Raftopoulos’s most recent book argues, among other things, for the cognitive impenetrability of early vision. Before we can assess any such claims, we need to know what’s meant by “early vision” and by “cognitive penetration”. In this contribution to this book symposium, I explore several different things that one might mean – indeed, that Raftopoulos might mean – by these terms. I argue that whatever criterion we choose for delineating early vision, we need a (...) single criterion, not a mishmash of distinct criteria. And I argue against defining cognitive penetration in partly epistemological terms, although it is fine to offer epistemological considerations in defending some definitions as capturing something of independent interest. Finally, I raise some questions about how we are to understand the “directness” of certain putative cognitive influences on perception and about whether there’s a decent rationale for restricting directness in the way that Raftopoulos apparently does. (shrink)

In this chapter, I defend the thesis that early vision is Cognitively Impenetrable (CI) against very recent criticisms, some of them aimed specifically at my arguments, which state that neurophysiological evidence shows that early vision is affected in a top-down manner by cognitive states. This criticism comes from (a) studies on fast object recognition; (b) pre-cueing studies; and (c) imaging studies that examine the recurrent processes in the brain during visual perception. I argue that upon closer (...) examination, all this evidence supports rather than defeats the thesis that early vision is CI, because it shows that (a) the information used in early vision to recognize objects very fast is not cognitive information; (b) the processes of early vision do not use the cognitive information that issues cognitive demands guiding attention or expectation in pre-cueing studies; and (c) the recurrent processes in early vision are purely stimulus-driven and do not involve any cognitive signals. (shrink)

Cognitive and affective penetration of perception refers to the influence that higher mental states such as beliefs and emotions have on perceptual systems. Psychological and neuroscientific studies appear to show that these states modulate the visual system at the visuomotor, attentional, and late levels of processing. However, empirical evidence showing that similar consequences occur in early stages of visual processing seems to be scarce. In this paper, I argue that psychological evidence does not seem to be either sufficient or (...) necessary to argue in favour of or against the cognitive penetration of perception in either late or early vision. In order to do that we need to have recourse to brain imaging techniques. Thus, I introduce a neuroscientific study and argue that it seems to provide well-grounded evidence for the cognitive penetration of early vision in face perception. I also examine and reject alternative explanations to my conclusion. (shrink)

Cet article examine la contribution de la problématologie, une philosophie qui commence et se termine par la question, à notre compréhension du rôle du questionnement dans l’acte de lecture. Il s’interroge sur ce qui distingue l’approche de Michel Meyer des analyses poststructuralistes du sens littéraire (Barthes, Derrida) et de l’esthétique de la réception (Iser). Bien que l’œuvre de Meyer ne soit pas la seule à mettre l’accent sur la fonction de la réflexivité dans le questionnement littéraire, l’originalité de la problématologie (...) réside dans l’importance qu’elle attribue au rôle social de la littérature en tant que discours parmi d’autres discours. La valeur de la problématologie se trouve également dans l’attention qu’elle porte au contexte dans la lecture littéraire et au rôle de l’idéologie dans la délimitation des questions et des réponses posées par et au texte littéraire. La problématologie offre une nouvelle façon de penser l’histoire littéraire en proposant une vision à la fois intégrative et à long terme du développement de la littérature, que cet article appelle la « lecture à distance » de Meyer. Cette perspective est complétée, dans la lecture problématologique, par une attention rigoureuse au rôle du langage figuratif dans l’interprétation littéraire. (shrink)

I have argued that early vision is cognitively impenetrable because its processes do not operate over cognitive contents. Recently it has been argued that pre-cueing guided by cognitively driven attention affects early vision rendering it cognitively penetrated. Since the signatures of these effects are found in early vision, early vision is directly affected by cognition since its processes use cognitive information. Here, I defend the cognitive impenetrability. First, I define early (...) class='Hi'>vision and cognitive penetrability. I argue that a set of perceptual processes is cognitively penetrated only if cognition undermines the epistemic role of these processes in grounding empirical beliefs. Second, I discuss the problems cognitive penetrability causes for the epistemic role of perception and relate them to the impact of cognitive penetrability on the sensitivity of perception to the data. Third, I examine the epistemic role of early vision and argue that the cognitive effects underpinning pre-cueing do not undermine this role and, thus, do not render early vision cognitively penetrable. In addition, they do not entail that early vision uses cognitive information; they are indirect effects similar to the shifts of overt or covert attention. (shrink)

Pylyshyn argues that early vision is cognitively impenetrable, and therefore – contrary to knowledge-based theories of perception – that perception is noncontinuous with cognition. Those processes that are included in “early vision,” however, represent at best only one component of perception, and it is important that it is not the component with which most knowledge-based theories are concerned. Pylyshyn's analysis should be taken as a possible source of refinement of knowledge-based theories of perception, rather than as (...) a condemnation of them. (shrink)

: In this article I discuss Athanasios Raftopoulos’ view on the epistemic role of attention and early vision, as outlined in his most recent book. I start by examining his view on attention, which he illustrates during his discussion of structured cognitive contents and their interactions with perceptual contents, as well as during his discussion of selection effects. According to Raftopoulos, attention not only operates pre-perceptual input selection, but also influences perceptual processing during late vision biasing the (...) sampling of the iconic image for perceptual hypotheses-testing. Afterwards, I critically assess Raftopoulos’ conclusions about the epistemic role of early vision, which are based on his view about the role of attention. From this assessment, I raise a potential concern for his proposal in the form of a new problem of selection: the interesting epistemic consequences of cognitive penetrability either follow or do not follow from selection effects, depending on how these selection effects are construed, but regardless of the stage of visual processing in which they take place. Keywords: Cognitive Penetration; Attention; Constructivism; Selection Effects; Perceptual Epistemology Il ruolo epistemico della visione primaria: penetrazione cognitiva e selezione attentiva Riassunto: In questo articolo discuto la proposta di Athanasios Raftopoulos riguardo al ruolo epistemico dell’attenzione e della early vision, contenuta nella sua recente monografia. La mia discussione comincia da un esame delle sue idee riguardo all’attenzione, che illustra sia durante la sua discussione dei contenuti cognitivi strutturati e delle loro interazioni con i contenuti percettivi, sia durante la sua discussione degli effetti di selezione. Secondo Raftopoulos, l’attenzione non opera solamente una selezione pre-percettiva degli input, ma influenza anche i processi percettivi di late vision orientando il processo di valutazione delle ipotesi percettive sulla base dell’immagine iconica. Successivamente, valuto criticamente le conclusioni di Raftopoulos’ riguardo al ruolo epistemico di early vision, fondate sulla sua concezione del ruolo dell’attenzione. Da questo esame, evidenzio una potenziale criticità nella sua proposta costituita da un nuovo problema della selezione: le conseguenze epistemiche della penetrabilità cognitiva seguono o non seguono dai processi di selezione, a seconda di come tali effetti sono concepiti, ma indipendentemente dal livello nella serie dei processi visivi nel quale si verificano. Parole chiave: Penetrabilità cognitiva; Attenzione; Costruttivismo; Effetti di Selezione; Epistemologia percettiva. (shrink)

Pylyshyn's concentration on form perception to demonstrate that early vision is cognitively impenetrable neglects that color perception is also part of early vision. Thus, the finding of Duncker (1939), Bruner et al. (1951), and Delk and Fillenbaum (1965) that the expected color of objects affects how they are perceived challenges Pylyshyn's thesis.

Purpose. To determine whether highlights are rapidly identified at early levels of vision. -/- Methods. Visual search experiments were carried out using simple black and white figures corresponding to shiny objects lit from various directions. These included, for example, depictions of cylinders with highlights positioned at various heights (see figure). Targets and distractors differed only in the arrangement of their constituent regions, allowing them to be distinguished by the position of the highlights on the corresponding objects. -/- Results. (...) Three observers were tested. Search is rapid when the target corresponds to a shiny black object with a bottom highlight among objects with top highlights (view figure from rightside up). However, search slows down when the target corresponds to an object with a top highlight among objects with bottom highlights (view figure from upside down). This asymmetry in search speeds is destroyed when the contrast of the figures is reversed. -/- Conclusions. These results indicate that regions in the image can be rapidly identified as highlights at early levels of vision. They also suggest--as for several other rapid recovery processes--that an assumption of lighting from above is used as a simplifying constraint. (shrink)

I elaborate on Pylyshyn's definition of the cognitive impenetrability (CI) of early vision, and draw on the role of concepts in perceptual processing, which links the problem of the CI or cognitive penetrability (CP) of early vision with the problem of the nonconceptual content (NCC) of perception. I explain, first, the sense in which the content of early vision is CI and I argue that if some content is CI, it is conceptually encapsulated, that (...) is, it is NCC. Then, I examine the definitions of NCC and argue that they lead to the view that the NCC of perception is retrieved in a stage of visual processing that is CI. Thus, the CI of a state and content is a sufficient and necessary condition for the state and its content to be purely NCC, the CI?≡?NCC thesis. Since early vision is CI, the purely NCC of perception is formed in early vision. I defend the CI?≡?NCC thesis by arguing against objections raised against both the sufficient and the necessary part of the thesis. (shrink)

Licklider--1960--Man-Computer Symbiosis Roberts--1970--ARPAnet Internet Engelbart--1962-1968--Mouse, linked documents Kay--1970--Dynabook Berners-Lee--late 1980s and early 90s--World Wide Web Brin and Page--1996--Google--first adequate search engine other prophets--Nelson, etc. whom I neglect undeservedly from ignorance.

Empirical research suggests that motive states modulate perception affecting perceptual processing either directly, or indirectly through the modulation of spatial attention. The affective modulation of perception occurs at various latencies, some of which fall within late vision, that is, after 150 ms. poststimulus. Earlier effects enhance the C1 and P1 ERP components in early vision, the former enhancement being the result of direct emotive effects on perceptual processing, and the latter being the result of indirect effects of (...) emotional stimuli on perceptual processing that automatically capture exogenous attention. Other research suggests that emotional stimuli do not capture attention automatically but attentional capture is conditioned on the context. Since context dependent effects are first registered with the elicitation of N1 ERP component about 170 ms. poststimulus, emotional stimuli affect late vision. However, the early affective modulation of early vision by emotive states threatens the cognitive impenetrability of early vision since emotive states are associated with learning and past experiences. I argue that the emotive modulation of early vision does not entail the cognitive penetrability of early vision. First, the early indirect affective modulation of P1 is akin to the effects of spatial pre-cueing by non-emotive cues and these preparatory effects do not signify the cognitive impenetrability of early vision. Second, because the direct modulation of C1 signifies an initial, involuntary appraisal of threat in the incoming stimulus that precedes any cognitive states. (shrink)

This paper examines the relationship between cognitive impenetrability and perceptual nonconceptualism. I argue against the view, recently defended by Raftopoulos, that the (alleged) cognitive impenetrability of early vision is a necessary and sufficient condition for states of early vision and their content to be nonconceptual. I show that that view, here dubbed ‘the mutually entailing thesis’, admits two different standard interpretations depending on how we understand the property of being nonconceptual—corresponding to the distinction between the state (...) and the content views of perceptual nonconceptualism. I first argue for the falsity of the state-nonconceptualist reading of the mutually entailing thesis, on the grounds that it mistakenly takes being nonconceptual to be a causal instead of a constitutive relationship. The content-nonconceptualist understanding of the thesis, I then argue, is disproved by plausible views regarding the content of experience. The mutually entailing thesis could only be true, I conclude, on a non-standard, causal interpretation of the notion of nonconceptual content. Yet, on that reading, the thesis would either be trivially true or would entirely fail to engage with the contemporary literature on perceptual nonconceptualism. Some potential relationships between the causal reading of the mutually entailing thesis and psychological research in this area are also briefly discussed. (shrink)

This article aims to open a discussion on better ethical assurance for non-university research actors drawing on democratic norms. It derives from the author’s experience of a gap in ethical assurance for social science and humanities (SSH) research that takes place outside academia, for example within international organisations, public bodies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and by private entities. Many of these actors commission, conduct or sub-contract research activities involving human participants on a regular basis, an activity that often increases during times (...) of crisis where researchers in both the public and private sphere scramble to generate the new knowledge necessary to respond and prevent further harms. The ethical assurance frameworks for such research, while growing, remain limited. Discussion of research conducted by actors outside of university settings and their ethical assurance frameworks are both subjects under-interrogated within the literature. This paper seeks to open that discussion by presenting this broad non-university research context through the frame of research in crisis settings, where the ethical requirements of ‘do no harm’ and the ‘dual imperative’ possess an even heavier significance in research ethics. Furthermore, the global and diverse nature of crisis settings often gives rise to conversations concerning the positioning of the research actor and the need to empower the research participant. This paper presents an early vision of the non-university research actor and ethical assurance process based on the democratic norms of equality and inclusivity. (shrink)

Although some types of cognition may not affect early vision, there is ample evidence that other types of cognition do. Evidence indicating that early vision is penetrable by direct manipulation of viewers' perceptual intentions and by knowledge of the structure of familiar objects is reviewed, and related to both the Pylyshyn target article and Fodor (1983).

The perception of the lightness of surfaces has been shown to be affected by information about the spatial configuration of those surfaces and their illuminants. For example, two surfaces of equal luminance can appear to be of very different lightness if one of the two appears to lie in a shadow. How are we to understand the character of the processes that integrate such spatial configuration information so as to yield the eventual appearance of lightness? This paper makes some simple (...) observations about the vocabulary of appearance used in these contexts, and proposes that the end results can be called "phenomenal" in a traditional sense of that word. Processes whose products are phenomenal are next distinguished from processes characterized in other terms: (a) processes of perceptual grouping; (b) processes of perceptual organization; and (c) attentional (as opposed to preattentive) processes. These four categories are conceptually and empirically distinct. In particular, the paper reviews some evidence that appearances as of contours, occlusion, and amodally completed shapes can occur preattentively. Some implications for understanding gestalt grouping processes are briefly discussed. (shrink)

In this chapter, I elaborate my thesis that a stage of visual processing, namely, late vision, is Cognitively Penetrated (CP). The CP of late vision results in states with hybrid, that is visual/iconic and semantic/symbolic contents. The conceptual modulation of late vision notwithstanding, I argue that late vision is a perceptual stage rather than a stage of discursive thought. My main claim is that instead of discursive inferences, late vision involves pattern matching processes, and I (...) discuss the perception of ambiguous figures to sybstantiate my claim. I also argue that early vision, too, does not involve discursive inferences and that both late and early vision involve some sort of abductive reasoning. (shrink)

We show that early vision can use monocular cues to rapidly complete partially-occluded objects. Visual search for easily detected fragments becomes difficult when the completed shape is similar to others in the display; conversely, search for fragments that are difficult to detect becomes easy when the completed shape is distinctive. Results indicate that completion occurs via the occlusion-triggered removal of occlusion edges and linking of associated regions. We fail to find evidence for a visible filling-in of contours or (...) surfaces, but do find evidence for a "functional" filling-in that prevents the constituent fragments from being rapidly accessed. As such, it is only the completed structures—and not the fragments themselves—that serve as the basis for rapid recognition. (shrink)

In this chapter, I examine the repercussions of the cognitive impenetrability of early vision and cognitive penetrability of late vision for the epistemic role of visual perception and for the constructivist claim that our access to the world is mediated through our concepts.

This chapter explores the shifting role of human sociability in early modern moral and political thought as it was deployed in formulating the moral psychological underpinnings of social order. In what sense humans can be considered “naturally” social and political creatures has never been a settled conception in the history of western moral psychology. Yet, the early modern period marks a transformation in conceptions of human sociability. The challenge to the Aristotelian and other forms of naturalism, the gradual (...) rise of sovereign states, renewed interest in the various forms of moral scepticism, religious controversies and numerous wars increased the anxiety to explicate the nature, origins and sustainability of human sociability. The chapter argues that, during the course of the early modern period, the concept of sociability as an innate inclination capable of providing sufficient foundations for the peaceful flourishing of large-scale societies came under scrutiny. As a result, the traditional view of humans as inherently social and political beings underwent a transformation. Gradually, this perspective was supplanted by the notion that sociability is an artificial construct, shaped by the unique historical context of societies and influenced by political dynamics. (shrink)

Objectification involves treating someone as a thing. The role of images in perpetuating objectification has been discussed by feminist philosophers. However, the precise effect that images have on an individual's visual system is seldom explored. Kathleen Stock’s work is an exception—she describes certain images of women as causing viewers to develop an objectifying ‘gestalt’ which is then projected onto real-life women. However, she doesn’t specify the level of visual processing at which objectification occurs. In this paper, I propose that images (...) can affect a viewer's early visual system. I will argue that if a viewer is exposed to a lot of images that depict women as sexual objects, this will bias their early visual selection mechanisms in a way that can result in an objectifying way of seeing. This is an important contribution to work on objectification as it incorporates empirical studies on vision and findings from philosophy of mind. It also examines some of the epistemic and moral consequences of objectification occurring at this early visual stage. (shrink)

Species : visions and values -- Fantasies : seeing without what was within -- Prestiges : illusions in magic and art -- Glamours : demons and virtual worlds -- Images : the reformation of the eyes -- Apparitions : the discernment of spirits -- Sights : King Saul and King Macbeth -- Seemings : philosophical scepticism -- Dreams : the epistemology of sleep -- Signs : vision and the new philosophy.

Visions of the Buddha: Creative Dimensions of Early Buddhist Scripture, by Eviatar Shulman. Oxford University Press, 2021. 274pp. Hb £64.00. ISBN-13: 9780197587867.

This paper attempts to delineate the relation of early Chinese views on vision and visuality to nascent reflections on painting arising in the Early Medieval period. Ever since that time, pictorial creativity has been associated with Buddhist ideas of spiritual perfection. Likewise, the Early Medieval concern for the visualization of spiritual journeys to exceptional humans (and superhumans) through imaginary landscapes seems to be of Buddhist origin. The first part of this paper gives a short sketch of (...) the intellectual landscape in which theorizing on painting since the 5th century CE first arose. The main body of the study, consisting of parts two through five, close readings of pre-Buddhist texts on vision and imagination. From these exploratory investigations it emerges that the very terms that are key in early reflections on painting such as ‘spirit’ (shen神), ‘perspicacity’ (ming明), but also ‘imagination’ (xiang想) and ‘symbol’ (xiang象) are closely related to a specific conception of seeing and visuality which is manifest in these texts. A final part sketches the possible relevance of these observations in early and pre-imperial sources for the interpretation of Chinese theories on painting. It emerges that while the rising interest in imagination since the Eastern Jin period is indeed an innovation inspired by Buddhism, the extraordinary role of the notion of ‘spirit’ in reflections about painting is closely related to earlier autochthonous traditions. The appeal to specifically Buddhist notions such as thesamādhiof free play in texts on pictorial production and contemplation appears to be of a secondary character. It seems to be mediated by the inclusion of the very word ‘spirit’ (shen) into Chinese renderings of technical Buddhist terms related to meditation, which resulted in the implicit association of this specialist vocabulary with inherited conceptions of spirit as a luminous force animating, inspiring and enlightening things, in both quite a literal and in a rather metaphorical sense. (shrink)

Although the study of visual perception has made more progress in the past 40 years than any other area of cognitive science, there remain major disagreements as to how closely vision is tied to general cognition. This paper sets out some of the arguments for both sides and defends the position that an important part of visual perception, which may be called early vision or just vision, is prohibited from accessing relevant expectations, knowledge and utilities - (...) in other words it is cognitively impenetrable. That part of vision is complex and articulated and provides a representation of the 3-D surfaces of objects sufficient to serve as an index into memory, with somewhat different outputs being made available to other systems such as those dealing with motor control. The paper also addresses certain conceptual and methodological issues, including the use of signal detection theory and event-related potentials to assess cognitive penetration of vision. A distinction is made among several stages in visual processing. These include, in addition to the inflexible early-vision stage, a pre-perceptual attention allocation stage and a post-perceptual evaluation, memory-accessing, and inference stage which provide several different highly constrained ways in which cognition can affect the outcome of visual perception. The paper discusses arguments that have been presented in both computer vision and psychology showing that vision is "intelligent" and involves elements of problem solving". It is suggested that these cases do not show cognitive penetration, but rather they show that certain natural constraints on interpretation, concerned primarily with optical and geometrical properties of the world, have been compiled into the visual system. The paper also examines a number of examples where instructions and "hints" are alleged to affect. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Vanities of the Eye: Vision in Early Modern European CultureDallas G. Denery IIStuart Clark. Vanities of the Eye: Vision in Early Modern European Culture. Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Pp. xi + 415. Cloth, $75.00.A popular and pervasive historical narrative links the Renaissance development of linear perspective with Europe’s transition from a pre-modern to an early modern society. Erwin Panofsky gave this (...) narrative its definitive form early in the twentieth century and William Ivins boiled it down to a simple idea that served as the title of his most famous book. According to Ivins, single-point perspective, the artistic technique championed by Alberti and perfected in the paintings of Masaccio and Piero della Francesca, allowed for “the rationalization of sight.” In other words, it provided a mathematically and geometrically grounded method for accurately representing the external world. It is a powerful and seductive claim, one that has shaped generations of scholarly work. It is also, Stuart Clark contends in this important new book, patently wrong. Far from exhibiting a renewed or reinvigorated confidence in the accuracy and reliability of vision, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century philosophers, artists, theologians, and doctors worried that sight was susceptible, perhaps permanently so, to all sorts of debilitating derangements, displacements, and delusions.Rather than relate a history of progress, Clark offers a history of exhaustion, failure, and, ultimately, of rejection. Early modern intellectuals inherited a comprehensive theory of vision and cognition from their medieval predecessors known as perspectivist optics. This theory sought to secure the accuracy of human sense perception through regularized causal processes that linked things in the world with our various cognitive faculties. While some fourteenth-century intellectuals, most notably Nicolas of Autrecourt and Nicole Oresme, recognized structural deficiencies in this theory, their critiques were mostly ignored or treated as anomalies. Over the course of the next two and a half centuries, Clark argues, the challenges to this theory multiplied until it collapsed under their weight (20).Clark’s argument is straightforward and, as his evidence mounts, thoroughly convincing. Throughout each of the eight engrossing chapters that form the core of the book, Clark outlines a different threat, a different set of challenges that pointed out problems with the assumption that vision is trustworthy. The range and depth of those challenges are truly amazing. Doctors worried that imbalances in our humoral system, and especially in the black bile that causes melancholy, could render our visual perceptions dubious at best (ch. 2). Theologians, wary of the dangers of witchcraft and eager to prosecute its practitioners, obsessed over the cognitive threats that devils and demons posed to good Christians (ch. 4), while Protestant reformers relegated the entire tradition of Catholic miracles to the counterfeit illusions of the antichrist (ch. 5). For their part, artists believed that perspective undermined vision, depending as it does on the assumption that what we see is always relative, dependent upon our point of view (ch. 3).Clark structures much of his argument around George Hakewill’s 1608 book, The vanitie of the eye, an exposition on the natural, artificial, and demonic sources that forever render visual knowledge suspect. He could just as well have organized it around the opening pages of Descartes’s Meditations, and in many ways Clark’s book serves as a superb rumination on the sources of Descartes’s skeptical arguments. Unlike Etienne Gilson and, more recently, Richard Popkin, both of whom have done so much to open up the scholastic and early modern sources of Descartes’s skeptical thought experiments, Clark does not limit himself to philosophical lineages. Rather, he considers sources of visual skepticism that developed across an entire culture—in natural philosophy, medicine, art, religion, and literature (especially in Shakespeare’s Macbeth). Not only does the sheer volume and variety of such [End Page 103] sources help to explain Descartes’s urgent desire to overturn everything he had learned and begin again from the foundations, but it also contextualizes the specific arguments he employs. None of Descartes’s skeptical arguments were new and most were well known in the Middle Ages. What had changed over the intervening centuries, Clark contends, was how these arguments drew from... (shrink)

This article contains an analysis of Warren Neidich’s early photographic work of 1997 until 2002. These works are linked to the extensive theoretical production of the artists who connect them to the concepts of the dispositif and apparatus respectively. The article provides a close description of the parameters of four pivotal work groups of Neidich’s early practice, Brain Wash (1997), Double Vision (1997—2000), Shot Reverse Shot (2001) and Law of Loci (1998—9). These works were realized with the (...) aid of low-tech devices stemming from neuro-ophthalmology, marking the interface between current neuro-philosophical discourses such as the plasticity of the brain, the apparati of visual, i.e. analog and digital, culture and the philosophy of memory. It is suggested that Neidich, even though he intervenes and contributes importantly to these intermingling discourses in a broad manner, is particularly interested in the degraded and infirm implementations of human vision in order to explore new sensations and habits of perception. (shrink)

Introduction -- Daoism and "morality" -- Hearing the silent harmony: revisioning ethics in the Zhuangzi -- Travellers on the way: friendship in the Zhuangzi -- The preservation of the Way: rights, community, and social ethics in the Zhuangzi -- The great returning: death and transformation in the Zhuangzi -- Inwardly a sage, outwardly a king: the Way as ruler.

Pylyshyn's effort in establishing the cognitive impenetrability of early vision is welcome. However, his view about the role of attention in early vision seems to be oversimplified. The allocation of focal attention manifests its effect among multiple stages in the early vision system, it is not just confined to the input and the output levels.

We present a model for several early stages of the sensorimotor transformations involved in targeted arm movement. In psychophysical experiments, human subjects pointed to the remembered locations of randomly placed targets in three-dimensional space. They made consistent errors in distance, and from these errors stages in the sensorimotor transformation were deduced. When subjects attempted to move the right index finger to a virtual target they consistently undershot the distance of the more distal targets. Other experiments indicated that the error (...) was in the sensorimotor transformation rather than in the perception of distance. The error was most consistent when evaluated using a spherical coordinate system based at the right shoulder, indicating that the neural representation of target parameters is transformed from a retinocentric representation to a shoulder-centered representation. According to the model, the error in distance results from the neural implementation of a linear approximation in the algorithm to transform shoulder-centered target parameters into a set of arm orientations appropriate for placing the finger on the target. The transformation to final arm orientations places visually derived information into a frame of reference where it can readily be combined with kinesthetically derived information about initial arm orientations. The combination of these representations of initial and final arm orientations could give rise to the representation of movement direction recorded in the motor cortex by Georgopoulos and his colleagues. Later stages, such as the transformation from kinematic to dynamic parameters, or to levels of muscle activation, are beyond the scope of the present model. (shrink)

New Blackfriars, Volume 102, Issue 1100, Page 589-593, July 2021.

Three early 20th-century attempts at unifying separate areas of biology, in particular development, genetics, physiology, and evolution, are compared in regard to their success and fruitfulness for further research: Jacques Loeb’s reductionist project of unifying approaches by physico-chemical explanations; Richard Goldschmidt’s anti-reductionist attempts to unify by integration; and Sewall Wright’s combination of reductionist research and vision of hierarchical genetic systems. Loeb’s program, demanding that all aspects of biology, including evolution, be studied by the methods of the experimental sciences, (...) proved highly successful and indispensible for higher level investigations, even though evolutionary change and properties of biological systems up to now cannot be fully explained on the molecular level alone. Goldschmidt has been appraised as pioneer of physiological and developmental genetics and of a new evolutionary synthesis which transcended neo-Darwinism. However, this study concludes that his anti-reductionist attempts to integrate genetics, development and evolution have to be regarded as failures or dead ends. His grand speculations were based on the one hand on concepts and experimental systems that were too vague in order to stimulate further research, and on the other on experiments which in their core parts turned out not to be reproducible. In contrast, Sewall Wright, apart from being one of the architects of the neo-Darwinian synthesis of the 1930s, opened up new paths of testable quantitative developmental genetic investigations. He placed his research within a framework of logical reasoning, which resulted in the farsighted speculation that examinations of biological systems should be related to the regulation of hierarchical genetic subsystems, possibly providing a mechanism for development and evolution. I argue that his suggestion of basing the study of systems on clearly defined properties of the components has proved superior to Goldschmidt’s approach of studying systems as a whole, and that attempts to integrate different fields at a too early stage may prove futile or worse. © 2011 Elsevier Inc. (shrink)