An enormous intellectual adventure. In this groundbreaking new book, the American biologist Edward O. Wilson, considered to be one of the world's greatest living scientists, argues for the fundamental unity of all knowledge and the need to search for consilience --the proof that everything in our world is organized in terms of a small number of fundamental natural laws that comprise the principles underlying every branch of learning. Professor Wilson, the pioneer of sociobiology and biodiversity, now once again breaks (...) out of the conventions of current thinking. He shows how and why our explosive rise in intellectual mastery of the truths of our universe has its roots in the ancient Greek concept of an intrinsic orderliness that governs our cosmos and the human species--a vision that found its apogee in the Age of Enlightenment, then gradually was lost in the increasing fragmentation and specialization of knowledge in the last two centuries. Drawing on the physical sciences and biology, anthropology, psychology, religion, philosophy, and the arts, Professor Wilson shows why the goals of the original Enlightenment are surging back to life, why they are reappearing on the very frontiers of science and humanistic scholarship, and how they are beginning to sketch themselves as the blueprint of our world as it most profoundly, elegantly, and excitingly is. (shrink)

This article offers a fresh assessment of the views of the American paleontologist and evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould on the relation of science and religion. Gould is best known for his celebrated notion of “nonoverlapping magisteria,” which is often seen in somewhat negative terms as inhibiting dialogue. However, as a result of his critique of the unificationist approach to knowledge developed in Edward O. Wilson's Consilience, Gould later made increased use of the more positive notion of a “ (...) class='Hi'>consilience of equal regard,” which recognized the porous nature of disciplinary divides and the propriety of interdisciplinary dialogue. Gould's final views on the relation of science and religion, set out in The Hedgehog, the Fox, and the Magister's Pox, published after his death, affirms the distinctiveness and autonomy of science and religion on the one hand, while encouraging their constructive dialogue and productive interaction on the other. This should now be seen as Gould's definitive statement on this question. (shrink)

Consilience is a term popularized by the entomologist Edward O. Wilson in 1998 as a key piece of a program aimed at unifying knowledge and fostering dialogue among the scientific, social, and humanistic disciplines. Wilson’s proposal received polarized reactions: its aspirations of synthesis were praised but it was also severely accused of reductionism. This paper analyses Wilson’s concept of consilience, by attending to its antecedents and explaining the mechanisms of extension from biology to culture. I conclude that, although (...) consilience can serve as a source of inspiration for interdisciplinarity, it presents methodological and conceptual inconsistencies that hinder its applicability to the social sciences and humanities, which raises doubts about its viability as an integrative model of knowledge unification. (shrink)

In 2012, the Geological Time Scale, which sets the temporal framework for studying the timing and tempo of all major geological, biological, and climatic events in Earth’s history, had one-quarter of its boundaries moved in a widespread revision of radiometric dates. The philosophy of metrology helps us understand this episode, and it, in turn, elucidates the notions of calibration, coherence, and consilience. I argue that coherence testing is a distinct activity preceding calibration and consilience, and I highlight the (...) value of discordant evidence and trade-offs scientists face in calibration. The iterative nature of calibration, moreover, raises the problem of legacy data. (shrink)

This volume takes a new approach to bridging the cultures of science and the humanities. The editors and contributors formulate how to develop a new shared framework of consilience beyond mere interdisciplinarity, in a way that both sides can accept.

Edward Wilson wrote in Consilience that “Human history can be viewed through the lens of ecology as the accumulation of environmental prostheses” (1999 p 316), with technologies mediating our collective habitation of the Earth and its complex, interdependent ecosystems. Wilson emphasized the defining characteristic of complex systems, that they undergo transformations which are irreversible. His view is now standard, and his central point bears repeated emphasis, today: natural systems can be broken, species—including us—can disappear, ecosystems can fail, and technological (...) prostheses potentiate rather than ameliorate disaster when the fragilities that they introduce into our evolutionary co-dependencies with natural systems, and with each other, are under-appreciated. (shrink)

In this paper I sketch William Whewell’s attempts to impose order on classificatory mineralogy, which was in Whewell’s day (1794e1866) a confused science of uncertain prospects. Whewell argued that progress was impeded by the crude reductionist assumption that all macroproperties of crystals could be straightforwardly explained by reference to the crystals’ chemical constituents. By comparison with biological classification, Whewell proposed methodological reforms that he claimed would lead to a natural classification of minerals, which in turn would support advances in causal (...) understanding of the properties of minerals. Whewell’s comparison to successful biological classification is particularly striking given that classificatory biologists did not share an understanding of the causal structure underlying the natural classification of life (the common descent with modification of all organisms). Whewell’s key proposed methodological reform is consideration of multiple, distinct principles of classification. The most powerful evidence in support of a natural classificatory claim is the consilience of claims arrived at through distinct lines of reasoning, rooted in distinct conceptual approaches to the target objects. Mineralogists must consider not only elemental composition and chemical affinities, but also symmetry and polarity. Geometrical properties are central to what makes an individual mineral the type of mineral that it is. In Whewell’s view, function and organization jointly define life, and so are the keys to understanding what makes an organism the type of organism that it is. I explain the relationship between Whewell’s teleological account of life and his natural theology. I conclude with brief comments about the importance of Whewell’s classificatory theory for the further development of his philosophy of science and in particular his account of consilience. (shrink)

Is a genuinely consilient concept of human culture possible? I identify some of the major stumbling blocks that prevent mutual illumination between the humanities and evolutionary sciences. Whereas the sciences are often concerned with predictive averages, the arts draw attention to "outliers" that defy general trends. The solution is not to disregard these outliers, but rather to understand the open-ended processes that, by design, produce startling variations. Such open-endedness is an essential part of the evolutionary story, not an insignificant byproduct. (...) Conversely, humanistic scholars have much to gain by engaging, rather than spurning, the evolutionary framework. (shrink)

As the title implies, this chapter will review the main conclusions of the preceding chapters as a prelude to consideration of the essential ontological question concerning the existence of God. We begin with “The Metaphysical Poem of Parmenides”, which in its own right provides an intriguing basis for belief in a necessary Being that is the source of all being. The main philosophical arguments for the existence of God are briefly presented, beginning with St. Augustine’s original “Argument from Truth”, which (...) is then followed in historical order by Boethius’ “Argument for the Necessity of a Supreme Good”, and detailed explanation of St. Anselm’s “Ontological Argument”. The five arguments of St. Thomas are then mentioned with particular attention given to “The Argument of the First Cause” and “The Argument of Contingency”, which together lead to the existence of a Necessary Being that is the Self-Sufficient First Cause all that exists. St. Thomas’s “Argument of the First Cause” and “Argument of Contingency” are re-evaluated in the context of the existence of an eternal multiverse, in which case we must ask whether such an entity could be the Necessary Being that is the sufficient cause of itself. We then show why the interdependent collection of pocket or bubble universes that comprise the eternal multiverse cannot be the sufficient cause of itself; and why the parallel argument that atheists make against the self-sufficiency of God as the Necessary Being is answered by the Modified Argument from Truth, described herein. We show the essential role played by the existence of infinite and eternal Consilient Truth, and the epistemology of Dewy and Bentley which posits that knowledge, per se, has no existence of its own but rather must exist in mind knowing truth. This argument leads to the existence of an eternal mind that knows eternal Consilient Truth. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 26.2 (2002) 312-333 [Access article in PDF] Consilient Literary Interpretation Marcus Nordlund I THIS IS AN EXCITING TIME in the history of human self-knowledge. Like the two souls in Plato's Symposium, the life sciences and the human sciences are slowly coming to terms with their painful divorce and are increasingly on speaking terms. Thanks to important developments across a broad range of academic disciplines from biology (...) and neuroscience to anthropology and psychology, we are starting to glean the possibility of a new conceptual integration that may have important consequences for our understanding of human nature. After hundreds of years of virtuoso variations on the theme of philosophical and scientific dualism, we have come some way towards bridging the gap between mind and matter, biology and culture, science and the arts.From the perspective of literary studies, two recent developments have been especially valuable. The previous decade saw a growing recognition among social scientists of the explanatory force of evolutionary theory, and of the ultimate bankruptcy of the nature-nurture opposition that forces biology and culture into different compartments. Since the social sciences have always supplied literary studies with food for thought, it would be strange if such developments did not reflect on literature, too. Equally important has been the increasing impatience among scholars in the humanities with the radical skepticism, antiscientism, and dogmatic agnosticism that turns both science and literature into mere self-validating narratives and sees no significant difference between descriptive and normative statements. Together, these theoretical shifts have slowly begun to pave the way for a new dialogue between those who study biology, psychology, and cultural artifacts like literature. Since the mid-1990s, a number of literary [End Page 312] scholars have taken the first steps towards merging evolutionary and cultural explanation in the study of literature. 1One striking defense of such a conceptual integration between science and literature was delivered a few years ago in Edward O. Wilson's Consilience. 2 According to Wilson, there is "only one way to unite the great branches of learning and end the culture wars. It is to view the boundary between the scientific and literary cultures not as a territorial line but as a broad and mostly unexplored terrain awaiting cooperative entry from both sides" (p. 138). While he concedes that the two cultures can and should be characterized by "radically different goals and methods," he also stresses that interpretation provides a "logical channel of consilient explanation between science and the arts" (p. 234).While we have good reason to be optimistic about the potential of this joint endeavor, it is nevertheless fraught with massive problems. The current track record in interdisciplinary literary studies is uneven, to say the least. Strange confusions about the nature and status of theory abound, and these often take the shape of spontaneous raids into foreign conceptual frameworks that are bound to baffle the practitioners of the host discipline. As Richard Levin importantly points out, 3 there are numerous reasons why current interdisciplinary literary theories tend to become self-validating. There are no negative tests; critics tend to choose theories on the basis of ideological preferences rather than the criterion of truth; and there is a widespread assumption that theories can simply be transformed willfully whenever they do not meet the requirements of the interpreter.Many of the problems Levin points to can, I think, be remedied by something as trivial as a change in attitude within the discipline of literature itself. For example, something has obviously gone seriously wrong when the automatic spouting of political ad hominem arguments and genetic fallacies has become second nature to so many critics. But there are other and more fundamental problems that seem intrinsic to the whole question of interdisciplinarity. One of these, according to Wilson, is that as we move forward in the hierarchy of sciences, from physics to biology to literature, we encounter a rapidly accelerating complexity: "It is far easier to go backward through the branching corridors than to go forward.... Biology is almost unimaginably more complex than physics, and the arts equivalently more complex than... (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to describe the evolution of the fundamental guidelines according to René Girard’s interpretation of the Oedipus myth. After close examination, it appears Girard’s methodology is based on four complementary levels: (1) the common-sense tracking of sacrificial substitutions; (2) the careful analysis of symmetries and dissymmetries in mythical texts; (3) the identification of cross-cultural and historical persecution stereotypes; (4) the application of the common standard of evidence (i.e. guilty beyond a reasonable doubt) for criminal conviction. (...) Throughout the paper, we will show that Girard’s approach bears strong resemblance with William Whewell’s method of consilience as well as Charles Sanders Peirce’s views of the historical sciences. (shrink)

Most contributions to Whewell scholarship have tended to stress the idealistic, antiempirical temper of Whewell’s philosophy. Thus, the only two monograph-length studies on Whewell, Blanché’s Le Rationalisme de Whewell and Marcucci’s L’ ‘Idealismo’ Scientifico di William Whewell, are, as their titles suggest, concerned primarily with Whewell’s departures from classical British empiricism. Particularly in his famous dispute with Mill, it has proved tempting to parody Whewell’s position in the debate by treating it as a straightforward encounter between an arch-empiricist and an (...) arch-rationalist. There is, however, a danger that an emphasis on the necessitarian and a priori elements in Whewell’s philosophy may well obscure the unmistakable empirical emphasis in Whewell’s theory of science. I think it is time to begin to redress the balance, by focusing attention on the significant ‘empiricist’ strains in Whewell’s philosophy of science. One of the most important of those strains is connected with the operation which Whewell calls ‘the consilience of inductions’. (shrink)

The article develops an explanation of corporal punishment (CP) as an expression of family violence by developing a multi-level, conciliatory model of human behavior. The synthesis builds upon a review of the relevant analytic approaches and empirical evidence spanning multiple levels of human behavior to include five interrelated frameworks: (1) behavioral investment; (2) socialization; (3) cultural justification; (4) social location; and (5) societal context. The analytic levels highlight the various explanatory principles that address questions relevant mainly to investigators who study (...) behavior in terms of different levels of informational complexity. The paper outlines the most important factors that shape the use and non-use of CP within family settings. The model identifies key ontogenetic and biophysiological factors linked to the fitness of parents’ offspring, along with primary socialization processes and cultural justification mechanisms that increase the probability of the intergenerational transmission of violence. In addition, the model identifies the sociological dimensions of family relationships and the importance of social locational variables in shaping parental usage of CP, as well as the importance of communities and institutions as situated within sociocultural contexts. The main conclusion suggests that to understand and explain more fully why human beings use violence in the context of familial relationships—including corporal punishment practices—analysts must consider the different influences and possible impacts of factors across all five levels. (shrink)

The paper attempts to elucidate and evaluate William Whewell's notion of a "consilience of inductions." In section I Whewellian consilience is defined and shown to differ considerably from what latter-day writers talk about when they use the term. In section II a primary analysis of consilience is shown to yield two types of consilient processes, one in which one of the lower-level laws undergoes a conceptual change (the case aptly discussed in Butts [1977]), and one in which (...) the explanatory theory undergoes conceptual "stretching." In section III both consilient cases are compared to the non-consilient case in reference to L. J. Cohen's method of relevant variables. In section IV we examine the test procedures of the theory in all three cases, and it is shown that in the event of genuine consilience (consilience of the second type) a theory acquires extraordinarily high support. In the final section something is said of the short-comings of standard Bayesian confirmation theories that are highlighted by Whewellian consilience. (shrink)

Can the divide between science and religion be bridged? The current article will present the case for semiotics – and specifically the process of theosemiosis – as that platform of connection. In order to present this argument a key issue that must be tackled is whether there is one underlying function within the category of religion that can be extracted and held accountable in its knowledge claims: what has generally been termed the perennial philosophy. This extracted principle must then be (...) capable of conforming to a broader model of consilience that can contain the knowledge captured in both science and religion. A model that can equally explain the work of Aristotle, Bacon, Galilee, and Einstein as it does Moses, Buddha, Jesus and Krishna, both in an ontological and epistemological sense; and thus a modification and extension of Enlightenment principles in such a way that they can capture the western and eastern notions of that light. In this regard, seeing truly is ‘knowing’. (shrink)

This book argues that God can be found within the edifice of the scientific understanding of physics, cosmology, biology and philosophy. It is a rewarding read that asks the Big Questions which humans have pondered since the dawn of the modern human mind, including: Why and how does the universe exist? From where do the laws of physics come? How did life and mind arise from inanimate matter on Earth? Science and religion have a common interest in the answers to (...) such questions, yet many scientists and believers have been at odds for centuries. The author and contributors present a program for moving beyond the vastly different perspectives of reality offered by science and religion. Historical proofs for the existence of God are considered in light of the possibility that the universe may be only one in an eternal multiverse that contains an infinite number of other universes. Readers will find a modification of St. Augustine’s Argument from Truth for the existence of the necessary, self-sufficient being commonly referred to as God. This book is suited to all with an interest in the crossing points of science and religion, providing much food for thought and reflection. If in the end, you cannot accede to philosophy’s proofs, or theism’s invitation to faith, perhaps you will nevertheless say ‘yes’ to the amazing universe in which we live. (shrink)

Millennia ago, the human mind set out to discover the cosmosCosmos it had one day awoke to. After a long and meandering journey it has finally returned and in a final act of cognition faced its own nature.

All of us, including scientists, make judgments about what is true or false, probable or improbable. And in the process, we frequently appeal to concepts such as evidential support or explanation. Bayesian philosophers of science have given illuminating formal accounts of these concepts. This paper aims to follow in their footsteps, providing a novel formal account of various additional concepts: the likelihood-prior trade-off, successful accommodation of evidence, ad hocness, and, finally, consilience—sometimes also called “unification”. Using these accounts, I also (...) provide a new Bayesian analysis of how someone such as Charles Darwin hypothetically could have reasoned in favor of evolution over special creationism. Lastly, I explore how these accounts relate to other topics and accounts in philosophy, and I chart out some areas for further research. (shrink)

I propose a measure of dependence that relates a set of items of evidence to an hypothesis H and to H's negation. I dub this measure relative consilience and propose a method for using it as a correction factor for dependence among items of evidence. Using RC, I examine collusion and testimonial independence, the value of diverse evidence, and the strengthening of otherwise weak or non-existent cases. RC provides a valuable tool for formal epistemologists interested in analyzing cumulative case (...) arguments. (shrink)

Reductionism and complexity theory are two paradigms frequently found in language research. There exist a number of conflicts in terms of concepts and methodologies between reductionism and complexity theory, which are not conducive to creating a unified language research framework. This paper starts by discussing the adaptability of complex dynamic systems and combines cognitive processing model and artificial neural networks to construct and verify an adaptive weight model, showing that the study of reductionism is induction of high-weight elements and the (...) study of complexity theory is a discussion of system complexity from adaptability, meaning that there is a good fit between the two frameworks. The adaptive weight model is conducive to developing a unified interpretation of language research results. (shrink)

In establishing a consilient basis between the social and biological sciences, the human brain and the nature of the self continue to present the most formidable obstacle, the greatest challenge, and yet the ultimate key to any final deep understanding of social, political and cultural processes. In this paper we interpret such phenomena as successively complex levels of ‘exfoliation’, growing from a neu- robiological base. Their emergent qualities and interconnections have hitherto constituted separate domains of study within the social sciences. (...) The problem of psychohistory is to seek some way in which degrees of co-dependence between seperately emergent phenomena at successive levels can be visualised, and any invariant properties identified and understood. The topological models of R. Thom and E.C. Zeeman may suggest some possible approaches. Inasmuch as psychic growth itself is an accretion process, the roles of pre- and post-natal trauma in determining the later ramifications of neural development are crucial, yet the consequences remain to a certain extent unavoidable at the present level of human development. Certain theological traditions based on an apophatic approach to human consciousness have recognised this and may offer some insight into how the emotional consequences of early trauma (and the group fantasies they generate later at social, political and cultural levels) may eventually be understood and contained. (shrink)

Forster presented some interesting examples having to do with distinguishing the direction of causal influence between two variables, which he argued are counterexamples to the likelihood theory of evidence. In this paper, we refute Forster's arguments by carefully examining one of the alleged counterexamples. We argue that the example is not convincing as it relies on dubious intuitions that likelihoodists have forcefully criticized. More importantly, we show that contrary to Forster's contention, the consilience-based methodology he favored is accountable within (...) the framework of the LTE. (shrink)

The book was inadvertently published with an incorrect ToC where Chapter 8 subchapter was not indented (Consilience, Truth and the Mind of God: A Synthesis). It is now corrected asRecollection and Synthesis.

How does the community of social scientists actually decide that a certain research program counts as a contribution to social science? On what criteria? The opposition between scientific and nonscientific modes, or perhaps humanities versus science is too simple, and there are in fact three clearly distinct ideal types here. These are referred to as ideal-types to avoid the suggestion that any discipline or field is organized exclusively around all of these possible modes of transmission, although in many fields one (...) of them is clearly dominant. The three modes are called science, erudition, and relevant connections, respectively. This chapter briefly describes these three modes before applying this model to the specific case of kinship in anthropology. (shrink)

This monograph introduces a meta-framework for conducting interdisciplinary research in the science of emotion, as well as a framework for a particular kind of theory of emotion. It can also be understood as a “cross-over” book that introduces neophytes to some of the current discourse and major challenges for an interdisciplinary approach to the science of emotion, especially from a philosophical perspective. It also engages experts from across the disciplines who are interested in conducting an interdisciplinary approach to research and (...) theorizing in the science of emotion, and introduces to them some of the contemporary debates in the philosophy of emotion. It does so by providing a taxonomy of theories of emotion which allows one to understand the contemporary interdisciplinary discourse in the science of emotion as a debate between four fundamental types of theories of emotion—realism, instrumentalism, eliminative-realism, and eliminativism—and which can be found or potentially found across the disciplines, and by arguing for foundational principles which can unify, without consilience, these four kinds of approaches as perspectives about the same object of inquiry. It also covers a wide range of concerns, including the problem of skepticism in the science of emotion, the problem of the underdetermination of a theory by the evidence, the question of the place of ordinary intuitions and ordinary language for a science of emotion, the mind-body problem, the hard problem of consciousness, the meta-hard problem of consciousness, the problem of intentionality, questions about the rationality of emotions and whether emotions can be a vehicle for knowledge, and the debate between cognitive and noncognitive theories in the philosophy of emotion. (shrink)

Recent work in cognitive science has uncovered a diversity of explanatory values, or dimensions along which we judge explanations as better or worse. We propose a Bayesian account of these values that clarifies their function and shows how they fit together to guide explanation-making. The resulting taxonomy shows that core values from psychology, statistics, and the philosophy of science emerge from a common mathematical framework and provide insight into why people adopt the explanations they do. This framework not only operationalizes (...) the explanatory virtues associated with, for example, scientific argument-making, but also enables us to reinterpret the explanatory vices that drive phenomena such as conspiracy theories, delusions, and extremist ideologies. (shrink)

This paper considers clinical psychoanalysis together with developmental psychology (particularly attachment theory), evolution, and neuroscience in the context a Bayesian account of confirmation and disconfrimation. -/- In it I argue that these converging sources of support indicate that the combination of relatively low predictive power and broad explanatory scope that characterise the theories of both Freud and Darwin suggest that Freud's theory, like Darwin's, may strike deeply into natural phenomena. -/- The same argument, however, suggests that conclusive confirmation for Freudian (...) hypotheses, as in the case of Darwin's, will come from outside the original domain of explanation sketched out by Freud. As in Darwin's case conclusive confirmation came from understanding the physical mechanisms or reproduction, in Freud's case it will come from understanding the neural mechanisms that realise the phenomena described in psychoanalysis. (shrink)

For twenty-five centuries the theory of inference has asked how warrant moves from evidence to conclusion, and its principal instruments, deduction, induction, abduction, Hegelian dialectic, consilience, and Bayesian credence, were each built to answer that question. What none of them answers is whether the evidence structure on which any such move runs is itself sound. Every mode in the tradition presupposes, and cannot certify, the independence and non-degeneracy of its evidence lines: a Bayesian posterior strengthens under a latent common (...) cause that should dissolve the convergence, consilience celebrates an independence it possesses no operational test for, and falsification cannot recognize a falsifier without a verification frame it does not supply. This paper presents Trisduction, a verification architecture operating at the certification layer beneath inference. Complete factual claims decompose, under a reproducible deletion test, into exactly three independent warrant lines, formal, empirical, and registrational; the three lines close geometrically on a fourth point into twelve directed verification conditions; and the verdict takes closed mathematical form, det(R) = (Re(q̂_F q̂_E q̂_ER))², a three-state output, sealed, broken, under-determined, whose admissible functional class is provably closed. The architecture's primary discriminator is provable and testable: on collinear evidence a Bayesian posterior strictly increases while the verdict determinant vanishes identically, and no weighted aggregation of positive inputs can vanish on collinear data, with the 2014 BICEP2 announcement and its Planck dust resolution supplying the worked historical case and an eight-check executable battery reproducing the verdict identities at machine precision on any floating-point substrate. If the analysis stands, the long search for epistemic certainty terminates the way genuine searches terminate, in a classification: indefeasibility is provably unattainable for finite verifiers, maximal warrant is attainable and its instrument is closed, and each historical mode survives, completed, at the one layer it actually occupies. (shrink)

In the twenty-first century, Stephen Hawking proclaimed the death of philosophy. Only science can address philosophy’s perennial questions about human values. The essay first examines Nietzsche’s nineteenth century view to the contrary that philosophy alone can create values. A critique of Nietzsche’s contention that philosophy rather than science is competent to judge values follows. The essay then analyzes Edward O. Wilson’s claim that his scientific research provides empirically-based answers to philosophy’s questions about human values. Wilson’s bold new hypothesis about the (...) ‘social conquest of the earth’ challenges Nietzsche’s vision of philosophy’s mission. Confronting both Nietzsche and Wilson, the essay then considers three theoretical proposals for a consilience of philosophy, science, engineering and technology. The conclusion presents a working African model of consilience that addresses the existential problem of poverty in the Global South. (shrink)

To maximally flourish, the social sciences must be inoculated against parasitic ideas (e.g., postmodernism) and suicidal empathy (e.g., an epistemology of care), both of which arise when the pursuit of truth is confounded with social justice activism. Furthermore, the social sciences currently exist in disorganized if not incoherent silos of knowledge void of an organizing meta-theory. The evolutionary lens provides such a unifying framework whilst engendering the requisite consilience.

Societies have always used their heritage to remain resilient and to express their cultural identities. Today, all the still-available experiences accrued by human societies over time and across space are, in principle, essential in coping with the twenty-first century grand challenges of humanity. Artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms can assist the next generation of historians, heritage stakeholders, and decision-makers in decoding unstructured knowledge and wisdom embedded in selected cultural artefacts and social rituals, encoding data in machine-readable systems, aggregating information (...) according to the user’s needs in real time, and simulating the consequences of either erasing, neglecting, putting in latency, or preserving and sharing specific human experiences. What our global society needs is a multilingual and transcultural approach to decode-encode the treasure of human experience and transmit it to the next generation of world citizens. This approach can be the pathway to work on a new science of heritage, its ethics, and empathy. (shrink)

This paper defines in a formal and computational way the notion of ‘consilience’, a term introduced by Whewell in 1847 for the evaluation of scientific theories. Informally, as has been used to date, a model or theory is ‘consilient’ if it is predictive, explanatory and unifies the evide-nce. Centred in a constructive framework, where new terms can be intro-duced, we essay a formalisation of the idea of unification based on the avoidance of ‘sepa-ration’. However, it is soon manifest that (...) this classical approach is vulnerable to the introduction of fantastic concepts to unify disparate sub-theories. Our second approach is constructed by using a detailed evaluation of the relationship between the theory and the evid-ence by means of reinforcement propagation. With the use of reinfor-cement, fantastic concepts can be better detected and the role of con-silience for theory construction and revision can be specialised for dif-ferent inference mechanisms like explanatory induction, abduction, deduc-tion and analogy. (shrink)