In 1969, John McCarthy and Pat Hayes uncovered a problem that has haunted the field of artificial intelligence ever since--the frame problem. The problem arises when logic is used to describe the effects of actions and events. Put simply, it is the problem of representing what remains unchanged as a result of an action or event. Many researchers in artificial intelligence believe that its solution is vital to the realization of the field's goals. Solving the Frame Problem presents the various (...) approaches to the frame problem that have been proposed over the years. The author presents the material chronologically--as an unfolding story rather than as a body of theory to be learned by rote. There are lessons to be learned even from the dead ends researchers have pursued, for they deepen our understanding of the issues surrounding the frame problem. In the book's concluding chapters, the author offers his own work on event calculus, which he claims comes very close to a complete solution to the frame problem. Artificial Intelligence series. (shrink)

The search for the “furniture of the mind” has acquired added impetus with the rise of new technologies to study the brain and identify its main structures and processes. Philosophers and scientists are increasingly concerned to understand the ways in which psychological functions relate to brain structures. Meanwhile, the taxonomic practices of cognitive scientists are coming under increased scrutiny, as researchers ask which of them identify the real kinds of cognition and which are mere vestiges of folk psychology. Muhammad (...) Ali Khalidi presents a naturalistic account of “real kinds” to validate some central taxonomic categories in the cognitive domain, including concepts, episodic memory, innateness, domain specificity, and cognitive bias. He argues that cognitive kinds are often individuated relationally, with reference to the environment and etiology of the thinking subject, whereas neural kinds tend to be individuated intrinsically, resulting in crosscutting relationships among cognitive and neural categories. (shrink)

According to the cognitive penetrability hypothesis, our beliefs, desires, and possibly our emotions literally affect how we see the world. This book elucidates the nature of the cognitive penetrability and impenetrability hypotheses, assesses their plausibility, and explores their philosophical consequences. It connects the topic's multiple strands (the psychological findings, computationalist background, epistemological consequences of cognitive architecture, and recent philosophical developments) at a time when the outcome of many philosophical debates depends on knowing whether and how cognitive (...) states can influence perception. All sixteen chapters were written especially for the book. The first chapters provide methodological and conceptual clarification of the topic and give an account of the relations between penetrability, encapsulation, modularity, and cross-modal interactions in perception. Assessments of psychological and neuroscientific evidence for cognitive penetration are given by several chapters. Most of the contributions analyse the impact of cognitive penetrability and impenetrability on specific philosophical topics: high-level perceptual contents, the epistemological consequences of penetration, nonconceptual content, the phenomenology of late perception, metacognitive feelings, and action. The book includes a comprehensive introduction which explains the history of the debate, its key technical concepts (informational encapsulation, early and late vision, the perception-cognition distinction, hard-wired perceptual processing, perceptual learning, theory-ladenness), and the debate's relevance to current topics in the philosophy of mind and perception, epistemology, and philosophy of psychology. (shrink)

The third edition of a work that defines the field of cognitive neuroscience, with extensive new material including new chapters and new contributors.

The rapid integration of large language models into everyday cognitive tasks has created a need for conceptual frameworks adequate to the cognitive consequences of delegating thinking to AI systems. Existing constructs in psychology and also in epistemology, including critical thinking, metacognition, intellectual autonomy, and epistemic agency, each address related phenomena but none adequately captures the specific capacity threatened by habitual AI-assisted cognition, which I define as the ability to remain the genuine author of one's own understanding. This paper (...) introduces cognitive sovereignty as a distinct construct, defined as the capacity to (a) notice when one's thinking is being displaced, (b) maintain a meaningful connection to how one's beliefs and judgments are formed, and (c) distinguish between genuine reasoning and the subjective impression of having reasoned. I trace the concept's philosophical lineage, engage with the extended mind objection, differentiate cognitive sovereignty from adjacent constructs through systematic comparison, and present a growing body of empirical evidence that motivates the construct. The paper argues that cognitive sovereignty names a phenomenon that existing constructs individually fail to capture and that its articulation is a prerequisite for empirical research on AI's impact on human thinking. (shrink)

We owe young people special moral consideration in virtue of their developmental immaturity: we must not foreclose their futures by impeding the development of capacities they need for autonomous agency. I argue that providing children with extreme cognitive assistance—help that is ubiquitously available, very domain-general, and largely substitutive of their own cognitive effort—violates this obligation. When children routinely rely on such assistance, they systematically fail to exercise core regulatory skills (inhibitory control, working memory, cognitive flexibility, and planning), (...) and capacities that go unexercised predictably fail to develop normally. This matters urgently: building artificial systems capable of providing exactly this kind of assistance to children is the explicit, stated goal of the world's largest technology companies, who are investing hundreds of billions of dollars toward achieving this aim. Worse, they may already have succeeded: cognitive assistance need not be maximally substitutive, available, and domain-general to impede development. I conclude by considering whether compensating demand for cognitive exercise might arise elsewhere and argue that the prospects are dim. (shrink)

Justin Barrett and Kelly James Clark have suggested that cognitive science of religion supports the existence of a god-faculty akin to sensus divinitatis. They propose that God may have given rise to the god-faculty via guided evolution. This suggestion raises two theological worries. First, our natural cognition seems to favor false god-beliefs over true ones. Second, it also makes us prone to tribalism. If God hates idolatry and moral evil, why would he give rise to mind with such biases? (...) A Plantingian response would point to the noetic effects of sin. Such a response, however, would have to assume that God is restoring the minds of believers. This paper considers empirical reasons to doubt that such a process is taking place. (shrink)

The argument of this paper is that we should think of the extension of cognitive abilities and cognitive character in integrationist terms. Cognitive abilities are extended by acquired practices of creating and manipulating information that is stored in a publicly accessible environment. I call these cognitive practices (2007). In contrast to Pritchard (2010) I argue that such processes are integrated into our cognitive characters rather than artefacts; such as notebooks. There are two routes to (...) class='Hi'>cognitive extension that I contrast in the paper, the first I call artefact extension which is the now classic position of the causal coupling of an agent with an artefact. This approach needs to overcome the objection from cognitive outsourcing: that we simply get an artefact or tool to do the cognitive processing for us without extending our cognitive abilities. Enculturated cognition, by contrast, does not claim that artefacts themselves extend our cognitive abilities, but rather that the acquired practices for manipulating artefacts and the information stored in them extend our cognitive abilities (by augmenting and transforming them). In the rest of the paper I provide a series of arguments and cases which demonstrate that an enculturated approach works better for both epistemic and cognitive cases of the extension of ability and character. (shrink)

In this paper epistemological, ontological and sociological questions concerning the statistical significance of sharp hypotheses in scientific research are investigated within the framework provided by Cognitive Constructivism and the FBST (Full Bayesian Significance Test). The constructivist framework is contrasted with the traditional epistemological settings for orthodox Bayesian and frequentist statistics provided by Decision Theory and Falsificationism.

This paper introduces a novel perspective on Agentive Cognitive Construction Grammar (AgCCxG) by examining the intricate interplay between mind and language through the lens of both Active Inference and Peircean semiotics. AgCCxG emphasizes the impact of intention and purpose on linguistic choices as a cognitive imperative to balance the symbolic Self (Intelligent Agent) with the dynamics of the environment. Among other things, the paper posits that linguistic constructions, particularly Constructional Attachment Patterns (CAPs), like argument structure constructions, embody experienced (...) interactions with the world through reenactment routines via the integration of multisensory channels. Unlike traditional usage-based approaches (e.g., construction grammars), AgCCxG embraces a robust theory of signs that reveals human representation as a continuous process of semiotic hybridization for the creative prediction of uncertain scenarios. Importantly, the paper challenges the notion of the mind as a unified, rational, uncertainty-reducing machine by asserting that physical processes governing open biological systems profoundly influence the linguistic sign system. Intelligent agents’ adaptability in expressing incongruous realities thus highlights the role of semiotic hybridization in preserving an agent’s autonomy and semiotic boundary. (shrink)

In this section I would like to offer a conclusion and then bring this book to an end. Immediately afterward I will begin work on Phenomenology of Social Choice. I consider phenomenology of social choice to be an interdisciplinary field that applies philosophy to sociology, or integrates sociology into philosophy. Establishing phenomenology of social choice is the next task I hope to accomplish. To acknowledge that we already possess a cognitive system when we come to know things is, I (...) believe, absolutely necessary for epistemology—indeed unavoidable. Although philosophers rarely make this assumption explicit, in fact they all consciously or unconsciously rely upon a cognitive system. A cognitive system consists of two aspects: a system of knowledge and a system of cognitive capacities. Within the system of cognitive capacities I have introduced a priori spatializing capacity. The introduction of this capacity makes the process of the constitution of objects clearer and thereby effectively avoids Bertrand Russell’s criticism of Kant, a well-known criticism which I call “Russell’s ordering challenge.” In essence, Husserl’s theory also faces the problem that the process of object constitution is not sufficiently clear; therefore Russell’s ordering challenge applies equally to Husserl’s theoretical system. Finally, we may summarize cognitive-system phenomenology as follows. (shrink)

In this section, we continue our discussion of super-existence. I would like to focus mainly on why I introduce the concept of super-existence, and on the hope that this concept can provide a certain solution to Kant’s dual opposition between the thing-in-itself and appearances. Personally, I consider the concept of super-existence to be very important. I originally proposed this concept in my research on philosophy of life; that is, within my investigation of philosophy of life, human super-existence plays a foundational (...) role. Clearly, there are many forms of human super-existence—so many, in fact, that they could constitute an independent field of study. I plan to discuss human super-existence in the next section. I believe that the concept of the super-existence of objects will find applications in many disciplines, because the “objects” discussed here are not limited to the natural objects with which we are usually familiar. They also include objects belonging to Popper’s World 3, as well as the objects of a “World 4” that I introduce—namely, collective entities such as nations, corporations, armies, and so forth. In the previous section, we saw that in mathematics, imposing constraints on the super-existence of mathematical objects can yield new concepts. This conclusion holds not only for mathematics but also for other disciplines. The example we gave was the triangle. If we impose a constraint on one of a triangle’s angles (which is part of its super-existence), setting it equal to 90 degrees, we obtain the concept of a right triangle. Within the right triangle, we discover the Pythagorean theorem: the sum of the squares of the two legs equals the square of the hypotenuse. This theorem is both beautiful and famous. Thus, I believe that super-existence plays a positive role in mathematical discovery. I have also conducted some interdisciplinary research combining sociology and philosophy. After completing Cognitive-System Phenomenology — A Critique of Husserl, I intend to complete Phenomenology of Social Choice, and then my work on philosophy of life. In all of these projects, I apply the concept of super-existence. Personally, I believe that the concept of super-existence may be applicable to all disciplines, including the humanities. Whether this is truly the case remains to be seen; perhaps time will ultimately provide an answer. Let us wait and see. -/- . (shrink)

In this chapter I offer two novel arguments for what I call strong primitivism about cognitive phenomenology, the thesis that there exists a phenomenology of cognition that is neither reducible to, nor dependent upon, sensory phenomenology. I then contend that strong primitivism implies that phenomenal consciousness does not require sensory processing. This latter contention has implications for the philosophy of artificial intelligence. For if sensory processing is not a necessary condition for phenomenal consciousness, then it plausibly follows that AI (...) consciousness (assuming that it is possible) does not require embodiment. The overarching goal of this paper is to show how different topics in the analytic philosophy of mind can be brought to bear on an important issue in the philosophy of artificial intelligence. (shrink)

I originally intended to introduce in this section the concept of a community of cognitive systems. Upon reflection, however, I realized that something remained incomplete in our discussion of Husserl’s eidetic intuition. Accordingly, in this section we continue the analysis of Husserl’s eidetic intuition and seek to extend its domain to its broadest possible scope. Husserl’s eidetic intuition is primarily applied in cases such as the eidetic intuition of an apple, of color, of a triangle, and so forth. An (...) apple corresponds to a concrete object; color corresponds to a surface property of an object; and although a triangle is a mathematical concept, it nevertheless corresponds to a certain form or shape. Notice that in all of the above examples—whether apple, color, or triangle—the result of eidetic intuition is our grasp of a concept: we apprehend the essence of a concept. For example, through the eidetic intuition of an apple, we grasp the essence of apple; through the intuition of a red sheet of paper, we grasp the essence of “red,” no longer this particular red; and through the eidetic intuition of a triangle, we grasp the essential features of triangularity. For “apple,” “red,” and “triangle” are all concepts. We may now pose the following question: Question A: For every concept, is eidetic intuition possible in this way? If not every concept admits such eidetic intuition, which kinds of concepts do? Through Proposition A, to be introduced later, we shall provide an elegant answer to this question. (shrink)

In the previous section, we discussed the three major tasks of cognitive-system phenomenology. In this section, we will further elaborate on one part of the first major task. At the same time, we will freely imagine the possibility of establishing additional disciplinary systems. Since Husserl relies solely on intuition, his understanding of things is limited to what intuition can reach. Although Martin Heidegger was able to discuss more kinds of meaning—such as historical meaning and relational meaning—I believe that these (...) meanings still do not encompass all possible meanings of an object. In Section 20, I introduced the concept of super-existence, which in essence covers all possible meanings of an object. In this way, we extend Husserl’s intuitive meanings, as well as Heidegger’s historical and relational meanings, to their fullest generalization. This totality constitutes all the super-existential meanings of an object. Therefore, it is reasonable to take the acquisition of all super-existential meanings of an object as a goal of epistemology—or at least the acquisition of all important super-existential meanings. In my article “Popper’s Three Worlds Theory and My Fourth World”, I introduced the concept of the Fourth World. The so-called Fourth World refers to a world composed of collectives. For example, all families are elements of the Fourth World, and a nation is also an element of the Fourth World. By combining the elements of the Fourth World with the concept of super-existence, we can envision additional theoretical systems. I believe we could establish disciplines such as Phenomenology of super-existential Family, Phenomenology of super-existential Love, Phenomenology of super-Existential Education, Phenomenology of super-Existential Enterprise, and Phenomenology of Super-Existential State. These are conjectures, but I consider them entirely reasonable. (shrink)

The last 15 years or so has seen the development of a fascinating new area of cognitive science: the cognitive science of religion (CSR). Scientists in this field aim to explain religious beliefs and various other religious human activities by appeal to basic cognitive structures that all humans possess. The CSR scientific theories raise an interesting philosophical question: do they somehow show that religious belief, more specifically belief in a god of some kind, is irrational? In this (...) paper I investigate this question and argue that CSR does not show that belief in god is irrational. (shrink)

In this section, we will develop the theory of Signification within the framework of Cognitive System Phenomenology (here we mainly consider content signification; other forms of signification will be discussed later). Different cognitive systems lead to different transcendental egos, forming what I call a transcendental ego group. Each element within this group has a distinct way of signifying objects. The three most basic types of signification are: affirmative signification, possible signification, and negative signification. We must point out that (...) our signification is not directed toward objects within consciousness, which makes it fundamentally different from Husserl’s. In fact, although Husserl believed his signification was directed at objects in consciousness, in essence, his signification also refers to transcendent objects, because it is impossible to signify an object that exists purely in consciousness. Thus, Husserl cannot truly “bracket” the external world (a conclusion that seems to shake the very foundation of his entire theory). We will explain why later. Through original intuition, we obtain a planar object; through spatialized re-intuition, we obtain a spatial object. Now we must ask—what exactly is this spatial object? This is the process of content signification. The content signification of an object is the conceptual definition of its content. We can imagine that this process is quite natural. The need to “signify” is also natural: if I wish to know something placed before me, I naturally want to know what it is. This is the most basic epistemological problem. It fully demonstrates the reasonableness and necessity of establishing a theory of signification. Beyond content signification, there are many other forms of signification (though content signification is the most important one). The broadest and most profound type of signification is what I call the trans-existential signification, related to my concept of super-existence. I believe the introduction of the super-existence concept is extremely important, for it will inevitably influence all disciplines. We will discuss the super-existence of objects later. (shrink)

Abstract This paper investigates interpretive divergence in clinical discourse from a cognitive-pragmatic perspective, focusing on how differences arise between intended and inferred meaning in doctor–patient interaction. Building on relevance theory and models of pragmatic inference, the study examines how linguistically underspecified utterances give rise to divergent interpretations under conditions of epistemic asymmetry. The analysis is based on selected examples of clinical communication in which patients derive interpretations that differ from the speaker’s intended meaning. Particular attention is given to linguistic (...) features such as hedging, temporal qualification, and indirectness, which guide interpretation while simultaneously increasing inferential demands. The findings indicate that interpretive divergence is not incidental but emerges from the interaction between linguistic form, contextual assumptions, and the hearer’s cognitive environment. The study proposes a heuristic typology of interpretive divergence, distinguishing between amplification, attenuation, and transformation as general patterns in the relationship between intended and inferred meaning. These categories capture the ways in which hearers may extend, reduce, or qualitatively shift the implications of an utterance, depending on the assumptions available to them. By conceptualizing divergence as a systematic outcome of inferential processes rather than as a communicative failure, the paper contributes to a more nuanced understanding of meaning construction in institutional contexts. It also highlights the importance of examining how asymmetry and cognitive variability shape interpretation in clinical communication. (shrink)

We previously introduced the concept of a language-related cognitive-system community. We may, for example, specify the language as English, since it is widely used throughout the world. This community is essentially the general public community—that is, its members are ordinary people. We may also call it the ordinary-person community. Within this large community, however, there are meaningful subsets. These subsets can be called sub-communities of the language-related cognitive-system community. In fact, there are many different kinds of such sub-communities.

In this section I would like to further discuss the fundamental tasks and the current state of cognitive-system phenomenology. -/- Our actual process of cognition operates within a cognitive system. Each person’s cognitive system may differ, but everyone necessarily possesses one. Therefore, I believe that cognitive-system phenomenology is an epistemology that is closer to the real cognitive processes of human beings. Precisely because each of us possesses a cognitive system, we face several fundamental questions: (...) -/- How does the transcendental ego cognize objects under a cognitive system? How does the knowledge system of the transcendental ego grow? How are entirely new concepts and new knowledge discovered and then recognized by a community? -/- . (shrink)

In our previous discussions, we focused primarily on visual intuition, which is, of course, a form of sensuous intuition. In this section, we will turn to non-visual forms of sensuous intuition. In phenomenology, “intuition” (Anschauung) should not be understood as a merely visual activity. The core of intuition does not lie in which sensory organ is employed, but rather in the manner in which an object is given to consciousness in its own way. Wherever an object can present itself to (...) consciousness with a certain originary givenness (originäre Gegebenheit), this presentation may be called intuition. Accordingly, experiences constituted through vision, hearing, touch, smell, and bodily movement all belong to different forms of sensuous intuition. Different sensory organs do not merely provide different channels of information; rather, they correspond to different modes of givenness of the object and thus participate, at the level of meaning-structure, in the constitution of the object. Therefore, through the participation of various sensory organs, we are not only able to obtain the content-meaning of an object, but also to acquire many other sensuous meanings. However, we must recognize that positing (Setzung) itself depends on the cognitive system of the transcendental ego. Consequently, all meaning-constitution depends on the cognitive system of the transcendental ego. Different transcendental egos, by virtue of having different cognitive systems, obtain different object-meanings. Moreover, Husserl does not restrict intuition to the sensuous level. In his phenomenology, there also exist non-sensory forms of intuition, most notably eidetic intuition (Wesensanschauung). Eidetic intuition is not realized through sensory organs but rather through the imaginative activity of free variation, by which the invariant structures of objects are grasped. Thus, the phenomenological call to “return to intuition” does not amount to a return to sensory empiricism, but rather to a return to the domain in which all meanings can receive originary givenness. In this section, however, we confine ourselves to a discussion of sensuous intuition. -/- . (shrink)

How should scientists carve up cognition to generate good predictions, explanations, and models of cognition? This chapter argues that cognitive categories should be constructed the same way that biological categories are: in terms of homology. The chapter adapts a developmental account of trait identity from evolutionary-developmental biology to make sense of the notion of “cognitive homology.” The consequence is that both brain structures and the organism’s ongoing interactions with the environment are crucial for individuating cognitive homologies, and (...) thus for cognitive ontology. (shrink)

According to one of the most powerful paradigms explaining the meaning of the concept of natural number, natural numbers get a large part of their conceptual content from core cognitive abilities. Carey’s bootstrapping provides a model of the role of core cognition in the creation of mature mathematical concepts. In this paper, I conduct conceptual analyses of various theories within this paradigm, concluding that the theories based on the ability to subitize (i.e., to assess anexactquantity of the elements in (...) a collection without counting them), or on the ability to approximate quantities (i.e., to assess anapproximatequantity of the elements in a collection without counting them), or both, fail to provide a conceptual basis for bootstrapping the concept of an exact natural number. In particular, I argue that none of the existing theories explains one of the key characteristics of the natural number structure: the equidistances between successive elements of the natural numbers progression. I suggest that this regularity could be based on another innate cognitive ability, namely sensitivity to the regularity of rhythm. In the final section, I propose a new position within the core cognition paradigm, inspired by structuralist positions in philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

In Cognitive Integration: Attacking The Bounds of Cognition Richard Menary argues that the real pay-off from extended-mind-style arguments is not a new form of externalism in the philosophy of mind, but a view in which the 'internal' and 'external' aspects of cognition are integrated into a whole. Menary argues that the manipulation of external vehicles constitutes cognitive processes and that cognition is hybrid: internal and external processes and vehicles complement one another in the completion of cognitive tasks. (...) However, we cannot make good on these claims without understanding the cognitive norms by which we manipulate bodily external vehicles of cognition. -/- Shaun Gallagher: “Menary sets out some extremely welcome clarifications that help to integrate the models of embodied and extended cognition. He not only provides convincing responses to all of the main objections that have been made against these approaches, he also puts flesh on the integrated model by incorporating concepts such as epistemic action, by expanding the discussion to include a Peircean view of representation, by demonstrating its evolutionary roots, and by exploring its implications for language and cognition. This is one of those books that takes us forward a number of giant steps. Menary makes it comprehensive and comprehensible.” . (shrink)

In the previous section, we raised two important questions: one concerns how an individual’s cognitive system is established; the other concerns how new concepts—and new theories—are introduced. Regarding the first question, we offered a preliminary and incomplete investigation. In this section, we will also provide a preliminary examination of the second question, in the hope that it may serve as a starting point to stimulate further inquiry.

In this section, I would like to discuss the functional super-existential meaning of objects. This is also one of the most important kinds of super-existential meaning that an object can have. Although the functions of certain objects cannot be intuited—for example, the function of the heart, which we discussed earlier—there are objects whose functions can be intuited. When the transcendental ego intuits a situation in which an object is being used, it thereby obtains the object’s functional super-existential meaning. Of course, (...) it is hardly surprising that when the transcendental ego observes an object being used, it must inevitably already possess a cognitive system; moreover, the transcendental ego must recognize all the relevant objects involved in the object’s use. It is unclear whether Husserl ever discussed the intuition of an object’s function, but it is evident that function is what truly matters for many objects. Once we speak of importance, we must inevitably refer to human beings. The importance of an object’s function is entirely dependent on humans; apart from humans, discussing the importance of an object’s function has little meaning. That is to say, the ultimate meaning of an object’s function must be related to human beings. Take a chair as an example. Aside from its color—which we may or may not care about—its function is what we care about most. Its function is to allow us to sit comfortably. It is precisely because of this function that we deliberately manufacture chairs, and this is also the fundamental reason why a chair is a chair. Therefore, in my view, the functional super-existential meaning of an object is the most important super-existential meaning for certain objects. Clearly, however, Heidegger was deeply interested in the function of objects, and he may also have believed that function constitutes the most important mode of an object’s being. He discussed the functions of many objects and connected these functions with human beings and with the world. The function of an object seems to go beyond our ordinary pragmatic understanding and is instead regarded as a bridge that brings together humans, the world, and Being. I personally find this perspective quite novel, even though the connection seems somewhat forced. (shrink)

We have introduced the concept of a cognitive-system community related to language (hereafter simply “community”). I consider this to be an important concept, one that accords with our actual cognitive processes. Each of us lives within such a community, and every member of the community possesses a distinctive cognitive system. Accordingly, we are faced with two extremely important questions: First, how is an individual’s cognitive system established? In the previous section, we attempted to answer this question, (...) but we discussed only the formation of concepts. Clearly, in addition to concepts, we must also examine the formation of general knowledge. In this section, we will explore this issue. Although we discussed the formation of concepts within a cognitive system in the previous section, it is evident that this account is incomplete. We need a deeper and more comprehensive investigation of how concepts within a cognitive system are established. The previous section merely served as a preliminary step. The second extremely important question is: how do we come to know a new object within a community? What is this process like? How do we arrive at a new theory? And how does such a theory gain recognition? These are likewise extremely important questions, and we will offer a preliminary discussion of them in the next section. In fact, I believe that, under the framework of cognitive systems, epistemology as a whole must be reconstructed. Traditional epistemology has not explicitly acknowledged that the knowing subject possesses a cognitive system (even though it implicitly presupposes one). As a result, the first question does not arise within it. At the same time, the second question differs entirely depending on whether the existence of a cognitive system is explicitly assumed or not. (shrink)

In the previous section, we introduced the concept of a cognitive-system community. Our primary interest lies in those cognitive-system communities that are related to language. As mentioned earlier, even a particular dialect can constitute a cognitive-system community. Thus, we can see that there are in fact many such communities associated with language. At the same time, with the development of technology, we are now able to translate more and more languages instantly, thereby enabling communication between people who (...) use different languages. As a result, the number of people with whom we can directly communicate through language continues to grow. Consequently, cognitive-system communities associated with globally prevalent languages will also expand. In this section, we will discuss the differences and connections between language-based cognitive-system communities and Husserl’s lifeworld. We will also briefly touch upon the process of knowledge transmission within a cognitive-system community. Clearly, a more comprehensive study is required for the problem of the development of cognitive systems, and I intend to return to this topic for further research when time permits. We have also discussed three types of relationships among members of a cognitive-system community and introduced the concepts of binary isomorphism, ternary isomorphism, and quaternary isomorphism. (shrink)

This chapter makes the general case for metaphysics as a required partner to cognitive science in the debunking project, for providing an external standard to assess intuitions. It considers the specific case studies of color, temporal passage, and spatial unity. These illustrate the general role of metaphysics in debunking, while also shedding more light on the interplay between cognitive science and metaphysics. There is also a sense in which cognitive science might be thought to have something very (...) specific to say just about metaphysics. Talk of intuitions is only coming in as a mediator between these two claims: the claims in metaphysics that are potentially open to debunking are intuitions, and cognitive science is relevant to the debunking of these very intuitions. What emerges from this paradigm case of a belief that needs debunking are three crucial and interconnected aspects of the debunking project: psychological aspect; metaphysical aspect; and epistemological aspect. (shrink)

We continue our discussion of the Theory of Meaning-Establishment within the framework of the Phenomenology of the Cognitive System. In the previous section, we introduced the concept of the Transcendental Ego Group, in which each element corresponds to a different cognitive system. When facing an object G, a transcendental ego X may or may not recognize this object. In both cases, we discussed the establishment of meaning (liyi, 立义) regarding G, which depends on the object W as constructed (...) in the consciousness of X. In this section, we ask: Why are we able to establish meaning at all? What is the underlying reason that makes meaning-establishment possible? I think this question is both natural and extremely important. Of course, Husserl never investigated it in depth. Why not? Given Husserl’s rigorous logical thinking, it is impossible that he did not consider such a question. I believe Husserl deliberately avoided it, because any inquiry into how meaning can be established necessarily presupposes a cognitive system — something Husserl absolutely refused to assume explicitly. Let us suppose that a transcendental ego X faces an apple G. According to the phenomenology of the cognitive system, through primary planar intuition and a priori spatialization re-intuition, X obtains a spatial object W. After constructing W, X can establish G as “an apple.” But why is G established as an apple rather than a peach? How does the transcendental ego X accomplish this? Obviously, when X sees an apple, he cannot be identifying it by recalling the definition of “apple.” Apples come from apple trees, but X cannot (and indeed, need not) determine it by tracing its origin. Yet, how do we know that it is an apple? In this section, I will introduce a special human capacity — the a priori capacity for essential sedimentation and essential intuition — to answer this question. This capacity belongs to the ability system within the cognitive system phenomenology. It also allows us to once again appreciate Kant’s idea that “man legislates for nature.” . (shrink)

This article defends the view that knowledge is type-identical to cognitive achievement. I argue, pace Duncan Pritchard, that not only knowledge, but also cognitive achievement is incompatible with environmental luck. I show that the performance of cognitive abilities in environmental luck cases does not distinguish them from non-abilities per se. For this reason, although the cognitive abilities of the subject are exercised in environmental luck cases, they are not manifested in any relevant sense. I conclude by (...) showing that this explanation is not ad hoc as it can be generalized to apply to causal features besides cognitive abilities. (shrink)

One of the critical issues in the philosophy of science is to understand scientific knowledge. This paper proposes a novel approach to the study of reflection on science, called “cognitive metascience”. In particular, it offers a new understanding of scientific knowledge as constituted by various kinds of scientific representations, framed as cognitive artifacts. It introduces a novel functional taxonomy of cognitive artifacts prevalent in scientific practice, covering a huge diversity of their formats, vehicles, and functions. As a (...) consequence, toolboxes, conceptual frameworks, theories, models, and individual hypotheses can be understood as artifacts supporting our cognitive performance. It is also shown that by empirically studying how artifacts function, we may discover hitherto undiscussed virtues and vices of these scientific representations. This paper relies on the use of language technology to analyze scientific discourse empirically, which allows us to uncover the metascientific views of researchers. This, in turn, can become part of normative considerations concerning virtues and vices of cognitive artifacts. (shrink)

In this section, we will discuss Kant’s theory of space and Russell’s challenge to it, which I call Russell’s arrangement challenge. In fact, I do not know whether anyone has ever solved this challenge. In my view, Kant’s theory of space, Husserl’s theory of object constitution, and indeed all theories of object constitution face two fundamental difficulties: one is the clarity of the process of object constitution, and the other is Russell’s arrangement challenge. These two difficulties are, in essence, the (...) essential problems inherent in all theories of object constitution. I have actually discussed this problem before in the example of the cube. But some readers, after reading that discussion, still have many doubts—especially regarding the solution to Russell’s arrangement challenge. Some believe that I have not solved it. In this section, I will rigorously prove that within my system, Russell’s arrangement challenge has indeed been completely resolved. In the next section, we will construct a theory of meaning constitution, which will differ from Husserl’s theory of meaning constitution, because we will be examining different cognitive systems. In fact, to establish any theory of meaning constitution, one must assume that we possess a knowledge system. We will also attempt to answer the question: How is meaning possible? It is evident that Husserl did not answer this question. (shrink)

In this section, we will discuss the diversity of cognitive systems and the collapse of Husserl’s Cartesian idealism.

The traditional approach to explanation in cognitive neuroscience is realist about psychological constructs, and treats them as explanatory. On the “standard framework,” cognitive neuroscientists explain behavior as the result of the instantiation of psychological functions in brain activity. This strategy is questioned by results suggesting the distribution of function in the brain, the multifunctionality of individual parts of the brain, and the overlap in neural realization of purportedly distinct psychological constructs. One response to this in the field has (...) been to employ the tools of databasing and machine learning to attempt to find and quantify specific correlations between psychological kinds such as ‘memory’ or ‘attention’ (or sub-kinds thereof) and patterns of activity in the brain. I assess the status and prospects of these projects. I argue that current proponents of the project are vague about their aims, vis-à-vis the standard framework, sometimes suggesting substantiation of the framework, sometimes suggesting retaining the framework but revising the ontology of mental constructs, and sometimes suggesting abandonment of the framework. I argue that extant results from within the projects fail to substantiate the standard framework, and propose an alternative. On my view, psychological constructs should not be viewed as explanantia, but instead as heuristic concepts that help us uncover ways that behaviors can vary and the ways that the brain implements those distinctions. I then discuss the normative upshot of these views for databasing and brain mapping projects. (shrink)

Over two decades have passed since the publication of van Gelder's (1998) “dynamical hypothesis.” In that paper, van Gelder proposed that cognitive agents were not digital computers—per the representational computational approach—but dynamical systems. The evolution of the dynamical hypothesis was driven by parallel advances in three areas. Theoretically, a deeper understanding of genetics, biology, neuroscience, and cognitive science inspired questions about how systems within each domain dynamically interact and extend their effects across spatiotemporal scales. Methodologically, more sophisticated and (...) domain-general tools allowed researchers to discover, model, and quantify system dynamics, structure, and patterns across multiple scales to generate a more comprehensive system-level understanding of behaviors. Empirically, we can analyze a system's behavior while preserving its natural dynamics, revealing evidence that the reductionist approach leads to an incomplete understanding of the components and the overall system. Researchers have traditionally reduced a complex system into its component processes and assumed that the parts can be recombined to explain the whole. These three advances fundamentally altered our understanding of a “cognitive agent:” How their behaviors are driven by long-range coordination across multiple processes, how the interdependent and nested structure of interacting variables produces behaviors that are greater than the sum of its parts, and how environmental constraints shape adaptive yet stable behavioral patterns. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Cognitive Linguistics Jahrgang: 27 Heft: 4 Seiten: 479-491.

This essay explores problems of consistency among commonsense beliefs about the comparative moral status of animals, fetuses, and human beings congenitally endowed with cognitive capacities and potential no higher than those of higher animals. The possibility of genetic cognitive enhancement exacerbates some of these problems, but also offers new resources for understanding the basis of our moral status as inviolable.

In Section 10, we discussed meaning-establishment errors and mistakes, as well as the causes that give rise to them. In the examples we examined, the main causes of such errors were deficiencies in the transcendental self’s cognitive system—either deficiencies in its knowledge system or in its system of abilities. A very natural question arises: apart from deficiencies in the transcendental self’s cognitive system (its knowledge and abilities), what other factors might cause errors or mistakes in meaning-establishment? In this (...) section, through our analysis, we want to point out to the reader that recognizing things, or distinguishing two different things, cannot be achieved solely through intuition. If, like Husserl, we rely only on intuition and only on clarity derived from intuition, we will be entirely unable to recognize certain things. We must make use of non-intuitive methods—and this is precisely what Husserl would inevitably oppose. In this section, we will present several examples that cannot be resolved by Husserl’s intuition alone. These examples are not at all rare. However, how to fully resolve these problems is a challenge that epistemology cannot avoid. Here, we merely offer a preliminary gesture—“throwing out a brick to attract jade.” -/- . (shrink)

Providing a new conceptual scaffold for further research in biology and cognition, this book introduces the new field of cognitive biology, a systems biology approach showing that further progress in this field will depend on a deep recognition of developmental processes, as well as on the consideration of the developed organism as an agent able to modify and control its surrounding environment. The role of cognition, the means through which the organism is able to cope with its environment, cannot (...) be underestimated. In particular, it is shown that this activity is grounded on a theory of information based on Bayesian probabilities. The organism is considered as a cybernetic system able to integrate a processor as a source of variety (the genetic system), a regulator of its own homeostasis (the metabolic system), and a selecting system separating the self from the non-self (the membrane in unicellular organisms). Any organism is a complex system that can survive only if it is able to maintain its internal order against the spontaneous tendency towards disruption. Therefore, it is forced to monitor and control its environment and so to establish feedback circuits resulting in co-adaptation. Cognitive and biological processes are shown to be inseparable. (shrink)

We continue discussing the theory of “positing meaning” (Liyi 立义) within cognitive-system phenomenology. This section focuses primarily on class-positing and unit-positing, image-positing, and on positing errors and the truth or falsity of positing. We reach the following conclusion: in many cases, a transcendental ego’s positing errors arise from inadequacies in its cognitive system. Sometimes the problem lies in an insufficient knowledge system; in other cases, an insufficient capacity system.