well as a reduced one. This self-conception is also damaging to one's moral identity and creates challenges that are not captured by (...) merely analyzing a reduced sense of agency. To help illustrate this claim, I consider experiences of people of color who internalize stereotypes regarding criminality and moral deviance. With these examples in mind, I show that internalized prejudices regarding criminality can cause people of color to view themselves as outlaws in the moral community, that is, as wrongdoers. This conclusion helps give voice to some of the challenges that women of color who experience multiple sorts of internalized prejudices often face. To conclude, I discuss one strategy for empowerment that women of color have used when confronted with multiple forms of internalized oppression. (shrink)

In this paper, we locate a general rhetorical strategy employed in theoretical discourse wherein philosophers argue from the mere existence of internalized oppression to some kind of epistemic, moral, political, or cognitive deficiency of oppressed people. We argue that this strategy has harmful consequences for oppressed people, breaking down our analysis in terms of individual and structural harms within both epistemic and moral domains. These harms include attempting to undermine the self-trust of oppressed people, reinforcing unjust epistemic power (...) hierarchies, undermining the moral agency of oppressed people, and obscuring real issues of oppression. In light of these many harms, we conclude that there are pro tanto reasons not to employ this strategy, and instead offer a series of suggestions for those considering adopting such a rhetorical move. (shrink)

In “Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition,” Natalie Stoljar asks whether a procedural or a substantive approach to autonomy is best for addressing feminist concerns. In this paper, I build on Stoljar’s argument that feminists should adopt a strong substantive approach to autonomy. After briefly reviewing the problems with a purely procedural approach, I begin to articulate my own strong substantive theory by focusing specifically on the problem of internalized oppression. In the final section, I briefly address some of (...) the concerns raised by procedural theorists who are leery of a substantive approach. (shrink)

Virtually nonexistent in traditional American Indian communities, today American Indian women and children experience family violence at rates similar to those of the dominant culture. This article explores violence within American Indian communities as an expression of internalized oppression and as an extension of Euro-American violence against American Indian nations.

Although clinical understandings of self-injury, the deliberate mutilation of body tissue, have developed significantly since the phenomenon was first studied, the predominant stereotype of who self-injures is still White, teenage girls.1 White girls as well as White women are, indeed, at risk for SI, and sociocultural explanations appealing to oppressive socialization—particularly the influence of Western beauty norms—have been offered to explain their high rates of SI. Yet evidence exists to challenge this conception that SI is exclusively a White, female issue: (...) Black women, South... (shrink)

Because individual identities evolve in the context of enculturation, interpersonal bonds of affection and interdependency, and unconscious attitudes and wishes, a philosophical account of self‐determination must not only give due weight to each individual's unique desires, capabilities, values, interests, and goals, but it must also accommodate these intrapsychic, interpersonal, and social realities insofar as they shape an individual's identity. In patriarchal cultures, women internalize oppression, for regnant narrative schemas, themes, and figurations provide the default templates for their self‐portraits and (...) self‐narratives. Women's appropriation of these default templates reproduce subordinat ing norms and crowds out alternative understandings of who they are and what their lives are about. Thus, patriarchal cultures impede women's agency. In contrast to existing value‐neutral, value‐saturated, and self‐narrative approaches to autonomy, this account stresses the need for a well‐developed, well‐coordinated repertoire of agentic skills. Using these skills enriches women's self‐knowledge, extends their emanci patory potentialities, and strengthens their ability both to define themselves in their own terms and to enact their identities as they understand them – i.e., agentic skills bring women's voices into alignment with their individual identities and their lives. (shrink)

Natalie Stoljar posits that those who have internalized oppressive norms lack normative competence, which requires true beliefs and critical reflection. A lack of normative competence makes agents nonautonomous, according to Stoljar. This framework is thereby meant to address what she calls the “feminist intuition”—the intuition that oppressive norms are incompatible with autonomy. On my view, however, Stoljar’s normative competence account of autonomy is subject to a worrying problem. Her account misattributes nonautonomy to those who perpetrate the oppression, making (...) those who are oppressed and those who oppress count as equally nonautonomous. I argue that this is implausible and demonstrate in this paper that we can establish an asymmetry of autonomy between those who oppress others and those who are made the target of oppression. (shrink)

Rahel Jaeggi argues that forms of life ought to be the main reference point for a critical theory of society because the internal normative structure of life forms allows for immanent critique. In this article, I extend her model by systematically considering the possibility of oppressive forms of life. Oppressive forms of life are clusters of practices in which subordinated groups are systematically excluded or disabled from participating in the social processes of interpretation through which the values and purposes of (...) those very practices are determined. The possibility of oppressive forms of life poses a challenge to the method of immanent critique because it seems that any such critique must rely on immanent norms that are at least partly constituted by interpretations and that can therefore be distorted by oppression. I argue that Jaeggi’s model of immanent critique can be extended to respond to that challenge, either by recovering a constitutive form of freedom within all forms of life or by consciously adopting a partisan stance in favour of oppressed and marginalised self-understandings. (shrink)

After describing some key features of life in an underground railroad and the nature of gray agency, Concepción illustrates how survivors of relationship slavery can stop levying misplaced blame on themselves without giving up the valuable practice of blaming. Concepción concludes that by choosing a relatively non-oppressive account of self-blame, some amount of internalized oppression can be overcome and the double bind of agency-denial and self-loathing associated with being an oppressively grafted agent can be reduced.

Feminists have argued that oppressive socialization undermines the liberal model of autonomy. We contend that this argument can also be employed effectively as a challenge to the standard bioethical model of informed consent. We claim that the standard model is inadequate because it relies on presumptions of procedural autonomy and rational choice that overlook the problem of how agents are often socialized so that they adopt and internalize oppressive norms as part of their motivational structure. The argument that oppressive socialization (...) undermines liberalism’s view of autonomy is most relevant to what Beauchamp and Childress call the threshold elements of informed consent—competence and voluntariness. We show how these elements fail to account for morally relevant factors such as oppressive socialization. (shrink)

This collection of new essays examines philosophical issues at the intersection of feminism and autonomy studies. Are autonomy and independence useful goals for women and subordinate persons? Is autonomy possible in contexts of social subordination? Is the pursuit of desires that issue from patriarchal norms consistent with autonomous agency? How do emotions and caring relate to autonomous deliberation? Contributors to this collection answer these questions and others, advancing central debates in autonomy theory by examining basic components, normative commitments, and applications (...) of conceptions of autonomy. Several chapters look at the conditions necessary for autonomous agency and at the role that values and norms -- such as independence, equality, inclusivity, self-respect, care and femininity -- play in feminist theories of autonomy. Whereas some contributing authors focus on dimensions of autonomy that are internal to the mind -- such as deliberative reflection, desires, cares, emotions, self-identities and feelings of self-worth -- several authors address social conditions and practices that support or stifle autonomous agency, often answering questions of practical import. These include such questions as: What type of gender socialization best supports autonomous agency and feminist goals? When does adapting to severely oppressive circumstances, such as those in human trafficking, turn into a loss of autonomy? How are ideals of autonomy affected by capitalism? and How do conceptions of autonomy inform issues in bioethics, such as end-of-life decisions, or rights to bodily self-determination? (shrink)

This book is about personal autonomy and oppressive social contexts. Theories of personal autonomy identify the conditions that must be met in order for a person’s life, identity, desires, motivations, values, and actions truly to count as her own. To make one’s life one’s own, in the senses relevant to personal autonomy, however, is not to escape relation. Autonomy is intricately dependent on relations of many sorts. This book articulates significant ways in which oppressive social circumstances constrain the autonomy of (...) marginalized agents by actively failing to provide and sustain the relations required for autonomy. While a lot of valuable work has been done to articulate the causally relational connections between oppression and autonomy, the focus of this book is to elaborate the undertheorized ways in which oppressive social circumstances are constitutively relevant to autonomy. It moves away from a focus on socialization and the internalization of oppressive norms and centers for analysis the implications for autonomy of living with those empowered to harass and engage in racial profiling, of experiences of epistemic injustice, of the political distribution of negative affect, and of practices of displacing the first personal, experiential perspectives of marginalized agents from the public sphere. These alternative considerations bring into focus the constitutively relational relevance of oppression to autonomy and provide an interpretive lens that can accommodate the claim that an agent may not internalize oppressive norms and values in ways that damage her, yet may nevertheless find her autonomy constrained by oppressive social relations. (shrink)

Theorists of oppression commonly accept that unfair social power disparities result in a variety of harms. In particular, oppression is characterized by a loss of open-mindedness in the oppressors, and negative internalization in the oppressed. That is, while oppressors are often unable or unwilling to consider the points of view of the oppressed, the oppressed often come to internalize conditions of oppression by experiencing them as indicative of their own alleged shortcomings. Nevertheless, the psychological mechanisms behind these (...) phenomena have remained underexplored. This is unfortunate, since understanding the psychological processes behind these phenomena could help us understand how they could be reversed. In this work, I aim to fill this lacuna by extending debates on mechanisms of mindreading to show how close-mindedness and negative internalization come about. I synthesize empirical findings to show that while theorizing fosters emotional insulation by “reframing” affective cues from a third-person point of view, simulation fosters feelings of emotional vulnerability and psychological continuity. As a result, while theorizing allows oppressors to take a somewhat detached attitude during self and other interpretation, involuntary simulation fosters negative internalization on the part of the oppressed. (shrink)

It is common in the autonomy literature to claim that some more demanding theories of autonomy disrespect certain individuals by giving the result that those individuals lack autonomy. This claim is often made in the context of the debate between substantive and content-neutral theories of autonomy. Proponents of content-neutral theories often argue that, in deeming certain people non-autonomous—especially certain oppressed people who seem to have internalized their oppression in certain ways—the substantive theories disrespect those people. They take this (...) as reason to accept content-neutral views over substantive views. Despite its ubiquity, this concern about disrespect is hard to pin down precisely. In this paper, I articulate two questions that need to be answered before we can understand the disrespect objection. First: Who, exactly, is supposedly being disrespected by substantive views? Second: Why is it that excluding people with these features is disrespectful? I consider a number of possible answers to each of these questions, and I argue that none of them gives us a plausible explanation of why we should think substantive theories of autonomy are disrespectful to anyone. No matter how we fill in the details, I will argue, there is simply no reason to prefer content-neutral theories of autonomy over substantive ones on the grounds of respect. (shrink)

In this paper, we concentrate on the controversy over internalism and externalism on the normativity of social roles and defend internalism. According to the internalist, we are subject to the normativity of a social role we occupy only if we stand in some attitude that makes the norm binding on us. According to the externalist, we can be subject to the normativity of a social role simply by virtue of occupying it, regardless of our attitudes. We analyse a crucial problem (...) raised by Charlotte Witt for internalism–– namely, that internalism cannot explain important cases of role nonconforming behaviour––and argue that John Searle’s and Robert Brandom’s internalist theories offer responses to this problem, albeit incomplete ones. We then outline a novel internalist model of the normativity of social roles, loosely inspired by Hegel’s theories of recognition and sociocultural habituation as a second nature, which incorporates an account of how social roles are acquired. We show that this model is not afflicted by Witt’s problem. In the conclusion, we suggest that our model can shed new light on the mechanisms of social role oppression. (shrink)

Attempts to articulate the ways in which membership in socially subordinated social identities can impede one's autonomy have largely unfolded as part of the debate between different types of internalist theories in relation to the problem of internalized oppression. The different internalist positions, however, employ a damage model for understanding the role of social subordination in limiting autonomy. I argue that we need an externalist condition in order to capture the ways in which membership in a socially subordinated (...) identity can constrain one's autonomy, even if one is undamaged in one's autonomy competencies and self-reflexive attitudes. I argue that living among those practically empowered to harass, to engage in racial profiling, and to treat as expendable is incompatible with a freedom-condition required for unconstrained global self-determination. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Oppression1Françoise Lionnet (bio)In her disquietingly incandescent poetic novella, La vie de Josephin le fou, completed with the energy of urgency in just two weeks in November 2002,2 Mauritian author Ananda Devi explores Joséphin's relationship with the protective aquatic environment that becomes his refuge from domestic abuse and maternal rejection:J'ai pris l'habitude d'aller dans la mer chaque fois que le monde d'en haut criait trop fort. La mer m'a accueilli (...) chaque fois sans poser de questions, elle avait pas de voix, la mer, que des sons transparents et mouillés, des sons qui vous bercent et vous endorment et vous cicatrisent et vous guérissent….(20)Going into the ocean became a habit every time the world up above would scream too loud. The ocean welcomed me every time, without asking any questions--the ocean had no voice, only sounds, transparent and soaked, sounds that could rock you to sleep and heal your wounds…..(27)The French-language narrative plays with the homonyms mer (sea/ocean) and mère (mother) to underline the nurturing maternal qualities of the deep, which it contrasts with the behavior of the abused and abusive human mother. Caught in a vortex of violence on land where he must always hold his breath and his tongue, Joséphin has developed the ability to survive without much air. This learned ability to restrict his breathing has prepared him for life under water:J'avais pas besoin de respirer. J'avais tellement retenu ma respiration depuis bébé pour pas la mettre en colère… que c'était facile de le faire de nouveau pour rester longtemps longtemps sous l'eau. Vivre là, en captant quelques bulles d'air échappées des coquilles.(22)I didn't need to breathe. I had held my breath for so long as a baby to not make her mad…. that it was easy to do it again, to stay a long long time under water, to live there, off of a few air bubbles escaped from sea shells.(28)In a story that takes on the generic characteristics of the fantastic, Devi thematizes the relationship between social or familial oppression and the physiological constriction of lungs due to oxygen deficiency. Joséphin's (self-)denial of air speaks to us today, eloquently, of an urgent issue that became prominent in the past two years: choking as a form of torture inflicted upon victims of police brutality. The oft repeated slogan, "I can't breathe," militant words of the international Black Lives Matter movement, [End Page 169] have become a rallying cry against oppression. "I can't breathe" is recognizable everywhere as a sign of outrage against gratuitous human cruelty, and in 2020, George Floyd became its most famous contemporary symbol, after Eric Garner's death in a choke hold first drew attention to the issue. Journalist Lonnae O'Neal has discussed Floyd's fate, his tragic last moments, his call to his absent, deceased mother. O'Neal dwells on the words he uttered as he lay in the street: "Momma! Momma! I am through." In her elegy to black motherhood, O'Neal asserts that a dying man's call to his mother "is a prayer to be seen," "a sacred invocation" that expresses the poignant hope that memory and justice will prevail. She invokes Floyd's need to be recognized as a human being, to testify to his humanity with his last breaths, and thus to be remembered as having mattered. Her lyrical prose contains direct echoes of Martinican poet Aimé Césaire's poem "Le cri" in which the narrator forces recognition of his humanity by leaving traces of his "souffle," his breath, in the invisible presence-absence of air:Le vent novice de la mémoire des méandress'offenseÀ vif que par mon soufflede mon souffle il suffisepour à tous signifierprésents et avenirqu'un homme était làet qu'il a crié[…]The wind, inexpert at remembering meandersis stungto the quick that my breathmy breath alone sufficesto signify to allnow and foreverthat a man was... (shrink)

A comparative examination of four alternative ways of understandingwhat human rights are supports an institutional understanding assuggested by Article 28 of the Universal Declaration: Human rightsare weighty moral claims on any coercively imposed institutionalorder, national or international (as Article 28 confirms). Any suchorder must afford the persons on whom it is imposed secure accessto the objects of their human rights. This understanding of humanrights is broadly sharable across cultures and narrows the philosophical and practical differences between the friends ofcivil and (...) political and the champions of social, economic, andcultural human rights. When applied to the global institutionalorder, it provides a new argument for conceiving human rights asuniversal – and a new basis for criticizing this order as tooencouraging of oppression, corruption, and poverty in the developing countries: We have a negative duty not to cooperatein the imposition of this global order if feasible reforms ofit would significantly improve the realization of human rights. (shrink)

Natalie Stoljar posits that purely procedural theories of autonomy are unable to explain the ‘feminist intuition’, which is the idea that the internalization of false and oppressive norms are incompatible with autonomy. She claims instead that an account based on ‘normative competence’ – which requires true beliefs and critical reflection – can explain why oppressive norms should be excluded as legitimate decision-making inputs. On my view, however, the normative competence approach is subject to a worrying problem. While Stoljar's view successfully (...) problematizes the internalization of oppression, her view misattributes non-autonomy also to those who perpetrate the oppression. I suggest that this is implausible, arguing instead that we can establish an asymmetry of autonomy between those who oppress others and those who are made target of oppression. (shrink)

In this dissertation I develop a philosophical theory of scapegoating that explains the role of blame-shifting and guilt avoidance in the endurance of oppression. I argue that scapegoating masks and justifies oppression by shifting unwarranted blame onto marginalized groups and away from systems of oppression and those who benefit from them, such that people in dominant positions are less inclined to notice or challenge its workings. I first identify a gap in our understanding of oppression, namely (...) how oppression endures despite widespread formal commitments to principles of equality and justice. I argue that prominent theories of oppression do not place enough weight on the question of how oppression is justified and concealed from us through blame-shifting, in ways that enable its persistence without our explicit approval of its systems. Scapegoating, a concept as old as the Bible, offers potential insight into the means through which we shift blame and avoid responsibility. However, my survey of the genealogy of scapegoating shows that existing conceptualizations of scapegoating are limited in their scope and cannot be applied to explain the endurance of oppression. I propose an ameliorative theory of scapegoating that accounts for deficiencies in prevailing theories of both oppression and scapegoating. Distinct from interpersonal theories and psychologistic analyses of scapegoating, my theory characterizes scapegoating according to its social function in oppression, thereby explaining structural dimensions that are not already captured by other accounts.With the motivation and ingredients in place, I develop my theory of scapegoating as made up of three sub-mechanisms: essentialization of marginalized groups as blameworthy, collective interest in protection against a threat, and social exclusion of the blamed. These sub-mechanisms work together to construct certain groups as scapegoats and encourage us to treat them accordingly through various structural and interpersonal means. I argue that scapegoating has important implications for the formation of social identities; namely, scapegoating constructs social identities in an oppressive arrangement that is largely hidden from us but informs our social and affective relations. By constructing some identities as essentially blameworthy and threatening, dominantly situated identity groups are encouraged to internalize a protected status, act together in defense of their status, and maintain systems of oppressive exclusion. Finally, I elaborate the epistemic dimensions of my theory of scapegoating to argue that scapegoating functions within our social imaginaries and structural epistemic practices. In particular, I focus on the ways that ignorance functions to maintain the scapegoat mechanism, and how scapegoating helps insulate structural forms of ignorance. I end by considering the potential for resistance to scapegoating. (shrink)

Leading expressivist proposals characterize the mental state expressed in the making of a normative judgment solely in terms of intrinsic, psychological dispositions. As a result, they fail to capture a subset of the normative judgments that agents can and do make; they miss the way that external factors can influence what the making of a normative judgment looks like. This problem can be seen most plainly in the context of systemic oppression. Intuitively, one can make a normative judgment that (...) conflicts with the oppressive ideas one has previously been conditioned to endorse, but expressivism seems to deny that this is possible. The expressivist's inability to count these avowals made under oppression as genuine normative judgments makes expressivism deficient as a metaethical theory. (shrink)

How does race shape international law? This volume orbits this question, exploring what many of the authors describe as international law’s complicity with racial hierarchy, systemic oppression, and global white supremacy. While mainstream international legal scholarship has long treated race as a peripheral concern—or a historic injustice to be remembered but not redressed—this volume argues that racialization is foundational to the discipline, shaping its doctrines, epistemes, and interlocutors. Bringing together leading and emerging scholars, the collection moves beyond a query (...) about whether international law is racist to explore how racial hierarchies are embedded in its structures and how they continue to evolve through legal and institutional practice. Divided into five sections, the book begins by situating international law’s racialized boundaries within its colonial, capitalist, and chauvinist afterlives, exposing how white ignorance and race-thinking underpin legal norms, from sovereignty to jus cogens. It then examines racial stratification across legal institutions, including investment law, refugee law, and the Genocide Convention. The third section extends this critique to human rights, revealing the ways in which even an emancipatory paradigm can bolster racial injustices. The penultimate section unpacks racial hierarchies in disparate societies, including Brazil, India, Japan, China, and the frontiers of nation-states. The volume concludes with an exploration of the role of alternative epistemologies in racial justice struggles, and the limits of international law’s capacity for anti-racist transformation. This book seeks to contribute to the anti-racist struggle by advancing an understanding of international law aimed at dismantling its racialized structures. (shrink)

The authors advance a situated internalism for adapted sport by linking genealogical analyses of power to the broad internalism value. Constraints are judged not only by what they forbid or allow, but by how they stage a meaningful trial. Call this challengeability: rules are challengeable when they calibrate uncertainty, secure non-dominating reciprocity and embed intrinsic adversity, protecting skill-dependence, fair mutual challenge, and striving and resilience. Extending Elster, the authors distinguish Fundamental Hard (constitutive), Contextual Hard (classification, equipment, comparability) and Soft constraints. (...) Genealogically these devices produce subjects; internally the authors assess their contribution to practice goods and the lived quality of the trial, with cases and governance cues on sustaining excellence without oppression or spectacle. (shrink)

I construct an analysis of social trust that attends distinctively to cooperation in social relations that has the capability to (begin to) counter the default social distrust obtained due to oppressive conditions via a form of collective reasoning. For social trust to overcome oppression it must be a normatively transparent form of trust. Transparent trust can counter the effects of oppression on social interaction and foster social cooperation by correcting unequal positions of social vulnerability and improving disparities in (...) credibility resultant of oppression since collective reasoning in norm legitimization permits all individuals to participate in the process of self and other defining and the development of the concomitant norms that guide these processes. (shrink)

Grappling with Monuments of Oppression provides a timely analysis of the diverse approaches being used around the world to confront colonial and imperial monuments and to promote social equity. Presenting 12 interdisciplinary, international case studies, this volume explores the ways in which the materiality of social domination can be combated. With contributions from activists, scholars, artists, and policymakers, the book envisions the theme of restorative justice in heritage and archaeology as encompassing initiatives for the reconciliation of past societal transgressions (...) using processes that are multivocal, dialogic, historically informed, community based, negotiated, and transformative. Arguing that monuments to historical figures who engaged in oppressive regimes provide rich opportunities for dialog and negotiation, chapters within the book demonstrate that, by confronting these monuments, citizens can envision new ways to address the context and significance of the figures they memorialize and the many people who were targets of their oppression. Contributors to the book also provide a toolkit of methods and strategies for addressing the continuing structures of social domination. Grappling with Monuments of Oppression will be essential reading for academics and students working in heritage studies, archaeology, anthropology, material culture studies, landscape analysis, and museum studies. It will also be of great interest to practitioners and activists around the world. (shrink)

In her paper “Radical Externalism”, Amia Srinivasan argues that externalism about epistemic justification should be preferred to internalism by those who hold a “radical” worldview (according to which pernicious ideology distorts our evidence and belief‐forming processes). I share Srinivasan's radical worldview, but do not agree that externalism is the preferable approach in light of the worldview we share. Here I argue that cases informed by this worldview can intuitively support precisely the internalist view that Srinivasan challenges, offer two such cases, (...) and explain away the externalist‐friendly intuitions that Srinivasan's cases solicit. I then articulate and defend a “radical” internalism, arguing that internalists’ aversion to epistemic hubris and emphasis on subjecting one's beliefs to critical scrutiny are especially attractive in realistic cases involving multiple intersecting axes of oppression—that is, precisely the sort of case that permeates our social world. I also argue that externalism's lack of interest in action‐guiding principles leaves it with little to offer us in the fight against epistemic oppression. (shrink)

The concept of “interlocking systems of oppression”—a precursor to “intersectionality”— was introduced in a social movement context by the Combahee River Collective (CRC) in pamphlet form in 1977. Addressing Black lesbians’ and feminists’ experiences of invisibility within white male-dominated New Left and socialist politics, male-dominated civil rights, Black nationalist, and Black radical organizing, and white-dominated women’s liberation and lesbian feminist movements, the CRC argues for an “integrated analysis and practice” of struggle against “racial, sexual, heterosexual and class oppression” (...) (CRC 1977/1981/1983, 210). I argue the CRC articulates and problematizes sexuality as a category of analysis from a “queer” subject position which avows racialized lesbian visibility and resists the tendency to “heterosexualize” women of color feminisms. I delineate three aspects of the concept of “interlocking systems of oppression”: its attentiveness to the phenomenological simultaneity of multiple oppressions; its synthesis of identity politics and coalition politics; its immanent critique of socialist concepts of class and class struggle. While some accounts of “intersectionality”—the now-predominant way of referencing the multiplicity of identities and oppressions—tend to reproduce a race-gender dyad (or a race-gender-class triad), the CRC notably articulates sexuality as a category of analysis from a “queer” subject position which avows lesbian visibility and thereby enables contemporary readers to resist the tendency to “heterosexualise” intersectionality—and women of colour feminisms more generally. (shrink)

Current legal responses are not able to effectively address obstetric violence and mistreatment in childbirth. This inadequacy stems from their failure to recognise that this phenomenon has a structural dimension related to the broader oppression women experience regarding childbirth, which manifests both during and beyond events of obstetric violence and mistreatment in childbirth. This structural oppression typically takes three forms: masculine domination, seen in the application of gender stereotypes regarding childbirth; professional domination of health professionals, evident in the (...) performance of non-consensual medical procedures; and structural violence, apparent in the lack of access to appropriate healthcare services. Structural oppression of women in childbirth must be addressed because it is fundamentally unjust and violates women’s human rights. The identification of State obligations regarding childbirth constitutes a promising framework for addressing this structural oppression as well as obstetric violence and mistreatment in childbirth more generally. (shrink)

This innovative text addresses the lack of literature regarding intersectional approaches to psychoanalysis, underscoring the importance of thinking through race, class, and gender within psychoanalytic theory and practice. The book tackles the widespread perception of psychoanalysis today as a discipline detached from the progressive ideals of social responsibility, institutional psychotherapy, and community mental health. Bringing together a range of international contributions, the collection explores issues of class, politics, oppression, and resistance within the field of psychoanalysis in cultural, theoretical, and (...) clinical contexts. It shows how, in contrast to this misperception, psychoanalysis has been attentive to these ideals from its origins, as well as demonstrating how it continues to be relevant today, through wide-ranging conceptual discussions of the anti-globalisation, Black Lives Matter and #MeToo movements. Written in an accessible style, Psychoanalysis, Politics, Oppression and Resistance will be essential reading for practicing psychoanalysts as well as academics and students in a range of humanities and social sciences fields. (shrink)

The French feminist philosopher Michèle Le Doeuff has taught us something about “the collectivity,” which she discovers in women’s struggle for access to the philosophical, but also about “the unknown” and “the unthought.” It is the unthought which will matter most to what I intend to say today about a fundamental ignorance on which speaker vulnerability is built. On International Women’s Day, it seems appropriate to speak about – or, at least, to evoke – the silencing which has been imposed (...) on women by an oppressive form of ignorance. My question is: how do our resounding voices as women – on 8 March 2016 – avoid what feminist philosophers have distinguished as wilful forms of silencing? Silencing exploits vulnerability; and speaker vulnerability is an exposure either to violence or affection, in its dependence on an audience. My response seeks to undo the silencing of women by transforming an ignorance of vulnerability into a distinctively ethical avowal. To see the significance of this undoing, we will consider how our contemporary global world reduces vulnerability to an openness to violence, ignoring what has been unthought: an openness to affection. A wilful ignorance of vulnerability develops not as a lack of knowledge but its disavowal – on which various forms of oppression are built. An active disavowal of thinking (the unthought) is the other side of a striving for invulnerability; and this striving is encouraged by a social world which remains ignorant of its own wounding, as well as its own potential for ethical relations in vulnerability. Like la mauvaise foi of the French existentialist, invulnerability is a form of self-deception; and those who claim it embrace ignorance of their own and others’ vulnerability too. (shrink)

This essay examines the relationship between African American internal colonialism and democracy, highlighting the complexities of democracy that make it both susceptible to oppressive violence at home and abroad, as well as a potential resource for emancipation and equality. I understand “internal colonialism” here to encompass various terms used by African Americans beginning in the 1830s, including semi-colonialism, domestic colonialism, and a nation within a nation. Much political philosophy assumes that society is “nearly just” or “generally just,” or that (...) class='Hi'>oppression and injustice are found in societies that we nonetheless deem legitimate. Centering the complexities and possibilities of democracy instead shifts the focus to how democracy is compatible with violence and injustice, as well as their overcoming. Such a focus leads to a consideration of abolition democracy and the question of what the process of overcoming internal colonialism demands. (shrink)

I argue that the overt subjugation in the system of American slavery and its subsequent effects offer a case study for an existentialist analysis of freedom, oppression and humor. Concentrating on the writings and experiences of Frederick Douglass and the existentialists Simone De Beauvoir and Lewis Gordon, I investigate how the concepts of “spirit of seriousness”, “mystification”, and an existentialist reading of “double consciousness” for example, can elucidate the forms of explicit and concealed oppression. I then make the (...) case that subversive humor is an effective means to bring to consciousness the inconsistencies and incongruities of the serious oppressors. I also illustrate how humor can act as a bulwark against the rise and persistence of oppression by (non-violently) attacking the absolutist stance on human nature maintained through the use of dominating and “authoritative” language and action. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 21.1 (2001) 107-108 [Access article in PDF] Sixth International Conference of the Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies John Berthrong Boston University The society's sixth international conference, held 5-12 August 2000, was an exceptionally successful event for the five hundred plus participants. In great measure the success was due to the conference's scenic and user-friendly location at the Pacific Lutheran University, Tacoma,Washington, and to the untiring work of Professor (...) Paul Ingram and his staff. The spirit of Mount Rainier towered over the whole event, reminding us that both Buddhism and Christianity have a stake in global healing.One of the most enjoyable aspects of the conference was how well the various panels, presentations, plenary programs, and workshops matched the announced theme of the conference. Although I cannot speak for all the participants, in my extensive sampling of the events, care was given in addressing the question of global healing from a diverse set of spiritual perspectives and academic disciplines.Whether you attended the section on meditation or the erudite papers on orthodoxy, the presenters strove to show how their work could be understood as a way to promote global healing.Nowhere was this attention to the theme of the conference more clearly demonstrated than in the evening plenaries. I confess that I am not a fan of evening meetings. However, in each case the various panels presented their analysis as a gift to the larger mosaic of the conference. The evenings began with Dr. A. T. Ariyaratne and Dr. Cecil Murray addressing nonviolent struggle for economic justice. This was followed by presentations on the Earth Charter; gender, justice, and oppression in Buddhism and Christianity; and consumerism and ecology. I would also be remiss if I did not note that we were treated to wonderful musical performances not only at the opening and closing ceremonies but during all the other plenaries as well.One of the most noteworthy features of the work of the society over the last two decades has been its conviction that erudite scholarship and the actual profession and practice of religion are not mutually exclusive. Furthermore, the society was founded on the belief that dialogue between Buddhists and Christians is a good thing in and of itself. The workshop on the interior dialogue of meditation was a gentle refutation to those in the academic world who maintain that only analysis of isolated religious practices or texts makes any sense. The society has always urged its members to bring their practices as well as their ideas to the dialogical encounter. [End Page 107]Music played a moving role in the life of the conference. The plenary sessions took place in the magnificent new music center at PLU, wherein resides a huge concert organ.We were literally moved by the organ's powerful rendition of the classic works of the Western religious musical tradition. Matching the organ was the gentle call of the shakuhachi. An organ and a shakuhachi may seem mismatched in theory and performance--much less sheer volume for the bamboo flute--but they blended into a symphony of shared sacred music.Having praised the thematic attentiveness, musical brilliance, and spiritual depth of the conference, I must likewise highlight the academic integrity of the papers. Many of the professorial types mentioned over and over again how pleased they were with the thoughtfulness of the academic presentations. Here we need not only to thank the authors but also the conference planning committee for its ability to select the best representatives of erudite, informed, and engaged models of academic scholarship. Those who were not present will simply have to wait for many of these fine papers to be published in various scholarly journals. Another helpful detail was the conference bookstore, which stocked many of the recent publications of the participants.The only criticism I heard during the whole conference was that it was, alas, a bit too long. In this busy world it is difficult for most people to block out a whole week for one conference. I mention this only in... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 21.1 (2001) 107-108 [Access article in PDF] Sixth International Conference of the Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies John Berthrong Boston University The society's sixth international conference, held 5-12 August 2000, was an exceptionally successful event for the five hundred plus participants. In great measure the success was due to the conference's scenic and user-friendly location at the Pacific Lutheran University, Tacoma,Washington, and to the untiring work of Professor (...) Paul Ingram and his staff. The spirit of Mount Rainier towered over the whole event, reminding us that both Buddhism and Christianity have a stake in global healing.One of the most enjoyable aspects of the conference was how well the various panels, presentations, plenary programs, and workshops matched the announced theme of the conference. Although I cannot speak for all the participants, in my extensive sampling of the events, care was given in addressing the question of global healing from a diverse set of spiritual perspectives and academic disciplines.Whether you attended the section on meditation or the erudite papers on orthodoxy, the presenters strove to show how their work could be understood as a way to promote global healing.Nowhere was this attention to the theme of the conference more clearly demonstrated than in the evening plenaries. I confess that I am not a fan of evening meetings. However, in each case the various panels presented their analysis as a gift to the larger mosaic of the conference. The evenings began with Dr. A. T. Ariyaratne and Dr. Cecil Murray addressing nonviolent struggle for economic justice. This was followed by presentations on the Earth Charter; gender, justice, and oppression in Buddhism and Christianity; and consumerism and ecology. I would also be remiss if I did not note that we were treated to wonderful musical performances not only at the opening and closing ceremonies but during all the other plenaries as well.One of the most noteworthy features of the work of the society over the last two decades has been its conviction that erudite scholarship and the actual profession and practice of religion are not mutually exclusive. Furthermore, the society was founded on the belief that dialogue between Buddhists and Christians is a good thing in and of itself. The workshop on the interior dialogue of meditation was a gentle refutation to those in the academic world who maintain that only analysis of isolated religious practices or texts makes any sense. The society has always urged its members to bring their practices as well as their ideas to the dialogical encounter. [End Page 107]Music played a moving role in the life of the conference. The plenary sessions took place in the magnificent new music center at PLU, wherein resides a huge concert organ.We were literally moved by the organ's powerful rendition of the classic works of the Western religious musical tradition. Matching the organ was the gentle call of the shakuhachi. An organ and a shakuhachi may seem mismatched in theory and performance--much less sheer volume for the bamboo flute--but they blended into a symphony of shared sacred music.Having praised the thematic attentiveness, musical brilliance, and spiritual depth of the conference, I must likewise highlight the academic integrity of the papers. Many of the professorial types mentioned over and over again how pleased they were with the thoughtfulness of the academic presentations. Here we need not only to thank the authors but also the conference planning committee for its ability to select the best representatives of erudite, informed, and engaged models of academic scholarship. Those who were not present will simply have to wait for many of these fine papers to be published in various scholarly journals. Another helpful detail was the conference bookstore, which stocked many of the recent publications of the participants.The only criticism I heard during the whole conference was that it was, alas, a bit too long. In this busy world it is difficult for most people to block out a whole week for one conference. I mention this only in... (shrink)

A new wave of thinkers from across different disciplines within the analytical tradition in philosophy has recently focused on critical, societal challenges, such as the silencing and questioning of the credibility of oppressed groups, the political polarization that threatens the good functioning of democratic societies across the globe, or the moral and political significance of gender, race, or sexual orientation. Appealing to both well-established and younger international scholars, this volume delves into some of the most relevant problems and discussions within (...) the area, bringing together for the first time different essays within what we deem to be a “political turn in analytic philosophy.” This political turn consists of putting different conceptual and theoretical tools from epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and metaphysics at the service of social and political change. The aim is to ensure a better understanding of some of the key features of our social environments in an attempt to achieve a more just and equal society. (shrink)

International development theorists and practitioners agree that human empowerment is a necessary part of good development. This agreement is encouraging because attention and resources are being directed towards the important goal of empowering the oppressed. It is problematic because the agreement is relatively superficial and masks some deep and important disagreements about the goals and means of development theory, policy, and practice. Chapters One and Two compare the dominant economic growth approach to development with the capability approach, a relatively new (...) alternative. I determine that the capability approach offers a more complete and therefore, superior concept of empowerment. Chapter Three considers Thomas Pogge’s argument for the conclusion that the praise and attention the capability approach receives cannot be justified. I explain that Pogge’s argument is based on a misunderstanding of crucial aspects of the capability approach, including the important role of empowerment. Chapters Four and Five provide detailed consideration of the role of empowerment within both Amartya Sen’s and Martha Nussbaum’s versions of the capability approach. I conclude that although neither scholar consistently uses the term empowerment, the concept of empowerment – both as agency and as capability-set expansion – plays a robust role on both versions of the approach. Moreover, I make the controversial suggestion that many of the differences between Sen and Nussbaum are more a matter of style than substance. Chapter Six considers the concern that Sen does not do enough to engage the role of institutionalized power in generating inequalities that prevent individuals from being empowered. I conclude that despite valuable contributions, Sen fails to provide a complete account of empowerment issues. However, this is not a fatal flaw. Considering both Sen’s contributions, and the fact that the approach is well suited to accommodate a more complete understanding of institutionalized power and of empowerment for development (for example, Naila Kabeer’s Social Relations Approach), it is clear that Sen and the capability approach have offered valuable steps towards a complete concept of empowerment. (shrink)

Re-reading Mary Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Men (1790) in the context of the international politics after the start of the French Revolution in 1789 and before the rise of the Haitian Revolution in 1791 leads to three discoveries in the history of European ideas. First, her reply to Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France was advertised, discussed, and rumoured to be the work of a woman in London papers days earlier in November 1790 than previously (...) documented. Second, Wollstonecraft’s first known instances of public reception beyond Britain were in a major Jamaican newspaper from January to March 1791. Thirdly, and most notably, in February 1791, the Kingston Daily Advertiser published a lengthy excerpt from her Rights of Men that called for the abolition of slavery and the realization of justice for the poor and oppressed. Long before Hegel probably developed his master-slave dialectic in response to journalistic accounts of the independence of Haiti in 1804, there was Wollstonecraft’s actual reception in the international news in Jamaica, amid the spread of reports of the rise of slave unrest in the broader post-revolutionary Caribbean. (shrink)

There is now an awakening to and recognition of the emotionally complex lives of some non-human animals. While their forms of consciousness may vary, some are indeed conscious and deserve political consideration. What that political consideration ought to be is the central topic of this article. First, I argue that interspecies justice must be understood in terms of the relationships that foster individual flourishing of all concerned. The obstacles to such flourishing are the five faces of oppression famously identified (...) by Iris Marion Young: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence. By extending Young’s concept of the social group to intra- and interspecies groups, we become more attuned to differences between and among species. Theorizing the existence of interspecies groups brings forward new avenues to explore oppression and simultaneously theorize its opposite – interspecies justice. Second, I argue that a positive theory of interspecies flourishing can be developed on the basis of Marx’s materialist philosophy and reclamation of species-being. Though Marx uses humanist language throughout the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, attention to his methodological commitments reveals that some non-human animals can no longer be excluded from the capability of flourishing and species-being. Some non-human animals are conscious, act purposefully, and labor creatively and must be included in our circle of moral and political concern. (shrink)

Conscientious refusal involves decisions by healthcare workers, on grounds of their conscience, to refuse to provide legal, professionally permissible and safe health interventions to patients. Conscientious provision involves decisions by healthcare workers, also on grounds of conscience, to provide safe and beneficial healthcare to patients that is prohibited by law or policy. Some bioethicists believe that the moral issues governing both are identical, and that if one permits conscientious refusals, one should also permit conscientious provisions. This article argues that this (...) assumption of symmetry is incorrect. To demonstrate this, it does the following: first, it establishes why it matters that we understand the difference between them; second, it describes three recent cases of conscientious provision in Canadian healthcare to help characterize its nature and scope; third, it situates these cases in a socio-economically nuanced analysis of the role of the conscientious provider under conditions or privilege and oppression; finally, it applies insights from the cases and the intersectional analysis to common criticisms of conscientious refusal to reinforce the fundamental asymmetries between conscientious refusal and conscientious provision. (shrink)

The article launches a conceptual argument against the suggestion that Christian fundamentalist women, having for religious reasons voluntarily chosen their subjugation, are not oppressed. The article also rebuts the related argument that Christian fundamentalism provides women with adequate means for subversive power. Instead, the article proposes that women within Christian fundamentalism are oppressed, because within Christian fundamentalism the very identity of ‘woman’ is construed as subjected, thus obliterating the possibility of choosing a non-subjected identity.

One of the most commonplace worries about humanitarian intervention relates to the perverse incentives that it might create, or the adverse reactions that it might provoke. For instance, it is sometimes said that by weakening the norm of sovereignty humanitarian intervention can encourage unscrupulous states to wage aggressive wars of self-interest using human rights as a pretense. It is feared, in other words, that humanitarian intervention—even when it has the purest motives—might ultimately do more harm than good by inciting unwanted (...) reactions from other states or substate groups. I will refer to these kinds of knock-on effects as the mediated consequences of intervention. They are brought about via the interceding agency of parties other than the intervener. It is generally assumed that when judging the proportionality of a humanitarian intervention, these consequences must be factored into the equation. If an intervention is expected to provoke adverse reactions the accumulated costs of which will outweigh the benefits that the intervention will deliver, then the intervention is thought to be disproportional and, therefore, unjustified. I want to challenge this assumption. I begin by considering what the principle of proportionality can reasonably demand of rebels who are defending their own basic rights against an oppressive government. I argue that a rebellion in such circumstances cannot plausibly be rendered impermissible solely by the expectation of negative mediated consequences, even when those consequences outweigh the anticipated benefits of the rebellion. This would seem to imply that rebels may discount mediated consequence from the proportionality calculus. But if this is so, do we have sound reasons for withholding the same prerogative from humanitarian interveners pursuing similar ends and using similar means? Can we justify asymmetric standards of proportionality? (shrink)

Theories of collective intentionality and theories of relational autonomy share a common interest in analyzing the social dynamics of agency. However, whereas theories of collective intentionality conceive of social groups primarily as intentional and voluntarily willed, theories of relational autonomy claim that autonomous agency is both scaffolded and constrained by social forces and structures, including the constraints imposed by nonvoluntary group membership. The question raised by this difference in view is whether social theorizing that overlooks the effects of nonvoluntary social (...) group membership on individual and joint agency overlooks crucial aspects of the social dynamics of agency. To explore this question, this article first evaluates Michael Bratman's planning analysis of individual agency from the perspective of relational autonomy theory and compares it with a narrative self‐constitution account of temporally extended agency. It then evaluates Bratman's analysis of shared agency and discusses Shaun Gallagher and Deborah Tollefsen's concept of we‐narratives, which extends the notion of narrative construction to shared agency. Overall, the argument aims to show that if we are interested in understanding the social dynamics of agency, it is critical to attend to the way that agents exercise their intentional agency in relation to internalized and external social constraints. (shrink)

How does working as a group impact the ability of counterspeakers to shift discourse norms? This chapter draws on data collected through ethnographic observation and interviews with members of the #iamhere International Network, a collective of over 150,000 Facebook users who respond together to what they regard as hateful comments online. As is discussed below, collective counterspeech has many benefits—it can amplify one’s speech and make efforts to counter hatred more sustainable, which can, in turn, make them more effective. As (...) the findings of this research show, the act of counterspeaking as a member of a group also positively affects those who do it—a category of people often overlooked by researchers in studies of the effectiveness of counterspeech. Interviewees reported that counterspeaking as a group made them feel braver and more empowered to challenge oppressive speech in a variety of settings. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Sixth International Buddhist-Christian Conference, August 5–12, 2000Paul IngramThe Sixth International Buddhist-Christian Conference, sponsored by the Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies, will take place at Pacific Lutheran University, Tacoma, Washington, from August 5 to 12, 2000. The Program Committee has approved the general conference theme as “Buddhism, Christianity, and Global Healing.” The conference will follow the structure, with some variations, of the last international conference that met at DePaul University (...) in 1996: morning working group sessions on several themes interrelated with the general conference theme; afternoon sessions devoted to individual papers; and evening plenary sessions.Evening plenary themes and speakers have been identified: Dr. A. T. Ariyaratne and Dr. Cecil Murray (senior pastor of the First AME Church in Los Angeles) will address the topic “The Non-Violent Struggle for Economic and Social Justice”; Sulak Sivaraksa and John B. Cobb Jr. will speak on “Consumerism and Ecology: Buddhist and Christian Perspectives”; Rita Gross and Daniel Maguire will speak on “Buddhism, Christianity, and Issues of Gender”; and Virginia Straus and a Christian speaker yet to be identified will address “The Earth Charter: A Buddhist and Christian Response.”Working Group cochairs and themes have also been identified: Buddhist-Christian Practice and Mind-Body Healing (Venerable Yifa and Mary Jo Meadow); Ecology, Consumerism, and Corporate Consciousness (David Chappell and Donald Mitchell); Gender: Issues of Oppression and Justice (Judith Simmer-Brown and Donald Luck); Buddhist-Christian Dialogue with the Natural Sciences (Ken Tanaka and Nancy Howell); Buddhist-Christian Dialogue on the Earth Charter (Virginia Straus and Jay McDaniel); The Interior Dialogue: Buddhist-Christian Meditative/ Contemplative Practice (Susan Postal and Ruben Habito); and The Role of Orthodoxy/Orthopraxis in Buddhist-Christian Dialogue (Rita Gross and John Keenan).For the first time in the twenty-year history of our international conferences, a special afternoon seminar will be cochaired by Sallie King and Paul Knitter that will focus on specific case studies on particular issues of peace and justice work that are [End Page 179] interrelated with the themes of the plenary sessions and working groups. These sessions will meet in the afternoon throughout the conference week and will involve a presentation in case-study format from a Buddhist and a Christian engaged in a practical way that illustrates the themes of the conference. They will be asked to describe their situation and what they are doing and, particularly, to speak about how Buddhism or Christianity guides them in their work, the problems and successes they have had, their hopes, and their struggles, after which there will be open conversation with those present. Finally, afternoon sessions will be devoted to individual papers and presentations organized around the conference’s themes and other themes that emerge as individual papers are submitted.A preliminary call for papers will be published in the spring 1999 edition of the Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies Newsletter. Individuals who are not members of the society but wish to have a copy of this call for papers may E-mail the editor of the newsletter, Harry Wells, at.The Department of Religion of Pacific Lutheran University, along with its administration, faculty, and staff, are currently working hard to make this conference enjoyable and memorable. Travel, room and board, and other information regarding Tacoma, Pacific Lutheran University, motels, and excursion arrangements will be made available in the fall 1999 edition of the Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies Newsletter. The final call for papers appears on pp. 242–243.Paul IngramPacific Lutheran UniversityCopyright © 1999 The University of Hawai’i Press... (shrink)

Bill Bowring’s book attempts to argue for a Marxist account of international law that embraces it as a tool for progressive politics and revolutionary change. He argues it is necessary to give a substantive account of both, locating them in the real struggles of the oppressed. Specifically, he locates human rights in the three great revolutions ‐ the French, the Russian and the anticolonial. However, this revolutionary heritage has been ‘degraded’ by recent events. As such, it is necessary to adopt (...) ‘revolutionary conservatism’, invoking international law’s origins against its current degradation. This review argues that, owing to international law’s indeterminacy, Bowring’s project is susceptible to imperial appropriation. This means, however, that Bowring cannot give an account of why we should use international law. It then argues that Bowring’s account of Pashukanis is wrong, and that Pashukanis’s work can better make sense of Bowring’s insights and international law more generally. (shrink)