This paper takes issue with the exemplarist strategy of fostering virtue development with the specific goal of improving its applicability in the context of education. I argue that, for what matters educationally, we have good reasons to endorse a liberal account of moral exemplarity. Specifically, I challenge two key assumptions of Linda Zagzebski’s Exemplarist Moral Theory (2017), namely that moral exemplars are exceptionally virtuous agents and that imitating their behavior is the main strategy for acquiring the virtues. I will (...) introduce and discuss the notions of enkratic exemplars and injustice illuminators and show that we have good reasons to consider them moral exemplars although they fail to satisfy (either of) the key assumptions. (shrink)

In this study, Olberding proposes a new theoretical model for reading the _Analects_. Her thesis is that the moral sensibility of the text derives from an effort to conceptually capture and articulate the features seen in exemplars, exemplars that are identified and admired pre-theoretically and thus prior to any conceptual criteria for virtue. Put simply, Olberding proposes an "origins myth" in which Confucius, already and prior to his philosophizing knows _whom _he judges to be virtuous. The work we (...) see him and the _Analects'_ authors pursuing is their effort to explain in an organized, generalized, and abstract way _why _pre-theoretically identified exemplars are virtuous. Moral reasoning here begins with people and with inchoate experiences of admiration for them. The conceptual work of the text reflects the attempt to analyze such people and parse such experiences in order to distill abstract qualities that account for virtue and can guide emulation. (shrink)

This article introduces an account of moral education grounded in Zagzebski’s recent Exemplarist Moral Theory and discusses two problems that have to be solved for the account to become a realistic alternative to other educational models on the market, namely the limited-applicability problem and the problem of indoctrination. The first problem raises worries about the viability of the account in ordinary circumstances. The second charges the proposed educational model with indoctrinating students. The main goal of this article is to show (...) how an exemplar-based account of moral education can handle both problems without compromising its structure and upshot. (shrink)

This article defends the use of narratives about morally exemplary individuals in moral education and appraises the role that ‘nudge’ strategies can play in combination with such an appeal to exemplars. It presents a general conception of the aims of moral education and explains how the proposed combination of both moral strategies serves these aims. An important aim of moral education is to make the ethical perspective of the subject—the person being educated—more structured, more salient and therefore more ‘navigable’. (...) This article argues why and how moral exemplars and nudge strategies are crucial aids in this respect. It gives an empirically grounded account of how the emotion of admiration can be triggered most effectively by a thoughtful presentation of narratives about moral exemplars. It also answers possible objections and concludes that a combined appeal to exemplars and nudges provides a neglected but valuable resource for moral education. (shrink)

I argue that while moral exemplars are useful, we must be careful in our use of them. I first describe forgiveness exemplars that are often used to persuade victims to forgive such as Nelson Mandela, Martin Luther King Jr., and Jesus of Nazareth. I also explain how, for Kant, highlighting these figures as moral exemplars can be useful. I then explain two kinds of rhetorical strategies that are used when attempting to convince victims to forgive. Last, I (...) explain (a la Kant) how the use of exemplars does not empower but instead disempowers victims. My overall claim is that using exemplars to persuade victims to forgive is problematic. It is best if we rely on decisive reasons to forgive instead of focusing on people who have forgiven. (shrink)

According to a popular line of thought, moral exemplars have a key role to play in moral development and moral education and by paying attention to moral exemplars we can learn about what morality requires of us. However, when we pay attention to what many moral exemplars say about their actions, it seems that our moral obligations are much more demanding than we typically think they are. Some philosophers have argued that this exemplar testimony gives us reason (...) to accept a radically demanding view of morality. We argue against this view by appealing to similar testimony from aesthetic exemplars. If we accept that the testimony of moral exemplars gives us reason to accept a radically demanding view of morality, then we should accept that the testimony of aesthetic exemplars supports a radically demanding view of aesthetic normativity. We argue that we should reject both arguments for radically demanding views, and instead see the testimony of exemplars as having something important to tell us about the nature of ideals. What we learn about morality and aesthetics from attending to the lives of moral exemplars is that those who embody an ideal are subject to obligations that others are not. (shrink)

This paper proposes that spiritual persons are an excellent focus for the study of 'living religion' and offers a methodology for doing so. By ‘spiritual persons’, I have in mind both exemplary figures – like Jesus or the Buddha – and the multitude of ‘ordinary’ spiritual persons whose lives are led in aspiration to the spiritual goods the exemplars manifest (enlightenment, say, or holiness). I start with Linda Zagzebski's recent argument that moral persuasion primarily occurs through encounters with (...) class='Hi'>exemplars of moral qualities, of a sort that invite admiration and emulation. A plurality of modes of spiritual exemplarity is distinguished, each reflecting a distinct form of spiritual aspiration, which will show in the lives of the members of different traditions. I develop this claim by focusing on the ways that spiritual aspirants can encounter exemplars through their depictions in spiritual narrative. It emerges that narrative encounters can activate certain forms of admiration and enable certain forms of emulation if they depict the suffering of exemplars. (shrink)

While rules and exemplars are usually viewed as opposites, this paper argues that they form end points of the same distribution. By representing both rules and exemplars as (partial) trees, we can take into account the fluid middle ground between the two extremes. This insight is the starting point for a new theory of language learning that is based on the following idea: If a language learner does not know which phrase‐structure trees should be assigned to initial sentences, (...) s/he allows (implicitly) for all possible trees and lets linguistic experience decide which is the “best” tree for each sentence. The best tree is obtained by maximizing “structural analogy” between a sentence and previous sentences, which is formalized by the most probable shortest combination of subtrees from all trees of previous sentences. Corpus‐based experiments with this model on the Penn Treebank and the Childes database indicate that it can learn both exemplar‐based and rule‐based aspects of language, ranging from phrasal verbs to auxiliary fronting. By having learned the syntactic structures of sentences, we have also learned the grammar implicit in these structures, which can in turn be used to produce new sentences. We show that our model mimicks children’s language development from item‐based constructions to abstract constructions, and that the model can simulate some of the errors made by children in producing complex questions. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In the present study, we examined how the perceived attainability and relatability of moral exemplars predicted moral elevation and pleasantness among both adult and college student participants. Data collected from two experiments were analyzed with Bayesian multilevel modeling to explore which factors significantly predicted outcome variables at the story level. The analysis results demonstrated that the main effect of perceived relatability and the interaction effect between attainability and relatability shall be included in the best prediction model, and thus, (...) were deemed to predict the outcome variables significantly. The main effect of relatability as well as its interaction with attainability positively predicted elevation and pleasantness. We discussed educational implications of the findings in terms of how relatability may be the first point of emphasis for moral educators to focus on and attainability can then bolster the effectiveness. These relatable and attainable moral exemplars can be sources for moral elevation and pleasantness, which promote motivation to emulate moral behavior presented by the exemplars. (shrink)

The present study aimed to develop effective moral educational interventions based on social psychology by using stories of moral exemplars. We tested whether motivation to engage in voluntary service as a form of moral behavior was better promoted by attainable and relevant exemplars or by unattainable and irrelevant exemplars. First, experiment 1, conducted in a lab, showed that stories of attainable exemplars more effectively promoted voluntary service activity engagement among undergraduate students compared with stories of unattainable (...) exemplars and non-moral stories. Second, experiment 2, a middle school classroom-level experiment with a quasi-experimental design, demonstrated that peer exemplars, who are perceived to be attainable and relevant to students, better promoted service engagement compared with historic figures in moral education classes. (shrink)

Imitative Exemplarism is the view that God's knowledge of creatures as objects of potential creation is acquired through reflection on his own essence-as-nature, by means of which He is able to see that nature as infinitely participable by creatures, each of which, and each kind of which, is known by Him by means of a Divine Idea or archetype that imitates that nature without materially resembling it. Having recently discerned that this is a view to which I am committed, I (...) examine this view and defend it in this essay. (shrink)

Counterspeech is a form of communication aiming at counteracting the potential harms of other communication. Concerning specifically toxic speech, counterspeech is an attempt to directly respond to the toxic message, trying to undermine it, and can be exercised either by the citizens or by the state. When it comes to ordinary citizens, however, several issues arise, including social pressure, a deficit of authority, the lack of skills, and the burdensomeness of such demand. In this paper, we will discuss whether moral (...) exemplars in Zagzebski’s exemplarist moral theory are particularly capable of– and required to– exercising counterspeech, avoiding some of the problems that affect other ordinary citizens. Our answer will be only partially positive; by highlighting problems in taking moral exemplars as paradigmatic counterspeakers, we will be able to identify a more promising category of counterspeakers, who share in some features of moral exemplars but seem also capable of avoiding the problems the latter pose: namely, that of what we will call moral influencers. By doing so, we aim also at extending the debate over exemplarism to issues traditionally left out of the neo-Aristotelian scholarship, and at exploring the potentialities of non-conventional exemplars. (shrink)

This paper confronts Zagzebski’s exemplarism with the intertwined debates over the conditions of exemplarity and the unity-disunity of the virtues, to show the advantages of a pluralistic exemplar-based approach to moral education (PEBAME). PEBAME is based on a prima facie disunitarist perspective in moral theory, which amounts to admitting both exemplarity in all respects and single-virtue exemplarity. First, we account for the advantages of PEBAME, and we show how two figures in recent Italian history (Giorgio Perlasca and Gino Bartali) satisfy (...) Blum’s definitions of ‘moral hero’ and ‘moral saint’ (1988). Then, we offer a comparative analysis of the effectiveness of heroes and saints with respect to character education, according to four criteria derived from PEBAME: admirability, virtuousness, transparency, and imitability. Finally, we conclude that both unitarist and disunitarist exemplars are fundamental to character education; this is because of the hero's superiority to the saint with respect to imitability, a fundamental feature of the exemplar for character education. (shrink)

The paper introduces an extension of the proposal according to which conceptual representations in cognitive agents should be intended as heterogeneous proxytypes. The main contribution of this paper is in that it details how to reconcile, under a heterogeneous representational perspective, different theories of typicality about conceptual representation and reasoning. In particular, it provides a novel theoretical hypothesis - as well as a novel categorization algorithm called DELTA - showing how to integrate the representational and reasoning assumptions of the theory-theory (...) of concepts with the those ascribed to the prototype and exemplars-based theories. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This is a guest editorial introducing a special issue on ‘Exemplars and Emulation in Moral Education’ which contains contributions from 10 multidisciplinary authors. Representing the state of the art in the discourse, this editorial elucidates several new themes pertaining to it, before outlining each contribution in relation to said themes. In light of David Carr’s recent objections to role modelling, it is then argued that these contributions provide a possible collective response.

In this chapter, I will discuss employing exemplars in moral and character education promoting virtue development with the involvement of embodiment. Virtue ethicists propose two phases of virtue development: early virtue habituation and later phronesis cultivation. I will overview prior research on the mechanism of habituation at the biological and neural levels to examine why embodiment is fundamental during the first phase, virtue habituation. Then, I will review recent philosophical and psychological studies about the nature of phronesis, i.e., practical (...) wisdom, to consider how educational activities cultivate it. Based on these preliminary examinations of the course of virtue development, I will examine the previous literature about the role and importance of using exemplars in moral and character education involving concrete and interactive activities with the exemplars involving embodiment during the learning process. Finally, I will draw upon the Self-determination theory about supporting students’ need for autonomy, competence, and relatedness to consider a way to improve the effectiveness of exemplar-applied education along with embodiment. After examining the relevant theoretical frameworks mentioned above, I will discuss several practical guidelines for using exemplars involving character embodiment for virtue development. (shrink)

Chapter 11 begins by outlining the nature of admiration, kinds of admiration, and some psychological studies of admiration. It then describes a way admiration can be made foundational in a moral theory. The proposeed theory derives the good in the sense of the desirable from the good in the sense of the admirable. It also derives the deontic concepts of right act, wrong act, and duty from the admirable. In particular, the theory is a map of the moral domain in (...) which the foundation is exemplars of moral goodness to which we refer directly through the emotion of admiration. The theory is called _exemplarism_. Basic moral concepts are defined via direct reference to exemplars of moral goodness, picked out through the reflective use of the emotion of admiration. (shrink)

Moral exemplarism, which insists on the centrality of particular embodiments of exemplary virtue to the moral life, is currently receiving significant attention within moral philosophy as well as theological and religious ethics. This introductory essay situates the contributions made by this focus issue on moral exemplarity in relation to the history of attention to moral exemplars, the twentieth‐century turn to virtue, philosopher Linda Zagzebski’s exemplarist moral theory, Stanley Hauerwas’s particularist embrace of Christian discipleship, Foucauldian turns to critique and self‐cultivation, (...) and the significance of exemplars in Jeffrey Stout’s democratic piety. Arguing for the critical importance of articulating the authority of exemplars, this essay points to the ways in which the present focus can assist us to navigate between the shoals of nostalgic deference to tradition and dismissive critiques of authoritarianism. (shrink)

AI technologies are rapidly advancing and have shown potential for providing significant value across a variety of sectors, including healthcare. Much of research has focused on the technologies’ capabilities and pushing their boundaries, with many envisioning AI and AI-enabled robots replacing human labor and humans in the near future. However, in critical domains of professional practice such as healthcare, full replacement is neither realistic nor aimed for, and collaboration between AI and humans is a given for the foreseeable future. This (...) article argues for a shift away from a sole focus on the efficiency and effectiveness of technology, proposing instead that AI-enabled technologies increasingly should learn to adapt to human users considering that healthcare professionals already are overburdened. Rather than contributing to this burden, AI might extend the professional self by anticipating and supporting human needs and intentions. Drawing on a selective meta-synthesis of recent reviews and studies, this article introduces the concept of the AI-extended professional self. This concept suggests a temporary, dynamic integration of human professionals with AI that extends their capabilities with minimal additional burdens regarding training and application. Through three exemplars from healthcare—healthcare consultations, breast cancer screening, and robotic surgery—this article explores how a perspective rooted in the AI-extended professional self might unlock the potential for deeper AI integration into professional practice. Beyond these exemplars, this article calls for interdisciplinary research into the associated potential and challenges, advocating that the burden of AI integration needs to shift from humans to AI-enabled technologies. (shrink)

We can judge whether some activities are scientific or religious, depending on how similar they are to exemplar scientific activities or to exemplar religious activities, even if we cannot specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for science and religion. The absence of the demarcation between science and religion does not justify the school policy of teaching the creationist hypothesis that God created the universe any more than it justifies the religious policy of teaching evolutionary theory, quantum mechanics, and the Big (...) Bang theory in religious institutions. -/- . (shrink)

This article explores the opportunities and challenges of using journalistic exemplars in the digital network to explicate intellectual virtues necessary for flourishing in that network. It seeks to advance media ethics theorizing by drawing together exemplar-based virtue theory, specifically Zagzebski’s Exemplarist Moral Theory, and work on intellectual virtues, in particular Baehr’s delineation of nine intellectual virtues. After a description of theoretical foundations, this article articulates an approach to identifying and explicating intellectual virtues through journalistic exemplars in the digital (...) network. It then applies this approach to the work of two journalists who have frequently and thoughtfully used social media. This exploratory analysis suggests the proposed approach holds promise for explication of individual virtues and identification of patterns among them. The approach also carries challenges and limitations, partly related to the nature and scope of virtual evidence for enactment of virtues by journalists. The authors suggest future research to minimize these limitations and continue advancing theorizing within this framework. (shrink)

This article proposes that Catherine Elgin and Nelson Goodman’s work on exemplification is relevant for discussions within moral philosophy and moral education. Generalizing Elgin and Goodman’s account of exemplification to also cover ethics, the article develops a two-factor account of moral exemplarity. According to this account, instantiation and expressivity are individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for someone or something to function as a moral exemplar. Applying this two-factor account of exemplarity to discussions within the philosophy of moral education the (...) article then argues that it is the expressive aspect of moral exemplars, which explains and justifies the educational significance of such exemplars. The article concludes by discussing the similarities and differences between the expressivity account and the transparency criterion formulated by Michel Croce and Maria Silvia Vaccarezza in a recent paper. (shrink)

The special issue deals with the connection between exemplarity and imagination in the context of human action and judgment, which has received little scholarly attention so far. The aim is to shed light on this aspect within practical philosophy and thereby to deepen existing debates. The contributions highlight both the theoretical potential and the challenges involved in dealing with examples – within philosophical reflection as well as in everyday contexts. The practical references range from the importance of personal role models (...) to the role of literature and social media to questions of technological and ecological transformation. Although the contributions take different theoretical and methodological approaches, what they all have in common is an interest in which examples can be considered exemplary against the backdrop of specific social and historical contexts and to what extent our imagination has a limiting or enabling effect in this regard. (shrink)

_Exemplarity and Chosenness_ is a combined study of the philosophies of Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) and Franz Rosenzweig (1886-1929) that explores the question: How may we account for the possibility of philosophy, of universalism in thinking, without denying that all thinking is also idiomatic and particular? The book traces Derrida's interest in this topic, particularly emphasizing his work on "philosophical nationality" and his insight that philosophy is challenged in a special way by its particular "national" instantiations and that, conversely, discourses invoking (...) a nationality comprise a philosophical ambition, a claim to being "exemplary." Taking as its cue Derrida's readings of German-Jewish authors and his ongoing interest in questions of Jewishness, this book pairs his philosophy with that of Franz Rosenzweig, who developed a theory of Judaism for which election is essential and who understood chosenness in an "exemplarist" sense as constitutive of human individuality as well as of the Jews' role in universal human history. (shrink)

Despite renewed interest in the positive role exemplars can play in moral education, exemplar-based education has been criticized as illiberal and indoctrinating. In this chapter, we investigate these worries and show how a specific, twofold approach to exemplar narratives can help avoid them. According to opponents, exemplar education can involve indoctrination and impose specific moral values, since pupils are expected to act in ways that resemble exemplars. Even if pupils are encouraged to pick their own exemplars, this (...) arguably still promotes moral deference instead of independent moral reasoning and critical thinking. We argue that a nuanced distinction between ‘imitation’ and ‘emulation’ helps avoid such worries. Rather than seeking to simply imitate their exemplars, pupils should be encouraged to take a more nuanced approach to emulation in which they engage with their exemplars, think about how they can promote the values, and embody the ideals and virtues that they identify and admire in them. This approach is supported by recent insights about which exemplars are more motivating and which risk backfiring due to ‘do-gooder derogation’. It also leads to practical pointers for those who want to work with exemplars in character education without being charged of indoctrination. (shrink)

As a face in the mirror, so the morals of men are easily corrected with an exemplar.As Christopher Janaway observed, “the topic of Schopenhauer as Educator is really education rather than Schopenhauer.”2 Indeed, Nietzsche described it as addressing a “problem of education without equal”.3 This article reconstructs the pedagogical challenge and solution presented by Nietzsche in that text. It is obvious that Schopenhauer’s example is meant to underpin Nietzsche’s new pedagogy; what is less obvious is how exactly that exemplary role (...) is meant to work. I concentrate on three issues: the exact nature of the pupil’s relationship to the exemplar, the institutional context of education, and... (shrink)

In this paper I respond to Lois McNay’s article “The politics of exemplarity: Ferrara on the disclosure of new political worlds.” After contextualizing her appraisal of my views on exemplarity within the current debate about critical theory and postcolonialism, and after clarifying my interpretation of Kant’s notion of sensus communis, I defend the function that this concept plays within an immanent and experience-near approach to critical theory. Sensus communis is what makes of a subjective grievance a cogent critique. I then (...) elucidate how the transcontextual communicability of human flourishing can be understood, along lines still compatible with Kant’s theory of judgment. In the final section of the paper, McNay’s suggestion to reconceptualize critique in experience-near terms is integrated as a genealogical reconstruction of sensus communis as nourished by encounters with experiences of injustice. (shrink)

The topic of exemplarity has attracted considerable interest in philosophy, legal theory, literary studies and art recently. There is broad consensus that exemplary cases mediate between singular instances and general concepts or norms. The aim of this article is to provide an additional perspective on the logic of exemplarity. First, inspired by Jacques Derrida’s discussion of exemplarity, I shall argue that there is a kind of différance between (singular) examples and (general) exemplars. What an example exemplifies, the exemplarity of (...) the example, eludes any fixed identity and follows a logic of supplement. Second, I shall present the so-called logic of exemplarity. The received paraconsistent view has it that the exemplar of X is an X and, at the same time, is not an X. Inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein’s discussion of the standard metre, I would like to present an alternative paracomplete view whereby we can say of an exemplar of X neither that it is an X nor that it is not an X. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to discuss the theory of exemplary causality of Peter Auriol (1280-1322). Until at least the late 13th century, medieval authors claim that the world is orderly and intelligible because God created it according to the models existing eternally in his mind (i.e. divine ideas). Auriol challenges the view of his predecessors and contemporaries. He argues that assuming divine ideas amounts to assuming multiplicity in God and therefore questioning the principle of his absolute simplicity. To (...) avoid this problem, he develops a system that enables him to account for God’s knowledge of creatures (both as individuals and as species) and hence to preserve the theological principle of providence, but at the same time allows him to reject divine ideas as intermediaries for creation. In Auriol’s theory of exemplary causality, divine essence is the only object of God’s knowledge and thus the only exemplar for creation. God’s cognitive act is directed exclusively towards his own essence. However, he knows creatures through multiple connotations, i.e. the multiple ways divine essence is connotated when God knows himself. But these connotations play no role in creation, because imitability is only proper to divine essence. To explain how an object can be the only exemplar for the creation of many different creatures, Auriol has to rethink the concept of imitability and develop a new model of exemplary causality enabling him to account for the relationship between God and his creatures. The traditional model was that of analogy: a cause produces an effect which is partly similar and partly different from it. Auriol relies on the concept of equivocity. He argues that it is unnecessary to assume a particular similarity between a cause and its effect. Quite the contrary: for an object to be the exemplar of multiple different things, it is necessary that it should not be similar to any of them. The concept of aequivocatio allows Auriol to reject the traditional model of creation. Aequivocatio does not entail a resemblance between idea and ideatum. There is no contradiction, then, in claiming that a single object (divine essence) is in an equivocal way (aequivoce) the exemplary cause of multiple different objects. This is Auriol’s new theory of divine exemplarism: the theory of similitudo aequivoca. (shrink)

This study conducted life story interviews with 40 members of the PRSA College of Fellows to examine the influence of crucibles (i.e. trials, challenges or growth opportunities) in the moral development and psychology of public relations exemplars. The outcomes were the development of an illustration of their moral and leader development journey drawing on Rest’s four-component model of ethical decision making, and a moral psychology profile of the key characteristics of public relations exemplars. The profile that emerged is (...) that of leaders who exemplify moral courage, resilience, generosity, genuine care about others and are willing to listen and learn. When they faced trials, they emerged stronger and stayed true to their values and character. (shrink)

In recent publications, Keith Lehrer developed the intriguing idea of a special mental process– exemplarization – and applied it in a sophisticated manner to different phenomena such as intentionality, representation of the self, the knowledge of ineffable content (of art works) and the problem of (phenomenal) consciousness. In this paper I am primarily concerned with the latter issue. The target of this paper is to analyze whether exemplarization, besides explaining epistemic phenomena such as immediate and ineffable knowledge of experiences, can (...) also solve the ontological problem of consciousness. In particular, Lehrer suggests that if we consider exemplarization, zombies cannot provide an argument for anti-physicalism. I argue that exemplarization offers neither a physicalist explanation of the conceivability of zombies nor a physicalist account of their impossibility. Therefore, exemplarization cannot offer a physicalist solution to the “hard problem” of consciousness. (shrink)

Contemporary moral psychology and education overemphasise rationality and neglect moral virtues and personality that must be part of a comprehensive understanding of moral functioning. The purpose of this study was to delineate the perceived personality characteristics of moral exemplars using the template of the Five-Factor Model which represents the fundamental dimensions of personality, and to compare that trait description with those for related types of exemplars. Participants were 120 adults from across the lifespan (17-91 years) who provided free-listing (...) descriptions of moral, religious and spiritual exemplars, which were then analysed in terms of the five personality factors. Results revealed meaningful differences in personality attributions across types of exemplars, and indicated that traits reflecting the Conscientiousness and Agreeableness factors were particularly salient for the moral exemplar. Discussion focuses on the value of a re-examination of moral character and virtue, and the need to integrate moral cognition and personality within a realistic model of moral functioning and education. (shrink)

This article analyses digital self-presentation in social media using the concept of self-exemplarity. This term is inspired by Hannah Arendt's concept of the exemplar structure and her reflection on the ‘who’ of a person. The present article develops the thesis that in the digital space a specific form of self-presentation unfolds that goes beyond Arendt's concept of self-presentation. To this end, the concepts of self-exemplarity, self-example and self-exemplar are introduced. The phenomenon of self-exemplarity is not exclusively one of the digital (...) space. However, the digital sphere changes the conditions and effects of this process fundamentally. While self-exemplarity in offline daily practices takes place in fleeting moments of interaction with the world around us, digital self-exemplars – concrete, visible artefacts such as posts, images or videos – are constantly and actively created. These self-examples shape the digital self and can be edited and adapted continuously. A specific resulting “Selbstexempel” is the idealised image of oneself that serves as a point of reference and is shaped by the entirety of the self-examples. Self-exemplarity describes the dynamics of this interplay: the continuous process of self-presentation and self-shaping in the digital space. The concept of self-exemplarity reveals a central shift in the understanding of exemplarity: while traditional forms assume that individuals orientate themselves towards others and use them as role models, digital self-exemplarity is characterised by the fact that one's own self-image becomes the benchmark. In this process, the digital profile functions as a self-example that is continuously aligned with the imagined perspective of the digital public. The article shows that this dynamic of self-exemplarity influences not only the digital, but also the “offline” existence of the person. (shrink)

The monograph explains how knowledge requires the capacity to justify or defend the target claim of knowledge. Defensibility is based on a background system. Lehrer argues that reflection on experience yields a self-referential exemplar representation.This is the novel contribution of his new book to truth about the perceptual world.

Theatre practitioners use empathy formation techniques within their acting methodology to develop particular characters for the stage. Here, Ann Phelps and Dylan Brown argue that, when Constantin Stanislavski's seminal dramatic method is placed in conversation with exemplarist moral theory, acting can become a tool for moral formation. To illustrate this claim, they describe their work with the Program for Leadership and Character at Wake Forest University, where a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics framework is embodied and expanded using this dramatic method. By (...) using acting exercises to help students rehearse how their moral exemplars would respond to situations, Phelps and Brown challenge students to embody their exemplars instead of merely engaging with them as a passive intellectual exercise. Moral educators can achieve their pedagogical aim by expanding Stanislavski's dramatic “super-objective” to encompass a “moral meta-objective.” This neo-Aristotelian modification to Stanislavski's method might extend beyond the stage in ways that facilitate the embodiment of morally exemplary behavior, even after the curtain falls. (shrink)

Many people report that reading first-person narratives of the experience of illness can be morally instructive or educative. But although they are ubiquitous and typically sincere, the precise nature of such educative experiences is puzzling—for those narratives typically lack the features that modern philosophers regard as constitutive of moral reason. I argue that such puzzlement should disappear, and the morally educative power of illness narratives explained, if one distinguishes two different styles of moral reason: an inferentialist style that generates the (...) puzzlement and an alternative exemplarist style that offers a compelling explanation of the morally educative power of pathographic literature. (shrink)

In Exemplars of Truth, Keith Lehrer presents an impressive new epistemological theory. He continues to emphasize that knowledge and epistemic justification depend upon the capacity to rely upon a background system of beliefs, preference, and reasoning in a defense against potential objections. New to his theory is an attempt to explain how experience dynamically affects one’s background system by a process of exemplarization and generalization. Lehrer resists characterizing his view as foundationalist or as reintroducing the notion of an epistemological (...) given. I argue that he has not adequately explained, however, how the truth security he finds in the possession of self-representing experiential exemplars is compatible with the corrigibility of all of our empirical judgments. I also argue that uncertainties in how to interpret his nominalism make for difficulties in figuring out how we reasonably generalize on these experiential exemplars. Nonetheless, I conclude by arguing that Lehrer’s central thesis that epistemic justification relies upon a background system facilitates a satisfactory response to Goodman‘s riddle regarding reasonable generalizations on observed samples. (shrink)

The emotion of admiration and the semantic theory of natural kinds and direct reference are foundational for Linda Zagzebski's exemplarist moral theory and divine motivation theory. Many have examined difficulties that arise from the central role of admiration, while others have engaged her account of the incarnation. Little attention has been given to her semantic theory or philosophy of language. This essay demonstrates the difficulties and problems that arise from this theory, problems that could be avoided with a sociopractical account (...) of language and exemplarity. One set of problems pertain to the “principle of the division of linguistic labor.” Related problems come to light in Zagzebski's attempt to account for radical changes in perceptions of exemplars through social, political, and ethical revolutions. In the end, her semantic theory creates the very epistemological uncertainties that it is meant to forestall. It also fails to account for radical disagreements about exemplars and the role moral exemplars play in sociopolitical and ethical revolutions. (shrink)

Artificial intelligent (AI) systems that perform image classification tasks are being used to great success in many application contexts. However, many of these systems are opaque, even to experts. This lack of understanding can be problematic for ethical, legal, or practical reasons. The research field Explainable AI (XAI) has therefore developed several approaches to explain image classifiers. The hope is to bring about understanding, e.g., regarding why certain images are classified as belonging to a particular target class. Most of these (...) approaches use visual explanations. Drawing on Elgin’s work (True enough. MIT Press, Cambridge, 2017), I argue that analyzing what those explanations exemplify can help to assess their suitability for producing understanding. More specifically, I suggest to distinguish between two forms of examples according to their suitability for producing understanding. I call these forms samples and exemplars, respectively. Samples are prone to misinterpretation and thus carry the risk of leading to misunderstanding. Exemplars, by contrast, are intentionally designed or chosen to meet contextual requirements and to mitigate the risk of misinterpretation. They are thus preferable for bringing about understanding. By reviewing several XAI approaches directed at image classifiers, I show that most of them explain with samples. If my analysis is correct, it will be beneficial if such explainability methods use explanations that qualify as exemplars. (shrink)

Conscious experience of the sensation of smell provides exemplars of the sensation exhibiting to us what it is like. These exemplars of experiences can become vehicles or terms of representation and meaning. I call this exemplar representation and the process exemplarization. The notion of exemplarization is indebted to Hume and Goodman. I modify the notion here to apply to the sensation of smell. Exemplar representation differs from verbal representation because the exemplar, like a sample, exhibits what the represented (...) items smell like, a perfume, a spice, or an animal. The exemplar represents the sensation and, at the same, represents external objects, my example is the spray of a skunk, by exhibiting what a skunk smells like. The exemplar is part of the meaning and conception of the external object. This solves the problem, as Reid insisted, of how experience of smell justifies perceptual belief in the existence of external objects. The meaning of thought and discourse about external objects is not exhausted by the exemplarization of the sensation of smell, but the exemplar becomes evidence of their existence as part of the meaning of what they smell like. The evidence and justification of the exemplar is fallible and defeasible. However, exemplar justification, when undefeated by error in the way it coheres with a background system, becomes knowledge of the external world. (shrink)

Different religious traditions offer different exemplars of faith. In all of these traditions, at least some exemplars struggle with emotional, social, intellectual, and other sorts of difficulties as they live out their faith. In this paper, we will focus on one sort of challenge many of them experience: intellectual doubt.

the structure of medical science with a special focus on the role of generalizations and universals in medicine, and (2) philosophy of medicine's relation with the philosophy of science. I argue that a usually overlooked aspect of Kuhnian paradigms, namely, their characteristic of being "exemplars", is of considerable significance in the biomedical sciences. This significance rests on certain important differences from the physical sciences in the nature of theories in the basic and the clinical medical sciences. I describe those (...) differences and maintain that they are these differentiating features that require the use of more comparative and analogical reasoning in medicine. I suggest that Kitcher's recent introduction of the notion of a ‘practice’ may have similar implications if it is construed to contain more analogical elements than he appears to recognize in his initial formulation. Finally I argue that though Gorovitz and MacIntyre's characterization of medicine as a "science of particulars" bears some similarities with my thesis, I maintain that such a position without careful qualification can lead to ignoring both the nature of generalizations in these sciences and their role as positive analogies tying together a family of overlapping models. Keywords: medical reasoning, biomedical theories/paradigms, science of particulars, philosophy of medicine CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Taking as starting point Kuhn’s analysis of science textbooks and its application to Sinnott and Dunn’s (1925), it will be discussed the problem of the existence of laws in biology. In particular, it will be showed, in accordance with the proposals of Darden (1991) and Schaffner (1980, 1986, 1993), the relevance of the exemplars, diagrammatically or graphically represented, in the way in which is carried out the teaching and learning process of classical genetics, inasmuch as the information contained in (...) them, indispensable for the right development of that process, exceeds the information contained in the “laws” linguistically articulated and presented in the textbooks. However, it will be maintained that the information is implicit in the law that according to the structuralist concept of fundamental law and the reconstruction of genetics presented by Balzer & Dawe (1990), and later developed by Balzer & Lorenzano (1997) and Lorenzano (1995, 2000, 2002a) could be considered the fundamental law of classical genetics,the law of matching, clearly identified in this paper. (shrink)

Moral ‘saints and heroes’ are generally considered to be admirable, moral exemplars worthy of emulation. J. O. Urmson characterizes them as morally laudable agents who perform supererogatory actions. This characterization, combined with relevant empirical evidence, presents a paradox in which supererogatory acts appear to become, not optional, but obligatory for moral saints and heroes. This is termed the ‘agent–observer disparity’. Drawing on Bernard Williams’ ideas, the concepts of practical necessity and moral incapacity, which are expressive of and grounded in (...) one’s character, are utilized to account for moral saints and heroes’ subjective morality and illuminate their exceptional strength of character. In response to misgivings regarding the imitability of moral saints and heroes and the attainability of their excellences of character, this study suggests that the considerable gap between the characteristics of extreme exemplars and ordinary individuals can provide ordinary individuals with the freedom to consider the moral perspectives of these exemplars that evoke wonder without the exemplars’ actions becoming a threat to ordinary people’s self-concept. The earnest aspiration to reach the moral ideals of moral saints and heroes can move ordinary individuals and trigger an aretaic impulse to act more virtuously without causing stress. It is concluded that moral saints and heroes as extreme exemplars complement the influence of ordinary ‘close-by’ moral mentors and both are key in exemplar-based character education. (shrink)

Linda Zagzebski's Exemplarist Moral Theory (_EMT_) tries to do justice to the peremptory influence that in our lives has admiring certain persons, e.g., exemplars or models. Zagzebski’s proposal should be welcomed, since it is supported _ceteris paribus_ by our experience. But _EMT_’s insufficiency comes to the surface if we do not try to specify generalities such as the one that holds that admiration “is shaped by experience, beliefs and the emotional responses of others”. A step forward in the direction (...) of a greater specificity comes from paying due attention to the loving context in which the emotion of admiration and the ensuing process of imitation occurred in people for the first time. Another specification of the circumstances in which admiration and imitation occur comes from considering that they are sustained by narrative contexts. By considering the importance of our loves in our lives and that they are hierarchically organized (the core of our emotions’ focus), the description of those circumstances makes the explanation of the admiration of models and their subsequent imitation or emulation by exemplarist moral theory more accurate. (shrink)

An important topic in the evolution of language is the kinds of grammars that can be computed by humans and other animals. Fitch and Hauser () approached this question by assessing the ability of different species to learn 2 grammars, (AB)n and An Bn. An Bn was taken to indicate a phrase structure grammar, eliciting a center‐embedded pattern. (AB)n indicates a grammar whose strings entail only local relations between the categories of constituents. F&H's data suggest that humans, but not tamarin (...) monkeys, learn an An Bn grammar, whereas both learn a simpler (AB)n grammar (). In their experiments, the A constituents were syllables pronounced by a female voice, whereas the B constituents were syllables pronounced by a male voice. This study proposes that what characterizes the An Bn exemplars is the distributional regularities of the syllables pronounced by either a male or a female rather than the underlying, more abstract patterns. This article replicates F&H's data and reports new controls using either categories similar to those in F&H or less salient ones. This article shows that distributional regularities explain the data better than grammar learning. Indeed, when familiarized with An Bn exemplars, participants failed to discriminate A3 B2 and A2 B3 from An Bn items, missing the crucial feature that the number of As must equal the number of Bs. Therefore, contrary to F&H, this study concludes that no syntactic rules implementing embedded nonadjacent dependencies were learned in these experiments. The difference between human linguistic abilities and the putative precursors in monkeys deserves further exploration. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe role of exemplification and exemplars is receiving increasing attention in educational theory. Usually, this is connected to emulation models in character and moral education. Exemplars in this framework are those who show us how to act and what to do, and inspire us emotionally to improve. In Hannah Arendt’s unfinished work on judgement, the exemplar plays a different role. Instead of functioning as an inspiration for behavioural change, the exemplar inspires thinking. In Men in Dark Times and (...) the lecture series ‘Some questions of moral philosophy’, we find a collection of texts describing in detail some of the intellectual inspirations for Arendt’s work on exemplarity and judgement. In this paper, I will use an exploration of these texts as a starting point for considering the role of exemplarity in the development of educational judgement. (shrink)

Exemplarism – the view that exemplary people, whom we admire, are the bearers of our moral concepts – presents considerable challenges to the (widely-assumed) place of moral theory in how we learn to be moral. Exemplarism has been garnered by Amy Olberding to articulate a Confucian approach to moral learning. This paper extends Exemplarism by considering how it may be put into practice, based on a seminal Confucian text, the Analects of Confucius. To date, the majority of discussions on Confucian (...) ethics that have brought Confucian philosophy to the attention of Anglophone scholars tend to focus on conceptually-based matters. There remain questions regarding how these values may be inculcated and embodied in our moral lives. Central to our proposal is the practice of reflective observation (guan 觀), comprised by three integrated components: observation, evaluation, and emulation. Observing, reflectively, is important not only for an individual’s acculturation to existing norms and practices but also for how they may subsequently exercise some latitude over their moral practices. Our reflections offer a practical approach to Confucian moral learning. In doing so, we demystify moral learning in Confucianism and open up avenues for future cross-tradition dialogues on moral education. (shrink)