Black soldier fly larvae (BSFL) bioconversion has been commercially established for over a decade as an efficient method for transforming organic waste into protein and high-quality organic fertiliser. Despite widespread adoption, emerging ethical and ecological challenges remain largely overlooked in both research and policy frameworks. This review critically examines these challenges, focusing on insect welfare within intensive farming systems, societal acceptance of maggot-based products, and ecological impacts on soil health and biodiversity. The underlying hypothesis is that current commercial BSFL practices (...) insufficiently integrate ethical and ecological considerations, creating urgent questions about responsible deployment. Previously underexplored ethical complexities include welfare thresholds, operational stressors, and trade-offs between productivity and humane rearing. Pressing areas for future research include longitudinal societal perception studies, integrative welfare metrics, and regulatory frameworks that reconcile economic realities with ethical and ecological standards. These findings provide actionable guidance for stakeholders, policymakers, and researchers to advance BSFL-based waste management systems that balance commercial efficiency with ethical stewardship and environmental sustainability. (shrink)

Moral philosophers agree that welfare matters. But they disagree about what it is, or how much it matters. In this vital new work, Wayne Sumner presents an original theory of welfare, investigating its nature and discussing its importance. He considers and rejects all notable theories of welfare, both objective and subjective, including hedonism and theories founded on desire or preference. His own theory connects welfare closely with happiness or life satisfaction. Reacting against the value pluralism that currently dominates moral (...) philosophy, he advances welfare as the only basic ethical value. He concludes by discussing the implications of this thesis for ethical and political theory. Written in clear, non-technical language, and including a definitive survey of other work in this area, Sumner's book is essential reading for moral philosophers, political theorists, and welfare economists. (shrink)

1. Happiness, then and now -- Happiness, eudaimonia, and practical reasoning -- Happiness as eudaimonia -- Happiness and virtuous activity -- New directions from old debates -- 2. Happiness then: the sufficiency debate -- Aristotle's case against the sufficiency thesis -- 3. Happiness now: rethinking the self -- Socrates' case for the sufficiency thesis -- Epictetus and the stoic self -- The Stoics' case for the sufficiency thesis -- The embodied conception of the self (...) -- The embodied conception and psychological well-being -- The Stoics' case against the embodied conception. (shrink)

The current situation amidst the pandemic has caused such negativities to people, especially among students. It has affected thewell-being and happiness that everyone experiences. In, on the other hand, students who were enrolled amidst the pandemic were more likely to experience mental exhaustion such as anxiety and depression, as this current situation limits and affect their academic performances and the level of happiness they feel. This study investigates the relationship between happiness and depression among senior high school (...) students here in the Philippines. The findings revealed a significant correlation between happiness and depression (r=0.041). (shrink)

Life's Values offers new analyses of the nature of pleasure, happiness, well-being, and meaning in life. Recognizing how individuals have different priorities, Goldman explains what is of ultimate value in our lives and argues that making our desires rational - relevantly informed of what it's like to satisfy them - maximizes well-being.

What is the relationship between meaning in life and happiness? In psychological research, subjective meaning and happiness are often contrasted with each other. I argue that while the objective meaningfulness of a life is distinct from happiness, subjective or felt meaning is a key constituent of happiness, which is best understood as a multidimensional affective condition. Measures of felt meaning should consequently be included in empirical studies of the causes and correlates of happiness.

Recent scientific research has settled on a purely descriptive definition of happiness that is focused solely on agents’ psychological states (high positive affect, low negative affect, high life satisfaction). In contrast to this understanding, recent research has suggested that the ordinary concept of happiness is also sensitive to the moral value of agents’ lives. Five studies systematically investigate and explain the impact of morality on ordinary assessments of happiness. Study 1 demonstrates that moral judgments influence assessments of (...) happiness not only for untrained participants, but also for academic researchers and even in those who study happiness specifically. Studies 2 and 3 then respectively ask whether this effect may be explained by general motivational biases or beliefs in a just world. In both cases, we find evidence against these explanations. Study 4 shows that the impact of moral judgments cannot be explained by changes in the perception of descriptive psychological states. Finally, Study 5 compares the impact of moral and non-moral value, and provides evidence that unlike non-moral value, moral value is part of the criteria that govern the ordinary concept of happiness. Taken together, these studies provide a specific explanation of how and why the ordinary concept of happiness deviates from the definition used by researchers studying happiness. (shrink)

Emerging research on the subject of happiness-in psychology, economics, and public policy-reawakens and breathes new life into long-standing philosophical questions about happiness. By analyzing this research from a philosophical perspective, Lorraine L. Besser is able to weave together the contributions of other disciplines, and the result is a robust, deeply contoured understanding of happiness made accessible for nonspecialists. This book is the first to thoroughly investigate the fundamental theoretical issues at play in all the major contemporary debates (...) about happiness, and it stands out especially in its critical analysis of empirical research. The book's coverage of the material is comprehensive without being overwhelming. Its structure and pedagogical features will benefit students or anyone studying happiness for the first time: Each chapter opens with an initial overview and ends with a summary and list of suggested readings. (shrink)

This book analyses Kant’s assumptions about happiness and the implications they have for his moral, political, and legal thought. It provides a “map” of the different areas in which the concept of happiness appears in his practical philosophy and examines how it relates to the main themes of his practical philosophy.

This paper proposes a novel conceptualization of happiness (subjective well-being) grounded in the "Enhanced Ten-Step Model of Judgemental Philosophy." We argue that happiness is not merely a static state but an ongoing dynamic process centered on the restoration, cultivation, and experience of Resonance. Resonance, within this framework, refers to the multi-faceted process by which experiences are implicitly registered as salient (Implicit Resonance), consciously processed as meaningful (Explicit Resonance), adaptively integrated into the self through Memory Consolidation, and shared through (...) Inter-brain Resonance. We posit that core components of well-being—such as meaning in life (eudaimonia), positive affect, flow, self-integration, and social connection—are fundamentally dependent on the healthy functioning of these Resonance mechanisms and associated modulatory systems (e.g., Affective Processing, Value Assessment & Motivation System). Conversely, states of unhappiness, alienation, and psychopathology, exemplified by phenomena like meaningless work or PTSD, can be understood as resulting from disruptions or failures in Resonance. By analyzing how various activities, therapeutic interventions (like EMDR), and life experiences contribute to either the disruption or restoration of Resonance, this paper offers an integrative, mechanism-based perspective on the pursuit of happiness. This framework aims to bridge phenomenological experiences of well-being with cognitive and neurobiological processes outlined in the Enhanced Ten-Step Model, suggesting new avenues for research and interventions focused on enhancing Resonance. (shrink)

This paper treats of Husserl’s phenomenology of happiness or eudaimonia in five parts. In the first part, we argue that phenomenology of happiness is an important albeit relatively neglected area of research, and we show that Husserl engages in it. In the second part, we examine the relationship between phenomenological ethics and virtue ethics. In the third part, we identify and clarify essential aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology of happiness, namely, the nature of the question concerning happiness (...) and the possibility of a phenomenological answer, the power of the will, the role of vocation, the place of obligation, the significance of habituation, the necessity of selfreflection and self-criticism, the importance of sociability and solidarity, the impact of chance and destiny, and the specter of regret. In the fourth part, we establish the inextricable linkage between Husserl’s metaethics and his metaphysics. In the fi ft h part, we provide a provisional exploration of his conception of the connection between happiness and blessedness. We acknowledge that there is an extensive literature on Husserl’s phenomenological ethics, and our study has benefitted greatly from it, but we also suggest that our holistic approach critically clarifies his description of happiness, virtue, and blessedness by fully recognizing that his phenomenological metaethics is embedded in his phenomenological metaphysics. (shrink)

"On the Happiness of the Philosophic Life" presents Heinrich Meier's confrontation with Rousseau's "Rêveries", his most beautiful and daring writing. The "Rêveries" show the fire of philosophy in the mirror of the water; in the reflections of the unlimited, needing more precise determination; of the inconspicuous, needing careful inspection; and of the surface, needing in-depth Interpretation.

Constitutivism locates the ground of practical normativity in features constitutive of rational agency and rests on the concept of a constitutive norm – a norm that is internal to a thing such that...

This paper argues against hedonistic theories of happiness. First, hedonism is too inclusive: many pleasures cannot plausibly be construed as constitutive of happiness. Second, any credible theory must count either attitudes of life satisfaction, affective states such as mood, or both as constituents of happiness; yet neither sort of state reduces to pleasure. Hedonism errs in its attempt to reduce happiness, which is at least partly dispositional, to purely episodic experiential states. The dispositionality of happiness (...) also undermines weakened nonreductive forms of hedonism, as some happiness-constitutive states are not pleasures in any sense. Moreover, these states can apparently fail to exhibit the usual hedonic properties; sadness, for instance, can sometimes be pleasant. Finally, the nonhedonistic accounts are adequate if not superior on grounds of practical and theoretical utility, quite apart from their superior conformity to the folk notion of happiness. (shrink)

Happiness is a universal human objective. We all want to be happy. But how we define, pursue, and maintain happiness often seems vague and elusive. That is why we need a personal philosophy of happiness. -/- This presentation lays out the underlying considerations and examines why other avenues of securing happiness are not succeeding. And it describes how we can arrive at our personal philosophy, guided by a deep understanding of our happiness. Happiness then (...) reveals itself not only as our ultimate objective but also as its own organizing principle: The Happiness Principle. -/- The presentation is divided into the following sections: -/- 1. Foundations. 2. The Necessity of an Independent Approach. 3. Substitute Strategies. 4. Trials of Happiness. 5. Happiness in Traditional Settings. 6. The Happiness Principle. 7. Philosophy of Happiness Book Genesis. 8. The Bane of Instructions. 9. Happiness in a Pluralistic Society. 10. Individual Strategies. 11. Defense Mechanisms. 12. Conclusion. -/- This is a 20-page transcript of a video presentation by Martin Janello. See the "Happiness Principle" page on the referenced website for access to the video. It is a primer for subjects discussed in more detail in my main work, titled "Philosophy of Happiness." More information about the book is available on the "Book" page of that site as well. (shrink)

"Philosophy of Happiness: A Critical Introduction" summarizes (a) what philosophy of happiness is, (b) why it should matter to us, (c) what assistance we can draw from philosophy, empiric science, religion, and self-help sources, and (d) why taking an independent approach is both necessary and feasible. -/- The article is in PDF format, 60 pages. The table of contents links directly to the listed captions. Also available in an html version under the phone variant of the referenced philosophy (...) of happiness website. -/- Table of Contents -/- 1. The Definition of Happiness. -/- 2. The Definition of Philosophy of Happiness. -/- 3. Taking Refuge from the Complexity of Happiness. -/- 4. Self-Help Contributions to Philosophy of Happiness. -/- 5. Religious Contributions to Philosophy of Happiness. -/- 6. Philosophical Authorities on Philosophy of Happiness. -/- 7. Happiness Studies by Sciences Beyond Philosophy. -/- 8. Independent Approaches Toward a Philosophy of Happiness. -/- 9. Further Reading. (shrink)

In his critical notice entitled ‘An Improved Whole Life Satisfaction Theory of Happiness?’ focusing on my article that was previously published in this journal, Fred Feldman raises an important objection to a suggestion I made about how to best formulate the whole life satisfaction theories of happiness. According to my proposal, happiness is a matter of whether an idealised version of you would judge that your actual life corresponds to the life-plan, which he or she has constructed (...) for you on the basis of your cares and concerns. Feldman argues that either the idealised version will include in the relevant life-plan only actions that are possible for you to do or he or she will also include actions and outcomes that are not available for you in the real world. He then uses examples to argue that both of these alternatives have implausible consequences. In response to this objection, I argue that what it is included in the relevant life-plan depends on what you most fundamentally desire and that this constraint is enough to deal with Feldman’s new cases. (shrink)

_The Promise of Happiness_ is a provocative cultural critique of the imperative to be happy. It asks what follows when we make our desires and even our own happiness conditional on the happiness of others: “I just want you to be happy”; “I’m happy if you’re happy.” Combining philosophy and feminist cultural studies, Sara Ahmed reveals the affective and moral work performed by the “happiness duty,” the expectation that we will be made happy by taking part in (...) that which is deemed good, and that by being happy ourselves, we will make others happy. Ahmed maintains that happiness is a promise that directs us toward certain life choices and away from others. Happiness is promised to those willing to live their lives in the right way. Ahmed draws on the intellectual history of happiness, from classical accounts of ethics as the good life, through seventeenth-century writings on affect and the passions, eighteenth-century debates on virtue and education, and nineteenth-century utilitarianism. She engages with feminist, antiracist, and queer critics who have shown how happiness is used to justify social oppression, and how challenging oppression causes unhappiness. Reading novels and films including_ Mrs. Dalloway_, _The Well of Loneliness_, _Bend It Like Beckham_, and _Children of Men_, Ahmed considers the plight of the figures who challenge and are challenged by the attribution of happiness to particular objects or social ideals: the feminist killjoy, the unhappy queer, the angry black woman, and the melancholic migrant. Through her readings she raises critical questions about the moral order imposed by the injunction to be happy. (shrink)

My main thesis in this article is that Descartes' ethics should be understood as involving a distinction between happiness and well-being. The distinction I have in mind is never clearly stated or articulated by Descartes himself, but I argue that we nevertheless have good reason to embrace it as an important component in a charitable reconstruction of his ethical thought. In section I, I present Descartes' account of happiness and of how he thinks happiness can (and cannot) (...) be acquired. Then, in section II, I introduce and develop the distinction between happiness and well-being. I do this via a discussion of a difficult passage in one of Descartes' letters to Elisabeth, where he may seem first to grant and then immediately to reject the view that people's happiness can vary in degree depending on the possession of goods or perfections that are outside their power to control. I believe my proposed distinction can help us make good sense of this passage. In the last two sections (III and IV), I then offer some further grounds or reasons for why the proposed distinction should be ascribed to Descartes. (shrink)

In Human Happiness and Morality, noted philosopher Robert Almeder provides lucid introductory explanations of the major ethical theories and traditions, as well as a clear and comprehensive discussion of the proposed answers to three basic questions in ethics: What makes a right act right? Why should I be moral? What is human happiness and how can I attain it? He then ventures beyond the basic questions, describing the relationship between morality and happiness; clearly defining human happiness; (...) and raising the question of whether happiness, so defined, is the likely product of a life lived morally. In the final chapter, Almeder details simple Stoic rules for happy living and shows how it is possible to live the good life despite the existence of unhappiness and failure in others. (shrink)

Kant is probably one of the most misunderstood philosophers in the history of Western thought. Some of the most well-known and pervasive objections to Kant’s practical philosophy often rest on considerable misunderstandings of his central theses or a poor and superficial reading of his work. A common misconception is that in Kant’s practical philosophy there is no place or role for human happiness. In Happiness in Kant’s Practical Philosophy: Morality, Indirect Duties, and Welfare Rights, Alice Pinheiro Walla dispels (...) this misunderstanding by elucidating Kant’s conception of happiness (understood in broadly hedonist terms) and showing that, for Kant, the pursuit of happiness plays an important role in our personal and collective lives. This means that, far from endorsing an ascetic ideal of the moral agent, as it is commonly thought, Kant’s system embraces an ideal of the human life in which there is significant space, and even a duty, to pursue pleasurable endeavours. Somehow surprisingly, in Pinheiro Walla’s reading, Kant’s ethics is arguably less demanding than standard interpretations of Aristotelian and Utilitarian ethical theories. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Good Conceived as an End The Good as a Convergent End The Meaning of “Eudaimonia” Happiness vs. the Happy Life The Finality Criterion The Self‐sufficiency Criterion Inclusivism The Shape of the Happy Life Concluding Remarks Notes Bibliography.

Health is certainly a valuable asset in the life of every human being and of particular relevance for a flourishing childhood. As empirical research concerning the social determinants of health shows, its distribution can, at least to a certain extent, be influenced by the way a society is arranged. Many philosophers now acknowledge that a fair distribution of health has to be a central part of a just society and they discuss to what extent a right to health can be (...) justified. However, they do not typically distinguish between physical and mental health and neglect the special problems arising from these distinct, though related, perspectives. In this paper, we argue in favour of such a distinction and ask whether a minimally just society ought to include mental health among the goods that are to be distributed in a fair way among its children. Furthermore, we investigate the relationship between mental health and happiness and ask whether making mental health a subject of justice implies that children are entitled not only to a healthy but also to a happy childhood. Despite the positive impact of happiness on the lives of children, we conclude that happiness cannot be incorporated into a functional theory of justice, since it does not fully meet the criteria of objectivity, measurability and influenceability. (shrink)

The paper explores the main competing interpretations of Aristotle's view of the relation between happiness and external goods in the Nicomachean Ethics. On the basis of a careful analysis of what Aristotle says in the Nicomachean Ethics (and other works such as the Eudemian Ethics, Politics, Rhetoric, etc.) it is argued that it is likely that Aristotle takes at least some external goods to be actual constituents of happiness provided that (1) they are accompanied by virtuous activity and (...) (2) the agent enjoying and using those external goods does so in ways compatible with the continuous aim of acting virtuously. (shrink)

This paper develops and defends a novel version of a relatively neglected category of theory of the nature of happiness: the desire-satisfaction theory. My account is similar in its fundamentals to Wayne Davis’s theory of happiness-as-subjective-desire-satisfaction. After arguing that this is the best general way to proceed for the desire-based approach, I develop an improved version of subjective desire satisfactionism in light of recent arguments in the happiness literature.

Happiness in World History traces ideas and experiences of happiness from early stages in human history, to the maturation of agricultural societies and their religious and philosophical systems, to the changes and diversities in the approach to happiness in the modern societies that began to emerge in the 18th century. In this thorough overview, Peter N. Stearns explores the interaction between psychological and historical findings about happiness, the relationship between ideas and popular experience, and the opportunity (...) to use historical analysis to assess strengths and weaknesses of dominant contemporary notions of happiness. Starting with the advent of agriculture, the book assesses major transitions in history for patterns in happiness, including the impact of the great religions, the unprecedented Enlightenment interest in secular happiness and cheerfulness, and industrialization and imperialism. The final, contemporary section covers fascist and communist efforts to define alternatives to Western ideas of happiness, the increasing connections with consumerism, and growing global interests in defining and promoting well-being. Touching on the experiences in the major regions of Asia, Africa, Latin America, Europe, and North America, the text offers an expansive introduction to a new field of study. This book will be of interest to students of world history and the history of emotions. (shrink)

Existential happiness is happiness that one has a basic life at all. Having a basic life, as I understand it, involves being the subject of experiences and being an agent in some minimal sense. As I argue, existential happiness is a fitting response to having a basic life. To make this argument, I look at two possible accounts of the fittingness of existential happiness: the value of a basic life and attachment to the constitutive elements of (...) one’s life. I also consider a few possible sources of existential happiness, including encounters with death, counterfactual thinking, and hedonically positive feelings of awe directed toward one’s own consciousness. (shrink)

Like most intellectuals of late antiquity, whether pagan or Christian, Augustine thinks that true happiness has to be independent from bodily and external goods. He therefore tends to accept the originally Stoic paradox that ‘virtue is self-sufficient for happiness’. In the framework of his thought this principle is however problematic because of his strictly eschatological understanding of happiness, and because he thinks that salvation depends not on human endeavour but exclusively on God’s grace. In this chapter it (...) is argued that while Augustine rejects the principle of self-sufficiency in its Stoic or Ciceronian version, he accepts it for both the present and the future life under the condition that virtue is redefined as right love, i.e. the love of God. This version of the principle can be reconciled with the doctrine of grace if we consider that grace is not the reward but the presupposition of virtue. (shrink)

The happy fish episode from the outer chapters of the Zhuangzi poses enormous difficulty for interpreters. While it may appear to surprisingly resemble the dialectic in Western philosophy, any attempt to analyse it in terms of the patterns of inference familiar to the West is often frustrated by the ostensible queerness that defies such treatment. The following examination of the dialogue in the episode is intended to address the difficulty and to provide a reasoned explanation for both the surface resemblance (...) and apparent queerness. I suggest that the dialogue becomes perfectly intelligible, if it is read against the backdrop of the disputations practiced in ancient China. My contention is that the real purpose of the dialogue is to expose the fundamental unreliability of the logic of the disputers by means of the logic itself. (shrink)

To recognize the causes of unhappiness is thus a part of our political cause. This is why any politics of justice will involve causing unhappiness even if that is not the point of our action. So mu...

This volume explores the relationship between rationality and happiness from ancient Greek philosophy to early Latin medieval philosophy. What connection is there between human rationality and happiness? This issue was uppermost in the minds of the Ancient Greek philosophers and continued to be of importance during the entire early medieval period. Starting with theSocrates of Plato's early dialogues, who is regarded as having initiated the eudaimonistic ethical tradition, the present volume looks at Plato, Aristotle, the Skeptics, Seneca [Stoicism], (...) Epicurus, Plotinus [neo-Platonism], Augustine, Boethius, Anselm, and ends with Abelard, the final major figure in early medieval philosophy. Special efforts are made to reveal and trace the continuity and development of the views on rationality and happiness among these major thinkers within this period. The book's approach is historical, but the topics it treats are relevant to many discussions pursued in contemporary philosophical circles. Specifically, the book aims to make two major contributions to the ongoing development of virtue ethics. First, contemporary virtue ethics often draws distinctions between ancient Greek ethics and modern moral philosophy [mainly utilitarianism and Kantianism], and seeks to model ethics on ancient ethics. In doing so, however, contemporary virtue ethics often ignores the transition from Greek ethics to the early Latin medieval tradition. Second, contemporary virtue-based ethics, in its efforts to seek insights from ancient ethics, centers on virtue. In contrast, in ancient and medieval ethics, virtue is pursued for the sake of happiness [eudaimonia], and virtue is conceived as excellence of rationality. Hence, the relationship between rationality and happiness provides the framework for ethical inquiry within which the discussion of virtue takes place. Contributors: JULIA ANNAS, RICHARD BETT, JORGE J.E. GRACIA, BRAD INWOOD, WILLIAM MANN, JOHN MARENBON, GARETH B. MATTHEWS, MARK L. McPHERRAN, DONALD MORRISON, C.C.W. TAYLOR, JONATHAN SANFORD, JIYUAN YU. Jiyuan Yu is Assistant Professor of Ancient Philosophy at the State University of New York at Buffalo. Jorge J. E. Gracia is Samuel P. Capen Chair and SUNY Distinguised Professor in the Departments of Philosophy and Comparative Literature at the State University of New York at Buffalo. (shrink)

The point of departure of this paper is the recently emphasised distinction between psychological theories of happiness, on the one hand, and normative theories of well-being, on the other. With this distinction in mind, I examine three possible kinds of relation that might exist between (psychological) happiness and (normative) well-being; to wit, happiness may be understood as playing a central part in (1) a formal theory of well-being, (2) a substantive theory of well-being or (3) as an (...) indicator for well-being. I note that, in the relevant literature, happiness is mostly discussed in terms of either (1) or (2). In this paper, I attempt to motivate a shift of focus away from such accounts of happiness and towards (3), i.e. its epistemic role. When examined in connection to (normative) well-being, (psychological states of) happiness and unhappiness should be understood as psychological states that inform individuals about the contribution of various activities, pursuits, or situations to their well-being or ill-being. (shrink)

In this address, I defend happiness as a disposition conducive to, or at least compatible with, a view of the world that is both cognitively and politically valuable, that is, both conducive to truth and ethically appropriate.

The book offers a novel account of human happiness suitable for the general or popular science reader. Drawing on evidence from psychology and economics, as well as recent thinking in ethics, Happiness Explained addresses two of the most important questions to humankind, namely, what is happiness and how can we take account of this in our everyday lives? The book starts by setting out what is wrong with focussing exclusively on gross national income as a measure of (...) wellbeing and introduces a novel approach developed by Nobel prize-winner Amartya Sen. It then considers evidence relating to different aspects of wellbeing from a wide range of economics and psychological studies. It also examines issues of fairness and wellbeing, the emergence of policies and practice around the world that seek to account for human wellbeing explicitly, and the principles that underpin wellbeing over the life course. (shrink)

This book offers a unique exploration of the social and emotional impacts of working in new, flexible ways such as the increasingly popular hybrid work modes. With a specific focus on fun and play, the book is based on recent ethnographic research exploring how hybrid work has changed workplace behaviours and interactions, and how these social aspects of work are increasingly important in hybrid work. Fun and play are still happening but are occurring in new ways and forms as workers (...) navigate fast-changing workscapes while still seeking happiness, frivolity, and laughter in their work relationships. The book presents current debates on these topics along with rich organisational (observed) examples, online chat, and interview excerpts from a variety of workers and managers. (shrink)

Reviews the role of happiness in Kant's moral and political philosophy and contrasts his ideas of happiness with ideas of human flourishing prominent in ancient philosophy. It considers possible reasons why Kant avoided the latter and worked instead with more subjective conceptions of happiness. This was apparently due not merely to historical influences or misunderstanding of ancient ethics but also to Kant's respect for the moral freedom of individuals to choose, within limits, the way of life they (...) prefer. Kant's understanding of happiness affects his ideas of intrinsic value, prudence, beneficence, and the aim of government. Michael Slote's charge that Kantian ethics requires us to devalue our own happiness relative to others’ arguably rests on a flawed analogy between beneficence to others and promoting one's own happiness. (shrink)

Finding happiness within the inevitable chaos of the world is one of the hardest things you can do. It's also one of the most important. There are lots of challenges in your life, occupying space in your mind and keeping you anxious, depressed, or angry. Mental health TikToker and licensed therapist TJ Hoegh outlines his three rules for chaotic happiness, helping you rise above the fray and claim the contentedness that is yours. With evidence-based advice and more than (...) 30 practical exercises, you'll explore your own psyche, improve the quality of your relationships, and understand the impact of the outside world so you can arrive at your happiest self. (shrink)

In this chapter, I consider the views of happiness (eudaimonia) from the perspective of soul in ancient Greco-Roman philosophical schools. I consider the specific way in which most schools connect happiness to soul: either as Aristotle, identifying happiness with the human good he defines it as soul’s activity in accordance with virtue or as the soul’s virtuous state as the Stoics. The Stoics famously consider a virtuous state of one’s soul to be sufficient for happiness, and (...) it has been argued that Plato and Socrates subscribed to the claim earlier. Aristotle by contrast holds that having virtue is necessary although not sufficient. Virtue of soul is still necessary for happiness for the late ancient Platonist Plotinus but in Plotinus happiness belongs to the intellect not to the soul, since the soul is capable of evil as well. A happy life belongs to the intellect intrinsically and inevitably and we live happily to the extent to which we can live a life of intellect. All of the schools considered in this chapter also hold that becoming morally or ethically good is either a necessary condition for happiness as in Plotinus, or that ethically good action constitutes happiness as in the case of Aristotle. (shrink)

In the novel A Burnout-Out Case, Graham Greene argues for an intimate relationship between burnout and happiness. The novel claims that a life worth living is a continuous balancing between something painful, e.g. burnout and something desirable, e.g. happiness. In this essay, I try to make a case for the happiness of burnout. By examining the case story of a young artist, who suffered from burnout, I describe how such suffering might open up for a necessary reevaluation (...) of the values that actually make sense. Such creation of new values is what eventually leads to more happy moments, not happiness per se. This essay provides a philosophical reflection regarding the relationship between happiness and burnout in order to say something regarding which life is worth living. (shrink)

우리들 모두는 행복하기를 바라고 있다. 그러나 우리는 행복이 무엇인지 모를 때가 많다. 행복한 삶은 무엇을 말하는 것일까? 오늘날 황금만능주의에 젖어있는 우리들은 행복을 돈을 소유하는 것이라고 생각할 때가 많다. 우리는 좋은 집안과 풍요로운 재산을 부러워하고 있다. 특히 현대인들에게서 행복의 조건은 더욱 높은 물질적 기준을 요구하고 있다.BR 아리스토텔레스는 행복을 위해서는 외부적인 조건이 필요하다고 했다. 그럼 그가 말한 외부적인 조건은 행복과 어떠한 관련을 맺고 있을까? 오늘 외모지상주의와 황금만능주의사회에서 현대인들이 추구하는 외부적 조건과 아리스토텔레스가 말한 외부적 조건과는 무엇이 다른가?BR 아리스토텔레스는 물질의 풍요로움이나 훌륭한 가문에 태어나는 (...) 것을 행복이라고 말하지 않는다. 그는 외부적 조건만을 행복이라 간주하지 않았다. 그는 오히려 행복은 외부적 좋음을 덕의 실천과 연결시키는 것이라고 했다. 그는 우리들에게 진정한 행복이 무엇인지 다시 질문하고 있다. (shrink)

이 논문은 헤겔 철학에서 행복과 국가 그리고 정치의 연관성을 검토하는 것을 목적으로 한다. 헤겔에게 행복이란 상호인정의 실현, 즉 삶이 만들어 내는 분열과 대립을 지양하여 그 속에서 편안함을 느끼는 상태를 지시하며 그리고 국가란 인륜성의 완성태를 의미한다. 이에 따르면 행복은 국가에서 완성된다는 도식이 가능해 진다.BR그런데 『법철학』의 국가론에는 헤겔 자신의 행복관에 부합한다고 보기 어려운 내용들이 포함되어 있다. 본 연구는 바로 이 지점에서 출발한다. 본론에서 구체적으로 논하겠지만, 『법철학』에 등장하는 국가는 결과적으로 시민 혹은 각 개인의 정치적 역할을 축소시키는 방식으로 유지된다. 그런데 정치는 상호인정에 도달하는 주요한 (...) 과정이다. 따라서 정치에서 배제된 개인은 상호인정에 도달할 수 없게 되며, 결국 행복할 수 없다. 이에 본 연구는 헤겔의 국가론은 행복의 실현과 관련하여 일정한 보완이 필요하다고 주장하고자 한다. (shrink)

블라스토스는 영향력 있는 한 논문에서, 소크라테스가 행복과 좋은 것들의 관계 문제를 어떻게 생각했을 법한지를 분석하고, 이 분석의 함축적 귀결로서, 스토아화된 소크라테스의 모습을 폐기처분한다. 스토아화된 소크라테스는 텍스트 근거가 없다는 것이다. 블라스토스의 주장은, 덕과 행복의 관계에 대한 충분 논제로 집약된다. 나는 이 글에서 우선 블라스토스의 충분 논제를 분석, 논박하고자 한다. 이를 통해 스토아적 소크라테스 독해가 여전히 유효하다는 점을 나는 방어할 것이다. 블라스토스 논박은, ‘행복’, ‘덕’, ‘관례적 선’ 사이의 관계에 대한 철학적 해명문제에로 자연스럽게 이어진다. 이 문제에 대한 나의 검토는 아리스토텔레스와 스토아의 비교를 통해서 (...) 이루어진다. 나는 아리스토텔레스와 스토아 간 비교를 통해, 행복과 좋은 것들 사이의 관계 문제에 대한 다섯 가지 입장을 도출해낸 다음, 블라스토스적 소크라테스, 아리스토텔레스, 스토아 각각을 이 다섯 가지 입장들 중 어느 하나에로 짝지을 것이다. 그런 다음 나는 스토아의 입장에 대한 몇 가지 정당화를 시도할 것이다. 스토아를 위한 나의 정당화는, 스토아 철학자들의 논증적 시도를 다시 살리되, 덕 개념이라기보다는 소위 ‘외적 선들’이라고 불리는 것들에 초점을 맞추어 다시 살리는 것이다. (shrink)

Reinterprets the ancient wisdom of the Greek philosopher Aristotle for the modern world, exploring the interconnections among morality, psychology, and spirituality and showing how they lead to meaning, joy, and fulfillment.

If we had to identify the most controversial concept today, “happiness” would certainly figure among the main candidates for this role. On the one hand, “happiness” has represented one of the main ethical axes in the history of philosophy – from Greek _eudaimonia_ to Bentham’s “greatest happiness for the greatest number of people.” Ethics was almost inextricably connected with the search for happiness, which was already in Greek synonymous for the “good life”. On the other hand, (...) capitalism today, notwithstanding the general apathy and despair due to the permanent crises of the capitalist system (climate change, pandemics, financial crises, etc.), still legitimises itself with, if not guarantees, at least a promise of happiness. Despite different historical contexts which again and again gave meaning to the concept of happiness, a common denominator can still be identified, which today, in the era of late capitalism, has even gained the status of a cornerstone of our hegemonic image of happiness. Happiness is a question of being. The evocation of happiness usually raises the question of whether one is happy or not, what it means to be happy, and how we become so. Happiness is thus inextricably connected to the question of identity: it is the sensual expression of our being, of what we supposedly are. In contrast to this “ontologisation of happiness”, the article tries to show not only that there is a _materialist concept of happiness_, but also that the latter bases itself on the primacy of the verb “having” instead of “being”. From a materialist perspective, happiness is something that we have or encounter, and not something that we are. Two references are crucial in this articulation: first, Benjamin’s formulation of happiness from his last essay “On the concept of history”, and second, the Freudian-Lacanian theory of repetition. (shrink)