The intentionality of consciousness and consciousness of intentionality

In Gabor Forrai, Intentionality: Past and Future (Value Inquiry Book Series, Volume 173). New York: Rodopi NY (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Some philosophers think that intentionality is ontologically distinct from phenomenal consciousness; call this the Thesis of Separation. Terence Horgan and John Tienson (2002, p. 520) call this.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
56 (#1,071,132)

6 months
56 (#157,717)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Kenneth Williford
University of Texas at Arlington

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references