Imagination is celebrated as our vehicle for escape from the mundane here and now. It transports us to distant lands of magic and make-believe, and provides us with diversions during boring meetings or long bus rides. Yet the focus on imagination as a means of escape from the real world minimizes the fact that imagination seems also to furnish us with knowledge about it. Imagination seems an essential component in our endeavor to learn about the world (...) in which we live--whether we're planning for the future, aiming to understand other people, or figuring out whether two puzzle pieces fit together. But how can the same mental power that allows us to escape the world as it currently is also inform us about the world as it currently is? Ten original essays grapple with this neglected question; in doing so, they present a diverse array of positions ranging from cautious optimism to deep-seated pessimism. Blending perspectives from philosophy of mind, cognitive science, epistemology, aesthetics, and ethics, Knowledge Through Imagination sheds new light on the epistemic role of imagination. (shrink)

Imagination has been assigned an important explanatory role in a multitude of philosophical contexts. This paper examines four such contexts: mindreading, pretense, our engagement with fiction, and modal epistemology. Close attention to each of these contexts suggests that the mental activity of imagining is considerably more heterogeneous than previously realized. In short, no single mental activity can do all the explanatory work that has been assigned to imagining.

Imagination is often considered the pinnacle of representational cognition. Looking at the concrete details of imagining in context, this paper aims to contribute to the emerging literature that is challenging this representational view by offering a relational and radically situated alternative. On the basis of observing architects in the process of making an architectural art installation, we show how to consider imagination not as de-contextualized achievement by an individual but as an opening up to larger-scale “affordances,” i.e. the (...) unfolding possibilities for action. We show how the architects coordinate the enactment of multiple affordances across different timescales, from small-scale affordances of picking up a mobile phone to the large-scale affordance of making the installation that takes months to unfold. These affordances get co-determined as they are jointly enacted. It is within this determining process that imagination too finds its place. On our view it is the indeterminacy of multiple affordances unfolding in action simultaneously that can be experienced as imaginative. The indeterminate character of this coordinative process allows activities to widen and open up, letting new possibilities for action enter into them. (shrink)

Imagination plays various epistemic roles but can it help us address dream skepticism? This paper explores different conceptions of imagination – propositional, processual, and imagistic – and examines their relevance to the Cartesian dream argument. I distinguish between the phenomenology of dreaming and its epistemological threat, arguing that dream skepticism arises not from the content of dreams, but from the immersive, belief-like quality of dream experience. While some models treat dreaming as propositional or inferential, I argue that these (...) fail to capture the distinctive imagistic nature of dream experience. This kind of imagination, vivid and involuntary, simulates the phenomenology of belief without involving actual belief formation. By interpreting dream skepticism through the lens of imagistic imagination, we gain a better understanding of why the dream scenario remains epistemically troubling – despite attempts to explain it away through propositional or inferential models. (shrink)

This paper explores the application of the phenomenological method of eidetic variation, developed by Edmund Husserl, to mixed reality (MR). Initially, MR is defined within the Reality-Virtuality (RV) continuum developed by Milgram and others (1994) and revisited by Skarbez and others (2021). MR objects, situated within this spectrum, are analyzed phenomenologically as both perceptual and imaginative, constituted by a network of relations. The paper then focuses on Husserl’s method of eidetic variation from Experience and Judgement, which involves arbitrary modification of (...) object characteristics to grasp their essence. This method, though rooted in essentialism, is used by content designers in augmented reality (AR) and virtual reality (VR) to create objects and environments. Lastly, the paper suggests that MR reflects the externalization of imagination through digital technologies, proposing an Analogue-Digital (AD) continuum that integrates human bodily experience and MR technology, facilitating imaginative visualization and creation without searching for the essence of objects. (shrink)

Aphantasia is a recently discovered disorder characterised by the total incapacity to generate visual forms of mental imagery. This paper proposes that aphantasia raises important theoretical concerns for the ongoing debate in the philosophy and sci- ence of consciousness over the nature of dreams. Recent studies of aphantasia and its neurobehavioral correlates reveal that the ma- jority of aphantasics, whilst unable to produce visual imagery while awake, nevertheless retain the capacity to experience rich visual dreams. This finding constitutes a novel (...) explanandum for theories of dreaming. Specifically, I argue that the recent dream reports of aphantasics constitute an empirical challenge to the emerging family of views which claim that dreams are essentially imaginative ex- periences, constitutively involving the kinds of mental imagery which aphantasics, ex-hypothesi, lack. After presenting this challenge in the context of Jonathan Ichikawa’s recent arguments for this view, I argue that this empirical challenge may be overcome if the ima- gination theorist abandons Ichikawa’s account of dreaming in favour of a modified version. This involves the claim that dreams are essentially inactive and constitutively involve non voluntary forms of imagination. I conclude with a suggestion for further research which can test the viability of this alternative hypothesis, and move the debate forward. (shrink)

Imagination is necessary for scientific practice, yet there are no in vivo sociological studies on the ways that imagination is taught, thought of, or evaluated by scientists. This article begins to remedy this by presenting the results of a qualitative study performed on two systems biology laboratories. I found that the more advanced a participant was in their scientific career, the more they valued imagination. Further, positive attitudes toward imagination were primarily due to the perceived role (...) of imagination in problem-solving. But not all problem-solving episodes involved clear appeals to imagination, only maximally specific problems did. This pattern is explained by the presence of an implicit norm governing imagination use in the two labs: only use imagination on maximally specific problems, and only when all other available methods have failed. This norm was confirmed by the participants, and I argue that it has epistemological reasons in its favour. I also found that its strength varies inversely with career stage, such that more advanced scientists do (and should) occasionally bring their imaginations to bear on more general problems. A story about scientific pedagogy explains the trend away from (and back to) imagination over the course of a scientific career. Finally, some positive recommendations are given for a more imagination-friendly scientific pedagogy. (shrink)

The imagination poses fascinating philosophical questions across a range of subjects including philosophy of mind, aesthetics and epistemology. However, until now it has been a relatively neglected topic. How do acts of imagining differ from other mental episodes, such as perceptions or judgements? What kind of awareness is involved in imagining? Can imagining ground knowledge and if so, how reliable is it? Is there some unity to the various forms of imagining? In this book Fabian Dorsch considers these questions, (...) introducing and assessing all the main issues and arguments concerning imagination, including: episodic imagining imagining objects propositional imagining imagination and epistemology imagination and aesthetics imagination and cognitive science the unity of imagining. Including chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary, _Imagination_ is an ideal starting point for anyone studying the philosophy of imagination for the first time as well as more advanced students and researchers in philosophy, psychology and related disciplines. (shrink)

Imagination allows us to step out of the ordinary but also to transform it through our sense of wonder and play, artistic inspiration and innovation, or the eureka moment of a scientific breakthrough. In this book, Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei offers a groundbreaking new understanding of its place in everyday experience as well as the heights of creative achievement. -/- The Life of Imagination delivers a new conception of imagination that places it at the heart of our engagement (...) with the world—thinking, acting, feeling, making, and being. Gosetti-Ferencei reveals imagination’s roots in embodied human cognition and its role in shaping our cognitive ecology. She demonstrates how imagination arises from our material engagements with the world and at the same time endows us with the sense of an inner life, how it both allows us to escape from reality and aids us in better understanding it. Drawing from philosophy, cognitive science, evolutionary anthropology, developmental psychology, literary theory, and aesthetics, Gosetti-Ferencei engages a spectacular range of examples from ordinary thought processes and actions to artistic, scientific, and literary feats to argue that, like consciousness itself, imagination resists reductive explanation. The Life of Imagination offers a vital account of transformative thinking that shows how imagination will be essential in cultivating a future conducive to human flourishing and to that of the life around us. (shrink)

​Imagination will remain a mystery—we will not be able to explain imagination—until we can break it into parts we already understand. Explaining Imagination is a guidebook for doing just that, where the parts are other ordinary mental states like beliefs, desires, judgments, and decisions. In different combinations and contexts, these states constitute cases of imagining. This reductive approach to imagination is at direct odds with the current orthodoxy, according to which imagination is a sui generis (...) mental state or process—one with its own inscrutable principles of operation. Explaining Imagination upends that view, showing how, on closer inspection, the imaginings at work in hypothetical reasoning, pretense, the enjoyment of fiction, and creativity are reducible to other familiar mental states—judgments, beliefs, desires, and decisions among them. Crisscrossing contemporary philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and aesthetics, Explaining Imagination argues that a clearer understanding of imagination is already well within reach. (shrink)

Defines the cutting-edge of scholarship on ancient Greek history employing methods from social science.

_Imagination_ is an outstanding contribution to a notoriously elusive and confusing subject. It skillfully interrelates problems in philosophy, the history of ideas and literary theory and criticism, tracing the evolution of the concept of imagination from Hume and Kant in the eighteenth century to Ryle, Sartre and Wittgenstein in the twentieth. She strongly belies that the cultivation of imagination should be the chief aim of education and one of her objectives in writing the book has been to put (...) forward reasons why this is so. Purely philosophical treatment of the concept is shown to be related to its use in the work of Coleridge and Wordsworth, who she considers to be the creators of a new kind of awareness with more than literary implications. The purpose of her historical account is to suggest that the role of imagination in our perception and thought is more pervasive than may at first sight appear, and that the thread she traces is an important link joining apparently different areas of our experience. She argues that imagination is an essential element in both our awareness of the world and our attaching of value to it. (shrink)

Issues of pretense and imagination are of central interest to philosophers, psychologists, and researchers in allied fields. In this entry, we provide a roadmap of some of the central themes around which discussion has been focused. We begin with an overview of pretense, imagination, and the relationship between them. We then shift our attention to the four specific topics where the disciplines' research programs have intersected or where additional interactions could prove mutually beneficial: the psychological underpinnings of performing (...) pretense and of recognizing pretense, the cognitive capacities involved in imaginative engagement with fictions, and the real-world impact of make-believe. In the final section, we discuss more briefly a number of other mental activities that arguably involve imagining, including counterfactual reasoning, delusions, and dreaming. (shrink)

This book is a phenomenological and hermeneutical investigation into the nature of historical imagination. Carefully defining historical imagination, the book probes the relationship between the imaginative and the empirical, as well as the relationship between historical understanding and self-understanding.

_Imagination_ is an outstanding contribution to a notoriously elusive and confusing subject. It skillfully interrelates problems in philosophy, the history of ideas and literary theory and criticism, tracing the evolution of the concept of imagination from Hume and Kant in the eighteenth century to Ryle, Sartre and Wittgenstein in the twentieth. She strongly belies that the cultivation of imagination should be the chief aim of education and one of her objectives in writing the book has been to put (...) forward reasons why this is so. Purely philosophical treatment of the concept is shown to be related to its use in the work of Coleridge and Wordsworth, who she considers to be the creators of a new kind of awareness with more than literary implications. The purpose of her historical account is to suggest that the role of imagination in our perception and thought is more pervasive than may at first sight appear, and that the thread she traces is an important link joining apparently different areas of our experience. She argues that imagination is an essential element in both our awareness of the world and our attaching of value to it. (shrink)

Both perception and imagination seem to play a crucial role in our engagement with fiction films but whether they really do so, and which role they possibly play, is controversial. On the one hand, a fiction film, as film, is a depiction that invites us to perceive the events portrayed. On the other hand, as fiction, it invites us to imagine the story told. Thus, after watching the film Alien, one might say that one saw Ripley fighting the monster (...) but one might also say that one imagined Ripley fighting the monster. Are these two reports compatible? If they are, how can we combine them so to make sense of them? If, instead, they are not, which of them should we give up? (shrink)

Imagination has received a great deal of attention in different fields such as psychology, philosophy and the cognitive sciences, in which some works provide a detailed account of the mechanisms involved in the creation and elaboration of imaginary worlds. Although imagination has also been formalized using different logical systems, none of them captures those dynamic mechanisms. In this work, we take inspiration from the Common Frame for Imagination Acts, that identifies the different processes involved in the creation (...) of imaginary worlds, and we use it to define a dynamic formal system called the Logic of Imagination Acts. We build our logic by using a possible-worlds semantics, together with a new set of static and dynamic modal operators. The role of the new dynamic operators is to call different algorithms that encode how the formal model is expanded in order to capture the different mechanisms involved in the creation and development of imaginary worlds. We provide the definitions of the language, the semantics and the algorithms, together with an example that shows how the model is expanded. By the end, we discuss some interesting features of our system, and we point out to possible lines of future work. (shrink)

This chapter considers how imagination generates emotion. ‘Supposition-imagination’ (S-imagination) is distinguished from ‘enactment-imagination’ (E-imagination). The former kind of imagination involves entertaining or supposing various hypothetical scenarios; with the latter kind of imagination, one tries to create a kind of facsimile of a mental state. Thus, one might try to create a perception-like state as in visual imagination or motoric imagination. It is argued that this much richer form of imagination generates (...) typical emotional reactions to fiction. Emotional reactions to fiction are generated in several different ways, including a process in which we E-imagine being a hypothetical reader or observer of fact. (shrink)

Imagination and Chance illuminates the different philosophical projects that animate Ricoeur’s hermeneutics and Derrida’s deconstruction. Basic concepts in Ricouer such as discourse, metaphor and symbol, and tradition are examined, and texts by Derrida including “White Mythology,” Introduction to Husserl’s The Origin of Geometry, and “The Double Session” are analyzed. The book also includes a previously untranslated round table discussion between Ricoeur and Derrida.

In Force of Imagination, John Sallis develops an original systematic philosophical project from the vantage-point of philosophy at the limit, the point at which the classical distinction between the intelligible and the sensible is inverted ...

This chapter focuses on the role of the imagination in creativity, using aphantasia as a case study. It first distinguishes between imagination and mental imagery, before giving an overview of what we know about aphantasia to date, focusing in particular on findings pertaining to creativity, imagination, and memory. It then turns to the role of the imagination in creativity, agreeing with philosophers that the imagination plays an essential role in creativity, which allows individuals to imagine (...) a multitude of possibilities. This view is then supplemented with a theory of the neuro-cognitive underpinnings of the imagination, whereby both the imagination and memory are supported by the same neural network – the default mode network. Finally, the chapter argues that this fuller picture allows us to understand the creative abilities of people with aphantasia, thoroughly resisting the thought that they might generally be unimaginative or uncreative. (shrink)

Intuitively, it seems that imagination plays a large role in our decision-making and thus in bringing about personal transformation. We imagine different futures for ourselves, and then we imaginatively explore which of these futures might be best. Recently, however, several philosophers have expressed skepticism about the ability of imagination to be as useful to us in these contexts as we might have thought. In particular, when the futures being imagined are radically different from anything that we have heretofore (...) encountered, the skeptics charge that imagination is unreliable, since what the transformation will really be like is imaginatively out of reach. In this chapter, after an introduction to imagination and the role it plays in decision-making, I explore the case for pessimism. Via an exploration of two different cases for an optimistic approach, I ultimately conclude that we should reject the pessimist’s claim. Imagination indeed serves as a transformative force in our lives. (shrink)

The article discusses the technical image, a central concept in Vilém Flusser’s later main work Into the Universe of Technical Images (1985a). After identifying its various dimensions, the analysis frames the concept as an amalgamation of disciplines, theories, and artistic practices the cultural philosopher Flusser explored during the 1960s and especially the 1970s. In particular, the field of information aesthetics developed by Max Bense and Abraham A. Moles, among others, as well as artistic video practices in France and the United (...) States played an important role in both Flusser’s biography and the formation of his technical image concept. At the same time, in Flusser’s cultural philosophy the technical image is the condition and result of a new kind of human imagination, which in this paper is specified as ‘projective imagination’. (shrink)

This essay highlights the relevance of the centrality of imagination in the work of John Sallis. It argues that the imaginative phenomenological engagement with things we find in Sallis’ work offers an account of being in the world that is both one of belonging and of excessiveness. The essay draws attention to the innovative character of Sallis’ account of belonging by way of contrast with Immanuel Kant, for whom self-originating desire precludes the possibility of genuinely belonging.

The cultivation of the imagination -- Enlightening thought: Kant and the imagination -- C.S. Peirce and the growth of the imagination -- Abduction: inference and instinct -- Imagining nature -- Ontology and imagination: Peirce on necessity and agency -- The evolution of the imagination -- Emergence, complexity, and creativity -- Be imaginative! suggestion and imperative.

A summary of Explaining Imagination (OUP, 2020) for the author/critics symposium in Analysis.

This book discusses that imagination is as important to thinking and reasoning as it is to making and acting. By reexamining our philosophical and psychological heritage, it traces a framework, a conceptual topology, that underlies the most disparate theories: a framework that presents imagination as founded in the placement of appearances. It shows how this framework was progressively developed by thinkers like Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant, and how it is reflected in more recent developments in theorists as (...) different as Peirce, Saussure, Wittgenstein, Benjamin, and Bachelard. The conceptual topology of imagination incorporates logic, mathematics, and science as well as production, play, and art. Recognizing this topology can move us past the confusions to a unifying view of imagination for the future. (shrink)

Should we descry the nature of the self from thought experiments? Shaun Nichols says ‘maybe,’ but only if we use thought experiments that do not recruit the indexical “I” (non-I-recruiting). His reason is that the psychology of “I” perforce mandates that imagination responds to thought experiments that recruit it (I-recruiting) peculiarly. Here, I consider whether he is correct about non-I-recruiting personal identity thought experiments. I argue positively using the same framework, i.e., considering the underlying psychology.

Imagination comes with varying degrees of sensory accompaniment. Sometimes imagining is phenomenologically lean (cognitive imagining); at other times, imagining involves or requires sensory presentation such as mental imagery (sensory imagining). Philosophers debate whether contradictions can obtain in fiction and whether cognitive imagining is robust enough to explain our engagement with fiction. In this paper, I defend the Principle of Poetic License by arguing for the Permissive View of fictional truth: we can have fictions in which a contradiction is true, (...) everything is true, or nothing is true. I show that imagination-based worries about impossible, unlimited, and empty fictions can be shown to be about sensory imagination and that sensory imagination isn’t necessary for fictional truth. (shrink)

This article is about moments when teachers experience hate speech in education and need to act. Based on John Dewey’s work on moral philosophy and examples from teaching practice, I would like to contribute to the discussion about moral education by emphasizing the following: (1) the importance of experience, (2) the problem with prescribed morals and (3) the need for moral imagination in education. My Deweyan proposal for teachers responding to hate speech in education is to use moral (...) class='Hi'>imagination in education and take contextual elements into consideration when deciding how to act. Doing this would facilitate work related to doing morals and help to prevent prescribing morals as something that has already been done and that teachers (and students) have to adjust to in schools without being part of the process. (shrink)

This paper offers a theoretical review of the literature with the aim of exploring the role that imagination plays in the genesis, maintenance, and manifestation of perfectionism within the context of music education. It is based on the hypothesis that imaginative processes – such as anticipatory visualization, the simulation of future scenarios, or the idealization of the self – not only accompany perfectionism but may also constitute one of its main psychological forces. In this regard, contributions from recent empirical (...) research, cognitive psychology, and the philosophy of mind are analyzed in order to establish conceptual and functional links between different types of imagination and the dimensions of perfectionism. The relevance of this review lies in the need to understand perfectionism not only as a maladaptive or adaptive personality trait, but also as a construct informed by imaginative projections that shape expectations, emotions and behaviors. This integrative approach opens new avenues for research and enhances preventive intervention strategies targeting individuals affected by perfectionistic patterns, particularly when these impact their psychological well-being, motivation, or performance. (shrink)

How imagination enriches ethics, devotion and Christian theology.

_The Politics of Imagination_ offers a multidisciplinary perspective on the contemporary relationship between politics and the imagination. What role does our capacity to form images play in politics? And can we define politics as a struggle for people’s imagination? As a result of the increasingly central place of the media in our lives, the political role of imagination has undergone a massive quantitative and a qualitative change. As such, there has been a revival of interest in the (...) concept of imagination, as the intimate connections between our capacity to form images and politics becomes more and more evident. Bringing together scholars from different disciplines and theoretical outlooks, _The Politics of Imagination_ examines how the power of imagination reverberates in the various ambits of social and political life: in law, history, art, gender, economy, religion and the natural sciences. And it will be of considerable interest to those with contemporary interests in philosophy, political philosophy, political science, legal theory, gender studies, sociology, nationalism, identity studies, cultural studies, and media studies. (shrink)

Imagination and idealism are particularly important creative epistemic virtues for the medical sciences if we hope to improve the health of the world’s ageing population. To date, imagination and idealism within the medical sciences have been dominated by a paradigm of disease control, a paradigm which has realised significant, but also limited, success. Disease control proved particularly successful in mitigating the early-life mortality risks from infectious diseases, but it has proved less successful when applied to the chronic diseases (...) of late life (like cancer). The time is ripe for the emergence and prominence of a supplementary medical research paradigm, the paradigm of ‘healthy ageing’ which prioritises the goal of rate (of ageing) control rather than disease control. This is the difference between extending the human healthspan versus extending survival by managing (or trying to eliminate) the multi-morbidities, frailty and disability currently prevalent in late life. The idealism of the disease control paradigm is myopic because it ignores the health constraints imposed by the inborn ageing process itself, a biological reality which is already inflicting significant economic and disease burdens on the world’s ageing populations. Unless the medical sciences retard the rate of biological ageing, these problems will continue to be amplified as larger numbers of persons survive into late life. (shrink)

Imaginative representations are crucial to the generation of action--both pretense and plain action. But well-known theories of imagination on offer in the literature [1] fail to describe how perceptually-formatted imaginings (mental images) and motor imaginings function in the generation of action and [2] fail to recognize the important fact that spatially rich imagining can be integrated into one's perceptual manifold. In this paper, I present a theory of imagining that shows how spatially rich imagining functions in the generation of (...) action. I also describe the imaginative structures behind two under-explored forms of action: semi-pretense and pretense layering. In addition, I suggest that my theory of imagining meshes better than the competitors with current work in cognitive and affective neuroscience. (shrink)

In recent pragmatist-leaning philosophy and ethics, the Jamesian notion of the cries of the wounded has reemerged as a method of evoking moral progress. Philosophers like Philip Kitcher have argued that a surefooted approach to the complaints of those harmed by given social moral arrangements may lead to an improvement of moral thought, practices and institutions. Yet, at the same time, it has been acknowledged that this comprises a most evident problem: many wounded stakeholders do not cry out about their (...) sorrow, not at last because they may not be capable of doing so. In this paper, we aim at providing a more detailed account on the communicative range of social unrest, capable of overcoming the reductive vision of some possibly harmed as being silent. Some moral philosophers have highlighted the role of the arts and the humanities in the fostering of a more empathetic imagination. With the aid of continental aesthetics (T. W. Adorno and M. Beistegui), we acknowledge the value of artistic imagination as a communicative faculty extending beyond the limits of discursive reason through non-conceptual tools. Taking it into account in moral inquiry effectively expands and provides a more detailed account on the wounded that are apparently silent, as it includes a variety of forms of communication as moral standpoints and conversational apostrophes. This finally leads us to reread James’ take on the notion of the cries of the wounded, to emphasize the necessity to understand it as a fruitful stance about inclusive moral inquiry exceeding the limits of a conceptual-discursive focus. (shrink)

This article explores the phenomenon of metamodern imagination as the cultural logic of the 21st century, which shapes new approaches to understanding human rights through the lens of emotional states – particularly loneliness and happiness. In the context of metamodernism, which combines modernist faith in progress with postmodern irony, happiness ceases to be merely a private emotion and acquires the status of a social construct that actively shapes normative expectations in society. At the same time, loneliness, traditionally viewed as (...) an individual experience, increasingly appears as a structural emotion caused by digital fragmentation, urbanization, and the breakdown of traditional forms of community. These emotional states not only affect personal well-being but also become the subject of legal regulation, necessitating a reconsideration of the conceptual foundations of human rights. The aim of the study is to identify how the imagination of metamodernism transforms legal discourse by institutionalizing emotional states as objects of legal protection. Methodologically, the article relies on an interdisciplinary approach that combines philosophy of law, sociology of emotions, digital anthropology, and cultural hermeneutics. Particular attention is paid to analyzing how algorithmic platforms, media narratives, and welfare policies influence conceptions of happiness as a right and loneliness as a social problem. In this context, happiness increasingly emerges as a normative demand that shapes standardized images of a 'successful life,' while loneliness is seen as a social pathology requiring institutional intervention. As a result, it has been substantiated that in the era of metamodernism, human rights require rethinking as a dynamic, affectively-rich, and culturally sensitive phenomenon. Happiness and loneliness are no longer merely psychological states – they are becoming normative categories that define new horizons of legal thought. This opens up prospects for the formation of an ethics of care, mutual vulnerability, and digital dignity as components of a contemporary human rights agenda. The Ukrainian context, particularly in conditions of war, digital transformation, and emotional turbulence, demonstrates the particular relevance of such approaches, requiring the adaptation of human rights to new forms of subjectivity and social reality. (shrink)

Imagination seems to play an epistemic role in philosophical and scientific thought experiments, mindreading, and ordinary practical deliberations insofar as it generates new knowledge of contingent facts about the world. However, it also seems that imagination is limited to creative generation of ideas. Sometimes we imagine fanciful ideas that depart freely from reality. The conjunction of these claims is what I call the puzzle of knowledge through imagination. This chapter aims to resolve this puzzle. I argue that (...) imagination has an epistemic role to play, but it is limited to the context of discovery. Imagination generates ideas, but other cognitive capacities must be employed to evaluate these ideas in order for them to count as knowledge. Consideration of the Simulation Theory's so-called "threat of collapse” provides further evidence that imagination does not, on its own, yield new knowledge of contingent facts, and it suggests a way to supplement imagination in order to get such knowledge. (shrink)

La morale n'est pas seulement affaire de raison. Elle engage aussi l'imagination. Tout ce qui compte moralement dans une situation ne se donne pas d'emblee, au premier coup d'oeil. Pour percevoir ce qui importe, il faut changer de perspective, recadrer la situation ou la comparer avec des alternatives contrefactuelles. L'imagination nous permet ainsi de voir les choses autrement et d'elargir notre perception morale. Elle enrichit notre connaissance, comme le montre encore le recours aux experiences de pensee. Quels sont (...) les mecanismes psychologiques a l'oeuvre? Comment en tenir compte dans nos deliberations? Martin Gibert propose de repenser le role de l'imagination en morale a la lumiere des recherches les plus recentes en ethique et en psychologie. (shrink)

The concept of imagination is notoriously ambiguous. Thus one must be cautious not to use ‘imagination’ as a placeholder for diverse phenomena and processes that perhaps have not much more in common than that they are difficult to assign to some other, better defined domain, such as perception, conceptual thought, or artistic production. However, this challenge also comes with great opportunities: the fecundity and openness of ‘imagination’ appeal to researchers from different disciplines with different approaches and questions, (...) and it draws together fields of enquiry that are initially considered far apart. Hence, arguably, the field of imagination is particularly poised for interdisciplinary enquiry. In the section on Imagination in Interdisciplinary Research, I will talk about some of the issues that have already entered that field of interdisciplinary inquiry. (shrink)

This chapter revisits Plato's image of our soul as a book where two craftsmen are at work, a scribe and a painter (_Philebus_ 39–40). Its focus is on how the painter's elaborations pertain to some important formal features of our belief‐formation. A special emphasis is on the relevance of Plato's image as both a commentary upon and an instance of the discursive thought understood as the soul's inner dialogue. In the _Philebus_, Socrates' comments are meant to clarify not the conditions (...) of a narrowly conceived theoretical epistemology, but the richness of the everyday thought processes including their modal and counterfactual dimensions. The clarification of these issues goes together with a new treatment of the false pleasures of the soul and their anticipatory character, and with an analysis of the implications of Socrates' remarks on the painter in our soul for the issue of self‐awareness. The proposed interpretation of _Philebus_ 39–40, which argues for a rather strong connection between the pleasures and pains of the soul, the latter's self‐awareness and the modal thinking that relies on comparing various mental representations, is then confronted with the Wax Tablet and the Aviary models of the mind from the Theaetetus, and also with some contemporary theories of belief‐formation and imagination. (shrink)

In this paper, I would like to investigate how Gadamer explores the hermeneutic potential of Kant’s aesthetic theory in the third Critique with regard to the notion of imagination. For the first time, by making some references, Gadamer discussed the question of imagination in his Truth and Method of 1960, and we can read as a further substantial contribution his essay entitled Anschauung und Anschaulichkeit (Intuition and Intuitiveness) published in 1980. Although Gadamer’s approach was influenced by some Heideggerian (...) impulses, he offered another alternative that is completely different from Heidegger’s one. I shall argue that even if the question of imagination is not so much stressed by Gadamer, it proves important to the development and ontological basis of the Gadamerian hermeneutics in Wahrheit und Methode. My hypothesis is that through the themes of intuition and education (Bildung), the imagination is concerned with the human understanding and our interpreting work, thus, its significance transcends the scope of aesthetics. (shrink)